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. . United StatesMarine Corps Command and Staff'College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Marine COI]JS Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES TITLE: Developing the Iraqi Army: The Long Fight in the Long War SUBMITTED IN PARTIALFULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES AUTHOR: MajorJohn E, BiJas, USMCR AY 07-08 Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: ProfessorErin M. Simpson, Assistant Professor sec~es M n · Of.National ov-- Approved: . /'- t3: g , Date: M" 0 Oral Defense Committee Member: Eric .Shibuya, PhD, Associate Professor ofStrategic Studies ,Approved:~~=.~...L.~:'::::::~~~...- _ Date: __----'L-L.._-L-.:.~L..!....O:o~.>o.....L~ _ Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Developing the Iraqi Army: The Long Fight in the Long War 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development REPORT NUMBER Command,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University,2076 South Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 58 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 ExecutiveSummary Title: Developingthe IraqiArmy: The LongFightinthe LongWar ':,.:.' Author: MajorJohnE. Bilas, USMCR Thesis: The surgeofAmericantroops, coupledwithlocal and militiauprisings (i.e., the Al AnbarAwakening), was thecatalystfor the IraqiArmy's progress in critical areas, such as logistics, personnelrecruitmentandretention, andpay administration, which contributedto buildingthe confidence andperformanceofthe IraqiArmyin2007. Discussion: Strategicdecisionsregarding the IraqiArmyhavebeen a centralpointofdebate within the U.S. militarysince2003. Afterthefall ofthe Iraqiregime, Americanforces were not preparednorhad theyplannedfor post-combatoperations. Theturningpointofthe Iraqi conflict cameinmid-2003, when theAmericanforces transitionedfrom conventional operations to a counterinsurgency. The formerIraqiArmywas disbandedand CoalitionProvisionalAuthority OrderNumber2, August 23, 2003, dictated anew army was to beformed. Since 2004, thenewlyformed IraqiArmy's logistics, personnelrecruitment and retention, and I:;' administrative supportwere majorconcerns for Coalitionforces. Furthermore, progress toward independencewas impeded attop levels within the Govermp.entofIraqand the Ministerof Defensebecause ofpoor securityconditions and continuous corruptionwithin the ministry. Becausethe strategywas failing, a surge ofU.S. forces totaling over30,000 additional troops deployedto Iraqtoprovide securityand stabilityin late 2006. This paperuses anexplanatory case study approach to investigatethe 2nd Brigade, 7thIA Division's level ofprogress madeinlogistics, personnelrecruitment, andpay administration over the spanoftwo calendaryears, 2006 (CY06)and 2007 (CY07). The case studyapproach determines therelationship amongthe various factors (i.e. the surge andthe citizen uprisings) thatinfluence the currentbehaviorofthe 2ndBrigade, 7th IraqiArmyDivision (2/7 BDE). Inorderto determine the relationship among the Brigade's various factors, several sources were usedfor data. Fortheexperientialknowledge, theresearcherinterviewed a former advisorof2/7 BDE, locatedinAIAsad, Iraq: He was the researcher's successorupon turnoverofthe I~) researcher's dutiesinDecember2006. Theresearcher's personal experiencein 2006 will be comparedto thesuccessor's assessmentofthe BDE'sperformancein2007. Theresearcher's personalnotes andsuccessorinterview are the primary sources. Similarly, U.S. advisorafter actionreports regardingotherIraqi units were reviewed. Conclusion: The lessons learnedfrom advising IraqiArmyhas setthe tone for a newparadigm shiftfortheU.S. military. As theU.S. militarybecomes involvedwithglobalconflicts, akey mission setwillbeadvisingdisorganizedmilitaries strifewith corruption. This tall taskand new paradigmshiftwillimpacttheU.S. military to restructureits forces to conductthe full gamut of nation building. Therefore, building the IraqiArmyis alessonlearnedhow the United States develops future militaries. 11 DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSE OFTHE INDNIDUAL STUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOT NECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFFCOLLEGE ORANY OTHERGOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDETHE FOREGOINGSTATEMENT. QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALLORANY PART OFTHIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE. iii Table ofContents Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARy .ii DISCLAIMER ~ ~ iii ('I) IN"TRODUCTION 1 METHODOLOGy 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ~ · 3 THE SURGE, OPERATIONAL FARDH-AL QANOON" AND THEAWAKENIN"G 6 HOWTHE SURGEIS AFFECTIN"GLOGISTICS, PERSONNEL, AND PAy 9' Logistics 9 Logistics: 2006 ~ ~ 10 Logistics: 2007 11 PersonneL 12 Personnel2006 12 /;;' Personnel 2007 '" 13 PayAdministration ~ 14 Pay: 2006 14 Pay: 2007 : : 15 IRAQIBRIGADE (1STBDE, 2ND DIV) PROGRESS IN"MOSUL, IRAQ 16 DISCUSSIONOFFIN1)IN"GS 17 AirCapability " 18 LeadershipDevelopment. 19 RECOMMENDATIONS ' 19 , • ! Logistics 20 Personnel. 20 Pay 21 ';.'1 The Surge and the Awakening 21 MOD legitimacy · : 22 Operationalize theIA 22 Iraqi Police 24 QualityAdvisors 24 CONCLUSION 25 Appendix A -TriangulatedDatafor IraqiArmy's Logistics andPay Logistics 27 iv Pay 31 Appendix B- Effects ofOperationFardhAI-Qanoon onIraqiProvinces 37 Appendix C- IraqiArmy OperationalReadiness Assessment (ORA) LevelDefinitions 38 (/ AppendixD- PersonnelStrengthfor 2ndBrigade, 7thIraqi Division (2006- 2007) .39 Appendix E- Personnel StrengthInComparisonTo MTOE* (2006- 2007) .40 Appendix F- Growth ofthe IraqiArmy (2003 to 2007) .41 Appendix G- DetailedDescription ofMonthlyPayCyclefor 2/7 BDE .42 AppendixH- IraqiArmy PayScale .45 Endnotes " " 46 Bibliography 51 ':'.,1 v t~• INTRODUCTION The strategic decisions leadingup to the IraqWarwillbe controversiallydiscussed and debatedfor manyyears. Inparticular, the strategic decisions regarding the disbandmentofthe IraqiArmyhavebeenacentralpointofdebate within the U.S. militarysince 2003. Mterthe fall ofthe Iraqiregime, Americanforces were notpreparednorhad theyplanned forpost-combat operations. Atno faultto the operational commanders, failure ofstrategic design andthe lackof understanding oftheMiddle-Eastern culturecostnotonlyAmericanlives, butalso leftIraq lawlessness and inchaos. Theturningpointofthe Iraqi coriflict cameinmid-2003, when the Americanforces transitionedfrom conventionaloperations to a counterinsurgency. TheIraqi Army was disbanded and CoalitionProvisionalAuthority (CPA) OrderNumber2, August23, 20031, dictated anew army was to beformed. Inaddition, the U.S. Militarywas forced to playa «i> largerrolein nationbuilding-inparticular, building anew IraqiArmy. Since 2004, inadequate logistics, personnelrecruitmentandretention, andpay administration within the Iraqi SecurityForces (ISF) weremajor concerns for Coalitionforces. Furthermore, progress towardindependencewas impeded attop levels within theGovernmentofIraq (GOl) and theMinisterofDefense (MOD) becauseofpoor securityconditions andcontinuous corruptionwithin theministry. However, this paperargues that the surge ofAmerican troops, coupledwithlocal andmilitiauprisings(i.e., the AI AnbarAwakening), was the catalystfor the IraqiArmy's (IA) progress incritical areas, suchas logistics, personnelrecruitmentand retention, andpay administration, which contributedto buildingtheconfidence andperformance ofthe IAin2007. Thispaperwill discuss the IraqiArmy, its development, andits abilityto sustainitselfincombatservice supportfunctions. Inaddition, this paper willillustratethat 1 progress at the tacticallevelhas outpacedprogress within the GOrs ministries at the strategic level. Thepaperbegins with theprojectmethodologyandhow datawas obtained and analyzed. Then, the researcherdiscusses backgroundinformation describinghow the situationinIraq dictated theroles andresponsibilities ofthe advisors in developing the IA andhow theincreased troop levels providedthe breathingroomfor political and militarydevelopment. Inaddition, the paperanalyzes theimpactoftheimproved security andhowiteffectedthe evaluationcriteria (logistics, personnel, andpay administration) for the IA. Afterdetailed discussioninthree functional areas within an Iraqi Brigade (BDE), discussion offindings andrecommendations for theMarineCorps andthe U.S. militaryare addressedand a conclusionis stated. METHODOLOGY This paperuses an explanatorycase study approach to investigatethe 2ndBrigade, 7th IA Division's (2/7 BDE) level ofprogress madeinlogistics, personnelrecruitment, andpay administration overthe spanoftwo calendaryears, 2006 (CY06) and 2007 (CY07). Thecase study approach "involves extensiveobservation ofa singleindividual, severalindividuals, or a single group ofindividuals as aunit"Zinorderto determine therelationship among the various beh~vior factors thatinfluencethe current ofthe 2/7 BDE. An explanatory case study concentrates on "experientialknowledgeoftheindividuals orunit andclose attention to the influence oftheir/its social, political, and othercontexts.,,3 Inorderto determine therelationship among the Brigade's various factors, several sources wereusedfor data. Forthe experientialknowledge, theresearcherinterviewed a former advisor of2/7 BDE, locatedinAl Asad, Iraq. He was the researcher's successorupon turnoverofthe researcher's duties inDecember2006. Theresearcher's personal experiencein 2006 will be 2 comparedto the successor's assessmentofthe BDE's performancein2007 intheAl Anbar region. Theresearcher's personalnotes and successorinterview are theprimary sources. Similarly, U.S. advisorafteractionreports (AAR) regarding otherIraqi units werereviewed. Additionally, theresearcherwantedto gainperspectivefrom outside ofAlAnbarthrough a ~/' personalinterview ofaformer U.S. Army advisor, who deployed with the IraqiArmy's 2nd DivisioninMosul. In addition to otheradvisors' reports, theresearcher evaluated Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, The Reportofthe Independent Commission on the Security ofIraq, Reportto Congress on the Situation inIraq, andothernewsprintarticles (e.g., newspaper, Marine Corps Gazette) in order to lookatfactors thataffectedthe Brigade, to include Iraqi units outside ofAlAnbar, and analyzehow thosefactors wereinfluencedbythe Brigade's social, political, and geographic contexts. Byusing awide varietyofresources (i.e., governmentdocuments, first-person experiences/observations, personalinterviews withsubjectmatterexperts), the researcher was , able to triangulate the datawhichhighlighted common supportingthemes from several sources. An Excel spreadsheetwas used to categorizelarge amounts ofdataintoitsrespective categories and to capture specific informationfor each area. An example ofhow theresearcherreduced the datafor onecategory (i.e., Logistics andPay) and its supporting evidence canbefound in Appendix A. Thefollowing sectionintroduces the surge and the civilianuprising's impact improvedtheperformance ofthe IraqiBDE. BACKGROUND INFORMATION "A second tenet of counterinsurgency is that foreign forces, however adept, are no substitute for capableindigenous ones. Lestwe forget, hugeforeign military intervention did not produce victory for the French in Indochina or Algeria, for the Soviets in Afghanistan, or for the Americans in Vietnam. An indigenous army can claim a measure of legitimacy that an occupying army-especially a Western one amid Muslim cooperation---cannot.,,4 3 In 2003, aftertheinvasion ofIraq, Coalitionforces misjudged thecharacterand nature ofthe conflictandfailed to planfor post-conflict and reconstruction operations. Thatis, Coalition forces transitionedfrom liberators to occupiers. Inaddition, thedecision to disbandthe Iraqi ArmyinMay2003 was also a strategicflaw. The outcome ofthis decisionresonates as one of themostfailed decisions during this warand illustrates thattheU.S.'sinabilityto predicthow disbanding the IraqiArmy onlyexacerbatedthe security situation.5 In an article from theIraqi Security Forces: A Strategyfor Success, James J. Wirtz wrote The Exquisite Problem ofVictory: Measuring Success in Unconventional Operations. Wirtz states: "Greatly worsening the situation was the U.S. decision to disestablish the Iraqi Army, a decision thatpromptlyleft over400,000 officers and soldiers unemployed. This military talent served as a ready recruitment pool for ethnic militias, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups who benefited from the chaotic conditions that quickly spread across several urban centers in Iraq on stability operations, the Coalition's efforts in Iraq were more than unsuccessfuL They actually were counterproductive because they had the If}' neteffectofreducingthe securityenjoyedbythe Iraqipeople.,,6 ByJulyand August2003, thefirst efforts were taken to form and create the new IraqiArmy. Itwas led bythe CoalitionMilitaryAssistanceTrainingTeam (CMATT). CMATTplannedto establishthreelightmotorizedbrigades, calledthe Iraqi CivilDefense Corps (ICDC). However, structural and organizationalproblems within CMATTand the CPAhindered the effortto operationalizethese brigades.? As aresultofthefailure to accuratelyplan andresource the Iraqi military, training andoperations werefurther delayed. Itwas notuntil the springof2004 that Coalitionforces achieved a sense ofurgencyanda realized thatIraqi securityforces were vital to 'f.~ Iraq's future.8 Between 2004 and 2005, the IraqiArmycontinuedto struggle. Operational capabilitywas limited andpersonnel attritionremained extremelyhigh. As Coalitionforces continuedto form, train, man, and equip anew IraqiArmy, securityinIraqcontinuedto deteriorate whichputa 4