DTIC ADA516320: USMC Aviation Vision 2025 and the Misdirection of Airborne Electronic Warfare

2 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

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UnitedStates Marine'Corps I
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CommandandStaffCollege
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. Marine Corps University ::
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command
Quantico Virginia 22134-5068
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MASTER OFMILITARYSTUDIES
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TITLE:
USMC AVIATION VISION2025 AND THE MISDIRECTION OFAIRBORNE
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILJ\1ENT
OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF
MASTER OFMILITARYSTUDIES
AUTHOR:
MAJR.M. KUDELKO, Jr.
AY08-09
Mentor andOralDefense Co~eMember: _Dr. C.A. SWANSON _
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Approved: ,
Date: ::;;'" z 7 ~f Z tfle::'9
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omr4l~ Memb:!D~A,---------_
OralDefense C,
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Approved:
Date: 2.'''7 IJffCl L 20(.)9
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009
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USMC Aviation Vision 2025 and the Misdirection of Airborne Electronic
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Warfare
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United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
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ExecutiveSummary
. Title: USMC AviationVision 2025 andthe Misdirection ofAirborneElectronic Warfare.
Author: MajorRobertKudelko, UnitedStates Marine Corps
Thesis: TheMarine Corps plan to eliminate atactical aircraft dedicatedto the mission of
electronic warfare as well as the increasedemphasis onunmanned systems to conductthe EW
mission will leave the Mmine Corps significantly unprepm'edto deal with both current and
emergingRF threats to MAGTFoperations.
Discussion: TheMarine Aviation CampaignPlan is amodernizationprogramthat will eliminate
all legacy aircraft andstreamline all tactical aircraft to theF-35 Joint StrikeFighter. Among the
aircraftbeing eliminatedis theEA-6B, the nation's only dedicated tactical airborne electronic
wm'fm'e aircraft. As areplacement to the EA-6B, the Mmines proposeF-35s andunmanned
systems equipped withjammers to fill the needfor airborneEW. This solution does not
adequately address the limitations ofthose two systems orthe supportneeds offuture.platforms
likethe MV-22 andtheExpeditionaryFighting Vehicle. These new vehicles will allow MAGTF
commanders to projectforces farther ashore and operatein an environmentincreasingly
vulnerable to enemyradm' guidedthreats. Unmanned systems plannedto"fill EWrequirements
do not have the liftcapacity to carryhigh poweredjammers anddo not have the range to operate
ashore from sea-basedexpeditionaryvessels. Unmanned systems also have ahigherloss rate
than do conventional aircraft, making theirpayloads vulnerable to enemycapture and
exploitation. TheMarine Corps needs to re-evaluate theirroad aheadregarding EW
requirements in orderto ensure that the capabilitythat they desireis, in fact, the capabilitythat
they m'e purchasing.
Conclusion: TheMarine Corps of2025 will be capable ofconducting electronic warfare with
boththeF-35 andits UASs. Whatit will not have is the speed, flexibility and versatilitythat the
Marines have COine to expect from their CUlTent airborne EW platfqrm, the EA-6B, whichis the
type ofsystemthat will be needed to supportfuture expeditionary operations.
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSE OFTHE
INDIVIDUALSTUDENTAUTHOR AND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE
VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO TillS STUDYSHOULD
INCLUDETHEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT.
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALL ORANY·
PART OFTillS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE.
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Preface
This projectis the manifestation ofseveral years offrustration born out ofconstant
indecisionregarding thefuture ofaviation electronic warfareintheMarine Corps. As an EW
operator, I havebeenwitness to numerous conferences in which the Maline Corps has attempted
to layout aroadmap for the future. In most ofthese meetings, the attendees areresigned to the
understanding thattbe EA-6B communityis astepchildwithin Maline Aviation andmostEW
related decisions are made outside ofhe Marine Corps. The complication lies in thefact that
'Big Navy' often determines the funding/procurement oftactical aircraft and th~ 'National As~et'
label attachedto EA-6B's makes us outsiders within our own service. While theMarine Corps
enters anew eraofV-22's, EXl?editionaryFighting Vehicles and Joint StrikeFighters, we are not
keeping up with ourobligation to protectthose systems. My aircraft, the EA-6B, will retire in
2019 afternearly45 years ofservice andI do not believethatthe Marine Corps is poisedto
address the RFthreat when that occurs..
I wouldlike to thankColWakeman andGySgt Gonzalez for the assistance they providedme
inmy research. The materials andinsightthey gave me on the Joint StrikeFighterprogram and
UnmannedAirborne Sensorprograms were valuable to myresearch. I would also liketo thank
the current andprevious directors ofthe MalineAviation Weapons Requirements (EW) division
atHeadquarters Marine Corps. Theirtireless dedication to promotingtactical electronic warrare
thatis relevant to thefuture Marine Corps is whatinspiredmy decision to write this thesis.
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Table ofContents
Page
DISCLAIMER : : i
PREFACE ii
INTRODUCTION 1
PLATFORMSUITABILITY 2
JOINT STRIKEFIGHTER : 3
UNMANNED SYSTEMS 4
MISSIONPAYLOAD 6
SURVNABILITy : : :.:· ~10
"
MISSIONREQUIREMENTS ; 11
O'GRADYTRAPMISSIOIN 11
ACEREQUIREMENTS 12
NEW SYSTEMEWLIMITATIONS ~ 14
MV-22 OSPREY..~ : 14
SEABASINGANDEXPEDITIONARYVEHICLES , 16
EWTARGETING 18
CONCLUSION 19
APPENDIX A: FUNCTIONS OFMARINE AVIATION 21
APPENDIXB: AIRFRAMETIMELINE/LIFEEXPECTANCY 22
APPENDIX C: FUNCTIONS OFINFORMATION OPERATIONS · 23
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APPENDIXD: AIRCRAFTPERFORMANCESPECIFICATIONS ~ 24
APPENDIXE: SIZE COMPARISON CHART 25
APPENDIXE: MEUACE COMPARISON 26
ENDNOTES , 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY 29
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INTRODUCTION
In the summerof2008, Marine,Corps Commandant General James Conwayreleased the
publicationMarine Corps Vision & Strategy 2025. The commandant stressedthe pointth~t
"MarineAviation will continue to provide sixfunctions to the MAGTF." Those six functions
being: assault support, anti air warfare (AAW), offensive airsupport (OAS), control ofaircraft
andmissiles, aerial reconnaissance andelectronic warfare (EW). Betweennow and2025,
MarineAviation will undergo numerous changes. TheMarineAviationTransition Strategyis' ,
designed to replace andupgrade everymajor aircraft type in theinventory with next generation
capability.
Presentlythemediumlifthelicoptercommunityis undergoing the replacementofits
fifteen Vietnamera CH-46 helicoptersquadrons with the tilt-rotor MV-22. This transition will
becomplete within thenext ten years.* Boththe VSTOL attackjetAV-8B andmulti-roleFA-18
will eventuallybereplaced bytheF-35 Joint StrikeFighter (JSF). The fighter/attack transition to
JSFis underway with an initial operational capability (IOC) date of2012 andcompletionby
2024. TheEA-6B Prowler, the world's onlytactical electronic attackjet, will beretiredoutright.
TheEA~6B will beginits drawdown in 2016 andberetiredfrom service at the end of2019.
When the Prowlerretires, it will markthe endofthe Marine Corps' only dedicated aviation
electronic attackplatfor~.
The que_stion that must be askedis: when the Prowlerretires, how will MarineAviation
countertheradio frequency (RF) threat ofthe future and adequately supporttheMAGTF? That
singlequestionis made up ofthree parts: threat, capability, andplatform. Whatis thefuture
electronic threat to theMAGTF? WhatEWcapabilitydoes the Marine Corps needin orderto
accomplish its mission? What platformis most suitablefor providingthatcapability at and
•Attheend of2008,fourCH-46squadrons had completedtransition to MV-22.
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beyond2025? Optimally, the aJ.1swers to the first two questions drive the third._Unfortunately..
in the complex andbudget driven world ofweapons procurement, developmentis not always so
linear.
Circumstances likethis have helpedto shapethe Marines' aviation transition strategy,
and this paperwillinvestigateplatform suitability as thefirst topic. Fromthere I will discuss
areas whereMarinemissions will likelybein need ofEWcapabilities. Finally, I will coverthe
limitedcapabilities Marine airhas in countelingthe RF threat.
PLATFORMSUITABILITY
Whatform must anEWplatformcomeinto suppOlithe MAGTFcommander? The
Vision 2025 documentis heavily laden with an expeditionary theme. The future Marine Corps,
"willbe increasinglyreliant onnaval deployment ... leanerin equipment, versatilein
capabilities, andinnovativeinmindset."l The transformation ofMarine air will provideitwith
"greaterrange, speed and agility" andthe associated technology will be "drivingnew concepts of
operation to the MAGTF."z Unmanned systems are specifically chargedwith "enhance[ing] and
extend[ing] the lethal andnon lethal capability ofthe MAGTF.,,3 These statements, along with
the Tactical AircraftIntegration Plan and eventual Joint StrikeFightertransition give apretty
goodguidance as to the desired shape ofthings to come. Thefuture ofMarine aviationis
streamlined, multi-functional, andexpeditionary.
Despite all ofits strengths, theEA-6Bs majorfault is its limited availability (quantity)
an4its lackofatrue expeditionary capability. Prowlers cannot deploy aboard amphibious
shippinglikethe STOVL capableAV-8B. The vmiousjammingpods necessaryfor different
missionrequirements give theProwler alarge logistic foot print. TheProwlerwas never
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manufacturedinsignificantnumbers to meet the high sortierates necessary to support sustained
ground operations.* Finally, the limitednumbers ofaircraftneeded to fill high prioritymissions
oftenresults in tasking originating above theMAGTFcommanders level. This tasking often
results in theMAGTFcommanderhaving to appeal to aJoint or CombinedForces Air
Component Commander (J/CFACC) in orderto source any aviationEW. This situationis
frequently referredto as "low density, high demand." Any new platform wouldideallybe
accessible to aMEUlevel commanderandideally wouldbecapable ofoperatingfrom a ship
within the Amphibious Strike Group. Meetingtheserequirements while still complying with the
Commandant's aviation campaign planimplies that the electronic warfare capabilitywill have to
reside among multiple types ofaircraft. In 2025, those platforms will beUnmannedSystems,
FixedWing (F-35, KC-130J), andTilt/RotaryWing (V-22, AH-l, CH-53).
JOINT STRIKEFIGHTER
Themost abundant ofthese platforms will be the F-35B. Thisis the VSTOLvariant of
the JointStrikeFighter. TheMarine Corps plans on purchasing overthree-hundredofthese
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aircraftbyFY2023. Itis certainlypossible that the Joint StrikeFighterwill be capable offilling
some ofthe more traditional mission sets that the Prowleronceprovided. Originally designed as
acoldwar weapon, the Prowlermission was focused on suppressing Sovietstyle enemy air
defense networks. TheProwlerfacilitated otherstrike aircraftin attacking targets deep behind.
enemylines. TheF-35, havingboth low observable characteristics and apowerfuljamming
capability will enableitto penetrate enemy defenses withoutexternal support. Overthe years
however, the Prowlermission has expanded greatly to include extensive communications
EA-6Bsarecurrentlyflyingbetweentwo andfivetimestheirprogrammed utilization ratesinsupportof
operationsin Iraq andAfghanistan.
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jamming, force protectionmissions, andotherdimensions within Information Operationssuch as
Psychological Operations (see App C). Itis in these newermission sets that aviation electronic
warfare has madeitselfnotjustvaluableto the groundcombatelementbut a sought after
capability. Thenature ofwarfare has evolvedto the point where the MAGTFcommanderwants
EWcoverage in direct,support ofhis ground scheme ofmaneuverjustas much as he wants
artillery andclose airsupport. Thatdemandis drawing attention awayfrom the air andcoastal
defense threats'andtowards the low tech, groundOliented devices that we are encounteringin
Iraq and Afghanistan today. TheMaline Corps proposal to make airborneEW more access able
to more Marines on the groundis through the use ofnumerous unmanned systems.
UNMANNED VEHICLES
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Marine Corps Unmanned Aerial Systems conceptofemploymentis structuredin three
tiersystem, each coinciding with the level ofcommandthey support. TierIis considered a
battalion level orbelow asset, TierIIis adivision, regiment, battalion, orMEVasset. TierIIIis
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assigned to the JointTaskForce/MAGTFcommander.
TheTierI systemfor the Marine Corps is theDragon-Eye with an eventual'upgradeto
the Raven-B. Problems observedwith these smallersystems are their susceptibilityto weather,
windand turbulence. Furthermore, sensor quality'suffers because these smaller airframes al'e
more sensitive to vibrations and al"e more vulnerable to gusting winds andenvironmentals noted
above. Vibration andinstability are poorcharacteristics ofan EW platform. A_stableplatfollI).is
neededfor accurateradio frequency (RF) directionfinding (DF) associated withElectronic
Walfare Supportmissions as well as arequirementforjammersteering stabilization conducting
Electronic Attackmissions.
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