DTIC ADA491606: The Future Today: Creating an All Purpose Battalion to Enhance the Marine Corps' Capabilities for Tomorrow, Today

1.6 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

UnitedState Marine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
TheFuture Today:
Creatingan AllPurposeBattalion to Enhance the Marine Corps' Capabilitiesfor Tomorrow,
Today
SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT
OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREEOF
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
by
MajorPhillip N. Ash
AY 07-08 '
~~\ ~~
ll;
Oral Defense CommittecetM... emp\ber:
~
Approved:
e 0 c
Date: Fh4(Jfo CO USA-
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
The Future Today: Creating an All Purpose Battalion to Enhance the
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Marine Corps’ Capabilities for Tomorrow, Today
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College,Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Control Development
Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 30
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: TheFutureToday: Creating anAllPurposeBattalion to Enhancethe Marine Corps'
Capabilities for Tomorrow,Today
Author: MajorPhillip N. Ash, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The developmentofanAll Purpose (AP) Battalion, from predominantly existing expertise,
will providethe Marine COlPS with apermanentstanding, flexible, professional, and unified force, and
will enableMarine Corps to operate efficiently across the spectrum ofmodern conflictwhile
remaining focused on its core competencies.
Discussion: Department ofDefenseDirective 3000.05, dated November28,2005, established that
"Stabilityoperations are acoreU.S. militarymission that theDepartment ofDefense (DoD) shall be
prepared to conduct and support." The Commandantprovides the Marine Corps with its visionfor the
futurebased onrequirements putforth bytheDoD and the Marine Corps' role in the U.S. National
SecurityStrategy. The Commandantprovidedhis vision ofthe future·ofthe Marine Corps in the
MarineCorps Operating Concepts for aChanging SecurityEnvironment, SecondEdition June 2007.
TheMarine Corps canfulfill his vision, as well as the greaterDoD vision with a slight organizational
change instructure and allocationofexpertiseinthe Marine Corps. ThIS reorganization will take
current capabilities and place them under one command element. This simple creation ofa new unit,
essentially aheadquarters element, will adhere to the principle ofunity ofcommand and provide the
Marine Corps with acredible and confidentforce inreadiness, capableofsupporting all aspects offull
spectrum operations as well as SSTR operations. This new unitis theAllPurposeBattalion (AP Bn).
TheAPBnwill primarilyfocus its efforts onnon-kinetic military actions, enabling the remainder of
theCorps to return its focus to core competencies thathave eroded overthe past six years. TheAP Bn
will consist of: aheadquarters element, civil affairs element, health andhuman services element with
an implicitmedical and dental support capability, information operations element, military and police
trainingelement, and an infrastructure and contracting specialist. Withintheheadquarters element,
there will also be astaffjudge advocate, interagency liaison specialist, and aregional expert in the
form ofeither aRegional Area Officer or aForeignArea Officer. The AP Battalions will be located at
CampPendleton, 29 Palms, Camp Smith, and Camp Lejeune with theirparent commands being their
respective MarineExpeditionaryForce commands. This work does notaddress command
relationships itonly serves to make suggestions, with the bottom linethatthe capabilitymustbe there
regardless ofthe commandrelationships beyondthe MarineExpeditionaryForce level. Each battalion
will consist ofdetachments with thesame capabilities as stated above. These detachments canthen
develop habitual relationships with therespective infantry units at theirassigned location, developing
expertise and cohesion. This enables each unitto be a truly "plug and play" organization, providing a
commonlytrained, commonly sourced, capability to each Marine infantryunit deploying from home
station to any localein the world.
Conclusion: TheMarineCorps mustbe ableto operate across all spectrums ofcombat. TheMarine
Corps must avoid what ColinS. Gray (Summer2006) calls "The sin of[presentism]," a view that
future concepts and considerations are developed with heavy influencefrom the CU11'ent situation.
TheAP Battalionwill allow the Marine Corps to return to its coni competencies and address the
central ideas for conductingSSTR Operations as putforth intheDoD publication Military Support
to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations JointConcept, v. 2 December
2006, as well as thecomplexissues associated with modem conflicts.
ii
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSE OFTHE .
INDIVIDUALSTUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTTHE
VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDYSHOULD
INCLUDETHEFOREGOING STATEMENT.
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM; OR REPRODUCTION OFALL ORANY
PARTOFTHIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE.
iii
TABLE OFCONTENTS
PAGE
EXECUTIVESUMMARy ii
DISCLAIMER iii
PREFACE v
INTRODUCTION ; 1
RESEARCHMETHODOLOGy 3
CHANGING CHARACTER '" 4
CORE COMPETENCIES- FULLSPECTRUM OPERATIONS 5
THEAP BATTALION'S RELEVANCE rNIRREGULAR WARFARE 7
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES " 9
CONCLUSION 21
NOTES 23
BIBLIOGRAPHy '" 24
iv
PREFACE
I beganwriting the initial concepts for this paperinthe earlypartof2007 whileserving
as the operations officerof3rd Battalion, i h Marines. ThirdBattalionSeventhMarines was
identified as a"surge"battalion; Iimmediatelybegantryingto coordinate with the anticipated
attachments. This was done to line up MojaveViper dates, as well as verify eachunit's
completion ofthepre-deploymenttrainingprogramperthe Marine Corps Order. Ifound that
while everyonewas completelywillingto help and work as hard as necessaryto preparefor the
impendingdeployment, the process generally seemed inefficient. Knowing my experiencewas
unique Iheld onto my concerns and awaited an opportunityto see what others had experienced
onceI arrived atCommand and StaffCollege. Ifound thatdespiteheroic efforts across the
Corps, inefficiencyreigned. Veryfew units were ableto identifytheir attachments, the
organizationoftheirmilitarytransitionteams orhavelead-time onwho they mayloseto fill
some ofthesekeybillets. As recently as 20 March2008, aunitless than 170 days from
deploying remains unaware ofthesekey issues. This is despite the beliefthe systemis rectified,
according to cominents at therecent "LongWar" conferenceheld at GrayResearchCenterin
Quantico, Virginia. This is not designed to offer a simple solution, butto identify concerns and
issues that are veryreal to marines inthe operatingforces today andfor the foreseeable future,
based onthe way ahead.
v
INTRODUCTION
"Waris notmerely an actofpolicybut a truepolitical instrument, a continuation of
political intercourse, carried on with othermeans.,,1 As anation develops a strategic vision and
foreign policy, it allows the militaryinstrument ofnational powerto determine its requirements
and role in the accomplishment ofthatnational strategicvision. A changingnational policy and
strategy create adifficult environmentfor militaryplanners to develop anational military
strategy. As thehead ofhis service, the Commandantprovides the Marine Corps with its vision
for thefuture based onrequirements putforth bythe Department ofDefense (DoD) and the
Marine Corps' role inthe U.S. National SecurityStrategy(NSS). Department ofDefense
Directive 3000.05, dated November 28, 2005, established, "Stabilityoperations are a coreU.S.
military mission that theDepartment ofDefense (DoD) shallbepreparedto conduct and
support.,,2 General James T. Conway, the Commandant ofthe Marine Corps, provided the
following planning guidance inthe 34th CMC Planning Guidance 2006: "Evolve Marine Corps
andnaval operating concepts that address our contributions to Combatant Commanders' theater
securitycooperationplans even as we maintain our contingency and crisis response capability."
As conflicts become increasingly globalized; institutions must adaptnew methods and
capabilities to address these new issues and concerns.
TherecentMarine Corps Operating Conceptsfor a Changing Security Environment,
June 2007provides the Marine Corps with an evenmoredetailed vision ofthe future from the
Commandant. The Commandantlists his priorities for the Marine Corps:
1. Achieve victory inthe Long War.
2. "Rightsize" our corps to achieve a 1:2 deploymentto dwell ratio.
3. Provide ourNation with a naval force that is fully preparedfo.r employment as a Marine Air
GroundTaskForce (MAGTF) across the spectrum ofconflict.
4. Reset and modernizeto "bemostready when thenationis leastready."
5. Improvethe quality oflifefor ourMarine s and theirfamilies.
6. Rededicate ourselves to our Core Values and warrior ethos.
7. Posturethe Marine Corps for thefuture.3
The Commandantprovidedthe Marine Corps with its visionfor thefuture. To accomplish this
vision will require organizational change inthe structure ofthe Marine Corps and specific
enablingfunctions.
This reorganization will take current capabilities and placethemunder one command.
This simple creationofanew unit, essentially aheadquarters element, will adhere to the
principle ofunity ofcommand and providethe Marine Corps with acredible and confidentforce
in readiness, capable ofsupporting all aspects offull spectrum operations as well as SSTR
operations. This new unit is the All Purpose (AP) Battalion. TheAP Battalion will primarily
focus its efforts onnon-kinetic military actions, enablingthe remainder ofthe Corps to return its
focus to core competencies thathave eroded overthe past six years. •The AP Battalionwill
consistof: aheadquarters element, civil affairs element, health andhuman services element with
an implicitmedical anddental support capability, information operations element, military and
police training element, and aninfrastructure and contracting specialist. Withintheheadquarters
element, there will also be a staffjudge advocate, interagencyliaison specialist, and aregional
expert intheform ofeither aRegional Area Officer or aForeignArea Officer. The development
ofan AP Battalion, from predominantly existing expertise, will providethe Marine Corps with a
permanently standing, flexible, professional, unifiedforce.
Theneedfor theAP Battalionis based onfive assumptions. Thefirst is the view thatthe
nature ofwarremains constantand that only the characterofwarhas changed; the "new" is
nothing more than achange inthe way some chooseto fight. The second and third assumptions
comefrom the unclassified version oftheMarine Corps' "LongWar Concept" (work in
progress). These assumptions arethat "TheMarine Corps will remain ageneral purpose force
/
2
capable offull spectrum operations, with an emphasis onIrregularWarfare, and that geographic
Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) will have a greater demandfor general purpose forces to
conducttheater securitycooperation.,,4 A fourth assumption considers the infantry battalion the
coreunit oftheSecurityCooperationMarineAir GroundTaskForce (SCMAGTF). A fifth and
final assumptionis that the infantrybattalion does not cUlTentlypossess the organic capabilities
to function inthis role and across thefull spectrum ofoperations.
RESEARCH:METHODOLOGY
The research design conductedused triangulation as presented in QualitativeEvaluation
andResearch Methods byMichael QuinnPatton. "Triangulationorthe combination of
methodologies inthe study ofthe/ samephenomena orprograms. This can mean using several
kinds ofdata, includingusing both quantitative and qualitative approaches."s This research
projectused primaryand secondary sources, personal interviews, surveys, and personal
correspondences, as well as Marine Corps directives andfield manuals. All data was collected in
confidence and theuse ofanyparticular individual's namewas approvedbeforehand and done
with the complete consent ofthepartyinvolved. Theremainder ofparticipants will remain
anonymous. Thetriangulation allowed theresearcher to seereculTingpatterns and themes inthe
research and createrecommended organizational and professional military education adaptations.
The analysis specificallyfocused onthe Marine Corps' need to retain traditional core
competencies and posture itselffor future operations based on current and developing
employment concepts. Abriefdiscussion ofIrregularWarfare and ofthe unchanging nature of
war will bethe initialpointto beginthe analysis.
3
CHANGING CHARACTER
Itis the characterofnon-state warfare thatis "new." How nationstates are attacked and
arelikelyto be attackedinthefuture has changed withthe modemera. This couldbeviewed as
atactic, inaccordance withthe MCRP 5-12A, "Ordered arrangementandmaneuver ofunits in
relationto each other, the terrain, and the enemy in orderto translatepotential combatpower into
victorious battles andengagements.,,6 Thenature ofwar does not simplychangewith a change in
tactics like suicidebombers, attacks againstinnocentcivilians, or actions taken against a
legitimate governmentto exercise influence. While the currentobjectivemaybe considered a
warfor the supportorcontrol ofapopulation, itis still abattlebetweenopposing wills.
Theevents of9-11 and the currentconflicts inIraq and Afghanistando not mark an end
to nation-sate versus nation-state warfare, nor do theysignify a change inthenature ofwar;
instead, they signify achangeinthecharacter ofwar. Itis generally acceptedby scholars and
students ofClausewitz's "paradoxical trinity" that thetrinityorganizes the nature, or essence, of
war into three elements: thepeople, the commander andhis army, and the government.
Clausewitzstates, "These threetendencies qre like different codes oflaw deep rooted intheir
subject and yetvariableinrelationship to one another."? This trinity andthis concept applyto
the conflicts the UnitedStates and its allies find themselves intoday.
There is abalancebetweenthe various thoughts ofold andnew theorists, with no one
being 100% correct. Anyone thatclaims to have the "rightanswer" is likely contradictingtheir
concept ofmulti-faceted conflict, orirregularwarfare. EG. Hoffmanwrites, "Tomorrow's
conflicts will notbe easilycategorized into simple classifications ofconventional or irregular. In
fact, some oftoday's bestthinking acknowledges theblurring oflines betweenmodes ofwar.
Ourgreatestchallengewill notcomefrom astatethat selects one approach, butfrom states or
4