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A I R P OW E R A New Way of Warfare (Sea Control) DR. DONALD D. CHIPMAN Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Airpower A New Way of Warfare (Sea Control) 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining St,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 13 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 AIRPOWER: A NEW WAY OF WARFARE 57 As our nation approaches the dawn of thetwenty-first century, we have enough indication to tell us that air power has really changed the American way of war. —Gen Ronald R. Fogleman Former Chief of Staff, United States Air Force VAGUE MILITARY THREATS and reduc tions in arms manu fac tur ing are forcing new stra te gic con sid era tions. Gone are the days when Amer ica could quickly mo bi lize and use brute force to over come the enemy. Accord ing to General Fo gle man, a new way of war is emerg ing, one based on technol ogy and airpower. These ad- vant ages, he stated, must be exploited “to com pel an ad ver sary to do our will at the least cost to the United States in lives and re- sources.”1 Hist oric ally, America based its strategy on su pe rior numbers forti fied by mass produc tion. In 1943, because indus tries such as the Kai ser Corpo ra tion could build a 10,800-ton Libe rty ship every 10 days, the United States launched more than fifteen hun dred ves sels.2 Duri ng World War II, American indust ries sent more than 19,200 B-24 Libera tors to the front.3 To day, be cause fewer cor po ra tions are in volved in the arms business, some indus trial experts surmise that the produc tion mira cles of the past are no longer possi ble.4 Airpower: America’s New Way of War RAND, however, believes that these gaps can be bridged by the extens ive use of tech- no logi cally sophis ti cated airpower. Their study claims that “with concent rat ion on air power, U.S. forces could manage concur rent cri ses, in say, the Persian Gulf area and Ko rea.”5 Echo ing this theme, Gen eral Fo gle man 58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997 A Libyan guided missile corvette burns in the Gulf of Sidra after a confrontation with airpower. In this and other operations, airpower delivered a violent and startling psychological message to Mu‘ammar Gadhafi. be lieves air power can “pro vide a tre men dous lev er age to re solve fu ture cri ses rap idly at low style war poses a problem the US military has cost.”6 been unable or unwill ing to solve.”8 When properly applied in the past, air- Against Iraq, coali tion forces found an en power has achieved some great successes. At emy who was particu larly vulner able to air- Norm andy, it gained command of the air and power. Still, the les sons from the Gulf War are thus provided valuable support for the D-day nei ther neces sar ily univer sal nor appli ca ble land ings. Against Japan, it helped the US take in other conflicts. Although airpower domi com mand of the seas and deliver a war- nated the Gulf War as no other, concluded ending blow. Eliot Cohen, “no military technol ogy (in- Not all air cam paigns, how ever, were ef fec deed, no technol ogy at all) works all the tive. In Vietnam, even after one million time.” Ultim ately, enthu si asts have to real ize fixed- wing sorties, airpower did not prevent that airpower is not neces sar ily a “shining the en emy from con tinu ing to ad vance and to sword.” 9 even tu ally force the United States out of the Yet, airpower is a critical compe tency in war.7 While airpower helped bring the North the adoption of a new American way of war- Viet nam ese to the dip lo matic ta ble, it was not fare. Given the right circum stances, it can be able to defeat the elusive guerril las. Ulti eff ect ive in acting alone or in the joint arena. mately, explained one histo rian, “at the low “Ameri can lead ers at the end of this cen tury,” est level of the conflict, protracted guerrilla- ac knowl edge Cohen, “indeed have been AIRPOWER: A NEW WAY OF WARFARE 59 vouch safed with a military instru ment of a Sea Control: Land-Based po tency rarely known in the his tory of war.”10 Airpower versus Ships In its past spectrum of achievements, airpower helped control the seas, occupy land, In 1919, Lt Comdr B. G. Leighton, US sup port armies, and supply others. Against Navy, began the first serio us American dia Mu‘am mar Gad hafi, it de liv ered a vio lent and logue on the use of airpower for sea control. star tling psycho logi cal message. During the His arti cle, “Possi bili ties of Bombing Air- Gulf conflict, in a “war of a thou sand cuts,” it craft,” outlined how airplanes could attack forced upon Iraq exten sive strateg ic paraly sis and de stroy the ene my’s na val forces.13 Build and ul ti mately a de ci sive de feat.11 As recently ing upon this concept, William “Billy” as 1995, air power aided the Bosnian peace ne Mitchell described a maritime scenario in go tia tions by conduct ing a “Delib er ate which dirigi bles conducted ocean recon nais Force” air campaign against the Serbs that ul sance, fighters gained command of the air, ti mately en cour aged them to sign the Day ton and bombers attacked enemy ships.14 Ac cords.12 Within this spectrum of achieve In 1921, after sinking the battle ship ments there were many great successes. Ostfries land, Mitchell proved that many of Among the more prominent, but seldom these theories were possi ble. Agreeing with cited, was the use of land-based airpower to both Mitchell and Leighton, an Army and con trol the seas. Navy board declared that “aircraft carry ing high-capac ity, high- explosive bombs of suf fi cient size have adequate offen sive Billy Mitchell proved a point in l921 when his bombers sank the captured German battleship Ostfriesland, which had been considered unsinkable. 60 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997 power to sink or seri ously damage any naval When the war be gan, Ger many had 56 sea ves sel at present constructed, provided such wort hy subma rines. By 1943, however, they had more than three hun dred, many of which were pa trol ling in the mid- Atlantic just south of Greenland. Known as the “Black Pit,” this Historically, America based its arena was free of Allied air cover age. Because strategy on superior numbers of the subma ri ne’s great successes, Churchill fortified by mass production. told an anti-U- boat committ ee in Octo ber 1942 to find better methods of fighting this men ace.21 One recom men da tion focused on con vert ing B-24 Libera tors into long-range pro jec tiles can be placed in the water along- ant is ubm ar ine aircraft and deploy ing them side the vessel.”15 into the Black Pit.22 These concepts, however, remained dor Three months later, 11 Lib era tors from the mant un til 1937, when the Japa nese marched Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command’s out of Man chu ria and in vaded China. In their 120th Squad ron landed in Ice land. From here as sault against Shanghai, the Japanese sent they flew into the Black Pit and began pa trol the cruiser Idzumo into the Yangtze River, ling. Armed with machine guns, acousti cal where it began firing upon the city. Several hom ing torpe does, and fifteen hundred miles away, in Nanking, Col Claire L. pounds of depth charges, each Libera tor had Chennault, advi sor to the Chinese air force, a range of over twenty-three hundred miles tried to disrupt this attack by sending North and could remain on station for about three rop 2E bombers against the warship. Piloted hours.23 by the Chi nese, these planes flew over Shang Be cause Great Britain and the Allies suc hai and dive-bombed the cruiser. Follow ing cessf ully defended several of her convoys, be hind in a re con nais sance air craft, May 1943 became a key turning point in the Chennault claimed that a five-hundred- Bat tle of the Atlan tic. One particul ar convoy, pound bomb exploded on the deck and that SC- 130, departed Halifax, Canada, on 11 the ship later sank. “At the end of the war,” he May, with 37 mer chant ships and six na val es ex plained, “a nose count of the Jap Navy corts. Pro ceed ing to ward Eng land, they sailed showed the alleged Idzumo, sunk in the mud for eight days unthreat ened through the at Kure.”16 Most authorities, however, agree North Atlan tic. The Germans, however, were that the bombs fell short and that the cruiser aware of the convoy’s route and prepared for rem ained unscathed.17 In any case, this was an assault. With approxi mately 30 subma one of the first at tacks by land- based air power rines in the Black Pit, they planned to coord i against a ship in World War II. nate their strikes by using Rudel tak tiks, or Be fore America became involved in World wolf- pack tactics.24 War II, the British began fighting Germany On 19 May, the convoy sighted a distant for con trol of the seas around the Brit ish Isles. U- boat and detached naval escorts to drive it In this strug gle, known as the Bat tle of the At un der wa ter. At about 0400, the first RAF B-24 lant ic between 1939 and 1942, 153 German ar rived over the convoy. Using airborne ra U- boats successf ully sank 1,124 British and dar, it discov ered a surfaced subma rine and neut ral ships. These losses included the Brit forced it to submerge. Diving down to one ish aircraft car ri ers HMS Coura geous and HMS hund red feet, the plane crossed over the en Ark Royal and the battles hips HMS Royal Oak emy vessel and dropped three 250-pound and HMS Bar ham.18Ger man sub ma rines sank depth charges and two acoustic homing tor an other 1,160 Allied ships in 1942 and re pe does. After an explo sion, U-boat 954 be- duced Brit ain’s oil im ports to a trickle.19 “The came the B-24’s first confirmed kill.25 U- boat at tack,” ac knowl edged Win ston Chur Con tinu ing its patrol, the Libera tor chill, “was our worst evil.”20 sighted five more U-boats. It success fully AIRPOWER: A NEW WAY OF WARFARE 61 forced four to crash-dive and then flew over Doe nitz, however, rede ployed his subma one subma rine that remained on the surface. rine forces into the South At lan tic. Since most Af ter the plane sprayed it with machine-gun fire, the U-boat submerged. In each attack, the aircrew marked the spot and called in na The lessons from the Gulf War are val es corts to con tinue the pur suit. By the end neither necessarily universal nor of the three-hour patrol, the Iceland-based applicable in other conflicts. B-24 had de stroyed one sub ma rine and forced five others to submerge.26 Duri ng the rest of the day, five more aircraft ro tated in and out of the Black Pit. Upon of the U-boats departed from French ports, ar riv ing over the convoy at 0915, the second pa trols began by sailing across the Bay of Bis B-24 attacked one subma rine and forced six cay. Incap ab le of transiti ng totally under wa oth ers to crash-dive.27 In the after noon, three ter, these submar ines had to surface peri odi more planes contin ued the surveil lance. cally. As a coun ter, the Brit ish sent long- range Air cover age was suspended during the air craft into the bay and began a sea-control night and restored at first light. During the cam paign later known as the “Big Bay Slaugh two- day battle, seven Libera tors sighted 24 ter.”33 U- boats and forced 16 to submerge. Of the In Octo ber 1942, the US Army Air Forces eight submar ines attacked, three were de- en tered the Atlant ic war by creat ing several stroyed.28 When results of these air attacks land- based anti sub ma rine squadrons. Offi reached Germany, the high command de cially known as the US Army Air Forces’ Anti- cided to withdraw their submar ines from the subm ar ine Command, these units were de- Black Pit. Thus unopp osed, Convoy SC-130 signed to help the US Navy hunt for enemy ar rived in Great Britain four days later. subm ar ines, which, at the time, were patrol- Un til this bat tle, the Ger mans be lieved that ling along the Atlant ic coast and in the Carib- their U-boats in the Black Pit could fight with bean.34 im pu nity. The presence of land-based air- As the fe roc ity of bat tle in the Bay of Bis cay power and other factors such as better intell i in creased, two Army Air Forces anti sub ma gence, radar, and the eventual intro duc tion rine squad rons joined the hunt. In No vem ber 1942, 21 American B-24s landed in South of escort carri ers forced a tacti cal change. Eng land and began flying out of St. Eval, Duri ng May 1943, Germany lost 41 subma Corn wall. Between Decem ber and March, rines; of these, 28 were destroyed in the mid- they flew several patrols across the bay Atlantic.29 At this point, acknowl edged Adm searchi ng for and attack ing various German Karl Doenitz, commander of all German U- subm ar ines. On occa sion they encount ered boats, wolf-pack opera tions “were no longer Germ an Junkers Ju-88 aircraft and had to pos si ble.” 30 “I accord ingly withdrew the fight their way back to England. boats from the North Atlan tic.”31 One histo Duri ng the bay campaign, the Americans rian summa rized this campaign in these found 20 U- boats and at tacked eight. One was terms: a con firmed kill, and three oth ers were clas si fied as damaged.35 Of the 21 Libera tors that The VLR [very long range] B-24 Liberator beg an the operat ion, one plane was lost in aircraft of RAF 120th Squadron was the weapon comb at and six in various acci dents.36 system which tipped the battle in favor of the In March 1943, the two American squad Allies. What made the aircraft such an effective rons were redes ig nated the 480th Group and weapon against the U-boat was their high speed relative to a surface vessel, a speed which sent to Port Lyautey, French Morocco. Here permitted them to search a much greater area they joined a US Navy squadron of PBY Cata than a ship.32 lin as, which pa trolled pri mar ily along the lit- 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997 to ral, up to two hundred miles out. The mately one hundred Allied planes, includ ing 480th, how ever, ex tended this At lan tic cov er modif ied B-25s carryi ng five-hundred-p ound age to over one thousand miles. 37 bombs, attacked and success fully destroyed Af ter several success ful subma rine attacks, an entire Japanese convoy.43 a B-24 crew sighted a U-boat on 17 July about Fly ing at one hun dred feet above the ocean two hundred miles west of Portu gal. As the sur face, American B-25s skipped their bombs Ameri cans began their attack, the en emy sent across the water and into the hulls of these a hail of fire into the plane’s cockpit, wound ships. At the battle’s conclu sion, 12 cargo ing the naviga tor, bombar dier, copi lot, and ships and four Japanese destroy ers were sunk ra dio opera tor. Despite damage, the crew or severely damaged. Comment ing on the dropped a 350-pound depth charge and then Bis marck Sea battle, one histor ian claimed strug gled back to Port Lyautey. Photos con- that air power “fi nally achieved what Gen eral firmed that the sub ma rine was de stroyed.38 In Billy Mitchell had so breezily predicted 15 tot al, the 480th sank three U-boats and dam- years before. They had destroyed an enemy aged four others.39 Af ter a four- month tour in fleet at sea un aided by na val sur face forces.” 44 Mo rocco, the 480th de ployed to Tu nis, where In China, Chennault’s Fourteenth Air it provided air cover age for Mediterr an ean Force flew against ships in the Gulf of Tonkin, con voys. Hai phong Harbor, and Hong Kong and While the Battle of the Atlan tic continu ed helped close down the Yangtze River. During to the end of the war, the spring of 1943 was a the fall of 1943, his planes conducted a six- turni ng point. In that year, in addit ion to day blitz in which they recorded great land- based airpower, the Allies deployed achieve ments. In addit ion to 71 Japanese air- more convoy escorts, includ ing carri ers, and craft destroyed, contended Chennault, these thus extracted a heavy toll on the German U- suc cesses included “three ocean-going ships boats. “The com bi na tion of sup port groups of sunk and damage to docks, coal piles, supply car ri ers and escort vessels,” acknowl edged de pots, and airdrome instal la tions.”45 Win ston Churchill, “aided by long-range air- In the fall of 1944, with the Battle of Leyte craft of the Coastal Com mand, which now in Gulf under way, the Allies began a campaign cluded American squadrons, proved deci to sever Japan’s southern sea lanes located in sive.”40 the South China Sea. Initially, though, Fifth In the Pacific, victory over Japan ulti Air Force helped se cure the Leyte land ings by mately depended on the Allies’ ability to de at tack ing Japa nese re in force ment ships in Or stroy the ene my’s mari time ca pa bili ties. As an moc Bay, located on the east side of Leyte Is- is land na tion, Ja pan de pended heav ily on im land. Each time enemy ships entered the bay, ported mate ri als to fuel its steel mills and Al lied airpower attacked and turned back an other indus tries. Thus, land-based aircraft es ti mated 70,000 enemy rein force ment were used early in the war to attack the Japa troops.46 In addi tion, noted the US Bombing nese naval and merchant ships. Begin ning in Sur vey, “twelve merchant ships and 15 naval Sep tem ber 1942, Fifth Air Force planes, fly ing ves sels carryi ng troops and supplies or per- out of Port Moresby, New Guinea, started form ing escort duties were sunk by United bombi ng the port city of Rabaul. Through States aircraft in or near Ormoc Bay.” Of con tinu ous at tacks, the Ameri cans even tu ally these, Fifth Air Force sank eight.47 sank over 373,000 tons of shipping.41 After With the capture of Mindoro in Decem ber Ra baul, the Fifth flew strikes against enemy 1944, land-based airplanes extended their ves sels in the New Guinea harbors of Wewak cove ra ge across the entire South China Sea. and Holland ia.42 From these bases they conducted maritime One of the most success ful sea-control raids against the ports of Saigon, Phan Rang, strikes occurred off the east coast of New Cam Ranh, and Hong Kong, and they flew as Guinea in March 1943. In that battle, known far north as Shang hai. Japa nese mer chant and as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, approxi na val ships in or near Hainan Island and For- AIRPOWER: A NEW WAY OF WARFARE 63 “In the spring of 1945, . . . B-29s began mining Japanese waters. . . . From March to the end of the war, these planes flew 1,529 sorties and dropped more than 12,000 mines in various channels, harbors, and straits.” mosa were also successf ully assaulted. On 13 on bomb ing mis sions against Ja pan and Man June 1945, 62 B-24s loaded with 55-gallon chu ria. One of the first B-29 missions, how- drums of napalm attacked ships in Hong ever, involved a bombing and mining opera Kong harbor. As they departed, the crews tion against Palem bang, Suma tra. On 9 claimed that the bay was a “sea of flames.”48 August, 56 B-29s departed Kharagpur and By March 1945, affirmed the United States flew to an advance base on the island of Cey Stra te gic Bombing Survey, “Japanese ship- lon. Here the planes refu eled, remained over- ping through the South China Sea had night, and then headed across the Indian ceased.”49 Ocean to Palem bang. While most of the air- Ja pan’s abil ity to im port iron ore and other craft bombed the city’s oil install at ion, eight raw mate ri als now focused on a few sea lanes B- 29s descended to one thousand feet and cross ing the Sea of Ja pan from Man chu ria. To planted mines in Moesi River channels lead fur ther strangle the enemy, airpower was ing to the refin ery.52 While the bombing at- used in the spring of 1945 to plant mines in tack accom plished little, the mining opera Ja pan’s inland seas, straits, and harbors. tion caused seven ship casual ties and closed One of the first success ful aerial mine op the river to oil traffic for over a month.53 era tions occurred in Februa ry 1943, when B- In the spring of 1945, fly ing out of Mari ana 24s of the Tenth Air Force closed Rangoon’s Is lands, B-29s began mining Japanese waters. har bor.50 This attack was followed by a series Nearly half of these missions were launched of airborne mining campaigns in the Solo against the Straits of Shimo noseki, located mon Islands, Bangkok, Nether lands East In- bet ween the islands of Kyushu and Honshu. dies, South China Sea, and the Bismarck Ar From March to the end of the war, these chi pel ago.51 planes flew 1,529 sorties and dropped more Duri ng the summer of 1944, B-29 Super- than 12,000 mines in various channels, har for tresses of the 20th Bomber Command be bors, and straits.54 gan fly ing out of Kharag pur, In dia. From here, This aerial effort complem ented an ongo they flew over the Himal aya Mountains and ing US naval subma rine campaign designed into Chengdu, China. Then they headed out to stran gle Ja pan. By the spring of 1945, Japa- 64 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1997 nese imports had declined to about 10 per- tor ian, “the Ka mi kaze was the dead li est aer ial cent of its prewar years, and maritime traffic an tiship ping threat faced by Allied surface in the Shimo noseki Straits decreased by war fare forces in the war. Approxi mately nearly 90 per cent.55 In to tal, B-29 aer ial mines 2800 Kamik aze attack ers sank 34 navy ships, sank 287 enemy ships and damaged 323 oth dam aged 368 others, killed 4900 sailors and ers. Ac cord ing to the US Bomb ing Sur vey, the wounded over 4800.” 59 At war’s end, the Japa ef fects of these opera tions were devast ati ng: nese still had hun dreds of ka mi ka zes ready to at tack any naval amphibi ous assault made The accumulated results of the mining upon their homeland. Af ter World War II, US land-based aircraft More than anything else, the 1982 par tici pated in several other sea-control Falklands War reemphasized the missions. One of these occurred on 12 May lethal effects of land-based aircraft 1975— a Khmer Rouge gunboat crew boarded the American merchant ship Maya guez.60 Af armed with antiship missiles. ter firing a rocket and several machine-gun rounds, the enemy pulled alongside and cap tured the vessel. Thus began a short conflict in which land-based airpower played a key campaign left Japan little hope of continuing role. the war for long. Resultant shortages of coal, oil, salt, and food contributed so completely to Shortly af ter tak ing the ship, Khmer Rouge paralyzing industry that shortly before guer ril las re moved the Maya guez crew and es surrender leading industrialists indirectly corted them ashore. At this point, US military informed the militarists that industry could not forces entered the conflict. While Navy P-3 continue. They estimated further that Ori ons conducted airborne recon nais sance, 7,000,000 Japanese would have starved to USAF A-7s and C-130 gunships attacked sev death if the war had continued another year. 56 eral Khmer Rouge gunboats. Three were im The mining campaign, however, exacted a me di ately sunk, and several others were se toll. Twenti eth Bomber Command lost 15 B- verely damaged.61 29s, and of these, 11 were lost over the Shi mo In an ef fort to neu tral ize any re main ing en noseki Straits.57 emy soldiers on the Maya guez, an Air Force The fight for sea control in the Pacific in A-7 Crusader skimmed across the ship’s bow volved more than just American strikes and dropped tear gas can is ters. While US ma against an unres ourcef ul enemy. Indeed, the rines began searching for the American crew Japa nese re tali ated with one of the most ef fec on Koh Tang Island, a US Navy destroyer tive an tiship weap ons yet de signed, a manned pulled along side the Ameri can mer chant ship air borne guided missile. At the time, it was and recapt ured it. After four days of hostilit ies, called the kami kaze. the guer ril las sud denly freed their cap tives.62 Ini tial strikes occurred in 1944, during the To this day, there is specu la tion on why the Bat tle of Leyte Gulf, when the Japanese sent Khmer Rouge re leased the crew. Some be lieve their kami ka zes against the American fleet they simply wanted to avoid esca lat ing the pro tect ing the landings. One kamik aze dove con flict. Others claimed that destruct ion of onto the carrier USS Sant ee and destroyed it. the gunboats forced the guerril las to recon An other hit the carrier USS Suwanee and sider their plight. One prominent histor ian, ripped a 10-foot hole in the flight deck. A who particip ated in the battle, contends that third struck the carrier USS Saint Lô and ig “the air pres ence proved the ca pa bil ity to im - nited stored muni tions.58 pose pain, and the sinkings proved the will Af ter this battle, when the American fleet ing ness to do so.”63 In any case, with the aid of re de ployed to the wa ters off Oki nawa, the ka land- based air power, “a very short war” came mi ka zes at tacked again. Ac cord ing to one his- to an end.64