DTIC ADA509850: The Effective Use of U.S. Coast Guard Security Zones in Countering Unlawful Transnational Protests at Sea

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2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
The Effective Use of U.S. Coast Guard Security Zones in Countering
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Unlawful Transnational Protests at Sea
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United States Marine Corps,Command Staff College Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Executive Summary
Title: THEEFFECTIVEUSE OF U S. COAST GUARD SECURITYZONES IN
COUNTERINGUNLAWFULTRANSNATIONAL PROTESTS AT SEA
Author: LieutenantCommander GregoryMagee, United States Coast Guard
Thesis: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) enforced SecurityZones, as highlightedinresponse to Cuban
Americanprotestflotillas, have proven aneffective andfocused means ofpreventing
international incidents causedbynon-state actors travelingfrom the United Statesto other
nations thatare atargetoftheirprotests.
Discussion: A flotillainbasicterms is anorganizationofboatsunderwayatthesametimefor a
similarpurpose. Non-state actors haveusedflotillas as a form ofprotest at sea, oftentargeting
othernations ortheiractivities. Environmental groups like Greenpeacehave usedflotillas to
disrupt activities ofothernations. The CubanAmericancommunityhasused flotillas as a form
ofdirectprotestagainst Cuba. These acts canbe detrimentalto US. relations with thetarget
nationifthatnonstateactoris operatingfrom US. ports. Inthe case ofCuba, this action
emboldenedCubato escalate itsreaction. This endedup taking the form ofthe shootdown of
US. private aircraftin 1996bythe Cubans. Whileunlawful flotillaprotest actions are
detrimental to US. bilateralre~ations and oftenareclearviolations ofthe law, thereis littlethe
U.S. cando thatwillpreventthe incidentfrom occurringinthe fIrstplace. The protestorsmay
be arrested afterthefact, butthe incidentandpotential damageto bilateralrelations has already
occurred. USCGSecurityZones offer achancetoprevent aflotilla from departing the Security
Zone iftheyintendto commitunlawful acts. Anessentialelementto triggeringthe level of
authoritynecessaryto controlthe movementofvessels inports to othernations is aPresidential
DeclarationofEmergency. These canbe controversial sincethereis no lawthat setsthe
standardforwhatis atrue emergency. Inthe caseofCubanAmericanprotestors, the Security
Zone to governflotilla actions againstCubawas largely successful. Itcurbedunlawfulaction,
namelyviolating Cubanterritorialseas. Onthe occasions itwas enforced, itdeterred other
protestors andprevented further incidentsbetween Cubaandthe US. Atthe sametime it
preventeddamage to majoragreements inplace topreventmass migrations. The SecurityZone
structurewas modifIed severaltimes to copewithevolvingthreats, utilizing extensive
interagencycooperationto dealwiththe complex aspects oftheseprotests and Cuba's response.
A measure ofcontroversythattheUSCG SecurityZonehas faced is throughtheregularrenewal
ofthe PresidentialDeclaration ofEmergency. Originallyenactedin 1996following Cuba's
shootdown ofUS. aircraft, ithas beencontinuouslyrenewedthrough2008, whenmany contend
the state ofemergencyhadpassed.
Conclusion: USCGSecurityZones offer ameans oflegallypreventingflotillas operating from .
U.S. ports from committingunlawful acts. Theyhave beenemployedeffectively. This legal
constructserves aframework for counteringthe actions ofotherprotests inthe future. Actions
suchas thosethatoccurredwithJapanesewhaling vesselsinthe Pacificbyflotillas, andflotillas
attemptingtorunthe Israeliblockade ofGaza, aretwo types ofscenariosthat couldbe similarly
played outwithflotillas operatingfrom US. ports againstnearbyNorthAmerican and Caribbean
neighbors.
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENT THE
VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ORANY
OTHERGOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDYSHOULD
INCLUDETHEFOREGOING STATEMENT.
QUOTATION ORABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALL ORANY PART
OF THIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPERACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS
MADE.
i
Preface
From 1998 to 2001 while atCoast Guard Headquarters, Ihad theopportunitytowitness
the developmentofU.S. policyregardingCubanAmerican flotillas andin2001 monitoreda
flotilla as Commanding OfficerofUSCGC SAPELO (WPB 1314). Thisresearch was an
opportunityto fully examineU.S. policy andhighlightanotherwaythe CoastGuardproves itself
as aunique instrumentofnationalsecurity.
I amgreatly indebtedto mywife Christyandmyfather Greg for theirnumerous reviews
ofmythesis work, their ideas, andtheirhonestfeedback. I also extendmythanks to thefaculty
ofthe Marine Corps Commandand StaffCollege, who haveprovided outstanding support and
learning opportunities whileattheschool.
11
Table ofContents
Disclaimer i
Preface ii
Introduction 1
Flotillas as aForm ofIntemationalProtest. 2
Greenpeace and EnviromnentalProtesters' Use ofFlotillas 4
Enforcement OptionsAgainst Unlawful Acts ofaFlotilla 5
USCG Maritime SecurityZones 6
PresidentialDeclarations ofEmergency 7
Overview oftheHistory CubanMigrationto the U.S 8
CubanAmericanExile Community 9
CubanAmericanFl<;>tillas Through 1994 9
CubanAmericanFlotillas After 1994 11
TheBrotherstotheRescue Shoot Down andFlotillaResponse 12
InteragencyResponse 14
PresidentialProclamation andthe SouthFloridaSecurity Zone 15
The SouthFloridaSecurityZoneinAction 16
The FlolidaSecurityZone 17
A Challengeto the FloridaSecurityZone 17
A New PresidentialProclamation 18
ConclusionandFutureApplication : 20
Bibliography 24
iii
Introduction
Non-state actors exercise increasinginfluencewithin the UnitedStates. These private
individuals andinterest groups oftenmakenations the targets ofprotests, to achieve various
goals orto simplyantagonize them.! Theseprotests canplacetheUnited States inanawkward
positionwith the othernation, potentiallydamaging bilateralrelations. Apotent form ofprotest
istheuse ofprivateboats operatingtogetherina flotilla. Flotillas canviolate territorial seas and
directly confrontlawenforcement ornaval vessels. The othernations, particularlythose with
stressedrelations with the U.S., maytake actionthrough amilitaryresponse against the
protestors. Worse, thesenations can extendtheil- reach beyondthe scope oftheil'borders and
that oftheflotillas, attacking vessels oraircraft operating onthehigh seas. This scenario played
outin 1995 and 1996when CubanAmericanflotillas provoked Cubainto shooting down U.S.
private aircraftininternational airspace. Theseflotillas negatively influencedU.S. policytoward
Cubaand complicatedthe already strainedrelationship. The U.S. is normallyreactive inthese
situations, onlytaking law enforcementactionafterthe incidentoccurs. This does littleto deter
theseincidents fromhappening. However, there is away to proactively counterunlawful flotilla
protests actions through the use ofU.S. CoastGuard (USCG) authorities. USCG enforced
SecurityZones, as highlightedinresponse to CubanAmericanprotestflotillas, haveproven an
effective and focusedmeans ofpreventinginternationalincidents causedbynon-state actors
travelfrom the United States to the othernations thatare atargetoftheirprotests.
This paperwill examine the use offlotillas ofprivate vessels to protest othernations and
howunlawful acts canprovoketarget nations into hostile action. Itwill highlight how flotillas
caninfluencebilateralrelations and various law enforcementoptions available to the U.S. to
counterunlawful prptest actions. Themost effectivemeans are throughUSCG SecurityZones.
1
These SecurityZones andthe keyrequirement ofaPresidential Declaration ofEmergency are
explained. Itwill also coverthehistory ofCubanMigrationto the U.S. andhow it drives the
agenda ofthe CubanAmericancommunity. CubanAmericannon-state actors effectivelyused
flotillas to provoke Cubainto actionthatstrained bilateral relations withthe U.S. Finally, itwill
highlighthowUSCGSecmity Zoneshave been successful inpreventingunlawful actions during
CubanAmerican flotillas and how SecurityZones maybe employed inthe fuhlre.
Flotillas as aForm ofInternationalProtest
Allnon-state actors operate outofanation and areaccountable to that nation's laws.
Those laws andtheirenforcementactas acheckon thereach ofthe non-state actor andprevent
international incidentsthroughunlawful actions. Unlawful actions by flotillaprotestors can
include violatingterritorialseas ofanothernation, blocking waterways, impedingthe safe
navigationofavessel, damagingproperty, polluting and disobeying law enforcement orders. In
the U.S., laws often deal withthe importand export ofmaterials orfinancial actions to counter
illegal activities. Butthesenon-state actors candepart theU.S. andtravel directly to the target
nationby seaand airto conducttheirprotests. Aircrafthavevery limited options withtheir
ability to protest. Broadcasting and dischargingitems intentionally (likepamphlets) areunlawful
buthaveminimalimpact. Logistics (range andrequirementfor abase ofoperations), limited
endurance, the risk ofhaving expensive aircraftseized or damaged, and/orpilot's licenses
revoked do notmakethemthe besttools for directprotestaction. However, privateboats are
easierto obtainthanaircraft, require littletraining and have no operatorlicensingrequirements
inthe U.S. Large cOlmnercial ships are expensive, buthavelilllimitedrange and arethe tools of
the most exclusivenon-state actors like Greenpeace orthe SeaShepherd Conversation Society.
Privateboats arethemost accessibletools for protests, organizedinto groups calledflotillas.
2
Flotillas are groups ofvessels underway togetherfor a commonpurpose. Withflotillas
predominantlymade up ofpleasure craft, theirrange is limited. This leaves countries near the
U.S. as likelytargets for flotillaprotests, namely Canada, Mexico, Cuba, theBahamas and other
Caribbeanislands. Russia canbereached byremote Alaskan locations, butthe oppOliunityfor
safenavigationis limited.
Thevalues and freedoms oftargetednations as well as the strengthoftheir bilateral
relations with the U.S. are afactor inthetargetednation's response to protests at sea. In addition
to the similarvalues andfreedoms thatCanadashares with theUS., strongbilateralrelations
make itunlikely Canadawill blame the US. for the unlawful actionofUS. flotillaprotestors in
Canadianwaters. TheBahamas and Mexico have similarvalues andfreedoms, butfromtimeto
timebilateralrelations withtheU.S. become strained over economic orimmigration issues,
making currentrelations atthemoment afactor inthe reactionto theprotests. In contrast, Cuba
does nothave similarvalues orfreedoms andhas strainedbilateralrelations withtheUS. When
faced withflotillaprotests, Cubamaytake aconfrontational view onthesituation, eitherthrough
aperceivedthreatto security oras anopportunityto embarrass the US. orthe Cuban-American
exilecommunity. The US. failure to actagainstunlawful flotillaprotests cantacitly supportthe
goals ofthe protest. Ifthe actiontakenbythe U.S. is onlyreactive, international relations are
still damagedbytheprotest act. Additionally, theUS. mayhave to conduct fiuiher bilateral
relations based onthe situationinvolving flotillas orthe targetnation's reaction, ratherthan
operating on its ownterms. Environmentalprotestorshave ahistory ofusing flotillaprotests,
oftenwithunlawful acts to improvetheir impact.
3
GreenpeaceandEnvironmentalProtesters) Use ofFlotillas
Greenpeace and itspredecessormovementpresentedthe United States with situations
involvingformally organized flotillas forprotestpurposes, In 1971,the group thatwould
become Greenpeacemadeplans to chartertlrree vessels to protestunderground nucleartesting'on
AmchitkaIsland, Alaska? The Canadianfishing vessel PHYLLIS CORMACK was the only
vessel to getunderwayforthe protest. Before othervessels could getunderway, the tests were
delayed and PHYLLIS CORMACKanchored offAkutanIsland (part ofthe state ofAlaska) to
awaitfurther developments. Although aUSCG securityzone was inplace aroundAmchitka
Island and an at-seaconflictwas plannedfor, Canadianpassengers onPHYLLIS CORMACK
went ashore onAkutanwithoutpermission, Becauseofthis, the vessel was conveniently seized
for U.S, Customs violations and theprotestthwarted. In 1981, aGreenpeaceflotilla made up of
Canadianflagged vessels departed Canada and enteredthe U.S. waters oftheStr'aits ofJuan de
Fucatoprotesttestingofthe ability ofsupertankers to navigate the waterway. Theflotilla
effectivelyblockedthepassage ofthe supertanker, helping topreventfuture efforts to buildports
for them.3 TheUSCG seized several oftheflotillavessels and arrestedtheircrews. In 1998,
other enviromnentalprotestors using Canadianvessels enteredU.S. waters toprotestthe whale
huntundeliakenbytheMakahIndiantribe, alllUltthatwas licensedbythe U.S, Goverrnnent.4
In2006,protestors organized aflotillatoprotest anuclearmaterials shipment from Charleston,
South Carolina,to France. SecUl1ty aroundthe ship ensuredtheprotestors couldnot get close
enough to influencethe delivery timelines. Ineach ofthese cases there was apotential for an
international incident,however, the U.S. didnotblame Canadafor theflotillanordidFrance
blametheU.S. forthe actions ofits citizens orvessels.
4