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Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Taking Joint Intelligence Operations to the Next Level 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 3 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Joint Intelligence Taking Operations to the Next Level Otero) Stephen Squadron ( Army and Air Force personnel receive intelligence mmunications briefing for Exercise Atlantic Strike V Co d2 T he Joint Intelligence Operations By Tyl er AKers Center (JIOC) at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) achieved can use. Integrating all available intelligence needed to master intelligence for tomorrow’s initial operational capability in into theater operations is our goal. Second, fight. In particular, the study found defense January 2006. After 18 months, it is already we must continue to develop a culture that intelligence—though quite capable of locating setting a new standard for joint intelligence empowers our talented workforce and enables conventional military forces—lacking in its operations in the Pacific. Aggressive collabora- us to master the intelligence environment. ability to determine objectives, methods, and tion and integration with operators, planners, Effective intelligence operations depend on operations of nontraditional threat groups such and the broader Intelligence Community have more than sophisticated sensor technologies. as al Qaeda. It challenged defense intelligence enhanced capability, improved predictive anal- Delivering the full potential of intelligence to break down bureaucratic and technologi- ysis, and, most importantly, provided operators assets requires bold analysis, innovation, and cal barriers to intelligence integration among with the intelligence support they need. vigorous collaboration. Department of Defense agencies and specifi- Today, we continue to press for further cally encouraged the elimination of obstacles gains in the effective execution of theater intel- Rethinking Intelligence between the Intelligence Community and ligence operations. Our main efforts follow The JIOC concept was created by an operational end-users. two primary lines of operation. First, we focus initiative to improve intelligence support to Moreover, the initiative directed the on processes. We must continue to drive intel- military operations. The initiative, “Remodeling establishment of JIOCs, which were charged ligence out of “intel-only” quarters and into Defense Intelligence,” was issued in 2003 by the with responsibility to synchronize capabilities venues that operators and foreign partners Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for of the Services, components, and agencies; Intelligence. It examined intelligence perfor- streamline processes; and improve intelligence Captain Tyler Akers, USNR, is Chief of the U.S. mance during major operations, including Iraqi tradecraft by increasing the analytic depth of Pacific Command Joint Intelligence Operations Freedom. The study also examined the strategy, our workforce. By exercising these responsibili- Center Futures Branch. operations, and manpower requirements ties in the Asia-Pacific, we are enabling more ndupress.ndu.edu issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ 69 SPECIAL FEATURE | Taking Joint Intelligence Operations to the Next Level agile intelligence operations and providing from Midway, a Japanese naval message was (ICP), Red Teaming, and Open Source Intel- the sound intelligence that underpins effective decrypted that indicated AF was short of water. ligence (OSINT) use. theater military plans and operations—across Further coordination among cryptanalysts and ICP—the intelligence version of the full spectrum of operations, from planning all-source intelligence teams allowed them to Adaptive Planning—allows the JIOC to for pandemics, to monitoring proliferation predict when and where the Japanese strike improve support to theater military plan- of fissile material, to providing humanitarian force would appear. This, in turn, enabled ning. Adaptive Planning is a joint process assistance and disaster relief. Admiral Chester Nimitz to marshal U.S. forces under development that is designed to make the planning process more seamless and Left: Japanese to produce high-standard plans faster. It is battleship on fire also designed to help generate plans that after Battle of mitigate risk by offering options for changing Midway conditions. At USPACOM, we used ICP to Right: Japanese fleet under attack at review the intelligence portions of all major Midway theater operational plans. Doing so requires D D O O significant collaboration among national and D D theater intelligence organizations and has The Concept at the right time and place to engage and defeat proven to be an excellent way to validate the One question that inevitably arises the Japanese. effectiveness of this planning tool. during JIOC command briefings is how the At Midway, collaboration among theater, Another key enabler is Red Teaming, USPACOM JIOC is different from its predeces- national, and allied intelligence professionals, which provides an alternative (non-U.S.) sor, the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific. While across all intelligence disciplines and absent perspective and allows hedging against conven- the transition has transformed organizational information barriers, was essential in anticipat- tional analysis, which is often constrained by processes, the highest impact change has been ing the Japanese threat and providing warning what we know or think we know. Red Teaming the shift in mindset at JIOC, which welcomes of the impending attack. Close integration taps the expertise of critical and creative think- cross-agency collaboration and demands among operators, planners, and intelligence ers and is designed to encourage consideration routine operations and intelligence interface, analysts allowed the United States to improve of overlooked possibilities, challenge assump- creating the energy and momentum that allow the confidence of intelligence estimates and tions, and present issues in a cultural context our new processes to succeed. generate actionable products that led to victory or from a different perspective. The success of U.S. Pacific Command has a long history at Midway and turned the tide of the war in the our first application of Red Teaming during of aggressive intelligence and operations col- Pacific. last year’s Exercise Terminal Fury was quickly laboration that was forged in World War II and is illustrative of the modern JIOC concept. At “Remodeling Defense Intelligence” found defense intelligence Midway, for instance, intelligence operations lacking in its ability to determine objectives, methods, and played a pivotal role in the outcome of the operations of nontraditional threat groups epic naval battle. In the spring of 1942, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was badly outmatched by the Japanese navy. Eighteen ships had been sunk To create the JIOC, we concentrated on followed by production of our Red Team’s or damaged during the attack on Pearl Harbor, aligning our operations with theater priorities, assessment on North Korea: “What if Kim and the aircraft carrier USS Lexington had been implementing processes designed to improve Jong-Il Were Willing to Give Up His Nuclear lost during the Battle of Coral Sea. theater intelligence, and building a culture Weapons?” The JIOC portion of the Midway story committed to aggressive collaboration. Most Our third critical JIOC enabler, OSINT, is begins on Station Hypo at Pearl Harbor, where significantly, we grouped major analytic efforts integral to comprehensive intelligence analysis. U.S. Sailors were attempting to break the Japa- into four divisions aligned along theater priori- Open source intelligence considers the enor- nese naval code in collaboration with fellow ties: China, counterterrorism, North Korea, mous amount of publicly available information code-breakers in Australia and Washington, and the Pan-Pacific. To break down internal and is critical to monitoring indications and DC. By early May, naval intelligence was con- barriers, we embedded within each division providing analysis, assessments, and threat fident that the Japanese navy was planning a not only all-source intelligence analysts but also warnings across a huge and well-connected major operation at an objective known as “AF.” planners; collections, targeting, and foreign geographic area. Midway was suspected, but the precarious disclosure experts; and graphics and collabora- Our OSINT effort has been quite success- position of the U.S. Pacific Fleet demanded a tion experts. Recognizing that 21st-century ful thanks to a joint approach that leverages the higher degree of confidence in the intelligence intelligence challenges require a more agile and unique capabilities and strengths of the compo- assessment. In collaboration with operators mature workforce, we also raised grade and nent commands. We credit much of our initial and planners, the intelligence team formulated experience levels for all key positions. success to U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). As a plan that directed U.S. forces on Midway to the USPACOM executive agent for OSINT, send out an uncoded message stating that the enablers USARPAC consolidated existing and emerging water distillation plant there had broken down. There are three critical enablers for JIOC OSINT capabilities and is now developing pro- Within 48 hours of sending the false report operations: Intelligence Campaign Planning cedures for managing OSINT requirements. 70 JFQ / issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu AKERS USARPAC leadership in this undertaking Navy intelligence officers discuss operations with Australian officer illustrates the critical role our components play during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2007 in building new intelligence capabilities in U.S. Pacific Command. Our other components lead several other OSINT-related initiatives. U.S. Pacific Air Forces lead theater distributed common ground station integration; U.S. Pacific Fleet is charged with increasing mari- time domain awareness in the Asia-Pacific; and Marine Forces Pacific play a critical role in theater intelligence security cooperation. Cornerstones of Culture The cornerstones of a successful JIOC culture are innovation, collaboration, and “staying low.” We are bringing forth smaller, more frequent experimentation and assess- Wood) ment to test JIOC ability to adapt and to see my L. wtiehsa at nwde cchaanl ldeno gteos mmeoerte e rmapeirdgliyn. gO onpep sourctuhn i- Navy (Jere recent effort employed Intellipedia, a sort of S. U. classified Wikipedia. We experimented with Intellipedia during a December 2006 exercise to improve JIOC capabilities. Over the next and quickly improved the speed of intelligence to create the Joint Intelligence year, JIOC will focus on creating new capability collaboration and delivery. This innovative Operations Center, we in five thrust areas: effort improved the effectiveness and capacity concentrated on aligning of our people by enhancing their ability to n deepening and broadening integration of our operations with theater share, work together, and create knowledge intelligence, plans, and operations priorities that end-users need. n strengthening integration of national, Our focus on aggressive collaboration interagency, component, and foreign partners as part of our culture extends far beyond Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) first” and n investing in our people to thrive in a Intellipedia. It permeates all that we do. An “write for release.” SIPRNET first means that complex environment example is our morning intelligence brief, we make every effort to post our products on n institutionalizing practices and standards attended by J3 and J5 and their staffs, com- SIPRNET rather than on the more-restrictive that deliver ready knowledge online ponent intelligence representatives, national Joint World-wide Intelligence Communication n pursuing and incorporating best prac- agency partners, and JIOC reserve centers. System. Write for release means that we strive to tices and instilling a “learning organization” The brief is collaborative and, more impor- write intelligence products in such a way as to mindset. tantly, allows time for immediate feedback allow release to foreign partners by our foreign among intelligence personnel, operators, and disclosure officers. An ambitious new document from the planners. Collaboration is further augmented This stay-low policy is enforced from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for with a monthly Analyst and J5 Desk Officer top. Use of material not releasable to foreign Intelligence, “JIOC After Next,” provides a Forum that ensures exchange of planning nationals requires approval from the division draft outline of the vision for JIOCs from and insights. Additionally, analytic divisions, chief, and analysts are charged with obtaining 2010 to 2015. An overriding premise of this through regular video teleconferences with releasable products to ensure that our assess- vision is that networks are more effective major theater joint task forces and compo- ments reach the largest audience possible. than hierarchies in the intelligence business. nents, share as much as possible about theater Today, in the interest of common security We see this network-of-networks vision as operations and plans. Finally, we employ a concerns, we focus on what we can share rather a long-term opportunity to enhance JIOC Combined Joint Collection Management than on what we cannot. The need-to-know effectiveness. Board that includes Australia and works to mindset has evolved into a responsibility-to- ensure that our collection priorities and out- share mindset. Although implementing lasting change comes are as efficient and effective as possible. is difficult, our people have made significant To facilitate emergence from the legacy, The Way Ahead progress. Process and culture changes at the intelligence-only mindset, the JIOC has adopted The next steps in the development of the JIOC have greatly enhanced security and sta- a stay-low policy to improve the dissemina- USPACOM JIOC are to assess existing initia- bility in the Asia-Pacific. Many challenges and tion of intelligence and information to theater tives, adopt successful ones, and discard the opportunities remain, however, and continued and partner nation forces. The two major others. Our leadership and execution teams are success lies in our ability to think and act anew. components of this policy are “Secret Internet developing and carrying out several initiatives It is imperative that we do so. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 47, 4th quarter 2007 / JFQ 71