DTIC ADA499824: Assessing the Totalitarian Islamists: A Strategy of Alliances

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MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
ASSESSINGTHE TOTALITARIANISLAMISTS:
A STRATEGY OFALLIANCES
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EXECUTIVES~RY
Title: Assessing theTotalitarianIslamists: A StrategyofAlliances
Author: Mr. MichaelP. Kunkler, DepartmentofDefense
Thesis: TotalitarianIslamistGroups have determined that the US's center ofgravityis the
internationalpoliticalwill ofallied nations, andhave created a strategyto attackit.
Discussion: The2004 bombings inMadrid, Spainmarkedamilestoneintotalitarian Islamist
strategyfor attacking US-ledcoalitions inMghanistan and Iraq. This attack, which occurred
days beforeapivotalelectionbetweenparties for and againstparticipationinthe Iraq operation,
resultedin asurprisingvictoryfor the anti-Iraqpartyand ahastydeparture ofSpanishforces.
This singleincidentadditionally sparkedthe withdrawal ofmilitaryforces from a further three
countries. This strategy ofbreaking US-ledcoalitions does more than remove allied military
forces; itattacks directly at theUS's centerofgravityinforeign operations, international
politicalwill.
The success ofthis operation, andits effects on thecohesiveness ofUS-led coalitions against
totalitarian Islamists, was a serious blow to the morallegitimacyofUS foreign policy. The
Madridbombings andotherexamples ofthreats andcoercions ofUS allies calls into question the
strategicvaluethe U.S. places oncoalitionmaintenance. Although the totalitarianIslamists have
found success intheirstrategy ofweakening US-ledcoalitions, theirefforts have been equally
unsuccessfulinbreaking alliedwill. This however does notavoid thefact that the U.S. needs to
reevaluate thepriorityit puts onmaintainingits coalitions, andthus its internationalmoral
legitimacy, inforeign militaryoperations.
Conclusion: TotalitarianIslamist Groups have enjoyedmixed successinremoving US-allies
from operations inAfghanistan and Iraq.
ii
DISCLAIMER
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iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTNE SUMMARY ii
DISCLAIMER iii
PREFACE v
mTRODUCTION 1
SECTION 1: Why TargetAlliances? 2
Clausewitz and the Importance ofPoliticalWill 3
SunTzu and theStrategy ofAttackingAlliances 4
TheEnemy's View onAttackingAlliances 5
SECTION2: Totalitarian IslamistInfluence on CoalitionPartners 5
Spain 6
TheDominicanRepublic and Honduras 9
Thailand 10
ThePhilippines 11
TheRepublic ofKorea 12
SECTION3: Evaluation ofthe Enemy's Strategy 13
SECTION4: Analysis andRecommendations 15
Increased SeniorDefenseRepresentation 16
SettingRealisticCoalitionExpectations 17
HandlingDedicated andWaveringPartners 18
CONCLUSION 18
APPENDIXA: AdditionalResearch 23
BIBLIOGRAPHY 28
IV
r
I
PREFACE
Theimpetus forthis paperstartedwillbeforemyattendance atMarine Commandand
StaffCollege. As aDepartmentofDefense officer charged with maintaininginternational
relations, as I watched the events following the 2004Madridbombings unfold, I quicklyrealized
that the totalitarianIslamists hadreacheda new level ofsophisticationin their global waragainst
theU.S. Atthat time, Ihadbelievedlikemanyothers thatAl Qaidawas uniquelybehindthe
attacks. However, in the course ofmyresearch I came to understand that thechain of
responsibilityfor theMadridbombings, and the otherincidents ofthreats causing allied
! '
withdrawalfromMghanistan and Iraq, is notas clearas thatofthe September 11 attacks inthe
U.S.
Al Qaidais developing, learning, and adapting to the newinternationalparadigmitfaces. ;~,
Itno longerneeds to centrallyplan out andfinance everyoperation, onlyneedingto "leta
contract" overthepublicly accessibleinternetto its ideological adherents around the globe. In
,orderto defendagainst this strategy, the U.S. needs to putsignificanteffortinto building a
strategyofcoalitionmaintenance andbuilding, notonlyto stymie the loss ofallies butto enlist
future partners inthewar against totalitarian Islam.
v
ASSESSINGTHETOTALITARIANISLAMISTS: A STRATEGY OFALLIANCES
"Acoalition ofthe willingis more like a summerromance, anintensebutfleeting attachment,
withoutanyfundamental commitment, beginningwith thebestofbehaviorbut deteriorating over
time, and notinfrequently endinginheartbreak." ,>
- Dr. ElizabethSherwood-Randall, AdjunctSeniorFellow for AllianceRelations at the Council
onForeignRelations
On a warmspringdayinMarch 2004, a series ofdeadlybombs rockedthe Madridtrain
system, killingalmost two hundred Spaniards and offering abrutalreminder that no countryis
safefrom acts ofterrorism. Followingthis attack, and a/befuddledattemptby the Spanish
governmentto placeblame ontheindigenous ETAterroristgroup, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
andhis Socialistpartyeasilyrode to victoryon acampaignpromiseto bring home Spain's
;'
roughly 1,300troops inIraq. In thefollowing months, Zapatero camethrough onhis pledge, and
Spanishtroops exitedIraqin spiteofwidespread condemnationofappeasementto terror groups.
These events demonstrate one example ofa disconcerting trend in global politics where
countries initiallywilling to fight on the side ofU.S. againstterror groups and despotic dictators
have offeredcombatforces, onlyto remove themunder threatorduress. Thewithdrawalof
Spanishforces was much more than a tactical victoryfor the totalitarian Islamists,l as it
demonstrated thefragility ofthe U.S.-ledcoalitioninIraqand the abilityofenemyforces to
target this weakness. However, are the totalitarian Islamists seeing success inthis tactic? This
papercontends thatthe totalitarian Islamists are seeingpartial success with this tactic, inthat the
3/11 attacks werepartofalooselylinkedseries ofoperations designed to target the centerof
gravityofU.S. policyinIraq and Afghanistan--international supportfor, and thus legitimacyin,
thoseoperations.
1
Byutilizingcenterofgravity analysis and otherhistorical military strategy and
philosophy, this paperinitiallyasses whetherornotinternational alliances are a critical
componentofU.S. foreignpolicy. This paperthen examines successfulexamples where
totalitarian Islamists intendedto inspire orinduce, specificallyor circumstantially, premature
allied troop withdrawals in Operations ENDURING (OEF) and IRAQIFREEDOM (OIF). This
analysis will contrasttheenemythreat with the domesticpolitical andmilitary situationin each
country, as well as examine secondaryeffects these withdrawals had onpartnernations. The
synthesis ofthehistoricalmilitaryphilosophy on alliances, takenin conjunctionwiththe case '
studies, will allowforrecommendations onhow bestU.S. policymakers should confrontthe
totalitarian Islamist's strategyofbreaking the U.S.'s international coalitions. Inthe aggregate, it
is hypothesizedthatalthougheach situation was largelyindependentfrom the others, the threat
itselfnotwas unilaterally capable ofguaranteeingthe withdrawal offoreign forces. Thethreat
was, however, atriggerthatpushed alliedcountriesjustenoughto encourage a domestic
reexaminationoftheirpositions as participants in OEFand OIF, as well as ininternational
alliances withtheU.S.
WHYTARGETALLIANCES?
FollowingU.S.-ledinvasions ofAfghanistan and Iraq, the conceptthat totalitarian
Islamists would targetan enemycoalition shouldnothave takenmanybysurprise. This strategy
ofwaging conflicts via the battlespace ofpopularopinion, now dubbedthe human terrain, is
hardlyarecentphenomenon. Judgingbythe almostcompleteunpreparedness ofthe U.S. and its
allies to counterthis esoteric threat, itseems Westernmilitary andpoliticalleaders failed to fully
conceptualizethe simplisticmaxims ofmilitarythoughtas putforth byphilosophers-soldierCarl
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von Clausewitz andSunTzu. Thesewidely adhered-to strategists have allplaced an enemy's
alliances as akey targetfor physical andpsychological attack. Theloss ofan ally and the
withdrawal ofhis armyhave a compound effectofbeingbothamoral andphysicalblow to a
coalition, especiallyintheeraofglobalnews networks and the internet. The basis for this as a
weakness on currentU.S. foreign policy, however, stems from theideathat global alliances are
essentialto the warontotalitarianIslarnistgroups.
Clausewitz andthe Importance ofPoliticalWill
Theideaofacenterofgravity (CoG) in a militaryendeavoris rootedin the writings of
Prussianmilitary strategistCarlvon Clausewitz. In his U.S. ArmyWarCollege (USAWC)
monograph, LT\ C Antulio EchevarriaII (Ph.D.), aprolificwriteronvonClausewitz and military
strategy, asserts thatthe Clausewitzian CoGis not a source ofphysical strength, as widely
believedwithin currentU.S. militarytheory, buta factor ofpower. LTC Echevarriacontinues
that theconcept ofCoGis only applicablein determining the "unity" or "interdependence" ofan
enemy as a cohesivefighting force.2 RegardingCoGanalysis in thewaron AI Qaeda, LtCol
James Reillyconductedin-depthanalysis ofwhatheperceivedto bethe U.S.'s CoG. LtCol
Reillyconcludes inhis USAWC thesis that thefriendly--U.S. and coalition--CoG was the "will
oftheinternational coalition," adding that withoutinternationalbuy-inthe waronAl Qaedawill
notsucceed.3 Althoughsomemilitary strategists argue that "politicalwill" cannotbe a CoG, one
cannotoverlookthe vital importanceofalliances as discussedin U.S. President George W.
Bush's 2002 National SecurityStrategy. Interwoventhroughout, PresidentBush specifically
addresses this importance, dedicating entire sections to strengthening alliances, working with
regionalpartners andsafeguarding allies againstterrorist networks.4
3
This linkagebetweenthefriendly CoG and apolitical, vice military, source ofpoweris
notjustrelegated to a CoGanalysis ofthe currentwaron totalitarianIslam. According to
Clausewitz, waris simply anoutcroppingofthepolitical objective, theoriginalmotive. War,
according to Clausewitz, is inextricablylinkedto, androoted in, political aims, without which
waris ameans unto itselfwithouta supported end. Inthatsame vein, withoutthe politicalwill
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to conduct and sustain war, thewareffortwill fail. When taken together, the assessments
presented suggestthat the cohesiveness ofpolitical willis necessaryfor success inany war, and
that subsequentlyinthecurrentstrugglethe internationalpolitical willis equally, ifnotmore,
importantthatthepurelydomestic.
SunTzu and theStrategyofAttacking Alliances
Althoughmuchmore amorphous and dated than Clausewitz, SunTzu's theories on
enemy alliances arejustas relevant. Inhis seminalwork TheArtofWar--written overtwo
thousand years before Clausewitz--SunTzu envisions conflictthrough amore holistic lens,
attributing actions taken ontheperipheryofthebattlefieldequally vital as to those onit. Being
greatlyoutmatchednumerically, technologically, andfinancially, theideaofweakening an
enemythrough anindirectmanner, i.e. withoutdirectconfrontation, mustappeal greatly to the
totalitarianIslamists. This strategy, allowing forrelative combat effectiveness much greaterthan
numbers ofmen ortechnologywould attribute, was aptlydubbedbySunTzu as thepinnacle of
militaryachievementor, "theacme ofskill."6
In terms ofthe stratification ofmilitarypriorities, SunTzu argues that targeting the
enemy's strategyis "ofsupremeimportance," and, therefore, shouldbethe ultimatefocus for
militarycommanders. Inhis stratification ofactions in war, SunTzu does notsee combat as the
secondbestoption, but, "disruptinghis alliances" as the nextbestpreferenceto attackinghis
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