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UnitedStates Marine Corps CommandandStaffCollege Marine Corps University 2076South Street Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES PHASED INSURGENCYTHEORY: RAMADI SUBMITIED IN PARTIALFULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FORTHE DEGREE OF MASTERSOF MILITARYSTUDIES MAJORJ.D. HARRILL AY 07-08 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Phased Insurgency Theory: Ramadi 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College,Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER University,2076 South Street, Marine Corps Control Development Command,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 29 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Executive Summary Title: Phased InsurgencyTheory: Ramadi Author: MajorJ.D. Harrill, United States Marine Corps Thesis: A critical analysis oftheRamadi-AI Anbarmodel provides insightinto thephases of insurgencyrelative to how thesephases affect the counterinsurgent's operational design inthe fOnTIS ofdefiningthemetrics for progress, designing a campaignto win and holdpopular support, creating security, establishingeffectivepopulargovernment, and developing realistic expectations oftimeinrelationto endstate. Discussion: Manycounterinsurgencytheorists and insurgentwriters alike signal the counterinsurgencydesignerto view insurgencies as aphasedmaturationprocess that evolves as new compounds orideas areintroducedwithinthe system. Theheart ofthe"systemis thepeople andtheirsupport. As the support ofthepopulace evolves, itfollows a sometimes seemingly random andunpredictable wave. The counterinsurgencyoperational designermust seekto understand where the insurgencyorinsurgencies existinphases ofmaturation orde-maturation in orderto combatthem effectively. Dueto themultilateral, complex, andvaryingnature of ' insurgencies, itis amistake for the counterinsurgencydesignerto attempt to jaminsurgencies into anumbered setofdistinctphases. To do so is to discount theuniqueness ofeachinsurgent organization, sub-movement, and outsideinfluencerororganizations. Instead, the operational designermust seekto understand the maturityofeach insurgent element or sub-element and the populace, whyitis at aparticularpoint, and what factors inrelationto the populace can influencethe elementto further evolve ordevolve. Onlythen canthe counterinsurgent seekto influencethe system atkeytimes orpoints withintheinsurgentlife cycle or system. Understandingthephases and life cycles within an insurgencyis crucial for effectivelyplanning and succeedingin counterinsurgencyoperations. Conclusion: Everyinsurgencyis unique, butall move through phases ofevolution or devolution. No systemorphasedmodelbehaves the same, butunderstandingthe life cycles of thehuman environmentand itsrelationship to the developmentofinsurrectionhelps the planner to set conditions for success. Thephasedmodel is not a recipe for success. Rather, it is a wayto , ' understand the elements within aninsurrectional system, analyze what causedtheirposition withinthe system, understand theirmotivations, andpredicttheirreaction to future actions by outside compounds (i.e., U.S. Forces, AQI). Once this is understood, leveragepointsmaybe uncoveredthat setthe conditions for faultlines. Thesefault linesmaythenbe exploitedto induce aphase change and tip popular support as was thecasewith the tribes and AQIinthe Ramadi-AI Anbar area. Table ofContents DISCLAIMER i Preface ; ii THEORYOFPHASED IN"SURGENCy 1 HISTORICALREVIEWOFTHERAMADIIN"SURGENCY 3 Pre-RegimeRemoval 3 PostRegimeRemoval 4 METRICS FORPROGRESS AND PHASES 5 POPULAR SUPPORTAND PHASES .' 7 Popular Support 7 TheMasses (Tribes) 7 AIQaedainIraq 8 CoalitionForces 9 '] SECURIT,YENVIRONMENTAND PHASES 10 SecurityApparatus : ; : 11 EconomicIncentive 11 SeparatingtheMassesfromtheThreat 12 EFFECTIVE/POPULARGOVERNMENTAND PHASES 13 EXPECTATIONOFTIME/PHASEIN"RELATIONTO ENDSTATE 15 Time/PhaseandEndstate 15 Ran1adi Tin1e/Phaseand Endstate 17 CONCLUSIONAND ROAD AHEAD 18 Conclusion 18 TheRoadAhead 19 Notes 21 DISCLAIM.ER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE VIEWS OF EITHERTHE MARINES CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR-ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THEFOREGOING STATEMENT. QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, ORREPRODUCTION OF ALL ORANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE. ii Preface The following thesis is aresult ofthe author's experience as the Operations Officerfor SecondBattalion, Fourth Marines, inRamadi, Iraq from February2004 to October2004 and his continued studyofthe area. This continuedstudywould nothavebeenpossiblewithout the manysubsequent discussions ofthe areawithmypeers who followed as battalion Operations Officers and ExecutiveOfficers inRamadi. These discussions not onlyprovided insightbut some closureto atopicandplacethatbecamepart ofus. Inthe end, it attempts to frame the chaosthatis inherentin counterinsurgencyplanning and executionwith windows oforder. This thesis represents the culmination ofa yearoflearningthatwould nothave beenpossiblewithout LtCol BJ. Payne, Dr. Eric Shibuya, Dr. Paul Gelpi, and mymentorDr. l.W. Gordon. 1 TIH~ORY OF PHASE:n INSURGENCY Thenature ofoperational design for counterinsurgencyhas alwaysbeen a complex, intricate, and delicate task. Theplannerorpolicymakerseeks to find simple, familiar, and often kinetic solutions to amultilayeredproblem ofideas, passions, andpolitics that are often only temperedbyablend oftime and appropriate actions. The counterinsurgent's design logic meshes the simplewiththebruteto reach a strategic accord. Thismethodoftenproves costlyin treasure andtime, and itrarelybrings the system it attempts to affectinto a stable state. The Ramadi- Al Anbarmodel, from 2003 to thepresent, demonstrates a superb, complex insurgent system for the counterinsurgentoperational designerto studyand analyze. Throughouthistory, manytheorists have attempted to frame the developmentof insurgencies. Mao Tse-Tungoffers counterinsurgencydesigners three distinctphases onwhich to plan for, evaluate, design against, and combat. Mao sawinsurgencies as protracted and evolvingas "Phase I (organization, consolidation, andpreservation), Phase II (progressive expansion), and Phase III (decision, ordestructionofthe enemy)."] David Galulain Counterinsurgency Warfare offers two phasedpatterns thatinsurgencies generallyfollow. Galulasawinsurgencies forming andmaturing as an OrthodoxPattern: Communist (Creation of a Party, UnitedFront, GuerrillaWarfare, MovementWarfare, Annihilation Campaign) and a Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern: Shortcut (BlindTerrorism, SelectiveTerrorism, integration into OrthodoxPatternifnecessary)2. Carl Von Clausewitz in On War conveys the changing characterofwar. He argues'thatthe deeperan armydrives orthelongerit'remains in a foreign territory, "themomentan invaderenters enemyterritory, thenature oftheoperational theater changes.,,3 Thesetheorists signalthe counterinsurgencydesignerto viewinsurgencies as a 2 phasedmaturationprocess that evolves as new compounds orideas areintroducedwithinthe system. Theheart ofthe system is thepeople and theirsupport. As the support ofthepopulace evolves, it follows a sometimes seeminglyrandom andunpredictable wave. The counterinsurgencyoperational designermust seekto understand where theinsurgencyor insurgencies existinphases ofmaturationorde-maturationinorderto combatthem effectively. Dueto themultilateral, complex, and varyingnatureofinsurgencies, itis amistake for , the counterinsurgencydesignerto attempt tojaminsurgencies into three distinctphases. To do so is to discount theuniqueness oreachinsurgent organization, sub-movement, and outside influencerororganizations. Instead, theoperational designermustunderstand thematurityof eachinsurgent elementor sub-element, whyitis at aparticularpoint, and what factors inrelation to thepopulace caninfluencethe elementto further evolve ordevolve. Onlythen canthe counterinsurgentseekto influencethe system atkeytimes orpoints within theinsurgent life cycle orsystem. Understandingthephases and life cycles within aninsurgencyis crucial for effectivelyplanning and succeedingin counterinsurgencyoperations. Anold sayinghas it, all insurgencies arelocalwhatworks againstonemaybeirrelevantto another. Manymissteps, wastedmovements, overreactions, arid setbacks occurifitis notunderstood where the insurgencyis withinitsphased life cycle, whereitis tryingto go, and whomit seeks to influence oreffectto·get there as evidencedbycontemporary, counterinsurgencywriters from David Kilcullen to Thomas Ricks. A critical analysis ofthe Ramadi-AI Anbarmodel provides insight intothephases ofinsurgency andhow thesephases affectthe counterinsurgents' operational design. This analysis will examinethephases interms ofdefiningthemetrics for progress, designing a campaignto win and holdpopularsupport, creatingsecurity, establishing effective popular government, and developingrealistic expectations oftimeinrelation to endstate. 3 HISTORICAL R]~:VIE'VOFTHE RAMADI INSURGENCY Fre-.Regime.Removal Ramadi, a cityofmore than 350,000people (predominantlySunni) sits onthebanks of the Euphrates River andis the capital ofAl Anbar Province. For centuries, the areahas been a hub oftrade and smuggling from the desertto the Mediterranean. Inthe 1800's, the Ottoman Empire occupied and controlledthe area. To organizethis occupation, thehosts oftribes were looselybroughtunder the control ofthe Dulaimtribal confederation.4 After the Mesopotamian Campaign of1917, theBritish attempted to use this organizationto control the areaduringits occupation. Theymet withresistancethroughouttheiroccupation anduntil Iraq's independence in 1932. In 1968, Saddam Husseinbeganhis rise to powerand soughtto reinforcethe prominence ofthe Sunniminority. SaddamHussein filled the ranks ofhis army, special forces, and intelligence services withloyalists from the Ramadi and surroundingAl Anbartribes or Dulaim confederation. This was his method to controlthe troublesome area and its tribes. Duringthe years that followed, Saddam experienced several rebellions from the tribes of 5 Ramadi. A combinationofforce and incentives extinguishedtheserebellions. As warwith Americadrewto an inevitable certaintyinlate2002, Saddambegan openingthe canto aready- made insurgency. Ramadi, then a communityofcurrent andretired army; special forces, and intelligence services officers, providedmuch ofthe substanceto his planfot an asymmetrical fight.6 Priorto hostilities, inthewords ofthe IraqiDeputyPrimeMinister, "Iraqwould fight , verydifferentlyfrom 1991, whenvastlysuperiorcoalitionfo·rces outClassed its conventional military.,,7 The extent ofthe cohesion, organization, and tiining ofthis plan continues to remain underdebate. 4 PostRegime Uemoval Atthe close ofthe initialUnited States and CoalitionForces invasion inMay of2003, Ramadi remained fairly untouched, sparedthe fate ofmanyother cities. A FloridaNational GuardbattalionoccupiedRamadiproperuntil relievedbyaU.S. Marine battalioninFebruary 2004. Duringthis yearlongperiod ofpregnantpause andrelative calm, the insurgencybeganto growlegs and transition from aplanning and organizationphaseto an organizationand action phase. Littleto no actionorinfluencebythe CoalitionProvisionalAuthoritymarked this period within Ramadi. InApril of2004, Ramadi explodedinthreedays ofchaos and fightingbetween the soleU.S. Marinebattalionsecuringandstabilizingthe cityandthousands offighters. The offensiveinRamadi would endwith over ahundred Marine casualties. The insurgents found 8 themselves tacticallydefeated, withhundreds ofdead, and theirspirits temporarilybroken. This offensivewas drivenbythe complexblendofanatural reactionto occupation, anger due to perceived disenfranchisement ofBathist and FormerRegime Loyalist (FRL), retribution due to themistreatment ofIraqis inotherparts ofAl Arrbar, aperceivedminimalization ofthepowerof the Sheikhs, religious motIvation, andthebeginnings ofoutside extremists influence. Itwas arguablycomposed ofamix ofFonnerRegime Loyalist and ArmyOfficers, extremist elements 9 (local and foreign), criminals, emotional tagalongs, andtribes. Fromthis experience, themany insurgent groups beganto mature intheirorganization and coordination. As timepassed, to combattheinsurgent swayoverthepopulace and the explosive securitysituation, theU.S. militarypresenceinRamadi grew from onebattalionto fourby2006. Throughout2004 to early2007, the U.S. military fought asagemix ofaggressive information, civil-military, and discriminatorycombatoperations. Never fully achievingunityofcommand oreffort, bylate2006, the Ramadi insurgencycanbe describedbroadlyas a setofelements