DTIC ADA515615: Irregular Warfare is Warfare

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Warfare
Warfare

V
iolent extremism is the most
likely and dangerous threat
the Nation will face between
now and 2020. U.S. superiority
in conventional warfighting has driven our
adversaries to avoid direct military confronta-
By KenneTh c. coons, Jr., tion. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) began with the recognition that irreg-
and gLenn M . harneD
ular warfare (IW) has become the “warfare
of choice” for our adversaries, who employ a
strategy of physical, economic, and psycho-
logical subversion, attrition, and exhaustion
to undermine and erode the power, influence,
and will of the United States and its strategic
partners. They fight us among the people in
protracted struggles for popular support and
legitimacy, limiting the utility of conventional
applications of our military power.
Soldiers survey remains of building
after firefight
Klika)
Russell Lee
my (
Ar
S.
U.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 97
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FEATURES | Irregular Warfare Is Warfare
Our adversaries are unconventional, Should the United States confront such states, over the definition of IW. Some within DOD
and so our approach for defeating them must its military will most likely need robust IW advocated an IW definition based on who
be unconventional as well. We cannot defeat capabilities to wage hybrid warfare among a conducts it (the actors) while others advocated
them solely by force; we must use a blend of hostile population. a definition based on how it is conducted (the
political, informational, military, economic, By the end of the QDR, the Department of methods). In the end, DOD senior leadership
and sociocultural approaches, in combination Defense (DOD) senior leadership had come to agreed that the IW definition should be based
with foreign governments, security forces, the following assessment with regard to IW:2 on why it is conducted (strategic purpose).
and populations. In January 2006, the Deputy Secretary of
n U.S. forces were primarily organized, Defense approved a working definition so
Potential Struggles trained, educated, and equipped for con- that IW concept and capability development
Violent extremism is not the only threat ventional warfighting, and these capabilities could proceed, and this working definition
our nation will face in the near future. The remained essential to deter and fight conven- with slight modification became the approved
danger of interstate war has not passed. The tional wars. definition on April 17, 2006:
United States must maintain its dominance n U.S. forces were not as well organized,
in interstate warfighting capabilities in order trained, educated, or equipped for protracted IW is a violent struggle among state and
to deter and, if necessary, win such wars. IW on a global scale. non-state actors for legitimacy and influence
However, the character of interstate warfare n DOD was underinvested in general over the relevant populations. IW favors
is changing. IW and conventional warfare are purpose force (GPF) and special operations indirect and asymmetric approaches, though
combining into new forms of hybrid warfare,1 force (SOF) capabilities and capacity for pro- it may employ the full range of military
as potential state adversaries are more likely tracted IW. and other capabilities, in order to erode an
adversary’s power, influence, and will.3
some within DOD advocated
an irregular warfare definition
based on who conducts it
while others advocated a
definition based on how it is
conducted
Cheeks) execuInt iDoenc eRmobaedr m20a0p5, DOD began crafting a
mera (Preston E. QtpooD flaiRccy iIl dWiteac tEeis xiimoecnpusl teoimof nteh nReto aQatidDomnR a.o Tpf .ht Ihetes I pIWWu rR-prooealsadet mewdaa sp
Ca
mbat was a temporary vehicle intended to enable a
Co successful transition from the QDR to execution
mpany planning and programming with a near-term
Co focus on the fiscal year 2008–2013 defense
SBoalgdhierar ns eVaarlclehyes for Taliban weapons cache in th55 Signal rpertoagrrya omf .D Oenfe nAsper dili 2re6c, t2e0d0 e6x, etchuet Dioenp ouft tyh See IcW-
Roadmap with 28 tasks organized into 5 major
to possess chemical, biological, radiological, Senior leadership emerged from the initiatives for developing IW capabilities and
and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and delivery QDR not knowing exactly what IW was, but capacity within DOD. The initiatives were:
means; sophisticated antiaccess capabilities; knowing that DOD needed dramatically
significant irregular capabilities for horizontal greater IW capabilities to wage and win n Transform the way DOD manages its
escalation; and populations mobilized to resist current and future struggles. military and civilian personnel to meet IW
U.S. military intervention. Future interstate operational requirements (first priority),
warfare is more likely to be some form of Defining IW which entails changing the way the military
hybrid warfare than the conventional warfare The DOD-wide IW effort during the Services identify, access, educate, train,
for which the Armed Forces are preparing. QDR generated a year-long disagreement develop, utilize, and retain personnel with IW-
associated expertise and increasing opportuni-
ties for DOD personnel to obtain, maintain,
Colonel Kenneth C. Coons, Jr., USAF, is Chairman of the Warfighting Department at the Air War College.
Colonel Glenn M. Harned, USA (Ret.), leads the Booz Allen Hamilton Team that supports irregular warfare and improve language proficiency and under-
efforts at U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Office of standing of foreign cultures.
the Secretary of Defense.
98 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
COONS and HARNED
n Rebalance GPF capabilities and capacity IW joint concept. The Multi-Service Concept physically and psychologically from the
to conduct long-duration counterinsurgency was approved in August 2006, shortly after relevant populations. At the same time, they
(COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) opera- the same writing team began work on the IW also seek to bolster their own legitimacy and
tions; train, equip, and advise large numbers Joint Operating Concept (JOC). credibility with those same populations.10
of foreign security forces; and foster the The IW JOC identifies the following Popular support, per se, may not be relevant
development of civil society and effective joint force problem: “How can Joint Force for certain terrorists and other extremists
governance in ungoverned and undergov- Commanders employ conventional and who simply coerce a population into compli-
erned areas. nonconventional military capabilities in ance. However, defeating irregular chal-
n Increase SOF capability and capacity in support of integrated [U.S. Government] lenges usually requires gaining legitimacy
two classified mission areas and to meet SOF and multinational partner efforts to gain or and influence over, and securing the support
air mobility requirements. maintain control or influence over a relevant of, the relevant populations, not defeating an
n Increase DOD capability and capacity to population?”5 The central idea of the IW JOC adversary primarily through direct military
conduct counter-network operations, which is that the joint force will solve this problem confrontation.
entails identifying, locating, characterizing, by conducting “protracted regional and Fourth, IW is ultimately a political
perturbing, and disrupting extremist cells, global campaigns using indirect approaches struggle with violent and nonviolent compo-
networks, and individuals, and predicting their against state and non-state adversaries to nents. The use of the term violent in the defi-
operational behavior. subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adver- nition was a particularly contentious issue.
n Redesign joint and Service military and saries rather than defeating them through The term refers to the nature of the struggle,
civilian education and individual and unit direct conventional military confrontation.”6 not the prescription of violence as the primary
training for the conduct and support of IW. These campaigns will be population-oriented, way to wage it. IW is “politics with guns.”
not adversary-oriented, and will emphasize
m)
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oriented, and will emphasize
strategic communication, remains intact:4
winning support
n insurgency and COIN
n terrorism and CT are the major propositions of current DOD
n unconventional warfare thinking as captured in the IW Joint Operat-
n foreign internal defense ing Concept. They have been refined by more
n stability operations when conducted than a year of experimentation.
within the context of an IW strategy or cam- First, irregular warfare is “a major and
paign aimed at gaining or maintaining the pervasive form of warfare”7 that occurs in
support of a host population politically unstable environments of per-
n transnational criminal activities that sistent conflict among populations. It is not
support or sustain IW and the law enforce- an environment or a type of military opera-
ment activities to counter them tion. Second, what makes IW “irregular”8
n civil-military operations is the focus of its operations—a relevant
n psychological operations population—and its strategic purpose to gain
n information operations or maintain legitimacy and influence over,
n intelligence and counterintelligence and the support of, that relevant population
operations. through political, psychological, informa-
tional, military, and economic methods. Marine cares for orphaned Iraqi child
Joint operating Concept Warfare that has the population as its “focus
Among other tasks, the IW Roadmap of operations” requires a different mindset The use or threat of political violence as a
directed U.S. Special Operations Command and different capabilities than warfare that tool to undermine an adversary’s legitimacy
(USSOCOM) to develop a joint concept for focuses on defeating an adversary militarily.9 and influence is one of its defining character-
IW. In November 2005, USSOCOM and Third, the foundation for IW is the istics. It is the violent nature of the struggle
the Marine Corps Combat Development centrality of the relevant populations to the that separates IW from the normal political
Command (MCCDC) agreed to develop a nature of the struggle. All parties seek to process. Because IW is about finding political
Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare undermine their adversaries’ legitimacy and solutions (or managing intractable political
to lay the intellectual foundation for a future credibility and to isolate their adversaries problems), the military should always have a
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 99
FEATURES | Irregular Warfare Is Warfare
supporting role, even when it is providing the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. will not be won by the United States alone, but
preponderance of resources. The relevant U.S. civilian agencies must rather by, with, and through the combined
Fifth, IW extends beyond the military build their capacity to operate in unstable or efforts of our strategic partners. This requires
domain. Governments and populations hostile environments.11 the joint force to establish long-term sustained
wage IW, not only armed forces. Influencing Sixth, IW depends on not only our mili- presence in numerous countries to build the
foreign governments and populations is a tary prowess, but also our understanding of necessary partner capability and capacity to
complex and inherently political activity. such social dynamics as tribal politics, social extend U.S. operational reach, multiply forces
IW campaigns will fail if waged by military networks, religious influences, and cultural available, and increase options for defeating
means alone. The nature of IW requires mores. People, not platforms or advanced our adversaries.13
the U.S. Government to achieve the level technology, are the key to IW success— The IW JOC also identifies four support-
of unified action necessary to integrate all patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people ing ideas that contribute directly or indirectly to
available instruments of national power to who can build the long-term relationships achieving the central idea of the concept:
address irregular threats. The Government essential to executing IW.12
will have to develop whole-of-government Last, waging protracted IW depends on n establish persistent global presence
approaches to wage IW at the political, building global capability and capacity. IW for IW
n establish and maintain interpersonal
Soldiers engage Taliban fighters near Allah Say, Afghanistan
relationships to support IW
n expand the role of the GPF to support
and execute IW missions
n create alternative command and
control (C2) mechanisms for conducting and
supporting IW when a joint task force (JTF) is
not required to conduct major combat opera-
tions. Three such mechanisms include extend-
ing the joint interagency task force (JIATF)
concept used today for counterdrug operations
to regional subordinate unified commands
and JIATFs with IW missions; establishing
interagency advisory assistance teams at sub-
national levels of government; and expanding
the use of U.S. Military Groups (MILGRPs) to
conduct and support irregular warfare as inte-
gral components of U.S. missions abroad.
Wargames
As the sponsor of the irregular warfare
JOC, USSOCOM was responsible for experi-
menting with the concept during the first
year of its life. As part of the experimentation
process, USSOCOM cosponsored the Unified
Quest 2007 and 2008 (UQ 07 and UQ 08)
wargame series with the U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The
IW JOC was tested against complex scenarios
without discovering any substantive problems
with its logic, description of future operating
environments, or fundamental descriptions of
operational requirements for the future joint
force. No other JOC has been so tested. As
the spiral game play evolved, so did partici-
pant discussion of the dynamics of IW, with
certain areas deserving particular attention
discussed below.14
Planning and Preparation. Players
recognized the need for a different type of
planning, assessment, and preparation period.
U.S. Army (Michael L. Casteel)
100 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
COONS and HARNED
Players recognized that IW is a “messy” form least as compelling to the relevant popula- than were the military participants. DOD
of warfare that does not lend itself to clean tions. The respective narratives become the preaches unified action but non-DOD senior
formulas or predictable outcomes. UQ partici- emotional, intellectual, and spiritual founda- participants argued instead for the more
pants struggled to determine the appropriate tions for each party’s policies, strategies, cam- realistic goal of managing diverse institutional
approach to the irregular problem set they paigns, and operations. cultures, relationships, and politics.
faced. Many civilian participants considered Difficulty with Whole of Government. In 2007, the Office of the Secretary of
the military planning process stovepiped The whole-of-government approaches that Defense sponsored a three-part IW wargame
and rigid. They stated that the U.S. Agency the IW JOC seeks to implement depend on to inform DOD efforts to develop new opera-
for International Development in particular achieving unified action through agreed tional and organizational constructs and
has a more dynamic planning process that is interagency processes and procedures that do identify capability and capacity shortfalls.
derived from the political and cultural nature not exist. Implementation is unlikely without The game tested the use of GPF and SOF to
of the interagency process and, unlike the a collaborative effort between the President stabilize a large, failing country. The IW JOC
military planning process, factors in more and Congress. The requirements for U.S. held up well. Significantly, no team recom-
ambiguity and longer term objectives (years, Government civilian agencies to conduct IW mended a direct military intervention with
not months). do not reflect the reality of interagency bar- GPF ground forces; all wanted to pursue a
Ambiguity of IW. The challenges of riers to implementing whole-of-government more indirect approach in support of host
building IW campaigns demonstrated the dis- approaches. The senior civilian participants country security forces. All teams agreed
comfort and confusion of GPF players when in the 2008 seminar wargame agreed that that the problem was primarily political and
forced to wrestle with the ambiguity inherent
in IW. While players generally agreed that
the U.S. Agency for International Development has a planning
the ideas introduced in the IW JOC were
valid and central to future warfighting, they process derived from the political and cultural nature of the
struggled with the nature of this form of interagency process and, unlike the military planning process,
warfare, especially when they were unable factors in more ambiguity and longer term objectives
to articulate the risk associated with various
indirect approaches.
Population as Focus of Operations. UQ implementing the IW concept is about lever- that the Department of State should have the
participants overwhelmingly validated the aging relationships within the interagency lead. They also agreed that the problem was
idea that IW should be population-oriented community. This process is ad hoc and will regional and asked that MILGRPs be estab-
and that conventional approaches to warfare never be as efficient as the military planning lished or reinforced in the threatened country
do not fully accommodate this notion. process. Civilian participants generally were and in all neighboring countries.
MILGRPs Conducting and Supporting more comfortable with this as an approach Most players did not think Congress
IW. The use of MILGRPs as an alternative to the ambiguities of irregular challenges would allow the executive branch to transform
C2 mechanism for IW was a recurring theme
during UQ 07 and UQ 08. Participants gener- Squad leader directs
Marines during firefight
ally agreed that MILGRPs with enhanced
with Taliban insurgents
legal and budget authorities have distinct
advantages over JTFs when conducting or
supporting IW activities in the absence of
major combat operations.
Importance of Strategic Communica-
tion. These activities depend on early crafting
of a compelling narrative that resonates with
all relevant populations, legitimizing friendly
IW messages and actions while discrediting
the messages and actions of adversaries in the
minds of the relevant populations. One of the
most profound ideas to emerge during UQ
07 was the concept of narrative advanced by
Michael Vlahos of The Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity. A narrative is a story that a party to
an armed struggle uses to justify its messages Milks)
A.
and actions so they become legitimate and Keith
fsauvcocreasbs lien t oIW th ree rqeuleivreasn at pnoaprrualtaitvieo nths.a St tnroatt egic Corps (
only counters and discredits adversary nar- Marine
ratives but also offers an alternative that is at U.S.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 101
FEATURES | Irregular Warfare Is Warfare
for IW and believed that U.S. civilian agencies January 2007 invited the other DOD com- are more focused on the relevant popula-
would therefore be unable to build sufficient ponents to join in an effort to identify and tions than on adversaries.
IW capacity to fill their shortfalls. Some players prioritize the key capabilities the joint force The teams completed the revised
argued that even if the agencies could build needs to conduct global IW operations. Three appendix C in late July 2007, in time for its
adequate capacity, it might be more cost-effec- teams applied the ideas in the IW JOC against use during fiscal year 2010–2015 program
tive to expand DOD civil affairs, psychological selected steady-state security posture sce- development. USSOCOM and MCCDC are
operations, and foreign area officer capabilities narios to write three concepts of operations using it as the starting point for a co-led IW-
and detail these resources to the civilian agen- (CONOPS) for waging IW in friendly states, focused Joint Capabilities-based Assessment
cies or assign them to MILGRPs to function (CBA) that began in August 2007. The Joint
under the direction of Foreign Service Officers, Staff approved its joint capabilities document
the Coast Guard and Border
especially in unstable or hostile operational in August 2008, and the functional solutions
Patrol are the closest
environments where civilian agencies cannot analysis is under way.
operate effectively. government organizations to a
Moreover, the teams could not agree European-style constabulary Current Assessment
on how to build up the host country national DOD has made great progress over the
police and the associated judicial and penal last 3 years. There is growing consensus on
institutions. They saw the problem as mag- hostile states, and nonbelligerent states. the definition, character, and scope of IW. The
nitudes more difficult than building up a From these CONOPS, the teams developed a Deputy Secretary of Defense has approved
foreign military. DOD does not have a con- framework of key IW capabilities in terms of multiple plans for correcting IW shortfalls.
stabulary-like paramilitary force with police tasks, conditions, and effects. The fiscal year 2008–2013 program devoted
powers; the Coast Guard and Border Patrol The teams found that many of the tasks significantly more resources to IW. The
are the closest government organizations to that joint forces perform in IW are essen- Secretary of Defense approved and signed
a European-style constabulary. There is no tially the same as the tasks they perform in the IW JOC on September 11, 2007. The 2007
clear-cut solution to this critical shortfall in conventional warfare. However, the condi- version of Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for
capability to conduct COIN and CT missions. tions under which they perform them in the Armed Forces of the United States, incor-
IW are fundamentally different from the porates IW concepts into joint doctrine for
Capability Assessment conditions under which they perform other the first time, and new joint publications on
When USSOCOM completed the final military operations. These different IW counterinsurgency and counterterrorism are
draft of the IW JOC in December 2006, it conditions require the joint force to reex- being written. The Joint Staff completed its
knew that appendix C (Table of Operational amine how it performs these common tasks assessment of GPF requirements for COIN
Effects and Broad Military Capabilities) in IW. The teams also found that many of and CT and presented their options for
needed further refinement. Continuing their the desired effects for the tasks are different meeting those requirements to the Deputy
collaboration, USSOCOM and MCCDC in when conducted in IW because the effects Secretary of Defense in December 2007. The
Services and other DOD components have
a greater appreciation for their IW require-
Marines maneuver during firefight, Operation Iraqi Freedom
ments. An IW-focused CBA is under way,
and its products will help drive DOD require-
ments and programming efforts. USSOCOM
and USJFCOM are collaborating on a series
of IW workshops and experiments to further
refine the IW concept. Other government
departments and agencies have not embraced
the term irregular warfare but support State
Department initiatives to improve the ability
of the U.S. Government to plan and conduct
State-led “complex operations.” The State
Department has issued an interim Counter-
insurgency Guide for U.S. Government Policy
Reed) Makers, is co-sponsoring with DOD an
R.
Kevin Interagency Consortium for Complex Opera-
mera ( tions, and has expressed interest in expanded
Ca strategy and planning coordination between
mbat DOD and State.
Division Co As a wNheovleer, tDhOeleDs si,n mstuitcuht iroenms areinms ation b teo od one.
Marine oriented on peacetime processes to sustain
st1 and enhance conventional warfighting
102 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
COONS and HARNED
capabilities, at the expense of modifying those USSOCOM needs to increase its SOF IW-related skills and knowledge. If we do not
processes to meet current wartime demands, capabilities and capacity to perform uncon- create new demands that force the Service
improve outcomes, and prepare for persistent ventional warfare and other indirect IW activ- personnel management systems to transform,
conflict in the future. The correct metrics for ities on a global scale, and particularly outside we cannot hope to identify, access, educate,
measuring IW transformation are programs the U.S. Central Command area, where by our train, develop, utilize, and retain adequate
funded and capabilities and capacity fielded— absence we have ceded the strategic initiative numbers of the people we need to wage pro-
not briefings given, plans written, and pro- to our adversaries. Our nation cannot “kill tracted IW on a global scale.
cesses followed. Many in DOD disagree on or capture” its way to victory in this struggle. The 2006 QDR Report states that “to
the appropriate balance among conventional At best, our manhunting efforts buy time for achieve global effects across countries,
warfighting and IW capacities and the appro- more decisive indirect IW activities to achieve regions, and groups, the United States must
priate balance of effort required among U.S. their desired effects. localize and defeat terrorist extremist cells
Armed Forces and civilian departments and DOD needs to implement the options with approaches tailored to local conditions
agencies. There is widespread institutional identified in the Joint Staff assessment of GPF and differentiated worldwide.”17 Seven years
resistance to the concept of transforming IW capabilities and capacity. The general into this struggle as it was redefined on 9/11,
DOD to wage persistent and protracted irreg- purpose forces need a new COIN and CT the Department of Defense must do every-
ular warfare on a global scale. Some within paradigm; the current paradigm of U.S.-based thing it can to accelerate the fielding of new
DOD also see IW as a temporary inconve- joint expeditionary forces organized into capabilities and capacity to wage irregular
nience that will go away when U.S. major JTFs is inappropriate for steady-state IW warfare and win this struggle. JFQ
combat forces leave Iraq, a belief reinforced by requirements. DOD should embrace a return
the fact that DOD has not clearly articulated to the Cold War paradigm of large numbers NoteS
what the force employment requirements of empowered MILGRPs operating under the
are for waging IW globally. Absent a defined direction of U.S. Chiefs of Mission and col- 1 Hybrid warfare is the simultaneous and
intertwined application of conventional and irregu-
endstate for IW transformation, the best laborating regionally to defeat transnational
lar warfare methods to achieve strategic objectives.
DOD has been able to achieve are marginal adversaries. The leading advocate of this
2 U.S. Department of Defense, Irregular
improvements to existing capabilities. paradigm shift is noted strategist Colonel
Warfare Execution Roadmap (IW Roadmap)
There are still debates over whether IW Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.), who has written
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, April
and hybrid warfare will replace conventional a study15 for the Center for a New American
28, 2006), 6.
warfare. In some respects, the current combat Security and an article in Army magazine16 on 3 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan tint the the need to adopt such a paradigm shift. Armed Forces of the United States (Washington,
lens of the debate, but the measures of effec- The DOD intelligence components and DC: The Joint Staff, May 14, 2007), I–1.
tiveness for IW transformation should not unified commands need to accelerate their 4 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept
be improvements to current operations but efforts to improve counter-network opera- (IW JOC), version 1 (Washington, DC: Department
rather how well DOD prepares for the broader tions. As the IW Roadmap states, “Vital to of Defense, September 11, 2007), 8.
5 IW JOC, 15.
ongoing effort against violent extremists and this effort is increasing the ability of DOD
6 Ibid., 17.
their state and nonstate sponsors. to capture and integrate knowledge from
7 JP 1, I–6.
DOD continues to struggle with how anthropologists, sociologists, geographers,
8 Some IW advocates would prefer a different
to deal with the inability of relevant civilian demographers, and other social scientists into
term, such as unconventional, nonconventional,
departments and agencies to expand their intelligence and operational analysis at all
or traditional warfare, but irregular warfare is the
own capacities to perform nonmilitary tasks levels down to the tactical.” term of record at least for the remainder of this
(governance, essential services, economic The military departments and Services, administration.
development, and so forth) that are vital unified commands, and National Defense 9 JP 1, I–7.
to waging IW and conducting complex University need to institutionalize the changes 10 Ibid.
operations. they have made to joint and Service education 11 IW JOC, 1.
But we must get past these challenges and training for IW. The U.S. military has a 12 Ibid., 1.
13 Ibid.
and seize the momentum of the IW JOC. The century-long history of adopting temporary
14 U.S. Southern Command, Unified Quest 07
Armed Forces have been assigned an impor- solutions in response to irregular challenges,
Analytical Report (June 4, 2007), 5–8 and 12–23.
tant new IW mission and must now adapt only to scrap them when the challenges pass.
15 Robert B. Killebrew, The Left-hand Side of
their portfolios, requirements, programmatic This current struggle will not pass in the
the Spectrum, Ambassadors and Advisors in Future
funding, and conventional mindsets to IW. foreseeable future. Our education and train-
U.S. Strategy, The Future of the U.S. Military Series
ing base needs permanent solutions to meet (Washington, DC: Center for a New American
A Way Ahead the demands from the field that will come Security, June 2007).
Transformation efforts of this scale are once the general purpose forces adopt a new 16 Robert B. Killebrew, “The Army and the
difficult, but a path does exist. The major paradigm for waging IW. Changing American Strategy,” Army (August
initiatives of the IW Roadmap are still valid, Most important of all, the military 2007), 25–34.
and DOD should continue to pursue them as departments need to create or improve 17 Department of Defense, 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Depart-
it moves forward in the fielding of new IW career paths, incentives, and advancement
ment of Defense, February 6, 2006), 22.
capabilities and capacity. opportunities for DOD personnel with critical
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