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Purple Virtues A Leadership Cure for Unhealthy Rivalry LT COL ERIC ASH, USAF Editorial Abstract: Joint operations are the rule, not the exception, for the US military. Why then do interservice rivalries seem to work against becoming “more joint”? Colonel Ash pro- poses that the lack of a recognized set of common “core virtures” is the root of the problem. He suggests that the tenets of West Point’s motto Duty, Honor, Country are these common, “pur ple” virtues. Too often in this war did the leaders fight each other while the troops fought the foe. —Capt Basil Liddell Hart A S GREAT AS it is, the American military still lacks a common Weltanschauung. Its “jointness” comes not from the heart but traces its current popularity to the Goldwater- Nichols Department of Defense Reorganiza tion Act of 1986. That act forces cooperation by law and personal careerist incentives; however, interservice friction produced by oppo sition to jointness still exists at many func tional and operational levels. People—not systems—are fundamental to jointness. Yet, good teamwork may not be happening. Gen Anthony Zinni was right on target in a recent US Naval Institute Proceedings article in which he attacked service parochialism.1 Interservice competition for roles, functions, and resources is not necessarily detrimental to the military and can be good, but interservice rivalry and friction based on lack of integrity or other unethical conduct are damaging to na tional defense efforts. In addition, breaches of integrity are not limited to the interservice domain, for at times the services work very well together from an ethical standpoint. But sometimes they collectively or singularly stoop to poor moral standards when dealing with other decision-making bodies and au- 32 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. 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LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 8 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 PURPLE VIRTUES 33 thorities, such as the Department of Defense differences and competition are not the (DOD) or Congress. problem. The difficulty arises when rivalry What we have is a very important leader- turns sour due to breaches in ethics. ship challenge for the twenty-first century. Military leaders today might want to pay close attention to Liddell Hart’s assessment of a First World War dilemma (above) because it Interservice competition for roles, func may still apply. Technology changes; opera tions, and resources is not necessarily tions and tactics change; and we speak of rev detrimental to the military and can be olutions in war as well as generational differ good, but interservice rivalry and fric ences like baby boomers and Generation tion based on lack of integrity or other Xers. But truth and honesty are timeless, and unethical conduct are damaging to na they are also as fundamental to discipline and tional defense efforts. military effectiveness as anything else. Herein lies the leadership challenge. Ask any acad emy commandant if maintaining the honor code and getting cadets to live according to On the one hand, competition among dif sound ethics are not among the greatest chal ferent soldiers over roles and functions was lenges in producing tomorrow’s leaders. That no more mission-detrimental or beneficial in challenge continues out in the services, par the past than such rivalry is today. Honest dif ticularly among the services. Ironically, the ferences of perspective are not unethical and realm of leadership itself has undertones of can promote service morale, technological interservice differences and potential rivalry. innovation, and adaptation of improved strat Behind closed doors, for example, some of the egy or doctrine. Healthy competition spurs other services might suspect that the Army organizational improvement. has the market on leadership. More geo On the other hand, cooperation can be graphical commanders in chief and chair- more important than competition.3 Despite men of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have the mood of cooperation promoted by the come from the Army than from the other Goldwater-Nichols Act, unhealthy interser services. Does that cause resentment and ri vice contention still exists and can become valry—or respect? downright ugly over issues such as the fire- War fighters need joint ethics, and that be- support control line, the debate over close air gins and ends with leadership, both as the support, and the halt-phase squabble (con example and as the enforcer. This article ar flicting visions of what airpower can and can- gues that our military leadership should live not do to halt enemy attacks quickly and de and promote joint cardinal virtues—“purple cisively during the “halt phase”). At a “Clash virtues.” This is no diatribe for a “kinder and of Visions” conference in Washington, D.C., gentler” Air Force. It is as legitimate and im in October 1997, the spirited debate over portant as air superiority and bombs on target. boots-on-the-ground versus airpower re Interservice rivalry may have begun thou- mained unresolved. The words of Maj Gen sands of years B.C., as offensive and defensive Charles Link, USAF, retired—a champion of forces organized to perform different roles airpower—reflect frustration over major dif for tribes and nations. Contemporary inter- ferences of opinion on the effectiveness and service rivalry stems from differences in or functions of airpower in future joint warfare: ganization and function, as well as doctrine, When a soldier talks about using airpower to culture, uniform, funding, and perspective. support troops on the ground, he’s applauded Another contributing factor is “divided alle for his ‘Jointness.’. . . When a sailor talks about giance,” whereby members must remain loyal using Air Force tankers to extend the range of to different superiors and organizations.2 Yet, naval aircraft, he’s lauded for his ‘Jointness.’ 34 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2001 But when an airman talks about using airpower izing that the system of civilian control independently to kill the enemy instead of put and/or the decadence of American society ting our troops in harm’s way in the first place, cause(s) interservice friction.10 The military he’s being parochial and ‘unjoint,’ which is must maintain ethical standards in interser now viewed as a sin on the order of adultery.4 vice relations not only for the military’s sake, but also because “high character in the mili tary officer is a safeguard of the character of the nation.”11 War fighters need joint ethics, and that Substandard ethical conduct is often the begins and ends with leadership, both as product of an unhealthy “system” rather than the example and as the enforcer. of corrupt individuals. Defenders of this sys tem will claim that it is simply Realpolitik that others do not understand or appreciate until they have been in that system.12 That is a Army and Air Force perspectives may both be weak argument. The system must change if it legitimate, based on competing paradigms, is corrupted with substandard ethics. It was but according to some people, “the reality is the message of Nuremberg, and it is the stan that we simply cannot afford both ap proaches by 2010.”5 If this is true, continued dard by which we must live today. competition is on the horizon. New interservice battlefronts over roles The primary underlying issue normally and functions are surfacing daily, including seems to be funding. Doctrinal, strategic, and space, information technology and opera tactical debates translate at some point into tions, functions versus geography, missile de dollars and “haggling over hardware.” Yet, fense, deep battle, special operations, and one can feel the effect back on the battlefield various small-scale contingencies. In addi with confusion over command and control, tion, the accelerating pace of the military, as well as operational excess and inefficiency. from adjusting to faster operations tempos to Defense spending in the United States has incorporating new technologies, has an effect dropped significantly during the post-cold- on interservice rivalry. Even minor sympto war years.6 The result of infighting for funds matic squabbles may become exaggerated could be a mutually agreeable solution under such conditions. As an Army general among the services, based on truly objective recently stated, “Speed bumps are tough to analyses of the most cost-effective force- deal with at 100 miles per hour.”13 structure mix. Yet, the services have a propen Media coverage adds to the recipe for di sity to force a “tricameral” military solution saster in any of these situations. As many a whereby the only mutually agreeable option politician knows, after finding oneself in the is to split available funding three ways.7 That limelight of dishonor, unburdening the yoke may seem fair, but is it right when one service of negative media attention becomes exceed has a more lethal or more cost-effective way ingly difficult. In a bizarre way, then, interser than the others to defend national interests? vice rivalry has taken on a new twist entailing President Lincoln said that “honesty is the scandal avoidance or “hope that the other best policy,” and S. L. A. Marshall calls hon guy is getting all the attention.” From Tail- esty the “governing principle” of the mili- hook to Aberdeen to Lt Kelly Flinn, it is a sad tary.8 With declining defense budgets and commentary when service personnel pri commensurate competition over resources, vately snicker at each other rather than come we must have integrity in funding decisions. to a mutual defense. There is no jointness In many respects, “military members re here. Given the explosive growth of infome flect the values and mores of the society that dia, services must be ever more diligent in produced them,”9 but the military must be collectively avoiding potential land mines careful not to play the blame game, rational that can set off scandal.14 Overall, the envi- PURPLE VIRTUES 35 ronment promotes continued interservice ri courage—something fundamental to the mil valry, but the delineator between productive itary. Students of war have learned that a sol competition and unhealthy contention is dier’s courage on the battlefield stems from a ethics. desire not to let down fellow comrades. Yet, that bond of camaraderie is destroyed by un ethical behavior and unhealthy rivalry. Cardinal Virtues Hence, joint ethics provides a basis of courage for the joint team. The erosion of ethical standards may be One requires not only right thinking, but due, in part, to people’s lack of clear under- also right action. Although a variety of virtu standing of ethical concepts. Ethics is a vast ous traits exists, in general one can distill subject, but with regard to jointness, it basi them into four cardinal virtues. Justice in cally involves character, honesty, and in volves relationships, both individual and insti tegrity—commonly known as virtues. Yet, our tutional. Jointness fails this cardinal virtue military services have established not virtues when, as Perry Smith notes, “some people will but “core values.” This is a problem. Integrity- never lie for themselves, but they’ll lie for the based conduct must flow more from funda institution.”19 Prudence is wisdom—the foun mental virtues than situational values. dational virtue for the other three—and is The problem with values is that they can be linked to what Clausewitz calls coup d’oeil. It is situational—culturally driven and temporal. the ingenious ability to grasp the obvious, to Values are dictated by profit and by circum see through the fog, and to anticipate the un stance, because they are based on “valuation” expected. But it is also such intelligence tem or worth. The Oxford English Dictionary defines pered by morality. Courage is simply bravery. a value as something “worthy of esteem for its Rather than reckless or immoral willingness own sake; that which has intrinsic worth.” The to fall in battle, however, it is virtuous bravery. worth, strength, or excellence of the military The final cardinal virtue, temperance, involves is important, but it should be moral and ethi balance and moderation. It involves avoiding cal for reasons that go beyond its worth. Busi extremes that may be tangential to the main ness as a whole is concerned entirely with one mission. Temperance focuses systemically on issue—worth—yet the business world is not the whole rather than just the parts.20 It pro- well known for ethical practices. As one au motes strategic thinking and cohesiveness— thor notes, the National Socialists of Ger critical issues to effective jointness. many in 1940 had integrity, were excellent in what they did, and practiced service before self.15 Ethics Core values do not promote the moral fac tor necessary in military ethics. Virtues do. Ethics is imbedded in the officer’s com Values simply do not go deep enough be- mission and oath of office: “special trust and cause they are focused on means rather than confidence” and “no mental reservation or ends.16 purpose of evasion.”21 According to military Alexis de Tocqueville once said that ethicist James Toner, ethics is best deter- “Napoleon Bonaparte was as great as a man mined by a blend of customs, rules, goals, ex can be without virtue.”17 Indeed, Napoléon pectations, and circumstances. It involves the had many leadership abilities as a com “study of good and evil, of right and wrong, of mander, yet his lack of virtue also detracted duty and obligation in human conduct, and from those abilities. Virtue is neither tempo of reasoning and choice about them.”22 In ral nor value-dependent. It involves “doing order for an act to be ethical, its means, ends, one’s duties whatever the cost to self [as well and circumstances must all be acceptable, as] an ethical obligation to put military duties which undermines Machiavellian arguments first” (emphasis added).18 In other words, it is that in jointness the ends justify the means.23 36 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2001 The military cannot afford to have situa Perhaps the key to such ethical fitness is in tional ethics in which cultural standards slip tegrity or “response-ability”—the ability to re into what Herodotus and Polybius called “the spond in all situations according to the right decay of political glory.”24 History is replete ethical orientation.30 Although the military with examples of “bureaucratic barriers” per pays much attention to integrity of command, verting ethical standards, which were never just as critical is integrity in command. theless allowed to continue in a state of “honor among thieves.”25 According to Perry Core Values Smith, “I remember so often the Air Force people would say in the Air Staff, ‘We’ve got Thus, integrity is one of the core values the to fudge the figures because the Navy’s doing Air Force has established to promote ethical it.’ ”26 conduct. The Air Force’s values were first for One of the fundamental military concepts mally introduced by Brig Gen Ruben A. linking means and ends is the familiar West Cubero, dean of the faculty at the Air Force Point motto Duty, Honor, Country.27 Toner Academy, and then adopted by the rest of the transcribes this motto into another applica Air Force: “integrity first, service before self, tion for military conduct: Principle, Purpose, and excellence in all we do.” This sounds and People.28 Here, one’s honor involves liv great, but why are the Army’s values different ing according to principles. Duty is linked to (duty, loyalty, selfless service, honor, courage, purpose, and, finally, people—the nation— respect, and integrity), as are those of the should be the focus of all actions. By concen Navy and Marine Corps (honor, courage, and trating efforts and loyalty to principle, pur commitment) (table 1)? pose, and people, military members will more Despite the similarities, shouldn’t all mem effectively work through bureaucratic barri bers of a joint profession of arms have the same ers and dueling duties to maintain good ethi bedrock ethical foundation in the same core cal standards. values? Are interservice differences again influ The difficulty lies in having the “strength encing procedure, even to the point of affect of will” under difficult circumstances to put ing published ethical standards? ethics into practice. If practiced regularly, it Fortunately, one finds some commonality becomes second nature to “ethically fit” mili in published standards at the joint level, tary members.29 where moral courage and ethical conduct Table 1€ Core Values of the Military Services€ Air Force Army Marine Corps Navy integrity first integrity service before selfless commitment commitment self service excellence in duty all we do honor honor honor personal courage courage courage loyalty respect PURPLE VIRTUES 37 are promoted. It would be helpful, however, of leadership and virtue—what Toner calls if they also specifically addressed interser the “ethics of leadership.”36 It is a huge lead vice relations. Joint Publication (Pub) 1, ership challenge because people cannot Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United “touch, taste, or feel” ethics.37 When subordi States, says that the team begins with in nates abandon moral ethics, figuring that tegrity—the “cornerstone for building “what works is right,”38 it is time for the leader trust.”31 The document also states that mili to step in with moral authority. tary service is based on values—integrity, competence, physical courage, moral courage, and teamwork—common to all the services and the bedrock of combat suc- Duty, Honor, Country provides linkage cess.32 But the primary joint regulation on between the commission, the oath of of ethics, DOD Directive (DODD) 5500.7, fice, and the professional military ethic. Standards of Conduct: Joint Ethics Regulation, It is the motto of the “traditional idealis is principally concerned with financial mat tic code” unique to an American mili ters,33 and the section on ethical conduct tary founded on strength of character occupies only the last four pages of a 160- and universal equality rather than no page document. Also, this “single source of bility. standards of ethical conduct and ethics guidance” contains different values than the ones embraced as “core” by each separate service. In addition to leadership, the military also The joint ethics regulation attempts to needs more education. William J. Bennett tie ethics and values together conceptually: observes that people are not born with “Ethics are standards by which one should virtues; they must be learned.39 Arguably, act based on values. Values are core beliefs they can also be unlearned. Therefore, the such as duty, honor, and integrity that moti educational process must never let up but vate attitudes and actions. Ethical values re- continually reinforce ethical fitness. late to what is right and wrong.”34 The reg But soldiers, sailors, and airmen do not ulation’s list of values contains important have time to read Aristotle in the heat of bat- concepts for healthy interservice relations, tle.40 They must have already probed the dif and the regulation emphasizes ethical con- ficult and morally ambiguous issues, and they duct, even to the point of stating that DOD must have the benefit of a familiar code to personnel should “be prepared to fall some- carry them through challenging times. The what short of some goals for the sake of best answer for this is the time-honored West ethics and other considerations.”35 Yet, evi Point motto. dence suggests that, within the services, no- According to military ethicist Anthony body dares fall short, and fine-sounding eth Hartle, Duty, Honor, Country provides link- ical pronouncements are disregarded when age between the commission, the oath of of it comes to protecting funding, roles, and fice, and the professional military ethic. It is functions. the motto of the “traditional idealistic code” unique to an American military Purple Virtues founded on strength of character and uni versal equality rather than nobility.41 As The bottom line is that the joint team Perry Smith recently stated, “The military needs joint ethics. The challenge is how to ethic of a strong institutional and personal make that happen, and leadership is the crit commitment to duty, honor, and country ical part of the answer. Good leaders must be has served this Nation well in war and peace moralists, and the military must have a union for over 200 years.”42 38 AEROSPACE POWER JOURNAL SUMMER 2001 The West Point motto is a moral rallying Finally, Duty, Honor, Country can promote point to remain committed to virtuous con- second-nature ethical fitness by providing a duct. People tend to have a love-hate rela crucial link to the four cardinal virtues. tionship with rules and checklists. Motorists Clearly, this motto implies both prudent and may dislike speed limits, but they appreciate courageous behavior motivated by the noble safer highways. Some drivers, however, will relationship of soldier and nation as defined not follow speed limits unless patrols enforce by love of country over self. Such sacrificial them. To date, the military services and Con loyalty might appear on the surface to gress have tried to develop various consensus- demonstrate a lack of temperance—one of building mechanisms, such as the Program the cardinal virtues. But deeper reflection Objective Memorandum in the Planning, shows that focusing on the paramount issue Programming, and Budgeting System and the of duty to country rather than having tunnel Goldwater-Nichols Act.43 One can criticize vision on certain elements of the country— these programs as artificial enforcers, but such as duty to an individual service or to a they serve their purposes. The ethical ques function within a service—makes sense in tions that arise are, Can we and do we wish to terms of temperance as well. enforce ethics artificially? The answer is yes. As a common motto for Conclusion all the services, Duty, Honor, Country would not be a legal benchmark conflicting with The most capable military in human his- the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Rather, it tory cannot afford to suffer from an ethical would be an educational one to help stand breakdown. Interservice competition is good the test of time and serve as tangible evi and is here to stay, but unhealthy interservice dence that the military is serious about em- rivalry must end. Presently, the Air Force, bracing ethics.44 It is better to have moral Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have different standards “spelled out and defended, rather core values. This is dysfunctional. Core values than assumed or ignored.”45 Properly en are also limited in effecting joint ethical con- dorsed by leadership, publicized, and em- duct because values don’t go far enough. braced by military members, our common They are situationally tied to worth and lack a motto could promote a joint ethical renais moral domain. Virtues are more appropriate sance in the military of the new millennium. as an ethical bedrock. West Point’s respected The motto would not promote narrow- motto Duty, Honor, Country is more closely mindedness but would serve as a springboard linked to virtues than values because it has to moral thinking that is essential to the pro moral implications. What does this have to do fession of arms.46 Just as the Code of Conduct with leadership? Everything. Ethics begins serves to support and guide the conduct of and ends with leadership—today’s leaders liv soldiers from all the services, particularly in ing it and tomorrow’s leaders believing it. prisoner of war (POW) status, the motto The leaders we need for the twenty-first cen would promote interservice relations by serv tury are those with virtue and ethical superi ing and guiding the conduct of other “POWs” ority. Only then can our joint force be joint (prisoners of Washington). from the heart. (cid:2) Notes 1. Anthony C. Zinni, “A Commander Reflects,” US Naval In tional Defense University Press, 1981), 10–11. According to Sam stitute Proceedings 126, no. 1 (July 2000): 35. Sarkesian, “the demand for institutional obedience and profes 2. James Brown and Michael J. Collins, eds., Military Ethics sional loyalty can lead to professional mediocrity and institutional and Professionalism: A Collection of Essays (Washington, D.C.: Na- sterility and constrain critical and responsible inquiry” (10–11). PURPLE VIRTUES 39 3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory 18. Myers, 47. and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 19. Perry Smith, “Leadership and Ethics: A Practitioner’s Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 8–10. The author sug View,” in Moral Obligation and the Military: Collected Essays (Wash gests that expertise, responsibility, and corporateness are funda ington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 138–39. mental to a profession. Corporateness holds that interservice ri 20. Josef Pieper, trans. Richard and Clara Winston et al., The valry can be counterproductive to the collective sense of “organic Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance (New unity.” Huntington does not include service in either the Army or York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965), 146–47. Navy as a profession but lists service in the collective military as 21. Thomas Begines, “Special Trust and Confidence,” in the profession. Ethics and National Defense: The Timeless Issues, ed. James C. Gaston 4. Quoted in James Kitfield, “To Halt an Enemy,” Air Force and Janis Bren Hietala (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Uni Magazine 81, no. 1 (January 1988): 62. versity Press, 1993), 6. 5. Dan Coats, “Joint Experimentation—Unlocking the 22. James H. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Promise of the Future,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 17 (Winter 1997): Military Ethics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 17. 9–17. 6. Sharon K. Weiner, “The Politics of Resource Allocation in 23. William Ebstein, ed., Great Political Thinkers, Plato to the the Post–Cold War Pentagon,” Security Studies 5, no. 4 (Summer Present, 4th ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1969), 284. 1996): 125. Under President George Bush, spending declined 25 24. Polybius, “The Histories,” in ibid., 122. percent, and the Bottom Up Review under President Bill Clinton 25. Myers, 50. cut spending another 5 percent. 26. Smith, 136–38. 7. Maj Gen Hugh A. Parker, transcript of oral history inter- 27. Arthur J. Dyck, “Ethical Bases of the Military Profession,” view, June 1972, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Parameters, 10 March 1980, 43. AFB, Ala., K239.0512-601. Splitting funding is the “easy compro 28. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance, 100. mise solution” to jointness. For example, as a member of the 29. Rushworth M. Kidder, How Good People Make Tough Choices Emergency War Plans Group on the JCS staff, Parker witnessed (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1995), 57. the splitting of every plan three ways because each service had its 30. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance, 101. own perspective and was fighting for its own existence: “Now how 31. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United honest some of it was remains in doubt.” States, 10 January 1995, vi–vii. 8. S. L. A. Marshall, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, 32. Ibid., ii, 1. D.C.: Armed Forces Information Service, Department of De 33. DODD 5500.7, Standards of Conduct: Joint Ethics Regula fense, 1975), 79. tion, August 1993. 9. Keith Hutcheson, “The Discipline Crisis,” Armed Forces 34. Ibid., 155. Journal, March 1996, 40. 35. Ibid., 157. 10. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (London: Brassey’s, 36. James H. Toner, “Leadership, Community, and Virtue,” 1963), 295. Joint Force Quarterly, no. 11 (Spring 1996): 101. 11. Marshall, 2. 37. Douglas A. Martz, “Professional Military Ethics,” Marine 12. Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the Ameri Corps Gazette, August 1990, 58. can Military Doesn’t Win (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), 4–6. 38. Kermit D. Johnson, “Ethical Issues of Military Leader- Gabriel identifies systemic incompetence and “institutional prac ship,” Parameters 4, no. 2 (1974): 36. tices” as the real problems behind military incompetence. 39. William J. Bennett, ed., The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of 13. General officer, address to Air War College, Maxwell Great Moral Stories (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 12. AFB, Ala. (nonattribution policy). 40. Gaston and Hietala, 140. 14. The service academies are notorious for pointing fingers 41. Anthony E. Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making at each other when scandal hits. For an example of Naval Acad (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 44–47. emy problems, see Mark Fiore’s “Top Brass at Naval Academy Are 42. Perry M. Smith, “Military Ethics in the Pentagon,” Marine Subjects of Pentagon Probe into Recent Scandals,” Chronicle of Corps Gazette 83, no. 11 (November 1999): 66–68. Higher Education, 23 June 1997. 43. Weiner, 130–32. 15. Col Charles R. Myers, “The Core Values: Framing and Re- 44. William F. Diehl, “Ethics and Leadership: The Pursuit solving Ethical Issues for the Air Force,” Airpower Journal 11, no. 1 Continues,” Military Review, April 1985, 36–42. (Spring 1997): 40. 45. Richard T. DeGeorge, “The Need for a Military Code of 16. Dr. James H. Toner, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala., Ethics,” Army, December 1984, 30. interviewed by author, 3 September 1998. 46. Toner, True Faith and Allegiance, 91. Gen Malham Wakin 17. Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times, From the Enlight warns that there is a danger in codes becoming narrow. They can- enment to the Present, 4th ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, not become a substitute for sound education in wisdom. 1987), 82.