DTIC ADA516619: Coalition Combat: Supporting South Korean Forces

8 Pages·0.5 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

ROK soldiers during
evacuation of Suwon
airfield.
Coalition Combat
U.S. Information Agency
Supporting South Korean
Forces
By W I L L I A M M. D O N N E L LY
F
rom 1950 to 1953, with only a were lacking in artillery, American
partial mobilization, the Army units were frequently tasked for sup-
fought in Korea, bolstered its port. U.S. artillerymen had inadequate
presence in Europe, and or- doctrine, combined operations train-
ganized an air defense artillery system ing, and equipment. Moreover, they
on the homefront. Success in these en- had to overcome differences in lan-
deavors depended significantly on the guage, culture, and skill levels, and
capability of the Republic of Korea also fears that the Koreans would col-
(ROK) army to stand and fight. Fire- lapse when attacked, leaving the ar-
power, particularly field artillery, was tillerymen exposed to enemy infantry.
an advantage that U.N. forces enjoyed Efforts to provide field artillery
during the war. Because the Koreans support were successful overall. Ameri-
can gunners often made the difference
William M. Donnelly is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and between victory and failure despite lin-
the author of Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War. guistic and cultural barriers even
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 71
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2001 to 00-00-2001
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Coalition Combat Supporting South Korean Forces
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National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 REPORT NUMBER
Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
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JFQ FORUM
though firepower by itself could not al- Combat in Korea found American using antiaircraft units as field artillery,
ways compensate for the weaknesses of artillery unprepared in several areas. it was assumed that they would rein-
ROK forces. Thus a lot of emphasis was Although there was doctrine on moun- force the fires of field artillery units,
placed on expanding Korean firepower tain operations, units had little train- not act as the field artillery headquar-
in the last two years of combat, espe- ing. Moreover, most units were unpre- ters. Colonel William Hennig, USA, the
cially field artillery, and improving the pared to defend battery positions and 10th Group commander, found that
skill of the units employing it. convoys. And finally, there was no only a few of his officers knew any-
guidance on supporting non-U.S. in- thing about field artillery operations.
Starved for Support
fantry beyond standard teachings on Fortunately, Eighth Army had earlier
When the war began in June 1950, artillery liaison with maneuver units. attached 10thGroup to 1stCavalry Divi-
the South Koreans had little in the way ROK artillery performance, like the sion for several days. Hennig had his
of field artillery. There were just six bat- rest of the Korean army, varied in early operations section staff observe the di-
talions, which had only finished initial engagements. Some units quickly broke visional fire direction center. A member
training in October 1949, to support its while others fought on stubbornly. The of the section later wrote, “the effective
eight divisions. The battalions were surviving units withdrew to the Pusan operation of 10th Group can be traced
equipped with 15 light M–3 105mm Perimeter with U.S. forces. In August, to this helping hand.”2
reinforcements joined While together from September to
combat in Korea found American Eighth Army, including fir- December 1950, 1st ROK Division and
ing batteries, bringing divi- 10th AAA Group proved a formidable
artillery unprepared to defend battery
sion field artillery battal- combination. Their success resulted
positions and convoys ions to full strength and from a harmonious relationship be-
providing separate battal- tween their commanders and profes-
howitzers, a shorter-range version of ions to serve as corps artillery. sional competence, generating mutual
the standard howitzer. Ammunition Growing artillery strength and the respect. The 1st ROK Division com-
stocks were low. The South operated an positioning of American and ROK divi- mander, Major General Paik Sun Yup,
artillery school and a few Koreans had sions side by side on the perimeter al- remembered Hennig as a “truly hum-
attended the U.S. Army Artillery lowed U.S. artillerymen to shoot in ble officer” who told him that the “job
School. American artillerymen had support of Korean units. An early in- of the artillery and the other combat
served with the Korean Military Advi- stance occurred when 1st Cavalry Divi- arms is absolute support of the in-
sory Group (KMAG). sion artillery operated with 1stROK Di- fantry.” According to Paik, “Every time
The U.S. field artillery establish- vision. The American units remained [our] division faced a combat crisis
ment showed the effects of lean post- in 1st Cavalry’s sector, firing across its thereafter, Hennig provided every prac-
war budgets. Eighth Army in Japan right flank, supporting the South Kore- tical cooperation.” Paik’s energy and
lacked corps-level support battalions, ans in both attack and defense. Korean leadership from the front impressed
and division artillery battalions were forward observers, sending data the Americans as well. The record of
all short one of their three firing bat- through 1st Cavalry Division artillery 10th Group noted that he “has gained
teries. The General Reserve contained liaison officers, directed most of the the personal respect of all personnel.”
only 11 nondivisional battalions, all firing. The greatest difficulties in these A consistent obstacle in combined
short of personnel. The Army National missions were the language barrier and operations was a fear on the part of
Guard had 32 battalions of nondivi- inexperienced Korean observers, who Americans that they could not rely on
sional artillery, all on reduced tables of exaggerated mission results.1 the Koreans. However, the competence
organization, short of equipment, and of 1st ROK Division laid that concern
A Perfect Partnership
needing months of training. to rest. When Paik presented Hennig a
American artillerymen faced other The deeds of 1st ROK Division in division patch, the group’s war diary
problems. The skills of officers and en- mid-1950 earned it a good reputation recorded it as a “signal honor,” as the
listed men varied considerably. World among Americans. On September 18, division was a “great fighting force.” In
War II veterans were experienced but 10th Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Group return, the eagerness of 10thGroup and
were a minority by 1950. Junior en- was attached to 1stROK Division to act its subordinate units to support
listed training since 1945 suffered from as artillery headquarters. The group 1st ROK Division impressed the Kore-
cuts in initial training and, in many brought with it 78th AAA Gun Battal- ans. Hennig routinely traveled with
cases, from inadequate unit training. ion, with towed 90mm guns, and Paik, and antiaircraft liaison officers
Artillerymen also faced a unique prob- 9th Field Artillery Battalion, with towed moved with division and regimental
lem, the decision in 1946 to merge field 155mm howitzers. headquarters and worked with both
and coast artillery into a single branch. The headquarters mission pre- Korean commanders and KMAG advi-
In practice, field and antiaircraft ar- sented 10thAAA Group with a problem: sors to coordinate fire support. A no-
tillery skills had little overlap, so officers although doctrinal manuals included table case of American willingness to
trained in one specialty but posted to offer support came in the advance on
the other were usually an encumbrance. Pyongyang: group vehicles shuttled
Korean infantry forward and M–55
72 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
Donnelly
U.S.artillery supporting
25thInfantry Division.
my
Ar
S.
U.
machine gun mounts, placed on attack. Withdrawing from the Chong- only one battalion of field artillery, X
trucks, moved with division lead ele- chon, 10th Group, reinforced by 68th Corps ordered the American 2d and 7th
ments to bring tremendous firepower AAA and 555th Field Artillery Battal- Infantry Divisions to assist. Supporting
to bear on enemy road blocks. ions, supported the division as it cov- 5th ROK Division was 49th Field Ar-
The climax to the partnership oc- ered 24th Infantry Division’s with- tillery of 7thDivision, reinforced with a
curred at the Battle of Unsan on Octo- drawal, then withdrew itself south of battery of 155mm howitzers, auto-
ber 25 to November 1 and withdrawal the river. On December 1, in retreat matic weapons antiaircraft battery, en-
from the Chongchon River in late No- and increasingly fearful of Chinese and gineer company, infantry battalion,
vember. At Unsan, as the Chinese Soviet air attacks, Eighth Army reas- and reconnaissance company of 7thDi-
checked the drive by the division into signed 10th AAA Group to air defense. vision. Supporting 8th ROK Division
North Korea, the battle culminated Paik later wrote that with the departure was 15th Field Artillery, reinforced with
with an enemy attack on the night of of the group, “I felt like the [division’s] a battery of 155mm howitzers as well
October 31. 78thAAA Battalion, exploit- firepower had shrunk to nothing.” as an automatic weapons antiaircraft
ing the 360-degree capability of 90mm battery and an infantry battalion. By
Trial and Error
guns, fired in three directions, expend- this point, Eighth Army had lost so
ing 1,319 rounds. With the 4.2 inch Most field artillery support for Ko- many howitzers that protection of
mortars of 2d Chemical Battalion and rean units during the mobile phase field artillery was paramount; each
9th Field Artillery, this fire support en- was less successful. On February 5, support force included American anti-
abled 1st ROK Division to repulse the 1951, X Corps mounted an attack aircraft weapons and infantry because
north of Wonju with two Korean divi- of concern over Korean reliability.
sions. Because these divisions still had
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 73
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ROK infantrymen
firing recoilless rifle,
June 1952.
Photos
World
Wide
P/
A
Available to fire reinforcing missions While 8th ROK Division advanced to continue the attack with fire support
was 96th Field Artillery, a 155mm how- on the left, its 20th Field Artillery failed from 49th Field Artillery and its attach-
itzer battalion. to impress the Americans because of ments. The battalion sent forward ob-
Operation Roundup support forces poor shooting. 5th ROK Division hit servers and liaison officers to the in-
had little time to establish a relation- strong resistance on the right from the fantry regiments of 3d ROK and liaison
ship with the Korean divisions; after re- start. The commander of 49th Field Ar- officers to its command post and ar-
ceiving the mission on the night of tillery assumed the duties of division tillery battalion; 674th Field Artillery re-
February 3, they moved into Korean artillery headquarters; he also had to mained with 5thROK.
sectors. The commanders of 15th and direct resupply of the artillery battalion The communists counterattacked
49th Field Artillery met with the divi- with howitzer ammunition. On Febru- on the night of February 11. Three di-
sion commanders the next day to plan ary 8, artillery fire broke up a North visions poured over 8th ROK Division
fire support. Forward observers and liai- Korean attack on an infantry regiment. as another Chinese force hit 3d ROK
son officers from the battalions only ar- Increasing resistance led X Corps to on the right flank and North Korean
rived at the infantry regiment level add 674th Field Artillery Battalion in units attacked 5th ROK Division. All
within the division a few hours before support on the same day. Then on Feb- three divisions collapsed by first light.
the attack began February 5. ruary 10, X Corps moved 5thROK Divi- American liaison officers and forward
sion to blocking positions on the right
flank and brought up 3d ROK Division
74 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
Donnelly
The Chinese continued to attack
Launching rockets,
on the morning of February 14, seek-
November 1952.
ing to capture Wonju. Unfortunately
for them, X Corps had assembled a
powerful concentration of field ar-
tillery. Eleven infantry battalions—
seven American, three Korean, and one
Dutch—shielded this concentration.
Coordinated by 2d Infantry Division
Artillery headquarters, American gun-
ners repulsed the attack, killing some
5,000 Chinese and leaving four divi-
sions combat ineffective. The “Wonju
shoot” dramatically demonstrated the
power of American field artillery when
its infantry shield held firm and the
enemy presented a lucrative target.
Building the Fire
In January and February 1951,
Eighth Army received sizable field ar-
tillery reinforcements, one Reserve and
nine National Guard battalions mobi-
my lized the previous summer. While
S. Ar these units still left Eighth Army far
U. short of what doctrine and command-
ers with World War II experience antic-
ipated, they played a key role in de-
observers with infantry regiments re- the battalion commander, executive feating the communist offensives in
ported the collapse of their field ar- and operations officers, four liaison of- April and May 1951.
tillery battalions and attempted to ficers, two battery commanders, three Reinforcements also allowed
move south to safety among the firing battery executive officers, and Eighth Army to provide more field ar-
routed South Koreans. most of the forward observers. An at- tillery support to Korean divisions.
Uncertainty in 2d Infantry Divi- tached battery belonging to 503d Field Added firepower helped Korean divi-
sion and X Corps over who held the Artillery lost all its 155mm howitzers. sions during the enemy spring offen-
authority to order the support forces The support force with 3dROK Di- sives but could not compensate for in-
to retreat was a disaster for units with vision did better. X Corps Artillery in- adequate equipment, training, and
8th ROK Division. When the com- formed 49thField Artillery of the devel- leadership. An example of the capabili-
mander of 15th Field Artillery got per- oping situation and gave it a ties and limitations of American field
mission to withdraw around 0300 movement warning order. Two and a artillery support occurred in IX Corps
half hours later, the 49th Field Ar- during the April offensive, when 987th
the “Wonju shoot” dramatically tillery liaison officer with 23d In- and 92d Armored Field Artillery Battal-
fantry Regiment notified his battal- ions supported 6thROK Division.
demonstrated the power of
ion that the Korean infantry was The Korean division and artillery
American artillery withdrawing in haste. Learning battalion had not impressed 92d Field
that the Chinese had blocked the Artillery during the previous month;
road south to Wonju, engineers ROK 27th Field Artillery had great diffi-
hours on February 12, the Chinese were ordered to cut a road with bull- culty maintaining communications
had established strong positions be- dozers. The support force reached with its forward observers and the divi-
tween the support force and 2d In- safety with the loss of only one sion did not know how to exploit the
fantry Division at Wonju. The support 155mm howitzer; battalion losses were capabilities of a U.S. artillery unit. As
force, with American and Dutch in- two killed, thirty-eight wounded, and IX Corps prepared for an expected
fantry battalions, had to fight its way thirteen missing. Infantrymen in the communist offensive in April, it at-
back to Wonju. The unit was beaten 5th ROK Division sector withdrew in tached 987th to 92d Battalion and gave
with the loss of 14 howitzers, 349 en- rout order and one battery was forced the units a mission to reinforce 27th
listed men, and 28 officers, including to use direct fire on advancing enemy ROK Field Artillery fires.
infantry to escape. The battalion was
able to withdraw without losing any
howitzers.
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 75
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JFQ FORUM
Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea
The South Korean military traces its origins to the constabulary unit organized in 1946 to assist the American occu-
pation forces and national police in maintaining public order. When the Republic of Korea was established in
1948, the constabulary served as the core of a nascent armed forces.
Army. The Korean army was formed on December 15, 1948. The U.S. Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG) was
organized on July 1, 1949, replacing provisional detachments that had been training Korean ground forces. By June 1950
the army included eight poorly equipped divisions with
115,000 troops. When the war ended, South Korea had three
Lookout Mountain,
corps with 590,911 men under arms. Each regiment, division,
June 1953.
and corps had a compliment of KMAG advisors.
Navy. The Coast Guard helped in organizing the
Korean coast guard in 1946, which became the nucleus of the
new coast guard/navy in 1948. During the conflict, South
Korean naval forces included frigates, minesweepers, and
landing ships which operated under the command of U.S.
Naval Forces Far East.
Air Force. South Korea formed its own air force on Octo-
ber 10, 1949. When war broke out, the United States provided
ten F–51s to South Korea. Korean pilots flew as part of a com-
pduorsiinteg Uth.Se. -cKoonrfeliacnt. unit organized by U.S. Far East Air Forces Photos
South Korean military losses from 1950 to 1953 totalled World
415,000 killed and 429,000 wounded. Wide
P/
A
Both U.S. battalions provided liai- could not prevent them from passing only to find that the Koreans were
son to 27th ROK Field Artillery, and between their guns. To the rear, 92d quickly withdrawing. Returning to
987th Field Artillery sent a liaison offi- Field Artillery commander placed an their old position, the Americans fired
cer and three observers for the division officer and an interpreter on the road 200 rounds in support of retreating
infantry. Because its 105mm howitzers to rally the Koreans. The pair collected forces. The situation led IX Corps to
had a shorter range than the 155mm between 500 and 600 soldiers, who move 213th Field Artillery the next day
howitzers in 92d Battalion, 987th Field were put under the control of a KMAG to support a harder-pressed unit, but it
Artillery had to move further forward officer. By 0900 hours, 987th Battalion later returned to fire for 6th ROK Divi-
in the division sector. The terrain in liaison officers informed their com- sion from April 25 to 27, which the
the 6th ROK Division area made that mander that 2d Infantry Regiment had Korean commander cited as the largest
difficult; to reach assigned positions in collapsed and 27th Battalion position factor in breaking the attacks on his di-
the vicinity of Sachang-ni, heavy had been overrun. The commander of vision. Then 213th Field Artillery
tracked vehicles had to move over 987th Battalion contacted the 92d Bat- helped cover the withdrawal by 24th
steep hills on a narrow dirt track that talion command post for instructions. Infantry Division.
crossed several streams. The entire When none arrived, he ordered his for-
Finding Common Ground
route was subject to cave-ins and land- ward batteries to withdraw. However,
slides. By nightfall on April 22, only the road collapsed at a chokepoint, U.S. officers identified several im-
nine howitzers had reached the battal- trapping the howitzers, and fire from pediments to cooperation in their
ion position; the other nine remained Chinese on the adjacent high ground analysis of field artillery support. The
in the previous position five miles forced the cannoneers to abandon their first was language; 987th Battalion
away as battalion personnel and Ko- vehicles. A scratch force attempted to recorded that “good interpreters are a
rean engineers cleared the road. recover the guns after dawn, but it was great asset to a unit, particularly when
The nine howitzers in the new po- ambushed and withdrew. Marines try- supporting an ROK division.” Unfortu-
sition began firing as soon as registra- ing to retrieve the vehicles later in the nately for the battalion, it had re-
tion was completed, as 6th ROK Divi- day were also turned back. ceived civilian interpreters, and most
sion came under heavy pressure. IX Corps ordered the newly ar- were “practically worthless under
Retreating Korean troops appeared in rived 213th Battalion to replace 987th combat conditions.”
such numbers that the Americans Battalion in support of 6th ROK Divi-
sion on April 23. This new 105mm
howitzer unit moved into position
76 JFQ / Spring/Summer 2001
Donnelly
A second obstacle was the quality headquarters, and then being prepared 1st ROK Division and 10th Group, the
of the Korean troops. American ar- to shoot reinforcing missions for a spe- results were equal to or superior to
tillery units could not overcome the cific subordinate artillery unit of the those found on average in U.S. units.
inability of some ROK units to stand corps. The reinforcing commander These two examples, however, were at
and fight, which in turn stripped the needed to coordinate with the rein- the extremes. More typical were the
artillery of infantry protection. During forced artillery and put a liaison officer experiences of 92d, 213th, and 987th
the May 1951 communist offensive, X in the unit command post. Battalions in the spring 1951 offen-
Corps dealt with this situation by not After the communist spring of- sives. During the mobile phase of the
placing American battalions in Korean fensives, American artillerymen con- war, Eighth Army lacked adequate
division sectors. Instead, a 155mm cluded that when supporting Koreans, nondivisional field artillery to develop
howitzer battalion was positioned on “it is almost impossible to accomplish regular relations, thus American and
the flank of a U.S. division so it could a mission of supporting them in the Korean units had little time to form as-
fire into the 5th ROK Division sector, manner to which our training and ex- sociations. The absence of skill and ex-
with a liaison team dispatched to the perience has accustomed us.” The perience in Korean units meant that
division KMAG detachment. In addi- weaknesses of equipment, training, reinforcing missions had to be per-
and experience in Korean ar- formed more as direct support by
U.S. liaison officers discovered that tillery battalions meant that American units, which were ill-
American units had to ap- equipped for the role. Language and
constant close contact with KMAG
proach reinforcing them more cultural differences were only partially
officers was essential as a direct support mission. overcome by bringing KMAG advisors
The 987th Battalion recorded, into fire support operations.
“The efficiency of artillery Finally, U.S. firepower could
tion, X Corps Artillery positioned 8- units in support of ROK units is al- often, but not always, prevent the col-
inch howitzers and 155mm guns to most directly proportional to the lapse or destruction of Korean units
support 7th ROK Division without hav- number of liaison and forward ob- which, because of weaknesses in fire-
ing to enter its sector. server parties used. To send your liai- power, skill, and leadership, became a
Another facet of the deficiencies son officer to the reinforced ROK field focus of enemy offensives. American
in Korean training and experience was artillery battalion is not sufficient.” artillerymen—called upon to conduct
a virtual absence of liaison between in- This judgment created trouble for missions for which they were unpre-
fantry and artillery units. ROK infantry corps artillery units. Their organization pared in doctrine, training, and re-
commanders treated American artillery did not include the personnel and sources—usually persevered, though
units in a similar way; 987th Field Ar- equipment found in divisional direct not without extensive improvisation,
tillery was not warned when 2d In- support battalions to field sufficient li- hard work, and heavy losses. JFQ
fantry Regiment decided to withdraw. aison and forward observer parties. A
U.S. liaison officers discovered that corps artillery 105mm battalion was NOTES
constant close contact with KMAG of- authorized one liaison officer and
1Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong,
ficers was essential. three forward observers. In April 1951,
North to the Yalu (Washington: Office of
A third obstacle was the clash be- 213thBattalion fielded four liaison offi- the Chief of Military History, 1961),
tween American field artillery doctrine cers and nine observers. In support of pp. 350–61.
and the problems of supporting an 2d ROK Division in May 1951, 987th 2Arthur C. Brooks, Jr., “From Pusan to
army lacking in artillery with little ex- Field Artillery provided liaison to divi- Unsan with the 10thAAA Group,” Antiaircraft
perience in combined arms operations. sion headquarters, 18th Field Artillery, Journal(January–February 1951), p. 13.
During Chinese spring offensives, U.S. and three infantry regiments. Officers,
corps artillery headquarters usually enlisted men, and equipment for these
gave a reinforcing or general reinforc- parties were taken from battalion
ing mission to field units supporting headquarters and firing batteries, creat-
the Korean units. For American ar- ing a corresponding difficulty for them
tillerymen, doctrine dictated specific to accomplish their missions.
responsibilities in such missions. In a
reinforcing mission, the unit “receives American field artillery support
calls for fire from the unit whose fires for Korean units met with mixed re-
it is to reinforce” and is prepared “to sults. On occasion, like the destruction
establish command liaison with, and of 15th Field Artillery in Operation
to reinforce the observation of, the Roundup, poor teamwork led to a dis-
unit whose fires it is to reinforce.” In a aster for supporting artillery. In in-
reinforcing mission, the first priority is stances when both U.S. and Korean
shooting missions from corps artillery units were competent, had dynamic
leadership, and developed a long-term
relationship, like the association of
Spring/Summer 2001 / JFQ 77