DTIC ADA491160: Viewing the Future of Seabasing Through the Lens of History: A Historical Analysis of Seabasing and What It Says About the Concept's Future Applicability

1.8 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

UnitedStates Marine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
2076South Street
Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
VIEWING THE FUTURE OFSEABASING THROUGH THELENS OFHISTORY:
A historical analysis ofseabasingand whatitsays aboutthe concept's future applicability
SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT
OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF
MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES
MajorJesse Kemp, USMC
AY 07-08
C ". A, 5 fJ/., ,l)
(),,'5 kVC; ,-,5tPh
-t:A~~a;:;;~===:::::::..-_---
Oral Defense~1JlQAl
Approved: ~~~~~--;;q.<:::'--Ir=----------
Date: ----=..:r--c-....L.-I-~..I..4-<'-'-~__O,I_-----
i
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Viewing the Future of Seabasing Through the Lens of History: A
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Historical Analysis of Seabasing and What it Says About the Concept’s
Future Applicability 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
United States Marine Corps, Command and-Staff College,Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER
University, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,2076 South
Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 41
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Executive Summary
Title: Viewing the Future ofSeabasing through the Lens ofHistory: A historical analysis of
seabasing and whatitsays about the concept's future applicability.
Author: MajorJesse Kemp, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: Seabasingprovides tremendous operational and logistical flexibility thatin the pasthas
oftenproved to be adecisive element ofcombat success, howeverit also presents fundamental
constraints to the operational commander and thus must never be viewed as more than a
complementarymeans ofsupportfor operations across the spectrum ofconflict.
Discussion: Seabasingis not arevolutionary concept. In fact, seabasinghas been used as a
method ofsupportingmilitary operations as far backin Americanhistory as theRevolutionary
War. During the courseof20th centurymodem warfare, ithas played aprominentrole, employed
in bothlarge scale and limited combatoperations from World WarII to as recently as Operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan. Currentproponents ofseabasing argue that, because ofrapidly
advancing technology, future seabasing concepts will revolutionize employment and supportfor
forces on the battlefield. In these concepts, seabasingis seen as alarge-scale, jointforce enabler
providinglong-term operational level logistics. Using a series ofhistorical vignettes from World
WarII, TheFalklandIslands, Vietnam, and Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, this paper
Builds acasethat, regardless ofthe steady-(and at times-rapid advance oftechnology
throughout the evolution ofwarfare, seabasinghas always possessedinherentlimitations. These
limitations can be categorizedby three main themes: vulnerability to securitythreats, a
constrained throughputrate, and an incompatibility with the evolving character ofmodern
warfare. Additionally, the paper examines two modem examples ofsuccessful seabasing: the
MarineCorp's SpecialLandingForceinVietnam and MarineTaskForce58 in Afghanistanin
orderto draw conclusions as to what the appropriaterole ofseabasingmightbein the future.
Conclusion: Seabasing's logistics shortfalls limitthe size and duration ofoperations it can
supportindependently. Additionally, seabasingmay be considered too risky as aprimary source
oflogistics due to its vulnerability to asymmetric threat systems designedfor the littoral
environment. Within these employmentconstraints however, seabasing can be apowerful tool
for the operational commander, particularly during shaping operations andin logistically
immature orpoliticallycontentious environments. Thekey to employment ofseabasing is not to
exclusively-rely onit, butrather to utilize it as part ofalarger, balancedlogistics network.
Therefore, while development offuture seabasingcapabilities should certainly continue, it
shouldbe done so withlimited expectations.
i
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OFTHE
INDIVIDUALSTUDENTAUTHOR AND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENT THE
VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFFCOLLEGE OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD
INCLUDETHEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT.
QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY
PART OFTHIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE.
11
Illustrations
Page
\~.
Figure 1. Operation CORPORATE, FalklandIslands 1982 5
Figure 2. Operation TELIC Al Faw PeninsulaIraq, 2003 8
Figure 3. OperationAVALANCHE: Salerno, Italy 1943 13
Figure4. OperationDAGGER THRUST: Vietnam 1965 17
\
Figure 5. OperationJACKSTAY: Vietnam 1966 19
Figure6. TaskForce 58 Operations in Afghanistan 2001 21
iii
Preface
Seabasingis oneofseveral evolving JointIntegrating Concepts that describe a
visualization ofhow Joint Forces hope to operate 10-20 years in thefuture. Because seabasing is
seen as a future Jointcapability, its potential scope is immense and would belikeno maritime
asset the United States has employed since thefinal years ofWorldWar II. As a Marine supply
officer and general-purposelogistician, seabasinghas the potential to directly affect my
professionin fundamental ways. Thus, I sawit as an important topicfor study. My literature
reviews on seabasingproduced a seemingly limitless amountofinformation in theform ofJoint
and individual service conceptdocuments, government-sponsored andindependent studies, and
opinionpapers. The focus ofmostofthe literature seemed to be on the current limitations of'
science and technologyand the advancements required to bridge the gap between current
capabilities and thefuture vision. WhatI found to be conspicuously absent, however, was any
comprehensive study ofmilitary history on the subject ofseabasing, and what that might say
about the viability offuture concepts. Thatabsence guided myresearch and the writing ofthis
paper. Itis byno means acomprehensivehistorical review ofseabasing, butI believe it begins to
shed lighton some common trends that should be carefully consideredas the development of
future seabasing concepts continues.
iv
Table ofContents
Page
DISCLAIMER ii
LIST OFILLUSTRATIONS iii
PREFACE iv
INTRODUCTION 1
SECURITY THREATS TO THE SEABASE 3
TheFalkland Islands 3
Guadalcanal 5
Operation TELIC: Al FawPeninsula, Iraq 7
THE COMPLEXITY OFSEABASINGAND ITS EFFECTS ON OPERATIONS 9
Guadalcanal and the Falkland Islands 9
,....
Salerno 12
Iwo Jimaand Okinawa 14
SUCCESSFULAPPLICATIONS OFSEABASING 15
The U.S. Marine Corps Special Landing Force in Vietnam 15
TaskForce58 inAfghanistan 20
ANALYSIS OF SEABASINGWITHRESPECTTO FUTURE OPERATIONS 23
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25
,,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 31
v

1. INTRODUCTION
The time is upon us when we no longerare tied to the buildup on the beach as a
sine quanon ofan amphibious operation. We can cut the umbilical cordofshore
basedfaGilities, including beaches, beach exits, gradients, airfields, ports, etc.,
andoperate entirelyfrom basesafloat. Seabase is the coming era ofthe
amphibiousforce.]
This quoteis acommon claim oftoday's seabasingproponents. The SeabasingJoint
Integrating Conceptof2005, the Department ofthe Navy's "Naval Operating Concepts" of
2005, and the Marine Corps' "MarineCorps Operating Concepts for a ChangingSecurity
Environment" of2006 all claim that seabasingis a key enableroffuture operations for many of
the samereasons.2Itmightbesurprising to find out, however, that the statementabove was
madein 1971, in aMarine Corps Gazette article by LieutenantColonelJ. W. Hammond titled,
"Seabase: TheTrueAmphibious Operation." Whatithighlights is that the concept ofseabasing
is notnew. In fact, seabasinghas beenused as a method ofsupportingmilitary operations as far
backin American history as the Revolutionary War. Seabasing also played a large partin 20th
centurymodern warfare, employedin both large scale and limited combatoperations from World
WarII to as recentlyas Operation Enduring Freedomin 2001. Currentproponents ofseabasing
argue that, becauseofrapidly advancing technology, future seabasing concepts will revolutionize
employment and supportfor forces on the battlefield. In theseconcepts, seabasing is seen as a
3
large-scale,jointforce enablerprovidinglong-term operational level logistics.
History, however, reveals that seabasinghas always possessed inherent limitations,
regardless ofthe steady-and attimes-rapid advance oftechnology throughout theevolution of
warfare. Using ahistorical analysis ofvarious applications ofseabasing, this paperwill show
that, while seabasingprovides tremendous operational and logistical flexibility, oftenprovingto
be the decisive elementofcombatsuccess, itwill always presentlimitations to the operational
1
commander and thus mustneverbe viewed as more than a complementary means ofsupportfor
operations across the spectrum ofconflict.
Seabasing is fundamentally alogistical capability. Itis a way ofbasing forces and
equipmentfrom which to projectpower ashore, and itis a way ofproviding initial or long-term
sustainmentto units ashorefrom ships offshore. While seabasing can also serve as amethod of
providing additional warfightingfunctions such as fire support and command and control, this
paperwillfocus primarily on its logistical characteristics. As such, itis first necessary to
understand therelationship between seabasing and logistics.
While logistics has many scientific and mathematical applications, logistics as an ~thas
always been the searchfor an ideal balancebetweenresponsiveness (i.e. the timely delivery of
forces and supportto the warfighter), and a minimized logistics "footprint" on the battlefield.4
Finding this balance can often mean the differencebetween success andfailure in a military
operation. In describing the nature oflogistics, the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication,
Logistics, states that, althoughlogistics byitselfcannotwin wars, it canbe the major
s
contributingfactor inlosing a war. Under the right circumstances, seabasing can enable success
in warby striking such abalance as to provide logistics responsiveness and the operational
flexibility ofalightfootprint. Indeed, seabasinghas provento be a critical capability that directly
contributed to combatsuccess for that very reason-most notably during World WarII, but also
morerecently during Vietnam and Operation Enduring FreedominAfghanistan. Conversely,
otherhistorical examples show that seabasing, as an operation's center ofgravity, can have
multiplecritical vulnerabilities, including susceptibility to attack by conventional and
asymmetric threats, complexity, and over-reliance on it as the sole source oflogistics.
Finally, it shouldbenoted that the majority ofthehistorical references used inthis paper
2