DTIC ADA508031: Rebalancing General Purpose Forces to Meet Expanding Worldwide Irregular Warfare Requirements

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UnitedStatesMarine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
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MASTEROFMILITARYSTUDIES
TITLE:
REBALANCINGGENERALPURPOSEFORCES TOMEETEXPANDINGWORLDWIDE
IRREGULARWARFAREREQUIREMENTS
AUTHOR:
MAJShannonS. Hume
UnitedStatesArmy
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2009 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Rebalancing General Purpose Forces to Meet Expanding Worldwide
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Irregular Warfare Requirements
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Title: Rebalancing GeneralPurposeForces to MeetExpandingWorldwideIrregularWarfare
Requirements
Author: MAJ ShannonS. Hume, United States Army
Thesis: GeneralPurposeForces (GPF) mustrebalance currentcapabilities to meet expanding
worldwide Irregular"Warfare (IW) requirements while maintaining or, in some cases, returning to
Conventional Warfare (CW) requirements.
Discussion: The global scope and irregularnature ofthe GlobalWar onTerror (GWOT) has
created acapacity gap in SpecialOperations Forces. This gap illustrates the need for the United
States (U.S.) to rebalance its GPF, especiallythosefound intheU.S. Army and the U.S. Marine
Corps. Historically, GPFhas focused onmajor combat operations or "symmetrical" conflict
capabilities and currentlyunmatched by anyknownthreat. "US forces can overwhelm any
standing adversary, establish andmaintainair superiority, control sealanes orlittoral waters, and
seize geographicterritory." A logical solutionto the capacity gap wouldbeto increasethe
current GPFIW capabilities orto institutionalizethe 'random acts ofexcellence.' Therequired
solutionmustbe along-term, comprehensive approach inthe applicationofthe instruments of
national power and influence. Thebestpath is neitherthe creationofpeacekeeping units nor the
quickreturnto heavyarmoredformations; prudence demands ablending ofthe two with the
proposed creation ofthe EnhancedMissionForce (EMF). The critical question is how to train, '
equip, and certifytheseorganizations to meetthe planning and implementationrequirements ofa
___________Geographic_CombatanLCommand (GCC). _
Conclusion: The gap in capabilities and capacities canbefilled inpartbytheEMF. Force
structure and doctrine mustbemodified to meettoday's threat, withoutmortgaging our
capabilityto defeatemergingthreats. TheArmyhas made great strides to ensure it is more
modular and relevant around the globe. TheMarines have maintainedtheir abilityto deploy
with great agility onshortnotice. TheEMF will meet all theserequirements, provideflexibility
as to force size, provide anexcellentmeans to integrate and synchronize operations withSOF,
and give these organizations the abilityto adapt as a conflictbecomes irregular in nature. The
EMFprovides abalanced, longterm, sustainable solutionto theunknownthreats oftomorrow
and continues to meetthe currentthreat.
11
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSE OFTHE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE
VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINECORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD
INCLUDETHEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT.
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORfREPRODUCTION OFALL ORANY
PART OFTHIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.
(
i
Illustrations
Page
Figure 1. IW Capability and Capacity Gaps 32
Figure2 Contrasting Conventional & IrreguhirWarfare 32
Figure3. SOFTruths 33
Figure4. SOF CoreTasks 34
Figure 5. COIN Lines ofOperation '. 34
Figure 6. ARFORGENProcess ' 35
Figure7. EMFTrain-Up Model (6 Month/Tasks) 35
/ ,
Tables
_________________________________________________________--' Page __
Table 1. IWActivities 33
ii
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Table ofContents
Page
DISCLAIMER i
LIST OFILLUSTRATIONS iii
LIST OFTABLES v
PREFACE vii
INTRODUCTION 1
KeyTerms defined 2
IRREGULAR OR CONVENTIONAL OR BOTH 3
THE NATURE OFmREGULARWARFARE 5
CURRENTSOFAND GPFCAPABILITIES 9
RANDOM ACTS OFEXCELLENCE 11
SOF OR SOF-LIKE, THE IWFORCE OF CHOICE 12
~_~~ ~__~ ENHANC~E~D_MIS~SIO~N~EORCE ~(EMF) '~'~'.""""" -16- -----~
RE-BALANCING GENERALPURPOSEFORCE 19
CONCLUSIONS 23
BIBLIOGRAPHY 25
ENDNOTES AND CITATIONS 27
TABLES AND FIGURES 32
\
GLOSSARy .- 36
111
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Preface
I wouldliketo thankProfessorErinSimpsonfor herhelp, guidance, and ideas throughout
this process. Withouther assistance, this paperwould stillbe anunformatted white-paper. I
would also liketo thankLTC MichaelLewis, USA, MarineCorps University, SOFchair. His
leadership and advicehave provided critical inputthroughout this project. I would liketo
acknowledgeLt Col Kevin Arthur, USAF, andDr. Pauletta Otis, thefaculty advisors for
Conference Group 3. Throughoutthis yeartheyhave provided equal parts carrot and stickto see
their students be successful.
Theprojectwouldhave neverstarted ifnotfor LTC (ret) MikeWalton, USA, and LtCol (ret)
no,
Gus Dearolph, USMC. More than onesear ago this started as aconcept and grew into the
IrregularWarfare, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). MuchofwhatI
n,
ofthe SOF Integration and Interoperability Branch, USSOCOM. A finer group ofpatriots
andwarriors has rarelybeen assembled. Veryspecial thanks to MSGRubenDeLeon, USSF,
andhis efforts onIrregularWarfare. He is the-reason I was able to evenwrite on SOF.
Lastly, I wouldliketo acknowledge Capt. JamieEdge, USMC, CPT CharlieRobinson, SFC
Chris Piper, SSGLeroyAlexander, SGTMattDeckard, andSPC Joel Bertoldie. Thesemen
neverknew each otheror servedtogether, three ofthemdied in Iraq and the otherthree died in
Afghanistan. Four ofthem areburiedtogetherinArlington. Their deaths set inmotion a series
ofevents thatput greatpeople ina room andformed a greatteamatUSSOCOM. As aresult
1000s ofSoldiers, Marines, Sailors, andAirmanhavebeentrained and lives saved. YoUr deaths
werenotinvain.
iv
INTRODUCTION:
"Future Warriors willbe asproficientin irregularoperations, including
counterinsurgency andstabilization operations, as they are today in high
intensity combat.,,]
"Irregularwarfare (IW), from myperspective, is thekeyproblemthat we face today. Itis
theproblemwe've gotto focus onbutnot to the exclusion ofother areas," stated General James
Mattis on24 June 2008, "[Wemust] not lose our sense ofbalancethat war remains ahuman
endeavor.,,2 Ensuringthatourmilitaryis organized and posturedto respond to current andfuture
threats is referred to as theproblem ofRebalancing GeneralPurposeForces (GPF) inthe
Quadrennial DefenseReview (QDR).3 Thechallenge is inundertaking aholistic approach to
this problemwhile atthe sametime incorporating adjustments to the associatedProfessional
MilitaryEducation (PME), personnel management, and an overall wayofthinking. As General
Mattis further noted, "IWis keytoday, butpeople are stillnot orientedto it. We must make this a
full intellectual commitment.,,4
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General PurposeForces (GPF) mustrebalance curren.t capabilities to meet expanding
worldwide IrregularWarfare (IW) requirements while maintaining orin some cases returning to
its Conventional Warfare (CW) competencies. The current Global War onTerror (GWOT)
capacityrequirements and requisite capabilities do notmatch. This paper will argue in support
ofa specific approach to rebalance the GPF which will eliminate the deltabetweenthe force size
needed andtheforce available to fight and winthe growing commitmentoftheforce towards
more irregularform ofwarfare. Outsidethe scope ofthis paper are the demand signal and
regional specificrequirements for IWforces.
This paper calls for the creationofan organizationwithinU.S. Army Brigade Combat
Teams (BCT) and U.S. MarineCorps Regiments calledthe EnhancedMissionForce (EMF).5 I
discuss theEMFinthe contextofthenature ofIrregularWarfare andfour critical areas offorce
'r
generation, training, and management: how GPFpersonnel orunits areselectedfor IW, the size
and scope ofthe GPFrebalance, themanagement andregenerationofGPF IWforces, andfinally
themitigation oftherisks associated withnon-special operatingunits executingtraditional
SpecialOperations Force (SOF) missions.
The challengeofachieving appropriatebalancebegins withunderstanding sixkeyterms.
Firstthe definition ofthe two broadtypes offorces inthe operational inventory, Special
Operations Forces (SOF) and GeneralPurposeForces (GPF). Second, the definitionofthe two
types ofGPF and SOFwarfare usedtoframe theirrequirements and mission, IrregularWarfare
(IW) and ConventionalWarfare (CW). Third, the classificationofthe distinctionbetween gaps
incapability and gaps incapacity (seeFigure 1).
For,this paper, SOF are defined as relatively small militaryunits formed and trainedfor
reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, and special operations with operational or strategic
impactt}1atrely onstealth, speed, selfreliance and closeteamwork, andhighly specialized
'----------------------------6--------------------------------------- - ------------- ----------- ------------ ---------------------- ---------------
equipment. GPF are defined as forces responsiblefor the conduct offorward presencemissions,
engage in arange ofsmaller-scale contingencies, and conductcombatoperations up to and
includingmajor theaterwars; theseforces are capable ofoperating across the tactical, operational
and strategiclevels ofwarbutbelowthe division, generallyremainfocused ontactical
operations.7
IWis defined as aviolent strugglebetweenstate and non-state actors to gainlegitimacy
andinfluence overrelevantpopulations. IWfavors indirect and asymmetric approaches, tJ;lOugh
itmay employthefull range ofmilitary andother capabilities, inorderto erode an adversary's
power, influence and will.8 CWis aform ofwarfare conductedbyusing conventional military
WeaponS (not inchidingchemicaJ, nuclear, of15iologicaI)ahdbattlefieldtaCties betweentwoor
more states inopenconfrontation. Theforces oneach side are well-defined andfight using
weapons thatprimarilytarget the opposing army.9
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Rebalance implies that GPFmustorient aportion ofits force structureto Irregular
Warfare (IW) capabilities. Expanded GPF capabilities include execution oftraditional SOF
missions such as buildingpartnernation capacities (BPC), fostering developmentofcivil society
inungoverned and under-governed areas, and conductingIntelligencePreparation ofthe
Environment (IPE)·andOperationalPreparation oftheEnvironment (OPE).lO The gap is
betweenthe currentforce structure's capacityfor global engagementbeyond Iraq and
11
Mghanistan andthe currentcapability ofGPF to conductrequired IWmissions.
IRREGULAR OR CONVENTIONAL THREAT· ORBOTH?
"[Hezbollah] displayed impressiveflexibility, relying on the cellularunits to
combine rapidlyfor specific operations, orwhen cutoffto operate independently
afterfalling in onpre-positionedstockpiles ofweapons andammunition.
Hezbollah's combatcellswere a hybridofguerrillas and regular- aform of
opponentthat U.S. forces are aptto encounterwith increasingfrequency,,12
The global scope and irregularnature ofthe GWOTillustrates theneedfor the United
-------------Staies-toreoalance-ifsGPP-,especIally-t11ose-foUi1ClTrifuiU,-S.AImyan<ftheUnitecCStates
Marine COrpS.I3 Historically, GPFhas focused onmajorcombat operations or "symmetrical"
conflict capabilities, and is unmatched. "US forces canoverwhelm any standing adversary,
establish and maintain air superiority, control sealanes orlittoral waters, and seize geographic
territory.,,14 Becauseofthe success ofGPF inconventional style warfare, potential adversaries,
buttressedbythe examples ofIraqandAfghanistan insurgencies now concentrate on asymmetric
I5
warfare orIW. However, GPF is limited and challengedbyits inabilityto shed its
conventionalfocus and redirect its efforts toward IW activities such as counterinsurgency
(COIN), Unconventional Warfare (UW), stability, counterterrorism (CT), and securityforce
assistance (SFA).I6 GPFhaveresponded quicklyto the requirementfot traininghostnation
pe
forces but is focused solely ononeregion and in its currentconfigurationhas limited abilityto
refocused worldwide.
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