DTIC ADA501650: Development and Assessment of Battlefield Visualization Training for Battalion Commanders

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lnterservice!lndustryTraining, S'imufation, andEducationConference (J/!7SEC)2008
Development and Assessment ofBattlefield Visualization
Training for Battalion Commanders
Scott B. Shadricl{ Dennis K. Leedom
u.s. Army Research Institute Evidence Based Research,Inc.
Fort Koox, KV 40121 Vienna,VA 22182
Scott.shadricl{(@us.army.mil [email protected]
James Bell, David Manning Cnrl W. Lickteig
Dynamic Research Corporation, Inc. tJ.S. Army Research Institute
FortKnox,KY 40121 Fort Knox, KY 40121
JbeIl3(mdrc.com, [email protected] CarI.LickteigilVus.army.mil
Keywords: Visualization, battle command,training,human performance
ABSTRACT
Visualization-·the ali and science of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and
envisioning how to move the force from its current state to the desired end state-is critical to successful battle
command, Unfortunately, the most common method oftraining battle command in today's Army is not the most
effective method for developing expert visualization skills, Recent research on expertise indicates that experience
alone, be it real or in simulated battle, is not adequate (Shadrick, Lussier, & Fultz, 2007), Instead, expertise is more
likely to be attained through acombination ofeducation, training, practice, and experience, For those reasons, the
U.S, Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences(ARI) initiated an analysis to better understand
how expert battalion commanders visualize battlefields, and to develop a structured, theme~basedtraining program.
Results ofthatanalysis revealed four distinct dimensions ofvisualization (Build, Synchronize, Assess, and Exploit)
and seven associated skills, The dimensions and skills provide the framework for End State: Commander
Visualization at the Battalion Level, EndS'tate is an interactive training program designed to provide field grade
officersand battalion commanders with education, training, practice, and experience in battlefield visualization. The
traininguses 3~dimensional animated coachesto relay the knowledge and perspectives ofexpertcommanders and to
provide immediate performance evaluation and feedback. In this paper, we discuss an analysis that led to the
visualization framework and skills, thedevelopmentofEndStatetraining, andthe resultsofinitial tests ofEndState
with battalioncommanders.
ABOUTTIlE AUTHORS
Dr. Scott B.Shadrick is aTeam Leader and Senior Research Psychologistfor U,S. Army Research Institute at Fort
Knox. He has conducted research on the acceleration of adaptive performance in tactical thinking skills,
training/instructional systems design and evaluation, cognitive task analysis and knowledge elicitation techniques,
performance assessment, and leader development. He is currently conducting research to understand and develop
training for visualization skills at the battalion level. I'le received aB.A. degree in Psychology from the University
ofSouth Florida, aM.A, in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from Western Kentucky University, and a PhD. in
Technology Management(Training)from IndianaStateUniversity.
Dr. Dennis K. Leedom is a Senior Scientist with Evidence Based Research (EBR). During his 36year career with
the U.S. Department of Defense, Dr. Leedom has led numerous research projects and organizations dealing with
military command and control~~··~including servingasthe SeniorScienceadvisortothe U.S. Army's III Corps, Since
joining EHR in 2001, his research on organizational sense making has focused on developing advanced knowledge
management theories and analytic tools for collaboratively maintaining operational awareness and understandingof
modern adversaries in acomplex andemergentbattlefieldenvironment
LTC (ret.) Jim Bell is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served 22 years as an Armor Officer. He has
conducted extensive research and analysis on collectiveand individual training requirements for U.S. Army units at
2008PaperNo, 8236Page 1of12
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Development and Assessment of Battlefield Visualization Training for
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Battalion Commanders
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]nterservice/]ndustryTraining, Simulation, andEducationConference (]J1TSECj 2008
brigade and below, He has also conducted extensive research on developing cognitive skills for training
visualization. He received his undergraduate degree from The Citadel and is agraduate ofthe Army's Command &
General StaffCollege.
LTC (ret.) David Manning is aretired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who served 22years as an ArmorOfficer. He
has conducted extensive research and analysis on collective and individual training requirements for U.S. Army
units at brigade and below. He received his undergraduate degree from Texas A&M University and a Masters
degree in Human Resources and Training Developmentfrom the University ofLouisville.
01'. Cad W. Lickteig is aTeam Leader and Research Psychologist for U,S. Army Research Institute at Fort Knox.
SincereceivingaPh.D, in Experimental Psychology from the University ofLouisville in 1984,hiswork has focused
on design, use, and application of digital technologies to complement human performance. His current work
includes developing a companion training program on Company Commander's Visualization and a research
program on unittraining.
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Interservice/lndustryTraining, Simulation, andEducationConference(I/ITSEC) 2008
Development and Assessment ofBattlefield Visualization
Training for Battalion Commanders
ScottB. Shadrick Dennis K. Leedom
U.S. ArmyResearch Institute Evidence Based Research, Inc.
Fort Knox, KY 40121 Vienna,VA 22182
[email protected] dId-texas(iDsuddenlink.net
James Bell, David Manning CarlW. Lickteig
Dynamic Research Corporation, Inc. U.S. Army Research Institute
Fort Knox,KY 40121 Fort Knox, KY 40121
JheI13iii:ldrc.com,dmanningwJdrc.com CarI.Licl{[email protected]
INTRODUCTION the mission and visualization ofthe end state ofthe
operation. Because there are always gaps and
U.S, Army doctrine describes battle command as the inconsistencies in information, the commander must
exercise ofcommand in an operation against a hostile, use his or her 'mind's eye' to determine what
thinking, and adaptive opponent (Department of the displays mean. Inevitably, even with net-centricity,
Army [DA], 2008). Battle command encompasses there is less information than onewould like to have,
assigning missions; prioritizing and allocating Filling ingaps is afunction ofcommand, enablingan
resources; selecting the critical time and place to act; experienced commander to navigate gaps using his
and knowing how and whento make adjustments in an or her experience to identify feasible solutions in a
on-going operation. In addition, battle command time-critical environment. (p. 4)
includes visualizing the current state and the desired
end state, then formulating concepts ofoperation to get New battle command systems, therefore, will not
from the current state to the end state. Visualization greatly change the underlying cognitive behaviors a
results when commanders understand the higher commander must perform to achieve mission success.
commander's intent, their assigned mission, the The underlying human behaviors will remain relatively
operational environment, the enemy's intent and consistent. To improve a commander's ability to
purpose, and the friendly force's capabilities and visualize, our Army must pursue training and leader
limitations. Battlefield visualization includes the development opportunities to improve the cognitive
commander's view ofwhat his forces will do and the behaviors associated with visualization skills. To
resources neededto accomplish themission. address the challenging visualization requirement, the
U.S. Army Research Institute (ARJ) initiated research
Success in an operation can often be attributed to the to understand and train commander's visualization at
commander who has a better mental "picture" of the the battalion level.I
terrain, enemy, and friendly forces. The U.S. Army is
trying to enhanceacommander's ability to visualize an The paper begins with an overview of commander's
increasingly morecomplex environment as it continues visualization, and a review of military and behavioral
to pursue advanced technologies and operational literature. Next, practical guidance on commander's
concepts. Network-enabled battle command systems, visualization is reported from commanders deployed to
for example, will give future commanders an Afghanistan and Iraq who participated in a cognitive
information advantage critical to successful task analysis (CTA). The paper then examines how the
performance. The new systems, tools, and automation results ofthe CTA--an identified set of visualization
initiatives may enhance a commander's ability to principles and skills-~were structured and integrated
visualize the battleJield. Systems will not, however, into multi-media training products. Finally, an
replace the need for the commander to clearly evaluation ofthetraining issummarized.
understand the situation and to visualize the operation.
As General Wallace (2005) wrote, no matter how Commander's Visualization
sophisticated thenew netvvork-enabled battle command
systems ofthe future mightbe: Commander's visualization is the guiding and
indispensable force in military operations and the
there is no situational understanding until the
commander applies his skilledjudgment, and that of
his staff, to interpreting the display in the context of IARI isalsodevelopingtrainingtosupportcommander's
visualizationalthecompanylevel
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cornerstone ofa commander's expertise. Visualization, A related problem is that while high-technology
the ability to think and create in mental images, is the displays extend the commander's vision far beyond
core mental processcommanders useto makedecisions line-of-sight, the information and images displayed
(DA, 2003a). It is the process by which commanders: may appear more reliable and timely than they are
develop a clear understanding of the current state; (Wallace, 2005), As the amount of information
envision a desired end; and determine a sequence of expands, and time to process it contracts, reports tend
activity to achievethe end state. to lack significant details or contain hasty errors. More
distortion and delay is added by the process ofsharing
Army doctrine and command practice assert that the information and visualizations acrossthe many persons
commander's vision is framed by the factors of and echelons required for collectiveenterprise,
Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time, and Civilians
(METT-TC). Commanders also draw on the principles In myriad ways, commanders must counter these and
ofwar, the tenets ofArmy operations, and particularly many additional problems in visualizing operations, In
their own experience and judgment to form an particular, expert commanders base their decisions on
understanding of the situation and to visualize the information fi'om as many sources as possible, They
operations required. Commanders utilize other exploit all available assets to proactively gather the
operational variables (political, military, economic, information and intelligence needed to best determine
social, information, and infrastructure plus physical what the enemy will do, when and where. However,
environment and time [PMESII-PT]), to develop an despite all resources available, commanders must rely
understanding of each METT-TC factor. But, that ultimately on their own visualization, Only the
alone, is not sufficient for envisioning their commander makes the decisive "read"through fog and
interactions, in particular the interactions among friction that commitsthe force toward peril and the end
friendly, enemy, and civilians within theenvironment. state, as Wallace (2000)stated:
Commander's visualization is a continuous process, My notion is just sit down and think. I tell my
which begins in planning and is repeatedly updated folks that you must do that. The night before the
until the force accomplishes its mission, Visualization fight, go sit inyourvehiclewith themap. Tell your
is the commander's essential means of assessing and driverto not let anyone botheryou, Sittherewith a
adjusting operations. By continually confirming or cup ofcoffee, andjustkind ofmap outtoyourself.
modifying their vision, commanders determine when Think about howyou expecttheenemy will come,
and where to make a decision, as well as what and importantly, whatyou are goingto do about it
decisions are needed (DA,2003b). (p. 1I)
On a more personal level, the commander's vision Challenges to training visualization today only
helps lead and motivatethe force. Itconvinces Soldiers intensify due to: unpredictable threats, a multitude of
their commander sees and understands the enemy in a interagency and multinational considerations, an
manner that strengthens and secures their course of endless stream of technology insertions that result in
action, As the visualization forms and evolves during more complicated systems, and increased "turbulence"
an operation, it is frequently described and shared to in personnel, organization, and doctrine, Unfortunately,
revise how ongoing actions and resources must be current methods for training visualization skills are not
directed to accomplish the mission. It is the process of sufficient Too often "training" equates to placing
sharing and shaping visualizations that links collective commanders in a realistic situation and hoping they
thoughtto collectiveaction, '~figureitout."
Visualization Challenges The commander's ability to visualize is a human
performance requirement. Yet, research on the
Caveats abound on the many potential problems in developmentofexpertiseclearly indicatesthat"trainas
forming and communicating the commander's you 11ght" immersion in fully simulated and realistic
visualization (DA, 2003b), Commanders base their battles is neither the most effective nor efficient
visualizations not only on facts, but also on their method of developing expertise (Ericsson, 1996). In
interpretation ofthem; not only on their observations, most domains, expertise is not ahappenstance; nor the
but also on the observations and interpretations of result ofincidental, discovery, or experiential learning.
others. Invariably, the higher the commander's level, The development ofexpertise generally requires highly
the more removed the commander is from thesituation, structured and focused learning methods that
from directobservation, progressively mold and hone performance to match
expeli models. To help train commander's
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visualization, two key research issues were examined. Taken together, these eight characteristics of
How do experts visualize? How do you train visualization provide a basic framework for examining
visualization? how visualization skills might be improved through
training. However, these characteristics are general in
HOW DO EXPERTS VISUALIZE? nature and do not convey the complex challenges of
visualization faced by tactical commanders in
To understand how expert commanders visualize Afghanistan, Iraq, or other operational environments.
operations, we conducted a cognitive task analysis of To begin to understand these challenges at a deeper
visualization skills and expertise at the battalion level level, we mustturn attention to the specifics ofmodern
(Leedom, et aI., 2007). Analysis included reviews of stability and counterinsurgency operations.
military and behavioral literature coupled with
interviews ofmilitary experts. The goal ofthe analysis Military literature contends that visualizing and
was to identify the underlying cognitive behaviors conducting stability operations requires the same
expert battle commanders exhibit during visualization general skills and processes astraditional offensiveand
ofdynamic battlefieldenvironments. defensive operations (DA, 2001). However, doctrine
also stresses that there are unique characteristics of
MilitaryLiterature stability operations that commanders must envision.
They include:
Doctrinal literature identifies several characteristics - Stability operations are political. Achieving the
thatcan serveas aguidefor identifyingand articulating desired political end state is often more challenging
visualization skills at different tactical levels of than achievingthedesired militmyend state.
command. Thesecharacteristics include: - METT-TC applies differently in stability operations
- Visualization purposefully frames actions and links where the "enemy" is ambiguous and the "mission"
them with understanding and intent. Visualization may change rapidly from conducting lethal combat
servesto frame and identify actions that can betaken to non-lethal stability operations.
to move the battlefield toward a set of objectives, - Key "terrain" is often based on political and social
goals, ordesired end states. factors, notphysical features ofthe landscape.
- Visualization is synchronized horizontally across the -- "Troops" may include host nation police and army
commander and staff who each contribute to its elements, contracted interpreters and laborers, and
construction and maintenance. multinational partners versus an integrated force.
- Visualization balances intuition with deliberate - Achieving goals in stability operations requires
reasoning in response to operational constraints such perseverance, maybe years. Civilian considerations
as timeand commander's experience. andorganizationsarecritical toachievingthe goals.
- Visualization is structurally framed by Army
doctrine to provide a common understanding that The increased complexity and ambiguity of stability
specifies and organizes the elements of knowledge and counterinsurgency operations taxes the
that traditionally comprise an effective operational commander's visualization process in countless ways.
plan. The commander may, for example, need to envision a
- Visualization is multifaceted and multilevel, matched three-block war that entails engaging insurgents in one
to the dimensions ofoperational complexity faced in block, quelling civilian protests in another, and
modern military operation that ranges from short conducting humanitarian assistance in a third (Krulak,
term combat and security operations to long-term 1997). In addition, the Contemporary Operational
stability and counterinsurgency operations with Environment (COE) is multidimensional (DA, 2003a).
political,economic,and social dimensions. Threats may emerge suddenly (Kilcullen, 2006) and
- Visualization is collaborative to achieve unity of may come from any direction (on the ground, on top or
effort across the multitude of units, teams, and within structures, underground, or from the air). These
agencies that impactthe operation. characteristics suggest the need for commanders to
- Visualization is continuously dynamic, adjusted in consider a number of additional factors in their
response to friendly actions, unforeseen civilian planningand execution ofstability operations.
considerations, and unpredictableenemies.
- Visualization is part of a larger mental process; it Behavioral Literature
supports alarger planning and execution process that
combines visualization, description, direction, and Behavioral literature examined the visualization
assessmenttotranslateunderstanding into action. process trom cognitive, social, and ecological
perspectives. The cognitive level focused on the
internal mental structures and processes commanders
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use to develop a framework of understanding; the other pieces of information about the commander's
social level, mechanisms by which commanders information environment. Available information is then
identify and use other sources ofexpertise to augment used to validate the activated mental models, fill in
and refinetheirunderstanding; andtheecological level, missing features, or initiateasearch for amorerelevant
ways in which thought and action mutually influence model. Overall, this process is iterative in nature, with
oneanotherovertime (L,eedom, et aL, 2007). the goal being to find a set ofmental model fragments
and information elements that cohere··..--that are
CognitivePerspective consistent and mutually reinforcing ofoneanother. 1na
Visualization is the mental process of linking intent more formal manner, the so-called "data/i'fame" model
with action within a constructed problem space. As ofSeick et aI., involves a number ofdifferent mental
shown in Figure 1, visualization involves the selective processes that serve to maintain a consistent
retrieval of data elements from the environment, the understanding ofthecurrentsituation.
activation ofrelevanttacitknowledgeor mental models
from the individual's experience, and the mental The data/frame model primarily deals with familiar
integration ofthese data and frameworks to form focal situations in which the individual possesses relevant
knowledge (Polanyi, J962). Here, focal knowledge experience and expertise to deal with the problem
represents the "current understanding" ofthe problem space. However, this is not always the case in many
space in terms ofhigh-level objectives and operational real world situations where a known problem calculus
realities. It is theframework used by thecommanderto cannotbe applied. To address this broadervisualization
envision and committo specificactions. challenge, the individual must first characterize the
level and nature of disorder being faced. Then,
INFORMATION depending upon the type of situation at hand, the
individual adjusts the framing cycle. Based on the
FOCALKNOWLEDGE inherent degree of order, Kurtz and Snowden (2003)
SELECTIVELY CONSTRUCTf'DMeNTAL offer a quadratic classification system of Known,
RETRIEVED MODEl.01'srrVATION
DATA Knowable, Complex, and Chaossituations. Akey tenet
SITUATION•ALCV!i'S" is thateach situation requires, or is best understood, by
• • employing different ways to form the commander's
•••
visualization.
• • •
•
Known situations,for example, mightbe often repeated
Cordon and Searches against a suspected terrorist safe
house. The process ofvisualizing the mission might be
bound by a familiar set of tactics, techniques, and
FRAGMENTARY
procedures (TTPs) with an emphasis on obtaining
MENTALMODEls
rAc:rrKHQWtWGE actionable intelligence. Complex or novel situations,
however, might require a focus on detecting and
Figure 1. Visualization astheConstructionofFocal
interpreting meaningful patterns or links. The
Knowledge.
commander may need to probethe situationto discover
patterns or links before being able to determine what
While Army doctrine can guide this mental process
actions are needed to disrupt undesirable patterns and
through mnemonics such as METT~TC and the
foster favorable ones.
elements of operational design, it cannot prescribe
"cookbook" solutions for constructing and linking the
Arguably, military training and practice are not
set ofmental constructs. Such devices merely serve to
adequately geared toward more complex and chaotic
directthe commander's attention to different aspects of
situations (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003). KUl1z and
the problemspace.
Snowden relate a case in which a group of Marines
went to the New York Mercantile Exchange and
How the commander constructs this framework has
competed against professional traders in a simulated
been investigated by Sieck, Klein, Peluso, Smith, &
trading environment. Of course, the traders always
Harris-Thompson (2004). Essentially, this process
won. But when the traders visited Quantico and
involves the activation of specific mental model
competed in simulated war games againstthe Marines,
fragments-,~based upon the commander's experience
they won again. One interpretation is that traders were
and expertise and the recognition ofrelevanttriggering
skilled at spotting and shaping patterns amid disorder,
cues from the operationalenvironment. Once activated,
while Marines were trained to collect and analyze data
mental model fragments provideabasis for interpreting
in ordertomake rational decisions in anorderly world.
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Regardless ofhow it is accomplished, the mental goal Ecological Perspective
of visualization is to develop a set of conceptual Visualization is not the passive process of fitting
pathways that link intent with action. As the available information into an experience-based
operational situation evolves, commanders are able to framework of interpretation. Instead, organizations
continually adjustexecution decisions with referenceto actively engage their operational environment to both
the current and end state. The visualization serves as a (I) shape real world events and states in conformance
roadmap or guide for maintaining unity ofpurpose and with the organization's vision and (2) probe and reveal
synchronization across the various elements of the additional aspects of the opcrational environment for
operation. If this visualization space is not explicitly subsequent advantage. An organization's active
expressed and maintained,thecommander runs therisk engagement (i.e., enactment) of the operational
of myopic attention on moment-to-moment actions environment is a relevant strategy to pursue in the
while losing sight ofthe "bigger picture" involved in complex and chaotic disorder that permeates stability
achievingmission success. operations(Kurtz& Snowden, 2003).
Social Perspective Shaping actions serve to conform the commander's
Typically, visualization is regarded as a cognitive operational environment to the envisioned problem
process occurring within an individual. However, space. They also help reduce the number ofunknowns
battalion success hinges on its ability to achieve shared and risks. Probing actions are particularly useful in
understanding and unity of purpose despite social complex operational environments where the
structures, processes, and barriers that often curtail commander is unable to apply aknown battle calculus,
collaboration. The commander and supporting staff Probing actions illuminate additional elements and
play unique and complementary roles in the linkages that can be exploited for an operational
visualization process. The commander establishes a advantage. However, for probing actionsto beeffective
framework for this process and articulates his or her and productive, they must be combined with deliberate
vision through commander's intent, planning guidance, analysis. Thus, the ecological aspects ofvisualization
and critical information requirements. Thc staff require the commander to establish meaningful
elaborates and translates this vision into causal measures ofeffectiveness (MOE) that focus on results
mechanisms and pathways to the end state through and consequences of unit actions. Measures assist in
knowledge productssuch as Intelligence Preparation of determining ifactions are appropriate, or ifdifferentor
the Battlefield (IPB), Intelligence, Surveillance, and alternative actions are required, Measures also link the
Reconnaissance (ISH.) Plan, Running Estimate, and outcome ofactionswith theoperational purpose, focus,
Course of Action Briefings. This more detailed and system effects established bythecommander.
knowledge is developed through collaboration across
the commander's personal, coordinating, and special Battlefield visualization is typically associated with
staiTs. Each focuses on specific aspects of the operational planning within the Military Decision
commander's visualization space. The effective ability Making Process (MDMP). However, visualization also
of these groups to create shared understanding and serves an important role during execution. During
unity of purpose minimizes barriers to collaboration execution, effective visualization enables the
across cognitive, social, organizational, and technical commandertotrack key problem elements and lines of
domains. effort over timc to identify meaningful patterns or
trends and to maintain unity ofpurpose for long-term
For visualization skill development, we looked beyond mission objectives. This involves the development ofa
the individual and address managementskills neededto Running Estimate, the staffs continuous assessment of
organizc, maintain, and sustain this social process. current and future operations to determine (1) if the
Visualization synchronizes the knowledge elements current operation is proceeding according to the
and associations internally across different levels of Commander's Intent and (2) if future operations are
thinking and assessment by the commander and staff. sUPP0l1able. It allows the commander to identify key
It synchronizes externally across different stakeholders variances with respect to forecasted events, and to
and players relevant to the operation. Within the appropriately adjust actions to maintain unity of
commander's immediate chain of command, this purpose. Without steady reference to the content and
includes synchronization across warfighting functions. structure of thc visualization space, the commander
Beyond the immediatechain ofcommand,this includes may become mentally absorbed in moment-to-moment
synchronization across the perspectives of other operations and lose sightofthebiggerpicture,
Joint/Coalition military forces, other government
agencies, and key civilian political and administrative
leaders withwhomthecommandermustcollaborate.
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Expert Interviews HOW DO YOU TRAIN YISUALlZATlON?
Weconducted Interviewswith 25 brigadeand battalion Based on the CTA findings, four skill domains and
command and staff personnel followed by interviews seven underlyingvisualization skillswere identified, as
with instructors from the Command and General Staff shown in Figure 2. The four skill domains address the
College and Fellows Irom the U.S. Army's School for need to Build, Synchronize, Assess, and Exploit the
Advanced Military Studies. The participants ranged commander'svisualizations (Leedom, etal., 2007).
from majors to colonels. All had recent experience in
battalion command or battalion/brigade staffs in Build represents the ability to construct acoherent and
Afghanistan or Iraq, They could deliberately reflect on comprehensive visualization in accord with doctrinal
those experiences and their implications for leader guidance (DA, 2003a). Synchronize reflects the ability
development. Participants received a read-ahead to share and integrate visualizations internally and
packagethat prompted them tothink aboutthetypes of externally. Assess reflects the ability to effectively
skills required for battlefield visualization. gauge execution progress and proactively refine the
visualization. Exploit rellects the ability to maintain
The "lessons learned" from the interviews focused on operational agility and momentum by advantaging
the great challenges commanders face in visualizing emergingopportunities and deterringemergingthreats.
military operations in the COE, Almost unanimously, Each skill reflects the commander's ability to link
participants stated that understanding and visualizing intenttoaction.
stability and counterinsurgency operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq was one of the most difficult For each of the seven visualization skills, the CTA
tasks in their military careers, Some key challenges developed target performance criteria to assess skill
were: acquisition during training. For instance, two ofthe six
~ Civilians are the center of gravity and visualization performance criteria for Skill I, Identify tactical
must address the non-lethal lines of operation that problems using the factors ofMETT-TC and Elements
influence civilians, ofOperational Design, are:
- Stability operations have immediate and long-term - Use factors of METT-TC and Elements of
timelines that require commanders to visualize and Operational Design to interpret and frame the
reconcile often conflictingconsequences, problem elements across the unit's tactical and
~ The prolonged nature ofstability operations makes it operational environment.
difficultfor commandersto maintainvigilanceonthe - Develop and communicate Commander's Intent and
currentstateand progresstowardtheend state. PlanningGuidance.
- The MDMP isoften abandoned in counterinsurgency
operations in favor ofmore adhoc planning. As the eTA identified seven discrete skills, learning
~ The elements of operational design need to be chunks tailored to each skill became a training design
extended downtothetactical level ofvisualization in requirement. Otherdesign requirements weretospecify
stability operations (current doctrine associates these the tasks and learning objectives associated with each
elements primarily with operational level skill. Different kinds of skills often require different
visualization). kinds of training, For example, for some perceptual
tasks, the training might present very little theoretical
Similar lessons are increasingly documented in more background, but create lots ofpracticeexercises where
recent counterinsurgency literature and doctrine (DA, accuracy and speed of performance are essential
2007). However, many ofthe participants interviewed (Fadede,2006).
stated they did not have specific training on
counterinsurgency issues, They arrived in theater As tasks become more cognitive in nature, the
without asolid mental model to visualize operations in instruction requires more complex cognitivechallenges
their area ofoperation and, therefore, learned to cope (Cooke, 1994). As such, the visualization process that
with unfolding events through "on the job training:' is taught needsto help commanders learn and integrate
Participants also reported little use of some key higherwordercognitiveskills, Therefore, exercises were
conceptual frameworks in Army doctrine such MDMP, developed that required learners to review a complex
PMESII-PT, andtheelements ofoperationaldesign. set of data, consider complex processes, and make
decisions incomplex situations.
2008PaperNo, 8236Page8ofI2
lnlerservice/!ndustryTraining, Simulation, andEducationConference(l/ITSEC) 2008
1, IdentifytaelicalproblemsusingthefactorsofMETI-TCand Elementsof
OperationalDesign
2.Synchronizevisualization
internallyacrosscommander
andstaff
3, Synchronizevisualization
externallyacrossrelevant
playerinterests
<1,Developmeasuresofeffectiveness(MOE)
5,Colledinfomlalionandidentifypallernsandtrends
Figure2.Visualization Frameworkand AssociatedSkills
For training complex cognitive skills across realistic improve the visualization skills offield grade officers,
situations, we used a set of instructional theories and battalion commanders and staffs, The training is
approaches based on a common theoretical viewpoint. situated in Iraq and provides supporting materials such
One of these instructional approaches was deliberate as Introduction to Visualization, Road to War, Rules of
practice (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Roemer, 1993; Engagement, and a Battalion Update Brief. The actual
Ericsson, 1996), In a separate example of deliberate training package includes 14 scenario-based training
practice training, learners were first provided the and practice exercises in vignette format. End S'tate
principles representing expert behaviors, and then also includes apre-test and post-test in vignette format.
given multiple practice opportunities to apply the Throughout the training, learners observe exemplar
behaviors (Lussier, Shadrick, & Prevou, 2003). performance of the seven expeli visualization skills
Initially, the practice sessions were short and focused performed by 3-dimensional animated role models (see
drills, with clear and immediatefeedback, followed by Figure 3) who convey the knowledge and perspective
more extended practice opportunities to overcome of expert commanders, Learners observe and then
diagnosedskill deficiencies. apply visualization skills across aspectrum ofstability
and counterinsurgency vignettes during which they
For End ,State, the instructional approach used the receive immediate and instructorless performance
following deliberate practicecomponents: feedback and evaluation,
- Learners are provided the principles they need to
apply; they are not left to discover the principles on Measurement is essential to training. Each training
theirown, vignette provides training objectives and guidance,
- Learners apply the principles to real-life situations, diagnoses performance difficulties and deficiencies,
Initially, the practicesessionsare focused on isolated and assesses skill acquisition ba<;ed on specified
skillsthatarechallengingbutnotoverwhelming. performance criteria. However, direct observation and
- Learners receive feedback, often by comparing the objective measurement of performance is often
solutionsthey developwith more expertsolutions. difficult in military settings, especially commander's
- After learners solve a problem, the next problem is cognitive performance. The unpredictable and
designed tofurther progress skill development. asymmetric COE along with the expanse of
information and complexity in network-centric
ENDSTATETRAINING PROGRAM operations further complicates commander's
visualization and its measurement. The training's
EndState: Commander's Visualization at the Battalion approach to measurement helps to mitigate such
Level is a multi-media, interactive training program to challenges by exploiting the use ofdeliberate practice
2008Paper/v'o. 8236Page90112