Table Of Content

Baghdad WITH THE EARLY morn ing attack on the Al Firdos (Amiriyah) shelt er on 13 Febr ua ry, Gen Col in Powell thought that Baghdad bombing had run its course. What's the value The Urban of “making the rubble bounce,” he told his staff. “We have got to rev iew things to make sure we're not bombing just for the sake of Sanctuary in ind isc rimin ate bombing.”1 What an odd and inacc ur ate image for the chairm an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to hold. Desert Storm? If ever there was a bombing campaign that was not ind isc rimin ate, it was Baghdad in Ope rat ion Desert Storm. Yet for all the visi bili ty of the Iraqi capital, and for all the W M. A ILLIAM RKIN briefi ngs—publ ic and classif ied—Gene ral Powell could not see what was happeni ng. Years later, in his autobio gr ap hy, he would still 4 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Baghdad. The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm? 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Air and Space Power Journal,155 N. Twining Street,Maxwell REPORT NUMBER AFB,AL,36112-6026 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 18 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 ask if air power needed to “pound down- I don't think the town Baghdad over a month into the war.”2 Airm en might lament Powell's infant ry bias, but such an instit ut ional explan at ion dang er in Berlin or glosses over far more import ant matters. If Des ert Storm was the first inform at ion war, Tok yo, either one, was as some claim, the Air Force stumbled badly. Even the highest military and civili an deci sion makers evidently did not unders tand part icul arly immin ent as the bombing campaign. Moreover, dispro port iona te attent ion focused on Bagh dad—an otherw ise statist ic ally minor part of it is for Baghdad today. the air war—bred misguided assumpt ions about targeti ng and strategy, ones that per sist to this day. Cons ide r these facts: —Walt er Cronkite •In 43 days of war, a mere 330 weapons CNN, 16 January 1991 (244 laser--g uided bombs and 86 Tomah awk cruise missiles) were delive red on Baghdad targ ets (a mere three percent of the total of all 5 Ta ble 1 Bombs Delive red by F--1 17 “Stealth” on Baghdad Targets JANUARY FEBRUARY 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 28 29 30 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 13 14 19 22 24 25 28 TOTAL Leadership Presidential(5)1 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 6 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 10 6 0 42 Government/Intelligence (5)2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 2 0 1 2 0 0 3 1 12 0 0 0 4 0 21 52 Military (5)3 1 3 0 0 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 4 7 0 6 0 0 0 0 32 Air Defense (2)4 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 Airfields (1)5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 4 0 25 C3 Telecommunications (9)3 5 0 1 4 0 6 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 6 8 0 0 0 0 0 39 Television/Radios(5)7 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 22 Bridges(4)8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 1 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 Other Storage (2)9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 Refinery(1)10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 TOTAL 10 5 1 5 4 14 2 4 13 9 3 10 13 9 6 6 13 33 0 29 4 14 10 21 244 Number of Targets Attacked 7 3 1 2 2 7 1 3 7 4 3 4 8 3 4 2 4 13 3 2 1 2 1 2 Tab le 1 connotes bombs deliv ered, not necess ari ly hits (see table 2). Based upon inform ation obtained by the author from AF/Checkmate, GWAPS, 37th Wing reco rds, and the author's research and visits to Baghdad. Most sources state that 116 Tomahawks hit Baghdad targets. However, 39 were launched on 17 Janu ary, 18 the next day, and some 29 followed on five days therea ft er (19, 22, 25, and 26 January), for a total of 86 cruise missiles.11 Note: Baghdad--a rea electric al power plants—Baghdad south electric al power plant (S/GTPP) (“Rashe ed” plant), Doura electric al power plant (S/GTPP), and Wa ziri yah electric al substat ion—were only targeted by Tomah awks. 1. This includes the “Amiriyah shelter” (Al Firdos C3 bunker), VIP bomb shelter (Govern ment Con 7. This includes Baghdad Inter na tional RADCOM transmit ter (AM), Baghdad Inter na tiona l Re trol Center South), New Presiden tial Palace, presiden tial residence and bunker, and Presiden tial Spe ceiver/RADREL, and Baghdad Primary TV XMTR/Antenna Center (Ahrar), “Inter na tional TV/Press” cen cial Secu rity Services compound. ter, and Minis try of Infor ma tion and Culture. 2. This includes Ba'ath party headquar ters, Baghdad Confer ence Center, Iraqi intel li gence Service 8. This includes Ahrar Bridge, Al Jumhu ri yah Bridge, Shuhada Bridge and 14 July (Arbataash) head quar ters, Iraqi Regional Intel li gence headquar ters, Minis try of Indus try, and Military Indus tri ali zat ion. Bridge. 3. This includes Iraqi air force headquar ters, Minis try of Defense (MOD), national computer com 9. This includes Baghdad army storage depot and Baghdad SRBM assem bly facil ity. plex, MOD headquar ters, Military Intel li gence headquar ters and Repub li can Guard headquar ters. 10. This includes Doura (Ad Dawra) refin ery. 4. This includes Baghdad air defense headquar ters (Wahda) and Baghdad RADREL termi nal air 11. CNA, De sert Storm Recon struc tion Report, vol. 2, pt. 1, 124, 142, 246, 340; vol. 4, pt. 1, 173, 251; de fense headquar ters. and vol. 5, pt. 1, 386, 420–34; Con duct at Persian Gulf War, SECRET version, T-- 256, released under 5. This includes Muthenna airfield. the Freedom of Infor ma tion Act; Atkin son, 37; Gordon and Trainor, 216. January 17 targets included 6. This includes “AT&T Building” (Rasheed Street), Baghdad automated multi pur pose radio relay Ba'ath party headquar ters, Minis try of Defense headquar ters, the New Presiden tial Palace, Doura and ter mi nal, Baghdad telecom mu ni ca tions center, Baghdad transmit ter station, Hurriya Square telephone Rash eed electri cal power plants and Baghdad-- area substa tions, and the Baghdad Doura refinery. ex change (Jadriya), Jenoub telephone exchange (Ma'moon in Al Karkh), Maiden Square (Bab al Janu ary 18 targets included the Govern ment Control Center South, MOD Computer Complex (Bab al Muadem) telephone exchange, Saddam City exchange and radio relay, and Shemal Telecom PTT. Muadem), Doura and Rasheed electri cal power plants and Baghdad-- area substa tions, and the Doura re fin ery. The remain ing strikes were all against leader ship and C 3 targets. BAGHDAD 7 Ta ble 2 of the total in the air war).4 Contrast this with Linebacker II, during which aircraft F-- 1 17 Baghdad dropped 15,000 tons on Hanoi in 11 days, Strikes, Hits, and Misses 50 times the bomb tonnage on Baghdad. NO- • There were 18 days and nights when STRIKES HITS MISSES DROPS there were no Baghdad strikes at all. In eight addit ional days and nights, five or January fewer weapons fell. There were only 14 17 13 7 3 4 nights when more than two indiv idu al tar- 18 7 5 0 3 gets were attacked within the city. 19 10 0 1 9 • Three of Baghdad's 42 targets—Iraqi air 20 6 4 1 4 force headquart ers, Muthenna airfield, and 21 2 4 0 0 Ba'ath party headquart ers—abs orbed 20 per- 22 11 14 0 2 cent of the effort.5 23 2 2 0 1 • The most intense “leaders hip” attack in 28 5 1 3 0 Baghd ad occurred on the last day of the war, 29 11 12 1 1 when 21 bombs were delive red against the 30 11 3 6 6 empty Ba'ath party headquart ers. • Only once, on 7 Februa ry, was a sus February pected president ial target hit with more 4 10 2 1 7 than two bombs during an attack. 5 10 9 1 0 Some argue that such statist ics prove the 6 16 12 1 3 dec is iven ess of a few bombs.6 Yet, based 7 8 8 1 1 upon an on--t he-- g round survey, interv iews 8 6 6 0 1 with Iraqi and American offic ials, and de- 10 8 5 1 3 tailed new data about the F--117 campaign 12 13 11 2 0 in the capital, a differe nt perspect ive 13 37 29 4 4 emerges. Assessi ng the effects of strateg ic 14 10 7 1 2 bombi ng has never been easy and Baghdad 19 28 25 2 1 is no except ion. But a close examin at ion of 22 2 4 0 0 city attacks leaves the unden ia ble conclu 24 9 12 2 0 sion that despite hyperb ole to the contrary, 25 8 6 0 2 Baghd ad bombing in itself produced little 26 35 0 0 35 ident if ia ble military effect. 27 2 0 0 2 Ind eed, the core focus mostly had civili an 28 21 25 0 5 imp act. The United Nations Children's Total 301 213 31 96 Fund (UNICEF) stated immed ia tel y after the ceasef ire that Baghdad “is a city essent ially Strikes are individual bombing missions with one or two bombs unm arked, a body with its skin basic ally in- designated to be dropped on targets. Hits are bombs delivered tact, with every main bone broken and with and scored by the 37th Wing as on or near aimpoints based its joints and tendons cut. . . .”7 There was upon onboard gun camera video. Misses are bombs obviously not delivered on designated aimpoints. No--drops are litt le rubble, and civili ans were spared, but occasions when pilots did not deliver ordnance during their their life support systems—elect rici ty, water, mission. transp ort at ion, commun ic at ions—were dis smart weapons expended) (see tables 1 and abled. 2).3 To some, this is the very definit ion of • Ordnance impacti ng in Baghdad totaled strateg ic. In the words of Lt Col Daniel 287 tons (not even one--t enth of one percent Kuehl, USAF, Retired, it was “the progress ive 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 entropic disloc at ion of the innards and Yet, the air attacks against Baghdad do not connec tive tissue of the Iraqi soci ety and of fer the operat ional exper ie nce to form the inf ras truct ure.”8 But did such convent ional bas is for such postwar convent ional wis inf ras truct ure ruin have the postul ated ef dom. Nor is it proven that a combin at ion of fect on the Hussein regime? The answer can early attacks by stealth and precis ion guided only come from a more candid appraisal of weapo ns can defeat advers ari es quickly and what really happened in the Iraqi capital. with a minimum of casualt ies. Befo re proceedi ng further, one must ex plici tly define the geographic limits and the reas on why Baghdad was a distinct part of A Stealth Mirage the air campaign. Because Iraqi air defenses ringi ng the capital were highly regarded, A postwar New York Times dispatch from “downt own” Baghdad was exclus ively the the Iraqi capital described “a people emerg dom ain of F--1 17 stealth fighters and cruise ing from defeat after sufferi ng one of the miss iles.9 Thirty--o ne targets were located heavie st aerial bomb ardm ents in history” (em within a three--m ile radius extendi ng from phas is added).11 Echoed Middle East hand the Rasheed Hotel (see figure 1). In total, Milt on Viorst in The New Yorker, “There was some 45 prospect ive Baghdad targets made no Second World War–style urban destruc it onto the bombing schedule (42 ended up tion, des pite the tons of explos ives that had bei ng attacked, 39 by stealth). fallen” (emphas is added).12 A dovish eyewit With unspari ng news media focus riveted ness wrote in The Nation that there were no on Baghdad, a hyperd isc rimin ate approach more than three thou s a n d civili an deaths. was chosen. Precis ion in weaponry and tar- “This would be the lowest number of civil get identif ic at ion facilit ated pinpoint bomb ian deaths from the bombing of a major ing to achieve “functional” as opposed to city in the history of modern war: Consid “physic al” destruct ion. Yet the impress ion er the Lond on Blitz, Dresden, Tok yo, Hi was always of far more intense bombing, roshima, Nag asaki.”13 How had the and even these sparse attacks ended up be imp ress ion become so skewed that Baghdad ing truncated, largely by Powell and Wash could be compared with the Second World ingt on decis ion makers who felt civili an War, when tens of thousands of tons were dama ge outweighed any military benefits. dropped and tens of thousands were killed The end result was that there were only a in indiv idu al raids? few moments in 24 nights when the invisi Partly the answer lies with the news me ble jets were actua lly present above the Iraqi dia, which spoke of massive attacks and an capit al. And there were merely six days “aval anche” of bombs, highlighti ng Bagh when Tomah awks made their presence felt. dad from the first night. US military “Iraqis are real trigger pullers,” one Air spokesm en, who chose the quick and glitzy Force offic er quipped, citing the mayhem of sound bite and video clip when more bal flak and surface--t o-- a ir missiles seen on anced and detailed explan at ion was re telev is ion that gave the impress ion of in- quired, contribu ted to the distort ion. tense bombing by coalit ion forces. The Fing er pointing nonethel ess fails to take firew orks display, however, was a powerf ul into conside rat ion the very strategy of air war ima ge. Air Force leaders even melded the plann ers and targete ers, and the employ larger strateg ic campaign and the bombing ment of the stealth fighter. Forty--t wo F-- of Baghdad together as if they were one and 117s flew 1,296 sorties (and 2,358 separate the same.10 The erro ne ous message is that strikes), dropping 2,077 bombs in Desert the proven strategy for any future war is to Storm, roughly 30 percent of Air Force foc us on a nat ion's capital—ind eed a guided tonnage.14 Given stealth's highly highly discriminate focus on its leaders hip. valu ed accur acy and surviva bili ty, most Key 1 Doura electrical power plant 26 State radio and television headquarters 2 Doura refinery 14 Ma'moon (Karkh) telephone exchange 27 Iraqi air force headquarters 3 Rasheed electrical power plant 15 Secret Police complex 28 Muthenna airfield 4 Jadriya/Hurriya Square communications relay 16 Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters 29 Al Firdos C3 facility 5 14 July Bridge 17 Ministry of Industry 30 Shuhada Bridge 6 Presidential palace/bunker 18 Saddam Conference Center 31 Ministry of Defense headquarters 7 New Pesidential Palace/bunker 19 Government control center south/bunker 32 Maiden Square/Bab Al Muadem telephone 8 Baghdad air defense headquarters 20 Internal security headquarters exchange 9 Alwiya telephone exchange 21 Nidal communications relay 33 Waziriyah electrical transformer station 10 Iraqi Intelligence Service regional headquarters 22 Jumhuriyah Bridge 34 Ministry of Defense computer center 11 Ba'ath party headquarters 23 Rasheed Street telephone exchange (AT&T Building) 35 Aadhimiya telephone exchange 12 Presidential security force 24 Ahrar Bridge 36 Military intelligence headquarters 13 Republican Guard headquarters 25 “Ministry of Propaganda” Off map: Baghdad SRBM assemb ly, intern at ional AM transmitt er, Rasheed airfield Unl oc ated: Army storage depot, Baghdad radio relay termin al air defense headquart ers (near or colloc ated with no. 8, Saddam City commun i cat ions relay). Note: Baghdad radio relay termin al air defense headquart ers and army storage depot are also located within the three--m ile ring. 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 (Above) A city burns. Ninety perc ent of the Japanese city of Toyama is in flames after an attack by B-29s on 2 August 1945. (Left) Schweinf urt erupts. Military, ind ust rial, and resident ial areas are the subject of a dense pattern of bombs. Yet, the bombing of Baghd ad was described as “one of the heaviest aerial bombard ments in history” in a post–Gulf War New York Times disp atch. BAGHDAD 11 A success? After the first three days, F-117s could report back that they had successf ull y del ive red a total of six bombs on capital leaders hip targets, 16 bombs overall in Baghdad. think it was sequest ered for high--t hreat ar eas where other planes might be more vul nera ble or where collate ral damage concerns prec luded less accur ate platforms. Stealth's foc us “mostly against targets in the heavily def ended areas of downtown Baghdad” is even cited in the Defense Departm ent's Con- duct of the Persian Gulf War as its decis ive cont rib ut ion.15 Howe ver, only 295 stealth strikes (12 percent of its effort) were against capital targets.16 Accord ing to 37th Fighter Wing rec ords, 493 of 2,358 strikes (21 percent) were against airfields located far from urban are as. And another 193 F--117 strikes (8 percent) were flown against targets in Kuwait and the Basra area.17 Indeed, nine of the top 10 targets hit by stealth—accounti ng for 662 strikes (27 percent of all F--117 activ ity)—were targ ets repeate dly attacked by other air assets, even early in the war, far away from Baghd ad. Only one—Ba'ath party headquar ters—was located inside the ring.18 In terms of historic achievement, there is no question that stealth demons trated that A Tomahawk leaves the sea on its way to a target. ind iv idu al targets in defended airspace Thirty-n ine Tomahawks attacked targets in Baghdad in could be found amidst dense urban sprawl the first 24 hours. 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 and that tradit ional collate ral damage could sumed some degree of immun ity. There was be minimized in their attack. Yet the illu only a total of 14 stealth leaders hip strikes sion of their habitu al presence over Baghdad in the entire first week in Baghdad—less had a definite drawback: The public —even than 15 percent of the aircraft's overall ef off ic ial—imp ress ion of far greater numbers, fort. Air defenses and bad weather, as well as part icul arly as the propaganda battle over ci hum an factors and the “friction” of war, sig vili an casualt ies heated up.19 This led to nific antly disrupted the planned effort. subs eq uent restrict ions on bombing the Iraq's first foray into counter bomb ing capit al. propa ganda—the “baby milk” fac tory—occurred on 23 January, and soon publ ic debate over civili an casualt ies esca lated far out of proport ion to physical real If Desert Storm was the first ity. Tens of thousands of sorties had been inf orm at ion war, as some claim, flown, and televis ion had aired less than a the Air Force stumbled badly. half dozen examp les of civili an damage. Yet, each Iraqi--o riginating news morsel im pacted with great force, and the two adver The stealth--d elivered bomb that had the sari es traded increasi ngly pointed parries. sing le biggest impact was in the second wave A few days after the baby milk spat, the on the night of 17 January. It was the object first news reports emerged of attacks on the of the first publicly unveiled videotape Amm an highway during Scud hunting. Even when Lt Gen Charles Horner showed it hit UN Secret ary General Javier Perez de Cuell ar ting the 13--s tory Iraqi air force headquar spoke up for the first time, labeli ng strikes ters building on the southeast edge of on oil tankers and refugee traffic “inad Muthenna airfield.20 Soon it became lore missible.”23 The Soviet Union—ost ens ib le part that F--117s “hit” more than 50 targets on ner in the inter na tional coali tion—in openi ng night and “des troyed” 40 percent of tensely complained to the Bush all strateg ic targets.21 adm inis trat ion about the “savagery” of the For all of the vivid reporti ng from Bagh air war.24 The president assured in his State dad, nothing of the sort transpired. Only ten of the Union address that “Iraq's capaci ty to 2,000-- p ound bombs and 39 Tomah awk sea- sust ain war is being destroyed. . . . We do launched cruise missiles attacked city targets not seek the destruct ion of Iraq, its culture in the first 24 hours, and only an addit ional or its people.”25 five bombs and 18 missiles landed the next With Scuds and crises du jour intrudi ng, day and night. Though Air Force planners let Baghd ad faded. During the entire second out a cheer on the first night when the lights week of the war, a total of 32 bombs fell on went out (all the work of Tomah awks; capit al targets; by the end of January, about stealth never attacked an electric al power 60 Baghdad strikes had been carried out, less plant), the achievement obscured the fact than one--t hird the number originally that the feat was against one of the most planned.26 fragi le target groups and was achieved with When news from Basra in early Februa ry att acks outside the capital. sugg ested carpet bombing, Pentag on spokes- Aft er the first three days, F--117s could men seemed increasi ngly exasp era ted.27 report back that they had successf ully deliv “We never said there would be no collate ral ered a total of six bombs on capital leader- dama ge,” Lt Gen Thomas Kelly complained ship tar gets, 16 bombs overall in at one of his aftern oon briefings: Baghd ad. Though the countryw ide score What we did say is that our pilots against leadership was better,22 the capital as scrupulously adhered to good targeting . . .