DTIC ADA510304: Reducing Battlefield Fuel Demand: Mitigating a Marine Corp Critical Vulnerability

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UnitedStates Marine Corps
Command and StaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
TITLE:
Reducing BattlefieldFuel Demand:
.Mitigating aMarine Corp Critical Vulnerability
SUMBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT
OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
AUTHOR:
MajorWilliamB. Fenwick
United States Marine Corps
AY 08-09
Mentorand oral~se~: Dr. AdamCobb
---=~=""-=----I:.::7""'::~==-------
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Date: 3- to':07 .
Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Pauletta Otis (ifapproved byCOMPASSIDr.
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Reducing Battlefield Fuel Demand: Mitigating a Marine Corp Critical
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Vulnerability
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Combat Development,Marine Corps University, 2076 South
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Table ofContents
DISCLAIl\1ER ',' .iii
EXECUTIVESUMMARy iv
PREFACE v
DEFININGTHENEE))FORANENERGYSTRATEGY 1
CAPTURINGPOSSIBLE SOLUTIONS : 6
FORMULATINGENERGYMANAGEMENTSTRATEGy 12
CONCLUSION 20
APPENDIXA (FIGURES 1-3) 21
ENDNOTES , 24
BIBLIOGRAPHY 27
ii
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ExecutiveSummary
Title: Reducing BattlefieldFuelDemand -Mitigating aMarine Corp Critical
Vulnerability
Author: MajorWilliamB. Fenwick, United States Marine Corps
Thesis Statement: ExpeditionaryManeuverWarfare, thefuture ofMarine Corps
doctrine, demands highly mobileforces operatingfrom bases overthehorizon with a
minimal logistics footprint ashore. A dichotomy exists betweenexpeditionarymaneuver
warfare doctrinal theory andthelogisticalreality ofoperations. Itis time to fix these
problems with acogent energy strategyfor the Marine Corps.
Discussion
Reducing battlefieldfuel consumption intheMarine Corps is ofparamount
importance. There exist strategic, operational, and tactical reasons for pursuing
immediate and longtermproposals to "unleash" the Marine Corps from the tether offuel
from which all Americans perilously cling today.
TheMarine Corps' battlefield dependence onfossil fuels carries not onlyfiscal
implications, butfarmore importantly, it is costingthelives ofMarines required to
deliver thatfuel. While it is concededthatthe Marine Corps will require battlefieldfuel
to conduct combatoperations, itis arguable, that we canreducethe amount offuel
required intheaterthrough more efficientfuel consumption. Byreducing the amount of
fuel required intheaters ofoperations, thenumber offuel convoys canbereduced
thereby decreasing Logistics Marines exposure to vulnerable supplyline. Recognizing
the dangerous confluence ofstrategic energy dependence and the mammoth effort
required to deliverthatenergyto thebattlefieldprompted General James Mattis to issue
the challenget.o DOD planners, "Unleashus from thetether offuel."Unfortunately, the
Marine Corps finds itselfin a situationwherelogistics concepts and initiatives required to
sustaintheforce arenotkeepingpacewith the operational gains ofnew combat systems.
Conclusion .
More specific strategic guidance is requiredfrom top Marine Corpsleadership on
the subjectofbattlefield energydependence. Many implementable solutions existto our
battlefieldenergy dependenceto includeadvances inhybridvehicletechnology,
altemativepower generation systems, and simple adjustments to operating procedl,ues.
Longer-term solutions with significant energyreductiontechnologies are onthe drawing
boards as well, butwill require astrategic visionfor theirimplementation.
TheFullyBurdened Cost ofFuel (FBCF) offers atransparent constructfor the
DOD to monetizethe "real" costoffuel delivered to thebattlefield. Itis amethod of
activitybased costing whichhas helped corporateAmericaprovide clarity onthe impact
ofcosts on operations and can certainlybe auseful tool for theDOD.
Simplywaitingfor guidancefrom the SecretaryofDefense andtheDOD is too
passive ofastanceto adopt onthis important issue. TheMarine Corps leadership should
proactivelyseek solutions to betterensure battlefield energy security.
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Preface
Marine Corps' battlefieldfuel dependence is an emergingtopichighlightedby
tenuous supplylines in currentcombatoperations. Manybusinesses are implementing
impressive costcutting measures by adapting greensolutions to theirprocesses and
gaining competitiveadvantage while doing so. While cost cutting measures rarely playa
part intheDepartment ofDefense culture, our growing dependence onbattlefieldfuel
supplyto austereregions ofthe worldhighlightedthe needfor greater attention to this
prob~em. The intentofthis report is to illustratethe issues that ourfossil fuel dependence
in combathas createdfor us and to stress theneedfor strategic guidance onthe topic
from thehighest echdons oftheMarine Corps.
Rachel S. Kingcaid, MLIS, ChiefReference Librarian at the Libraryofthe
Marine Corps provided invaluableresearch assistance. Michael Boyd, aretired Marine
Colonel andcurrentEngineerAdvocacyHead and Explosive OrdnanceDisposal Head
provided credibleprimary source information. Mr. Boyd currentlyworks for the
Assistant Commandantofthe Marine Corps for Plans, Policy, and Operations. Heis an
advocate for energyindependence initiative inthe Marine Corps. His interviewwas
invaluable inproviding the insight and reference materials which shedlight onthe DOD
and the Marine Corps to determinetheir actions thus far onreducingbattlefield energy
dependence. Last, butnot least, DrAdam Cobb, provided thenecessary guidance to best
communicatethe intent ofthis research in a cogent and effective manner.
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ReducingBattlefieldFuelDemand ~ Mitigating a Marine Corp Critical
Vulnerability
Thesis: ExpeditionaryManeuverWarfare, thefuture ofMarine Corps doctrine, demands
highlymobileforces operatingfrombases overthehorizon with aminimallogistics
footprint ashore. A dichotomyexists between expeditionarymaneuverwarfare doctrinal
theory and the logisticalreality ofoperations. Itis timeto fix these problems with a
cogent energy strategyfor the Marine Corps.
Definingthe Need for an Energy Strategy
"In aworldwhere we borrowmoneyfrom China topurchase oilfrom unstable
Persian Gulfcountries tofuel ourAirForceplanes thatprotectus againstpotential
threatsfrom these very countries, it's high time to make the choices andinvestments
necessary toprotectourcountry." RepSteve Israel, D-Ny'l
Strategic Reasonsfor PursuingEnergy Independence
There are compelling strategicreasons for pursuing amore comprehensive energy
independence strategy. From apoliticalperspective, theUnited States' negotiating
power is diminisheddueto our debilitating dependence on imported oil. Sixtypercent of
US oil originates from countries whose political and ideological values are antithetical to
ourown.2Russia is using it's natural gas reserves to influence its political bargaining
powerwhile Venezuela and Iran's political prominence inthe worldis over-accentuated
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due to their vastenergyreserves. Political options available to oil importing allies, as
well as theUS to respond to issues such as proliferation and counter-terrorism are
complicated dueto the concerns about availability ofoil from uncooperative sources.l.l.In
essence, the United States' freedom to maneuver ininternational relations is restricted
due to our addictionto foreign energy.
1
"Oil imports also accountfor afinancial vulnerabilityofstrategicimportance. At
$200 abarrel, theproven oilreserves ofthe six Gulfnations alone wouldrise invalue to
$95 trillion, abouttwice the size ofpublic equitymarkets," according to Morgan Stanley
managing directorStephenJen.5Thatwouldmake the SovereignWealthFunds ofoil
states marketkingmakers. When oil was sellingfor $147 perbarrel in2008, this alarming
propositionbecamequite realistic withstunning implications. Volatilityinthe world oil
market wildly complicates thebudgeting ofenergy costs for theDepartment ofDefense
(DOD), which canhave strategicimplications. "JohnYoung statedthat every $10
increase infuel, is abillion dollars less theDOD canplaywith.,,6
Recognizingthe dangerous confluence ofstrategic energy dependence and the
mammoth effortrequired to deliverthat energyto the battlefieldprompted General James
Mattis, USMC to issuethe challengeto DOD planners in2003, "Unleashus from the
tetheroffuel."? fu orderto frame theproblem and magnitude ofits effects, a
transformationis required interms ofhow energy costs are determined. No longer can
the costoffuel beviewed simplyinterms ofthe priceupon deliveryfrom the refinery.
TheFully BurdenedFuel Cost is aconstructthat addresses this shortfall and will be
discussed indetail inthe third sectionofthis paper.
OperationalandTacticalReasonsfor PursuingEnergyIndependence
The GlobalWar onTerrorhas illuminatedthe tenuous addictionAmerica's
operational forces havefor energyby stressing andtestingourlong supplylines into
austere, hostile environments withlittlemodem infrastructure. OperationEnduring
Freedom inAfghanistanpoignantlyillustrates this predicament.
2
Afghanistanis aland-locked countrywith extremelylimitedroad and rail networks.
All supplies brought into countrymusttraverse bordernations, noneofwhich are
particularlyfond ofU.S. intentions inthe area. Attacks on convoys from Pakistanhave
increased, Kyrgyzstanhas declar~dits territory closedto U.S. operations in6 months,
and slowmovementonopening anorthernlandroutehas put increasingpressure onU.S.
forces to workouttheir supplyflow problem. 8According to GeneralDuncanMcNabb,
.commander oftheU.S. Transportation Command over 130 contraCt drivers have been
killed trucking American supplies throughPakistan.9There is alargeflow ofsustainment
supplies through averyfew, predictable chokepoints into Afghanistan and this is a
critical vulnerabilitytheU.S. cando little to mitigate with its current dependence onfuel
incombatoperations.
Not only do supplyproblems existinAfghanistan, but also inIraq, where the
country's infrastructure is far morerobust. TheDefenseScience Boardstated, "As of
November2007, approximately 80 convoys travel continuouslybetweenKuwait and Iraq
destinations, all protectedbyuniformedforces. This degrades combat capability,
resulting inreal costs, evenifnot attributed to the supplies themselves."l0
• Seventypercent ofmilitary convoys inIraqtransportfuel.11
• 1.29million gallons offuel perday arebrought into countrybyUS forces in Iraq,
12
890,000 gallons from Kuwait alone.
• Insurgents targeted logistics convoys from Turkey, Jordan and Kuwait with
attacks as high as 30/day.13
TheDOD planinsists, "therehas always been astrategicmotivefor reducing
energydependence onfossil fuels, now there is atactical one.,,14Theproliferationof
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high-energy consumptionweaponsystems serve as a critical vulnerabilityfor U.S. forces
and will continuetobe agreater concem inproportionto the emphasis placed on
ExpeditionaryManeuverWarfare inthe future.IS For example, theMIAI Abrams main
battletank gets 0.6 mile per gallonoffuel, has a combatradius of275 miles andrequires
300 gallons offuel every 8hours for a standardmission.16The adverse implications for
expeditionary operations is clear.
The logistics concepts and initiatives required to sustaintheforce arenotkeeping
pace with the operational gains ofnew combat systems. For instance, one ofthe Marine
Corps' crownjewelsfor thefuture ofExpeditionaryManeuverWarfare is the
ExpeditionaryFighting Vehicle. Itrequires four hundredpercentmore fuel to accomplish
the same mission as its legacyplatform, theAmphibious AssaultVehicle.17 "TheDOD
mustfind a wayto integrate sustainmentwith maneuver and the other functions inthe
battlespace.,,18 As previouslymentioned, the need to reducethefuel consumptionbyUS
forces is real and is beingtargeted by a smart, adaptive enemy. However, there are
striking statistics from theDOD thatpointto ambivalence onthepart ofoperational and
tactical planners whenit comes to energy consumption and accounting. Here are afew
examples:
• TheAirForce spends eighty-fivepercent ofits fuel budgetmoving six percent ofits fuel
around inairbome tankers.19
• Accordingto the 2001 DSB report, ofthetop lO-battlefieldfuel users only 2 were combat
systems. Therestwere support systems. Forexample, the waterheaterfor thefield kitchen
2o
created a largerbattlefieldfuel demandthanthe"AH-64D attackhelicopter.
• Duringpeacetime, fuel consumptionbyArmy aircraftmakes up fifty percent ofits total. But
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during wartime, generators becomethe largest singlefuel consumer onthe battlefield.
As mentioned above the biggestissue is ourDefense spending dwarves ournearest
competitionto such an extent, our enemies darenotchallengeus inthe conventional fight. The
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