DTIC ADA510497: Application of US Special Operations Command Model to Department of Defense Cyberspace Force

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

UnitedStatesMarine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076SouthStreet
Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTEROF MILITARY STUDIES
APPLICATION OF US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND MODEL TO
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACEFORCE
SUBMITTED INPARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THEREQUIREMENTS FORTHE DEGREE OF
MASTERS OF MILITARY STUDIES
LIEUTENANT COLONELBRADLEYL. PYBURN
AY 08-09
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2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Application of US Special Operations Command Model to Department of
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Defense Cyberspace Force
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United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
Combat Dev,Marine Corps University, 2076 South
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Executive Summary
Title: Application ofUS Special Operations CommandModelTo DeparhnentOfDefense
CyberspaceForce
Author: LtColonelBradleyL. Pybmu,United States AirForce
Thesis: TheUS Special Operations Command Sh1.1cture, withits unique coupling ofcombatant
command authority andservice-likeresponsibilities, provides aviable modelfor establishing a
professionalDoD cyberspace force and organization.
Discussion: Thepotentialfor operations incyberspaceis onlymatchedbythe vulnerabilities it
creates to ournationaldefense. US criticalinfrastructures depend on freedom ofactionin
cyberspaceto provide essential services to ourcitizenry. Within the DoD, service-centric cyber
force development, anineffective cyberorganizational structure, weak C2 ofcyber forces, and
limitedoversightofcybertechnology andpersonnel developmenthinders om abilityto defend
US interests incyberspace. As aresult, the DoD mustmake significantorganizational,
persoilllel, anddoctrinal changes to ensure ourcontinued superiority inthe cyberdomain. The
USSOCOM structureprovides aviable option for organizing, equipping, and leading cyber
forces.
Conclusion: TheUSSOCOMmodelprovides significantadvantages for cyberspace
organizationalstructure, cyberpersOlmelmanagement, cyberweapons andsystems development,
andcyberspace doctrine: Establishing asub-unified commandfor cyberspaceunderthe purview
ofUSSTRATCOMis apromising option.
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Table ofContents
Disclaimer .i
Preface ii
Background 1
Definition ofCyberspace 2
Air Force CyberspaceForces ~ 3
Air Force Cyberspace Core and Enabling Competencies 4
AirForce Cyberspace CareerFields 4
Army CyberspaceForces 6
NavyCyberspaceForces 8
Marine Corps CyberspaceForces 9
DoD Cyberspace Organization ; 9
USSOCOMModel 11
Application ofUSSOCOMModel to DoD CyberspaceForces 13
Organization 14
Personnel 16
Systems & Technology 18
Doctrine 19
Conclusion: 20
Endnotes 22
Bibliography 24
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Disclaimer
The opinions andconclusions expressedherein are those ofthe individualstudent authorand do
notnecessarilyrepresentthe views ofeitherthe Marine Corps Commandand StaffCollege or
anyothergovernmentagency. References to this study shouldincludethe foregoing statement.
Quotationfrom, abstractionfrom, orreproduction ofall oranypartofthis documentis permitted
providedproperacknowledgement is made.
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Preface
The following thesis is aresultofmy career experience as anAirForce commlmications
andinformation officer, andspecificallymyprevious assignmentat JointTaskForce- Global
NetworkOperations, US Strategic Command, from August2005 to Jlme 2008. This study, along
withits recon:unendations, wouldnothavebeen,possiblewithoutthe continued support oftwo
groups: mypeerswho continueto defendUS interests in cyberspace andmany ofmy superiors
who serve as a springboardfor newideas. I'dliketo especiallythankBrigadier GeneralJeImifer
Napper, Colonel GaryMcAlum, ColonelBarryHensley, andColonelStephenKorns for their
guidanc~,mentorship and support. Additionally, I'dliketo thankLieutenant ColonelDave
Bmion, Dr. Doug Streusand, andDr. DonaldBittner- members ofthe outstandingfaculty ofthe
Marine Corps COl111l1and & StaffCollege- whose superbtutelage shapedthe criticalthinking
thatdrove the analysis behindthis study.
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Background
Cyberspace, the newestwarfighting domain, offers tremendous promise as the US
governmentandcommercialindustrycontinuethemovetowards cyber-centric operations. The
incrediblepotential ofoperating incyberspace also creates significantvulnerabilities and . .
challenges. The cyberattackagainstEstoniainApril2007 highlights boththe ~asewithwhich a
determinedfoe can cripplecybernetworks andthefar-reaching impacts onthe victim. Theneed
to protectanddefendUS cyberspacereachedafeverpitch inJanuary 2008 whenthe President
directedan interagency group, includingthe DepartmentofDefense (DoD) andDepartmentof
Homeland Security (DHS), to address the issue. Duringthe sameperiod, eachofthe military
services- mostnotably the USAirForce- developedsomemeasure ofcyberspace doctrine,
organization, andpersonnelmanagementplans. Along withthe challenges ofservice-dependent
cyberspace development, the currentDoD cyberspace orga11izationalstructure inhibits effective
commandandcontrol(C2) ofcyber forces anddoes littleto provide oversightfor cyber
weapons, systems, andpersOlmeldevelopmellt. Clearly, some changeis neededto effectively
organize, equip, andleadcyberforces inthe defense ofournation's criticalinfrastructures. The
US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) structure, with its unique coupling ofcombatant
commandauthority andservice-likeresponsibilities, provides aviablemodel for establishing a
professionalDoD cyberspace force andorganization. This paper- afterproviding some
backgroundon ClliTentcyberspace developmentandorganization, plus aprimeronUSSOCOM-
analyzes the applicability oftheUSSOCOM modelto developing aprofessionalDoD cyberspace
force andorganizational construct.
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Definition ofCyberspace
As theDoD struggled overthe lastseveralyears to organize andfight in cyberspace, the
US governmentrefinedthe definition ofcyberspacethrough the efforts ofseveral agencies and
working groups. In2003, the WhiteHouse released The NationalStrategy to Secure
Cyberspace, whichdefinedcyberspace as "thenervous system ofthese [critical] infrasuuctures-;-
the control system ofourcountry. Cyberspace compriseshundreds ofthousands of
interconnectedcomputers, servers, routers, switches, andfiber optic cables '" essentialto our
economy andnational security."! In September2006, the JointChiefs ofStaffdevelopeda
broaderdefinition, whichdescribedcyberspace as "adomain characterizedbythe use of
electronics andthe electromagneticspectrumto store, modify, andexchange datavianetworked
systems andassociatedphysical infrasuuctures.,,2 TheJointChiefs ofStaffdefinition, by
includingthe electromagnetic spectrum, threatenedto stallDoD efforts by dramatically
increasingthe scopeofthe cyberspace domain. Subsequently, duringthe developmentof
NationalSecurityPresidentialDirective 54/HomelandSecurityPresidentialDirective 23 (a
classifieddocument) inlate2007, ateam ofinteragency experts developedamorenarrow
unclassifieddefinition, describing cyberspace as a "networkofinfonnationtechnology
infrastructures, includingthe Internet,teleconll11lUlications networks, computer systems, and
embeddedprocessors andcontrollers." Leveragingthe interagencygroup's efforts, Deputy
Defense Secretmy Gordon Englandrefinedthe DoD definitioninMay of2008 by defining
cyberspace as "aglobal domainwithinthe info1111ation environnlentconsistingofthe
interdependentnetworkofinfo1111ationtec1mology infrastructures, includingthe Intel11et,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, andembeddedprocessors and conu·ollers.,,3
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Utilizingthemostcurrentdefmition, DoD is posturedto organize, train, and equip the forces to
defendUS interests inthe cyber domain.
AirFOl'ce CyberspaceForces
InApril of2008, the AirForce developed'aroadmap to organize, train, and equip
cyberspace forces in accordance with anupdated missionto extendglobalreach,.power, and, .
vigilanceintothe cyber domain. Fundamentalto theAirForce developmentofcyberspace
professionals is theAirForce conceptofoperations inthe cyber domain. AirForce actions in
cyberspace consistofcyberspaceoperations, cyberspace cross-domain operations, cyberspace
combatsustaiinnentoperations, andcyberspace intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance
(ISR). Cyberspace operationsprovide friendly forces freedom ofactionin cyberspacewhile,
denyingthe enemy's abilityto do the same. Cyberspaceoperations consistofoffensive actions
to deny, degrade, disrupt, ordestroy, and defensive actions to preserve, protect, recover, and
reconstitute. Cyberspace cross-domain operations seekto leverage cyber-unique capabilities to'
achieve effects innon-cyber domains. For example, cross-domainoperationsmayutilize cyber
networkattackto defeatenemy airdefense systems ordegrade enemy C2 systems. Cyberspac;e
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combatsustainmentwill develop andmaintain thenecessaryinfrastructure, systems, weapons,
andforces to achieve andmaintaincybersuperiority. CyberspaceISRprovides collection,
processing, analysis, anddistributionofintelligence for operations in cyberspace. Utilizingthe
above tenets ofcyberspace operations, theAirForcewillprovide combatantcommanders with
the abilityachieve andmaintaincyberspace superiority.4
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AirForce Cyberspace Core andEnabling Competencies
Inaddition to the concept ofoperations for cyberspace, theAirForce outlinedthe
necessarycore andenabling competencies for cyberspaceforces. TheAirForce core
competencies for cyberspace include establishingthe domain, controllingthe domain, and
leveragingthe domain. Establishingthe domain consists ofthe necessary actions to network
electronic devices togetherfor thepurpose ofexchanging, storing, ormodifyinginformation: .
AirForcepersonnel controlthe domainthroughrobust situationalawareness, effective
battlespacepreparation, strong defensive capabilities, andpositive command andcontrol (C2) of
cyberspacewarfare systems. After establishingthe domain andimplementing control, airmen
canleveragethe domain atatime andplace oftheirchoosingto achieve operational objectives.
Leveragingthe domainincludes offensive actions such as the disruption ofsensors andC2
systems, degradationofdecision supporttools andweapon systems, andmanipulationofdata.
Alongwiththe core competencies, the AirForce outlinedintelligence, engineering and
acquisition, research, andspace operations as enabling competencies. Effective intelligence
proVides the commanderwiththe situationalawareness necessary to operate across all domains-
air, space, andcyberspace. The blisteringpace oftechnologicaldevelopmentandtheAirForce,
dependenceon commercial infrasuuctures demandarapid, agile, andsU'eamlined engineering
andacquisitionprocess. Coupledwith acquisition, cutting-edgeresearchwilldelivertimely
developments to the warfighter, enabling cyberspace superiority. Finally, space operations, such
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as satellite communications, provide the abilityto delivernon-kinetic effectsworldwide.
AirForce Cyberspace CareerFields
Usingthe concept ofoperations for cyberspace, coupledwiththe core and enabling
competencies, the AirForce defmedfourprimary careerfields for cyberspacepersonnel:
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