DTIC ADA501229: Inside the Detention Camps: A New Campaign in Iraq ()

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

Inside the Detention
Camps
A New Campaign in Iraq
By Maso n Br ooKs and Dr eW MiLLer
T
he United States invaded Iraq
Greer) in 2003 without a detailed plan
m
Willia for handling large numbers of
Air Force ( (COIN) warfadreet.a Oinneee sc oinn sceoquunetnecrein osfu trhgiesn scity-
U.S. uation was the debacle at Abu Ghraib prison
that surfaced in 2004. Since then, the United
States has struggled to regain the moral “high
ground” and the trust of the Iraqi people.
After the Abu Ghraib scandal, the U.S.
military mainly concentrated on enforcing
conventional “care and treatment” standards
for the humane handling of detainees.1 Insur-
gents, on the other hand, challenged coalition
force (CF) authority in the camps and worked
to recruit and train insurgents inside U.S.
detention facilities. But in the past year, the
handling of detainees has undergone a trans-
formation. The new approach encourages
detainees to embrace a more moderate view
of Islam, reject violence, and support the gov-
ernment of Iraq. While the jury remains out
on the reorientation effort’s long-term effect
(curbing recidivism or cramping insurgent
recruitment, for example), it provides a useful
case study of adaptation in war.
Today, the detention situation in Iraq
is improved over a year ago. A calmed situa-
tion in the camps, coupled with a belief that
faster release could yield political advantages,
sparked a proposal to accelerate detainees’
release. Polls, interviews, and other sources
showed that Iraqis (especially Sunnis) over-
whelmingly see CF detention and detainee
treatment as unfair. Former Iraqi Minister
of Defense and Finance Ali Allawi noted,
“Heavy-handed security measures . . . played
a large part in crystallizing anti-Coalition
Colonel Mason Brooks, USAF (Ret.), and Colonel
Drew Miller, USAFR, are Staff Researchers in the
Institute for Defense Analyses. They were assigned
to Multi-National Force–Iraq, Strategy, Plans, and
Guards check Iraqi detainee’s name off list upon release Assessment Directorate, in Baghdad’s International
from custody
Zone from September 2007 to May 2008.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 129
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FORCE OF LAW | Inside the Detention Camps
feelings in the Sunni areas.”2 Anger stem- detention of thousands of Iraqis captured Using local imams to teach and discuss
ming from perceptions of unfair detention by by U.S. forces. He brought to the job a new moderate interpretations of Islam exposes
“occupiers” provides support for insurgents approach—something he credits to his experi- detainees to nonviolent thinking. While
and fertile ground for recruiting. Accelerated ence as a successful businessman and entre- voluntary, these sessions are well attended,
release of detainees can reduce this alienation preneur. Stone stresses practical problemsolv- and many participants say that this is their
effect and meet political demands to free ing and initiative, along with listening to first exposure to moderate religious views.
Iraqis, but it also risks having them rejoin detainees to understand their motivations. He Job training and education classes target basic
the insurgency and could jeopardize fragile speaks Arabic and routinely studies the Koran learning and labor skills to enhance employ-
security gains. to enhance his grasp of Iraqi culture. ment possibilities—a leading cause of recidi-
Pressed to inform General David General Stone began by separating vism. Detention facilities now offer classes on
Petraeus of complicated decision aspects, the insurgent agitators from other detainees, sewing, masonry, and carpentry.3
Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) staff giving moderates in the camps the freedom to
directed an assessment of the proposal’s risks choose a path other than violence. The result
screening and resulting
and benefits. This article describes the new convinced the general that at least a third of all
isolation of extremists improve
detainee policies, summarizes the effort to detainees could be influenced to reject insur-
assess benefits and risks, highlights the reac- gency within the camps’ controlled detention camp security by giving
tion to that assessment, and explains early setting. A new goal emerged: turning detainees moderates the freedom to
(and expected) campaign impacts. into cooperative moderates. A multilayered avoid and reject extremist
process aimed at attaining that goal is summa-
views and activities
New Detainee Policies rized in figure 1 and elaborated below.
Major General Douglas Stone, USMCR, Separation of Moderates from Irrec-
assumed command of Task Force 134 oncilables. TF–134 uses information from Exploiting Tribal Influences. Iraqi
(TF–134) in 2007, with responsibility for the detainee entrance screening at a transition tribes form a societal hierarchy accommodat-
barracks to identify moderates and extrem- ing the political, security, and social needs
Figure 1. Summary of Key TF–134 ists. While resource-intensive, this screening of members. Tribes help shape individual
Programs and resulting isolation of extremists improve behavior and are therefore essential to reinte-
camp security by giving moderates the grating released detainees back into society.4
n Transition Barracks In: Initially assesses freedom to avoid and reject extremist views (TF–134-sponsored studies show stronger
motivation for joining the insurgency,
and activities. It also enables detainees to societal bonds afford even a single detained
criminal history, religious status,
volunteer for education programs, cooperate Iraqi the potential to influence over 100 other
education/job skills
n Religious Discussion Program: Voluntary, with guards, and transform their outlook and Iraqis.) To exploit this effect, the task force
but used to determine extent of religion in behavior. works closely with Iraqi imams and others to
detainees’ lives and to develop a moderate Opportunity for Religious, Academic, apply Iraqi cultural operating codes, such as
view of Islam and Vocational Education. Programs address shame and honor and patronage,5 to develop
n Dar al-Hikmah (Basic Education): Chance the lack of education and training in Iraq. programs that further objectives.
to get a minimum 5th-grade education
n Vocational Education: Job skills training ADM Mullen views Camp Bucca detention
n Work Program: Compensated for voluntary center from observation tower
work activities (for example, sewing
center, mud brick facility, working parties)
n Individual Assessments: Occurs before
their Multi-National Force Review
Committee hearing to consider mental
health, religious ideology, education, work
program performance, guard force input
n Family Advocacy and Outreach: Includes
family in the rehabilitation process and
grants greater access based on progress
n Lion’s Spirit: Continuing moderate religious
education and training for those desiring
to become an imam
n Transition Barracks Out: May spend up
to a week in this program that includes
courses on civics, public health, and
rtheein ftaemgrialytion into Iraqi society and with Neeley)
Mc
Source: MNF–I TF–300 Theater Internment Facility Chad J.
Regional Center, brief, n.d. D (
O
D
130 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
BROOKS and MILLER
Family Advocacy. Capitalizing on the operational units, recommend release based TF–134 proposed increasing the number
closest of Iraqi societal bonds, family advo- on whether a detainee poses a security risk. In of moderate CF detainees released in the
cacy offers visitation as a privilege to detain- making these determinations, boards conduct interim, while still stressing a general policy of
ees who follow facility rules. Closer family face-to-face interviews with detainees and no general mass releases and no release of any
interaction for cooperative detainees provides review evidence from internment facility high-risk, irreconcilable detainee.
greater moral support and involves families in guards, counselors, teachers, and evaluations, The proposal met strong opposition
their transformation and reintegration efforts. along with that from arresting units and other from some commanders, who were convinced
This program consists of frequent on-site vis- sources. MNFRC boards and other TF–134 Iraqis would feign moderation and resume
itation—on average, about 300 families visit processes align with the local Islamic custom attacking CF troops as soon as they were
detention facilities each day, and this number of conducting communal, nonjudicial hear- released. With deeply divided opinions and
is steadily increasing.6 ings for accused persons to air grievances and pressed to inform the commanding general’s
Pledge and Guarantor Program. publicly present evidence. decision, the MNF–I staff called for a formal
Having detainees sign a pledge prior to release TF–134 saw detainees’ potential influence look to sort through all the issues. The impact
is another new practice. Some with troubled over friends and tribal members outside the on political reconciliation and insurgent ranks
backgrounds must also secure a guarantor, camps as a way to extend the positive effects of had to be assessed in only a few weeks.
often a tribal leader, to assume responsibility its program to the Iraqi population. This think-
for their post-release conduct. Iraqi judges for- ing produced a more aggressive policy, with Assessing Risks and Benefits
mally administer this pledge, and violators of an expanded goal of “establish[ing] an alliance The assessment began by looking at how
its provisions can be charged in Iraqi courts. with and empower[ing] moderate Iraqis to well the TF–134 approach to handling detain-
Pledges are frequently part of TF–134 release effectively marginalize the violent extremists.”8 ees aligned with the overall joint campaign
ceremonies, under its Lion’s Dawn program, This policy promotes political reconciliation plan for Iraq. COIN doctrine and literature
in which Iraqi leaders recognize detainee by extending positive moderate influences to agree that it is essential to drive a “wedge”
achievements and reinforce the significance of more Iraqis with the aim of reducing support between the hardened insurgent cadre and
being given a new start.7 These actions, lever- for insurgents and bolstering the government those less committed or motivated to support
aging Iraqis’ sense of honor and patronage, of Iraq. the insurgency.10 TF–134 seeks to do this
are also aimed at curbing recidivism. In fall 2007, as Iraqi politicians renewed inside the camps. But the dramatic change
Multilayered Release Policies. Multi- their call to grant amnesty to selected detain- in policy entails two other distinctive facets:
National Force Review Committee (MNFRC) ees, TF–134 proposed even more sweeping leveraging detainees’ influence over Iraqis
boards are the cornerstone of a paradigm shift expansions.9 If United Nations authority for outside the detention camps, and using the
away from warehousing detainees and generic U.S. detention of Iraqis was not renewed at the expanded release policy as a wedge to influ-
release policies to a multilayered risk assess- end of 2008, there could be a mass turnover ence political dynamics. While both support
ment for each detainee. To achieve the goal of of tens of thousands of U.S.-held detainees— COIN tenets of reducing insurgent forces
releasing only those detainees assessed as very potentially overwhelming Iraq’s prison and bolstering the government, implement-
low risk, these boards, manned by military capacity and creating another problem for the ing them is a bold and complicated step into
members from in-theater headquarters and Iraqi government. As a less risky alternative, uncharted territory.
Adolphson) the key question is whether
my (Jason inesituhregre fnrtosm g edte mtaoinree erse cwruhiots
Ar
S. were released or from other
U.
Iraqis who join because of
resentment over the detainee
alienation effect
The key question is whether insurgents
get more recruits either from detainees who
were released or from other Iraqis who join
because of resentment over the detainee alien-
ation effect (see figure 2). A recent Joint Force
Quarterly article on detaining Iraqis noted
that “many examples of arrests and intern-
ment [are creating] more insurgents than the
arrests neutralize.”11 For Iraqi perspectives on
Navy Judge Advocate General meets with Task Force 134
the likely impacts, the study used in-theater
attorneys and paralegals at Camp Victory, Iraq
Iraqi-American cultural advisors and native
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 131
FORCE OF LAW | Inside the Detention Camps
Iraqis living in Baghdad who work for the a range of actions to take advantage of detainee 2007, declaring the authors’ assessment “very
United States.12 The assessment used official releases, including their return to localities and useful” and matching his own impressions.
MNF–I insurgent troop strength estimates, followup stories. A worst-case assumption was With the decision made, controversy over
historical recidivism data, focus groups, and tested—reversing weightings for security and accelerated detainee release policy persists,
nationwide polls, as well as special surveys, political criteria. The results still showed accel- with early results still inconclusive. The new
working groups, and other subject matter erated release as the best option for achieving TF–134 view that detainees not only can
expert inputs.13 This research helped establish joint campaign plan objectives. be moderated, but also can become a force
a plausible range of release rates, recidivism These analyses pointed to an aggressive for spreading moderate beliefs across Iraqi
rates, and detainee alienation effects. ICP and low recidivism as particularly impor- society, still faces opposition from some who
Rough estimates based on analyzing a tant to achieving campaign goals. Lower believe it is best to keep detainees locked up
number of cases with varying combinations recidivism seems dependent on training and as long as possible. Some commanders report
of release, recidivism, and detainee alienation education programs in detention facilities opposition to detainee releases from locals
effect rates show that detainee alienation has as well as effective reintegration of releasees who characterize detainees as criminals or
the greater impact on insurgent force levels. In back into society, including securing a job or fear their return to the insurgency. While
most cases examined, the number of released job training, an education, and so forth. New some of those concerns are no doubt legiti-
detainees who return to the insurgency is less policies being implemented, which might free mate, they sometimes mask another problem.
than the number of insurgents created due at least half of the 23,000 detainees currently It is not uncommon for someone to steal
to detainee alienation, even where there are held, seem to be producing lower recidivism another’s home or property and provide bogus
high numbers of released detainees. Thus, the rates. In the months since the program’s information to authorities, spurring a false
benefits from lower detainee alienation offset implementation, recidivism rates are less than arrest and detention. Fear of revenge therefore
the risks of released detainees rejoining the 1 percent, substantially below historical rates motivates some of the release program’s most
insurgency—producing lower overall insur- of 6 to 9 percent.17 The rate of change sug- ardent opponents.
gent force levels. In addition, lower recidivism gests recidivism will probably not return to
increases the probability and scope of these previous higher levels, but more time (up to
some commanders report
positive impacts. These results are consistent 18 months) is needed to see if these rates will
opposition to detainee
with other COIN studies and are reinforced hold. Interestingly, these factors indicate that
by new COIN doctrine.14 while TF–134 efforts are vital, ultimate results releases from locals who
To consider broader political, security, may well depend on how other MNF–I subele- characterize detainees as
and other impacts, the analysis team adapted a ments follow through on and synchronize the criminals or fear their return
method that visually framed key decision cri- broader ICP and releasee reintegration imple- to the insurgency
teria (see figure 3).15 This flexible, multicriteria mentation aspects.
decision support approach allowed dynamic
weighting of rating factors.16 Starting from a Senior Reaction Results The program is still experiencing
pre–change-of-policy base case and incremen- General Petraeus approved the TF–134 growing pains, partly because no single entity
tally adding more detainee engagement steps moderation and early release program with has end-to-end responsibility for implementa-
and an aggressive information campaign plan the addition of a strong ICP to maximize tion or the result. As of August 2008, release
(ICP) yielded positive results. The ICP included political reconciliation benefits in December rates were still lower than TF–134 initially
Insurgent Recruitment and Growth Model proposed. ICP efforts to help spread the news
Figure 2. Insurgent Recruitment and Growth Model of faster release and assist in transmitting
moderate messages have only partially been
Possible Detainee Practices Impacts on Anti-Iraqi Forces Recruitment
Removed developed. Local reintegration efforts, critical
Insurgents to curbing recidivism, are also fragmented.
“DETAINEE ALIENATION EFFECT”
Some early disparities are to be expected,
Supporters and especially in a dynamic and uneven security
Population Insurgents
Sympathizers environment. Despite the challenges, progress
Detainees
is being made to set up effectively coordi-
Figure 3. MNF–I Assessment Detainee Policies and Priorities Scorecard
Defeating Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) 3 Political Reconciliation 5 Implementation Implementa-
feasibility 1 tion costs 1
Free up Coalition Interrogation/ Iraqi Detainee GOI Support 3 Other SCIO
Reduce # AIF 5
Force assets 3 Intelligence 1 turnover enlightenment 1 Potential 1
(does not impact
Detaining Recapture Not provok- Fewer Other Willing- AIF Fair Fair
include pos- 1
AIF 1 recidi- ing new AIF guards military ness to opposi- treat- treat-
sible improved
vism 1 (Detainee 1 assets 1 support tion 1 ment by ment by
post-release
Alienation GOI 1 GOI– GOI–
intelligence)
Effect) 2 Sunni 1 Shia 1
Key: GOI = Government of Iraq; SCIO = Strategic Communications Information Operations
132 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
BROOKS and MILLER
U.S. Army
nated, accelerated detainee evaluation and expert works by David Galula, James S. Corum,
release processes. Brian Reed, John F. Hussey, and the 1968 RAND
Important successes resulted from Vietnam Hamlet Evaluation System Study. War College
11 Kyle B. Teamey, “Arresting Insurgency,” Joint
working with tribal chiefs outside the formal
Force Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter, 2007), 117.
government and employing Iraqis, many of
12 Efforts to incorporate Iraqi perspectives
them former insurgents, as Concerned Local
include closely interacting with Iraqi-Americans
Citizens (also known as Sons of Iraq) to StRateGic LanDpoweR eSSay conteSt 2009
working in Iraq who collect information and
provide security. That sort of boldness opened maintain a dialogue with a large network of Iraqis
doors of opportunity. It is still too early to across the country and interacting with other Iraqis
assess whether the TF–134 initiatives will living in Baghdad and working in the International The U.S. Army War College and U.S. Army War
effectively complement the awakening to con- Zone for MNF–I open-source intelligence as media
College Foundation are pleased to announce the
vince more Iraqis to reject extremist views. By translators.
annual Strategic Landpower Essay Contest.
itself, the task force’s detention policy changes 13 Due to current instabilities in Iraq, coali-
tion force (CF) recidivism is generally reported in
will not turn the insurgency around, but they
terms of a person, detained in a theater internment The topic of this year’s entries must relate to
do represent a new patch in the larger quilt of
counterinsurgency studies. JFQ facility as a threat to security, who is released and Perspectives on Stability Operations and Their
again becomes an insurgent. The main way of mea-
Role in U.S. Landpower.
suring recidivism is when recaptured detainees’
NoteS
identifying numbers are reactivated when they pass
Anyone is eligible to enter and win except those
through the magistrate’s cell at Camp Cropper.
1 As used here, the term care and treatment Detainee recidivists who are killed or those involved in judging. The U.S. Army War College
refers to humane handling of detainees and
detained by Iraqi Security Forces whose identity Foundation will award a prize of $3,000 to the
conduct of detention personnel as established by
is confirmed by biometric data from previous CF author of the best essay, a prize of $1,500 to the
the Geneva Convention and promulgated by U.S.
detention are also included in this measurement
Government guidance documents. For example, second place winner, and $500 to the third place
when the information is made available.
Department of Defense Directive 2310.01E, Enclo- winner.
14 Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency
sure 3, contains the verbatim text of Common
(Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of
Article 3 to the Geneva Convention of 1949. Enclo-
the Army, December 2006), table 1–1. For more information or a copy of the essay contest
sure 4 contains other requirements of the law of war
15 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command rules, contact:
essential to ensure humane care and treatment of
draft pamphlet 525–FW–X, version 3.0, Com-
all detainees.
mander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design, is
2 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Dr. Michael R. Matheny
new doctrine (drawing systemic operational design
Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven:
and effects-based operations) that calls for better U.S. Army War College
Yale University Press, 2007), 187.
framing of the problem and conceptual approach
3 Ibid. Department of Military Strategy
by senior commanders.
4 William S. McCallister, “COIN and Irregular 16 Campaign Assessment Methodology (CAM), Planning and Operations
Warfare in a Tribal Society,” Applied Knowledge
developed by the authors for MNF–I, rates how 122 Forbes avenue
International pamphlet, 2007, 24, available at
selected factors affect Iraqi views and support for
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/coinand- carlisle, pa 17013–5242,
the government of Iraq by using campaign level
iwinatribalsociety.pdf>; Elizabeth A. Nathan and
objectives as criteria to weigh the desirability of tel: [phone], DSn 242–3459
Kevin M. Woods, “Saddam and the Tribes: How
actions based on how each promotes “tipping” email: [email protected]
Captured Documents Explain Regime Adaptation
Iraqis toward the government. Adapting it into a
to Internal Challenges (1979–2003),” Iraqi Perspec-
multicriteria decision support system (DSS) made it
tive Project Series Phase II, Institute for Defense
easier to reapply public opinion and “atmospherics”
Analyses, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
data from CAM into the Iraqi detention DSS situa-
Paper P–4263, August 2007, 37.
tion. Both CAM and DSS use RAND’s DynaRank
5 McCallister, 14.
multicriteria DSS. See Richard Hillestad and Paul
6 MNF–I TF–300 Theater Internment Facility
K. Davis, Resource Allocation for the New Defense
Regional Center, brief, n.d.
Strategy: The DynaRank Decision Support System
7 MNF–I Battle Update Assessment briefing,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998).
February 14, 2007, slide 28.
17 Yochi J. Dreazen, “U.S. Begins Freeing
8 TF–134 document describing moderation
Thousands of Captives in Iraq: Detention Policies
programs and mission.
Have Been Source of Public Anger,” The Wall Street
9 Joshua Partlow and Amit R. Paley, “Maliki
Journal, April 18, 2008, 3.
Renews Call to Give Some Insurgents Amnesty,”
The Washington Post, November 12, 2007, A16.
10 Besides other experts and sources specifi-
cally cited (including U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24,
Counterinsurgency), this review included many U.S.
Army Combined Arms Center Military Review
Counterinsurgency Reader sources and other
n dupress.ndu.edu iissssuuee 5522,, 11sstt qquuaarrtteerr 22000099 // JJFFQQ 113333