DTIC ADA496280: Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 52, 1st Quarter, January 2009

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issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009
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4EBO: Point >< Counterpoint
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J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R LY O, 1
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Inside
NEW
Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009
from NDU Press
JFQ dialogue
2
The National Defense Strategy: Striking the Right Balance
Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) By Robert M. Gates
[email protected]
8
From the Chairman
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Managing Editor, NDU Press 10 Open Letter Strategic Forum 235
LTC Robert E. Henstrand, USA Strategic Forum 233 The Absence of Europe: Implications for
11 Letter to the Editor Defense Transformation à la française and International Security?
Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz
U.S. Interests
Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Forum Facing a worsening economy and a war in
Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley Under President Nicolas Sarkozy, France has Iraq that will be difficult to end, the next U.S.
13
Executive Summary embarked on major changes in its national administration may well seek a more multi-
Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick
Design C hris Dunham and Jeremy Swanston, 15 An Interview with General George W. Casey, Jr. security strategy, structure, capabilities, and lateral foreign policy and closer cooperation
relationships with Allies. Leo Michel ana- with Europe. But, as Steven Kramer argues,
U.S. Government Printing Office
20 Let’s Win the Wars We’re In By John A. Nagl lyzes this transformation as presented in the Europe may be unwilling or unable to play a
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri French White Book of Defense and National larger role in global security. European uni-
by 27 Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars By Gian P. Gentile Security, the official blueprint approved in fication and NATO expansion have stalled,
34 June 2008. Michel notes that much more is at economic and social issues continue, and key
Hybrid Warfare and Challenges By Frank G. Hoffman
stake in this ambitious plan than the shape of leaders disagree on how to proceed. In short,
NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 40 Systems versus Classical Approach to Warfare By Milan N. Vego France’s defense establishment. French poli- Europe’s inability to work with the United
cross-component, professional military and cies and capabilities have implications for its States may be a logical consequence of its
49
academic publishing house. It publishes books, Mobile Nuclear Power for Future Land Combat By Marvin Baker Schaffer European Allies, the United States, and re- political structure and worldview, forcing Strategic Forum 237
policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and and Ike Chang gions beyond Europe such as parts of Africa. America to turn to Asia for support. Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: How
special reports on national security strategy, defense
Should the United States Respond?
policy, national military strategy, regional security Special Feature
affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is
part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a 56 Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century By Gabriel Marcella Persian Gulf security will increasingly pose
policy research and strategic gaming organization. and Stephen O. Fought difficult choices for the next administration.
Judith Yaphe perceives the United States
61
“Military-Political” Relations: The Need for Officer Education
This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department facing three challenges. The toughest by far
By Derek S. Reveron and Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris
of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions is whether to engage Iran and, if so, how. The
of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted 67 A Strategic Asset for Engagement: Enhancing the Role of second delicate issue is what posture to take
without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint
National Defense University By Keith D. Dickson on reform within the Gulf states. A heavy-
Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever
material is quoted from or based on its content. handed approach can trigger cynicism about
Commentary U.S. motives and charges of double stan-
70 dards. The third is how to build cooperation
COMMUNICATIONS Irregular Warfare Lessons Learned: Reforming the Afghan
between the Gulf states and Iraq. Lingering
Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly National Police By Lewis G. Irwin
online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming suspicions will be hard to overcome. The Gulf
issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and 78 Effects-based Operations: Combat Proven By Paul M. Carpenter states may well seek expanded security guar-
access to many other useful NDU Press publications. and William F. Andrews Strategic Forum 234 Strategic Forum 236 antees from the United States even as they
Constructive comments and contributions Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for NATO’s Uncertain Future: Is Demography
82 Civil-Military Relations Destiny? remain wary of formal ties.
are important to us. Please direct editorial EBO: There Was No Baby in the Bathwater By Paul K. Van Riper
communications to the link on the NDU Press Web
site or write to: 86 Victory—From the Prism of Jihadi Culture By Jeffrey B. Cozzens Patrick Cronin argues that irregular The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
warfare—highly political and ambiguous (NATO) is increasingly stressed by popula-
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Features and intensely local by nature—is likely to tion trends in its member countries. For
National Defense University Press dominate the global security environment example, the gap between U.S. and European
92
260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2505) Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach in the coming decades. Success in this type military-age segments is widening, with
Fort Lesley J. McNair By Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight of conflict will require a framework that bal- the U.S. cohort increasing while Europe’s
Washington, DC 20319 ances the relationships between civilian and shrinks; a young, growing U.S. popula-
97
Irregular Warfare Is Warfare By Kenneth C. Coons, Jr., and Glenn M. Harned military leaders and effectively uses their dif- tion will contribute to its enhanced global
Telephone: [phone]/DSN 325 104 Wired for War? Robots and Military Doctrine By P.W. Singer ferent strengths. Irregular warfare challenges economic profile in 2050, while Europe’s
FAX: [phone]/DSN 325 traditional understandings of how civilian aging and shrinking productive population
Email: [email protected] 111 Chinese Disaster Relief Operations: Identifying Critical Capability Gaps and military leaders should work together. will help diminish its presence. Jeffrey Simon Visit the NDU Press Web site
JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu By Nirav Patel Specifically, Cronin examines issues such as argues that these trends will hamper the for more information on
1st Quarter, January 2009 118 China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century By Jennifer L. Parenti merse,a asnurdi nfogr pgirnogg rienstse,g crhaoteods isntrga tthege ibese.st lead- Aanlldia tnhcues’s s ahboiuliltdy btoe dcoepnlsocyio oupselyr awtieoingahle fdo rince s, ndpuupbrleicsast.inodnus. eadt u
ISSN 1070-0692 125 NATO’s future strategic plans.
Shoulder to Shoulder: The Marine Corps and Air Force in Combat
By Daniel J. Darnell and George J. Trautman III
Force of Law
PUBLISHER
129 Inside the Detention Camps: A New Campaign in Iraq ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
By Mason Brooks and Drew Miller
DIRECTOR, INSS
134 “Operationalizing” Legal Requirements for Unconventional Warfare Dr. Patrick M. Cronin
By James P. Terry
ADvISORy COmmITTEE
Gen James E. Cartwright, USMC The Joint Staff
Interagency Dialogue
BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman
140 MG Byron S. Bagby, USA Joint Forces Staff College
Reconstructing Iraq’s Provinces, One by One By Henry L. Clarke
Col Michael Belcher, USMC Marine Corps War College
148 BG Edward C. Cardon, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Why USAFRICOM? By Edward Marks
A. Denis Clift National Defense Intelligence College
152 U.S. Africa Command: Value Added By Mary C. Yates Col Raymond C. Damm, USMC Marine Corps Command
and Staff College
Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Institute for Defense Analyses
Recall
RADM Garry E. Hall, USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Brig Gen Jimmie C. Jackson, Jr., USAF Air Command and Staff College
156
A General Airman: Millard Harmon and the South Pacific in World War II
Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff
By Thomas Alexander Hughes Maj Gen Stephen J. Miller, USAF Air War College
GEN Walter L. Sharp, USA The Joint Staff
Book Reviews Col David A. Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School
Maj Gen Robert P. Steel, USAF National War College
163
Off the Shelf By Robert E. Henstrand MG Robert M. Williams, USA U.S. Army War College
LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC National Defense University
164
Strategic Defense in the Nuclear Age: A Reference Handbook
RADM James Wisecup, USN Naval War College
Reviewed by Jeffrey L. Caton
EDITORIAL BOARD
164
The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War Reviewed by Bryon E. Greenwald Richard K. Betts Columbia University
Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
165
China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force Reviewed by John D. Becker Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University
Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University
Joint Doctrine Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Douglas N. Hime Naval War College
166 Gaming the 21st Century Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College
168
Joint Doctrine Update Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College
John J. Mearsheimer The University of Chicago
correctIoN
Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College
In JFQ 51 (4th Quarter, 2008), two photographs were incorrectly credited. On page 57, James A. Schear National Defense University
proper credit goes to Julius Delos Reyes. On page 59, proper credit goes to M. Erik Reynolds. COL Robert E. Smith, USA (Ret.) U.S. Army War College
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
CONTRIBUTIONS
Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent
research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers
About the covers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians
from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration
to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected]
Front cover shows Secretary of Defense Robert Gates reviewing a speech enroute to
“Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information,
Williamsburg, Virginia, aboard UH–60 (DOD/Cherie A. Thurlby). Table of contents
see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu.
(left to right): U.S. Army Chief of Staff greets recruit during 35th anniversary
celebration of all-volunteer force (U.S. Army/D. Myles Cullen); Soldiers patrol in Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University
Ninawa Province, Iraq (3d Armored Combat Regiment/Donald Spar); Iraqi detainees Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the
attend civics class at Camp Bucca (U.S. Army/Amie J. McMillen); and Marine and Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal
South Korean officers review range operations during bombing exercise in Djibouti designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and
(U.S. Navy/Michael R. McCormick). Back cover features (top to bottom): then–U.S. other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security
policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security;
Presidential candidate Barack Obama views Sadr City district of Baghdad with
and developments in training and joint professional military
General David Petraeus from UH–60 (U.S. Army/Lorie Jewell); USS Chancellorsville
education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to
and USS Decatur moored in Hong Kong Harbor (U.S. Navy/Spike Call); Afghan meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today.
officer uses sand table to prepare soldiers for mission in Nangahar Province,
Afghanistan (55th Combat Camera Company/Johnny R. Aragon); and tanker trucks
bring fuel for USS Kearsarge pierside in Santa Marta, Colombia, during Operation
Continuing Promise (U.S. Navy/Erik C. Barker). The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed
or implied within are those of the contributors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or
any other agency of the Federal Government.
ndupress.ndu.edu
The National Defense Strategy
Striking the Right Balance
By RobeRt M. Gat es
T
he defining principle driving as well as helping partners build capacity, and
our strategy is balance. Balance maintaining our traditional edge—above all,
is not the same as treating all the technological edge—against the military
challenges as having equal forces of other nation-states
priority. We cannot expect to eliminate n retaining those cultural traits that
risk through higher defense budgets—in have made the U.S. Armed Forces success-
effect, “to do everything, buy everything.” ful by inspiring and motivating the people
Resources are scarce, yet we still must set within them, and shedding those cultural
priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs elements that are barriers to doing what
and opportunity costs. needs to be done.
We currently strive for balance between:
As we have seen in recent years, in so
n doing everything we can to prevail in many ways, the basic nature of humanity
the conflicts we are in, and being prepared for and the iron realities of nations have not
other contingencies that might arise elsewhere, changed, despite the fondest hopes of so
or in the future many for so long, especially after the end
n institutionalizing capabilities such as of the Cold War. What has changed is that
counterinsurgency and stability operations, the international environment today is
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2 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
GATES
more complex and unpredictable than it has and of the kinds of missions we are most likely ourselves. The most likely catastrophic
perhaps ever been. to undertake in the future. threats to our homeland—for example,
What is dubbed the “war on terror” is, in an American city poisoned or reduced to
The Wars We Are In grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular rubble by a terrorist attack—are more likely
As we think about the security chal- campaign—a struggle between the forces of to emanate from failing states than from
lenges on the horizon, we must establish violent extremism and of moderation. In the aggressor states.
up front that America’s ability to deal long-term effort against terrorist networks The kind of capabilities needed to deal
with threats for years to come will depend and other extremists, we know that direct with these scenarios cannot be considered
importantly on our performance in today’s military force will continue to have a role. But exotic distractions or temporary diversions.
conflicts. To be blunt, to fail—or to be seen we also understand that over the long term, We do not have the luxury of opting out
to fail—in either Iraq or Afghanistan would we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. because they do not conform to preferred
be a disastrous blow to our credibility, both Where possible, kinetic operations should be notions of the American way of war.
among our friends and allies and among our subordinate to measures that promote better Furthermore, even the largest wars
potential adversaries. governance, economic programs to spur will require so-called small wars capabili-
In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units development, and efforts to address the griev- ties. Ever since General Winfield Scott led
in-country will decline over time. The debate ances among the discontented from which the Army into Mexico in the 1840s, nearly
now is about the pacing of the drawdown as the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient every major deployment of American forces
there will continue to be some kind of Ameri- accumulation of quiet successes over a long has led to subsequently longer military pres-
can advisory and counterterrorism effort in time to discredit and defeat extremist move- ence to maintain stability. General Dwight
Iraq for years to come. ments and their ideologies. As the National Eisenhower, when tasked with administering
In Afghanistan, as President Bush Defense Strategy puts it, success will require North Africa in 1942, wrote, “The sooner I
announced in September 2008, U.S. troop us to “tap the full strength of America and its can get rid of these questions that are outside
levels are rising, with the likelihood of more people”—civilian and military, public sector the military in scope, the happier I will
increases in 2009. Given its terrain, poverty, and private. be! Sometimes, I think I live 10 years each
neighborhood, and tragic history, the We are unlikely to repeat another Iraq week, of which at least nine are absorbed in
country in many ways poses an even more or Afghanistan any time soon—that is, forced political and economic matters.” And yet, in
complex and difficult long-term challenge regime change followed by nationbuilding Eisenhower, General George Marshall knew
than Iraq—one that, despite a large inter- under fire. But that does not mean that we he had the “almost perfect model of a modern
national effort, will require a significant may not face similar challenges in a variety commander: part soldier, part diplomat, part
American military and economic commit- of locales. Where possible, our strategy is administrator.” This model is as important
ment for some time. to employ indirect approaches—primarily and real today as it was 70 years ago.
In the past, I have expressed frus- through building the capacity of partner
tration over the defense bureaucracy’s governments and their security forces—to
priorities and lack of urgency when it prevent festering problems from turning into over the long term, we cannot
comes to current conflicts—that for too crises that require costly and controversial kill or capture our way to
many in the Pentagon it has been business American military intervention. In this kind victory
as usual, as opposed to a wartime footing of effort, the capabilities of our allies and
and a wartime mentality. When referring partners may be as important as our own,
to “Next-War-itis,” I was not expressing and building their capacity is arguably as Whether in the midst or aftermath of
opposition to thinking about and preparing important if not more so than the fighting we any major conflict, the requirement for the
for the future. It would be irresponsible not do ourselves. U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid
to do so—and the overwhelming majority That these kinds of missions are and comfort, begin reconstruction, and stand
of people in the Pentagon, Services, and more frequent does not necessarily mean, up local government and public services will
defense industry do just that. My point is for risk assessment purposes, that they not go away. Even with a better funded State
simply that we must not be so preoccupied automatically should have a higher prior- Department and U.S. Agency for
with preparing for future conventional ity for the purposes of military readiness. International Development, future military
and strategic conflicts that we neglect to And it is true that many past interventions commanders will no more be able to rid
provide, both short and long term, all the have had significant humanitarian consid- themselves of these tasks than Eisenhower
capabilities necessary to fight and win con- erations. However, the recent past vividly was. To paraphrase what a former United
flicts such as those we face today. demonstrated the consequences of failing Nations Secretary-General said about peace-
Support for conventional moderniza- to address adequately the dangers posed keeping, it is not a soldier’s job, but sometimes
tion programs is deeply embedded in our by insurgencies and failing states. Terror- only a soldier can do it. To truly achieve
budget, our bureaucracy, the defense industry, ist networks can find a sanctuary within victory as Clausewitz defined it—attaining a
and Congress. My fundamental concern is the borders of a weak nation and strength political objective—the U.S. military’s ability
that there is not commensurate institutional within the chaos of social breakdown. A to kick down the door must be matched by its
support—including in the Pentagon—for the nuclear-armed state could collapse into ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild
capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, chaos and criminality. Let’s be honest with the house afterward.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 3
DIALOGUE | Striking the Right Balance
Signs of Progress for shortcomings in policy or execution. As in the Army, and amphibious operations in
Given these realities, the military has Admiral Mullen has noted, in the broader the Marine Corps. We must remedy this situ-
made some impressive strides in recent years: battle for hearts and minds abroad, we have ation as soon as we can through growing the
to be as good at listening to others as we are ground forces, and increasing dwell time and
n Special operations have received steep at telling them our story. And when it comes opportunities for full-spectrum training.
increases in funding and personnel. to perceptions at home, when all is said and But in making the risk assessment asso-
n The Air Force has created a new air advi- done, the best way to convince the American ciated with near-peer competitors, in judging
sory program, and recently, General Norton people that we are winning a war is through where we can make tradeoffs, it is important
Schwartz announced a new career track for credible and demonstrable results, as we have to keep some perspective. It is generally
unmanned aerial operations. done in Iraq. agreed, for example, that the Navy has shrunk
n The Navy stood up a new expeditionary too much since the end of the Cold War—a
combat command and brought back its river- Don’t Forget the Nation-state view I share. But it is also true that in terms
ine units. Even as we hone and institutionalize of tonnage, the battle fleet of the Navy, by
n New counterinsurgency and Army oper- new and unconventional skills, the United one estimate, is larger than the next 13 navies
ations manuals, plus a new maritime strategy, States still has to contend with the security combined—and 11 of those 13 navies are
have incorporated the lessons of recent years challenges posed by the military forces of allies or partners. No other navy has anything
into Service doctrine. To the traditional prin- other countries—from those actively hostile comparable to the reach or combat power of a
ciples of war have been added perseverance, to those at strategic crossroads. single American carrier strike group.
restraint, and legitimacy. The images of Russian tanks rolling Russian tanks and artillery may have
n Train and equip authorities and pro- into the Republic of Georgia last August crushed Georgia’s tiny military. But before
grams allow us to move more quickly to build were a reminder that nation-states and their we begin rearming for another Cold War,
the security capacity of partner nations. militaries do still matter. Both Russia and remember that what is driving Russia is a
n A variety of initiatives are under way that China have increased their defense spending desire to exorcise past humiliation and domi-
better integrate and coordinate U.S. military and modernization programs, to include air nate their near abroad—not an ideologically
efforts with civilian agencies as well as engage defense and fighter capabilities that in some driven campaign to dominate the globe. As
the expertise of the private sector, including cases approach our own. someone who used to prepare estimates of
nongovernmental organizations and academia. In addition, there is the potentially Soviet military strength for several Presidents,
toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, I can say that the Russian conventional mili-
Retired Marine colonel T.X. Hammes and nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. tary, though vastly improved since its nadir in
has noted that whereas past insurgencies North Korea has built several bombs, and Iran the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet
consisted of military campaigns supported seeks to join the nuclear club. North Korea predecessor. And Russian demographics will
by information operations, they now often is impoverished and literally starving, while likely impede its numbers getting much larger.
consist of strategic communications cam- Iran sits on a sea of oil. Both have primitive Though Russia’s recent air and naval forays
paigns supported by military operations. In ground offensive capabilities and ballistic into this hemisphere have grabbed headlines,
Iraq and Afghanistan, extremists have made missile programs of increasing range. Both it is worth noting that in the last 15 years the
deft use of the Internet and propaganda to have a record of proliferation and ties to Russian navy has launched just two new major
misinform and intimidate local populations— criminal groups or terrorist networks. warships. Russia does present serious chal-
the swing voters, if you will, in these struggles. What all these potential adversaries lenges, but ones very different from the past.
Many defense leaders—including myself— have in common—from terrorist cells to All told, this year’s [2008] National
have bemoaned the U.S. Government’s rogue nations to rising powers—is that they Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S.
predominance in conventional warfare is not
unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium
a variety of initiatives are under way that better integrate term, given current trends. It is true that the
and coordinate military efforts with civilian agencies United States would be hard pressed to fight a
as well as engage the private sector major conventional ground war elsewhere on
short notice, but where on Earth would we do
that? We have ample, untapped striking power
limitations in this area. Our troops have made have learned over time that it is not wise to in our air and sea forces should the need arise
some ingenious adaptations, such as in Iraq, confront the United States directly or on con- to deter or punish aggression—whether on
for example, where they set up the “Voice ventional military terms. the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf,
of Ramadi” broadcast to counter what was Nonetheless, we cannot take this tra- or across the Taiwan Strait. So while we are
spewing forth from extremist mosques. ditional dominance for granted. Many of knowingly assuming some additional risk in
The Quadrennial Defense Review high- America’s refueling tankers and some fighters this area, that risk is, I believe, a prudent and
lighted the importance of strategic commu- are now older than the pilots who fly them. As manageable one.
nications as a vital capability, and good work a result of the demands of Afghanistan and Other nations may be unwilling to chal-
has been done since. However, we cannot Iraq, ground forces have not been able to stay lenge the United States fighter to fighter, ship
lapse into using communications as a crutch proficient in specialties such as field artillery to ship, or tank to tank. But they are develop-
4 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
GATES
ing the disruptive means to blunt the impact rockets and missiles now dwarfs the inventory of units we field, the weapons we buy, and the
of American power, narrow our military of many nation-states. Furthermore, Russian training we do.
options, and deny us freedom of movement and Chinese arms sales are putting advanced
and action. capabilities—both offensive and defensive—in Sensible and Responsive Procurement
In the case of China, investments in the hands of more countries and groups. When it comes to procurement, for the
cyber and antisatellite warfare, anti-air and As defense scholars have noted, these better part of 5 decades, the trend has gone
anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic hybrid scenarios combine the “lethality of toward lower numbers as technology gains
missiles could threaten America’s primary state conflict with the fanatical and protracted made each system more capable. In recent
means to project power and help allies in the fervor of irregular warfare.”1 Here, “Microsoft years, these platforms have grown ever more
Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the coexists with machetes, and stealth is met by baroque and costly, are taking longer to
networks that support them. This will put a suicide bombers.”2 build, and are being fielded in ever dwindling
premium on America’s ability to strike from As we can expect a blended, high-low quantities.
over the horizon and employ missile defenses; mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so too Given that resources are not unlim-
and it will require shifts from short-range to should America seek a better balance in the ited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers
longer range systems such as the next genera- portfolio of capabilities we have—the types for capability is perhaps reaching a point
tion bomber.
And even though the days of hair-trigger
other nations are developing the disruptive means to blunt the
superpower confrontation are over, as long as
impact of American power, narrow our military options, and deny
other nations possess the bomb and the means
to deliver it, the United States must maintain us freedom of movement and action
a credible strategic deterrent. Toward this end,
the Department of Defense and Air Force
have taken firm steps to return excellence and u.s. Marine convoy of up-armored humvees in helmand Province, Afghanistan
accountability to our nuclear stewardship.
We also need Congress to fund the Reliable
Replacement Warhead Program—for safety,
for security, and for a more reliable deterrent.
Blurring Boxes and Hybrid War
As we think about this range of threats,
it is common to define and divide the so-
called high end from the low end, the conven-
tional from the irregular—armored divisions
on one side and guerrillas toting AK–47s on
the other. In reality, as Colin Gray has noted,
the categories of warfare are blurring and
do not fit into tidy boxes. We can expect to
see more tools and tactics of destruction—
from the sophisticated to the simple—being
employed simultaneously in hybrid and more
complex forms of warfare.
Russia’s relatively crude—though
brutally effective—conventional offensive in
Georgia was augmented with a sophisticated
cyber attack and well-coordinated propa-
ganda campaign. We saw a different version
during the invasion of Iraq, where Saddam
Hussein dispatched his swarming paramili-
tary Fedayeen along with the T–72s of the
Republican Guard.
Conversely, militias, insurgent groups, Clinton)
other nonstate actors, and Third World mili- A.
taries are increasingly acquiring more tech- Randall
ntroaltoegdy b, yle tthhea lliotyss, easn adn sdo pphroisptaicgaatniodna— viacst oilrlyu s- Corps (
that Hizballah was able to inflict on Israel 2 Marine
years ago. Hizballah’s restocked arsenal of U.S.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 5
DIALOGUE | Striking the Right Balance
of diminishing returns. A given ship or partners. This is already happening in the future colonels, captains, and sergeants will
aircraft—no matter how capable or well- field with Task Force ODIN in Iraq, where not have to be quite so heroic or resourceful.
equipped—can only be in one place at one advanced sensors were mated with turboprop One of the enduring issues our military
time—and, to state the obvious, when one is aircraft to produce a massive increase in the struggles with is whether personnel and
sunk or shot down, there is one fewer of them. amount of surveillance and reconnaissance promotions systems designed to reward
In addition, the prevailing view for coverage. The issue then becomes how we command of American troops will be able to
decades was that weapons and units designed build this kind of innovative thinking and reflect the importance of advising, training,
for the so-called high end could also be used
for the low. And it has worked to some extent:
given the situations we are likely to face, it begs the question
strategic bombers designed to obliterate
cities have been used as close air support for of whether specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment for
riflemen on horseback. M–1 tanks designed stability and counterinsurgency missions is also needed
to plug the Fulda Gap routed insurgents in
Fallujah and Najaf. Billion-dollar ships are
employed to track pirates and deliver humani- flexibility into our rigid procurement pro- and equipping foreign troops—which is still
tarian aid. And the Army is spinning out cesses here at home. The key is to make sure not considered a career-enhancing path for
parts of the Future Combat Systems—as they that the strategy and risk assessment drive our best and brightest officers. Or whether
move from drawing board to reality—so they the procurement, rather than the other way formations and units organized, trained, and
can be available and usable for our troops in around. equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted
Afghanistan and Iraq. well enough, and fast enough, to dissuade or
The need for the state-of-the-art sys- A Full-spectrum Force coopt them—or, more significantly, to build
tems—particularly longer range capabilities— I believe we must do this. The two the capacity of local security forces to do the
will never go away, as we strive to offset the models can—and do—coexist. Being able dissuading and destroying.
countermeasures being developed by other to fight and adapt to a diverse range of
nations. But at a certain point, given the types conflicts—sometimes all at once—lands Institutional Culture and Incentives
of situations that we are likely to face—and squarely in the long history and finest tradi- I have spent much of the last year
given, for example, the struggles to field up- tions of the American practice of arms. In the making the argument in favor of institutional-
armored Humvees, Mine Resistant Ambush Revolutionary War, tight formations drilled izing counterinsurgency skills and our ability
Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and intelligence, by Baron von Steuben fought Redcoats in the to conduct stability and support operations.
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) in north, while guerrillas led by Francis Marion This begs a fair question: If balance between
Iraq—it begs the question of whether special- harassed them in the south. During the 1920s high- and low-end capabilities is so impor-
ized, often relatively low-tech equipment for and 1930s, the Marine Corps conducted what tant, and we cannot lose our conventional
stability and counterinsurgency missions is we would now call stability operations in the edge, why spend so much time talking about
also needed. Caribbean, wrote the Small Wars Manual, irregular or asymmetric warfare? The reality
And how do we institutionalize procure- and at the same time developed the amphibi- is that conventional and strategic force mod-
ment of such capabilities—and the ability to ous landing techniques that would help liber- ernization programs are strongly supported in
get them fielded quickly? Why did we have to ate Europe and the Pacific in the following the Services, in Congress, and by the defense
go outside the normal bureaucratic process to decade. industry. For reasons laid out today, I also
develop counter–improvised explosive device And then consider General “Black Jack” support them. For example, this year’s base
technologies, to build MRAPs, and to quickly Pershing, behind whose desk I sit. Before budget for fiscal year 2009 contains more than
expand our ISR capability? In short, why did commanding the American Expeditionary $180 billion in procurement, research, and
we have to bypass existing institutions and Force in Europe, Pershing led a platoon of development, the overwhelming preponder-
procedures to get the capabilities we need to Sioux Indian scouts, rode with Buffalo Sol- ance of which is for conventional systems.
protect our troops and pursue the wars we diers up San Juan Hill, won the respect of the However, apart from the Special Forces
are in? Moros in the Philippines, and chased Pancho community and some dissident colonels,
Our conventional modernization pro- Villa in Mexico. for decades there has been no strong, deeply
grams seek a 99-percent solution in years. Sta- In Iraq, we have seen how an army that rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or
bility and counterinsurgency missions—the was basically a smaller version of the Cold elsewhere for institutionalizing our capabili-
wars we are in—require 75-percent solutions War force can become an effective instru- ties to wage asymmetric or irregular con-
in months. The challenge is whether in our ment of counterinsurgency over time. But flict—and to quickly meet the ever-changing
bureaucracy and in our minds these two dif- that came at a frightful human, financial, and needs of our forces engaged in these conflicts.
ferent paradigms can be made to coexist. political cost. For every heroic and resourceful Think of where our forces have been
At the Air War College earlier this year, innovation by troops and commanders on the sent and have been engaged over the last
I asked whether it made sense in situations battlefield, there was some institutional short- 40-plus years: Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada,
where we have total air dominance to employ coming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo,
lower cost, lower tech aircraft that can be The task facing military officers today is to Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and
employed in large quantities and used by our support the institutional changes necessary so more. In fact, the first Gulf War stands alone
6 JFQ / issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 ndupress.ndu.edu
GATES
in over two generations of constant military hierarchical organization, and we must con- sions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic,
engagement as a more or less traditional con- sistently strive to overcome them. inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of
ventional conflict from beginning to end. As systems analysis, computer models, game
then–Marine Commandant Charles Krulak Humility and Limits theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise.
predicted just over 10 years ago, instead of From these personal lessons that I have Look askance at idealized, triumphalist, or
the beloved “son of Desert Storm,” Western learned from 42 years of service in this arena, ethnocentric notions of future conflict that
militaries are confronted with the unwanted I hope that national security professionals aspire to upend the immutable principles of
“stepchild of Chechnya.” take away two things: a sense of humility and war, scenarios where the enemy is killed but
There is no doubt in my mind that an appreciation of limits. our troops and innocent civilians are spared,
conventional modernization programs will First, limits about what the United where adversaries can be cowed, shocked, or
continue to have—and deserve—strong States—still the strongest and greatest nation awed into submission instead of being tracked
institutional and congressional support. I just on Earth—can do. The power of our mili- down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house, and
want to make sure the capabilities we need for tary’s global reach has been an indispensable block by bloody block. As General William
the complex conflicts we are actually in and contributor to world peace and must remain Sherman said, “Every attempt to make war
are most likely to face in the foreseeable future so. But not every outrage, every act of aggres- easy and safe will result in humiliation and
also have strong institutional support and are sion, or every crisis can or should elicit an disaster.” Or, as General Joseph “Vinegar Joe”
sustained in the long term. And I want to see American military response, and we should Stilwell said, “No matter how a war starts, it
an institution that can make and implement acknowledge such. ends in mud. It has to be slugged out—there
decisions quickly in support of those on the Be modest about what military force are no trick solutions or cheap shortcuts.”
battlefield. can accomplish, and what technology can In conclusion, for the reasons outlined
In the end, the military capabilities we accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, in this presentation, I believe our National
need cannot be separated from the cultural information, and satellite technology have Defense Strategy provides a balanced and
traits and reward structure of the institu- led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. realistic approach to protecting America’s
tions we have: the signals sent by what gets military can do: freedom, prosperity, and security in the years
funded, who gets promoted, what is taught in ahead. JFQ
the academies and staff colleges, and how we n the Taliban is dispatched within 3
train. months
Thirty-six years ago, my old Central n Saddam’s regime is toppled in 3 weeks NOTES
Intelligence Agency colleague Bob Komer, n a button is pushed in Nevada, and
who led the pacification campaign in seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Mosul 1 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st
Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA:
Vietnam, published his classic study of orga- n a bomb destroys the targeted house on
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December
nizational behavior entitled Bureaucracy Does the right, but leaves intact the one on the left.
2007), 28.
Its Thing. Looking at the performance of the
2 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar:
U.S. national security apparatus during that But also never neglect the psychologi-
Military Theory and the Future of War,” Naval War
conflict—military and civilian—he identified cal, cultural, political, and human dimen-
College Review 56, no. 3 (Summer 2003), 132–150.
a number of tendencies that prevented institu-
tions from adapting long after problems had
soldiers fire mortar at taliban insurgents near Firebase Martello, Afghanistan
been identified and solutions were proposed:
n the reluctance to change preferred ways
of functioning, and when faced with lack of
results, to do more of the same
n trying to run a war with a peacetime
management structure and practices
n belief that the current set of problems
was either an aberration or would soon be over
n where because a certain problem—in
that case counterinsurgency—did not fit the
inherited structure and preferences of organi-
zations, it simultaneously became everybody’s
business and no one’s business.
onro tt om sIau cdgiegt eee snttho tarhtm astto utuhdsey s itnnroisdtt iettosu itrnieo lrniteaicgle amnteti yltihetaaarrt ysw. haars, Michael Zuk)
It is instead a cautionary reminder that these Army (
tendencies are always present in any large, U.S.
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 52, 1st quarter 2009 / JFQ 7