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UnitedStatesMarine Corps CommandandStaffCollege Marine Corps University 2076South Street Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES '.~ CompletingthePhilosophy oftheEthical Warrior SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT OFTHEREQUIREMENTFORTHEDEGREE OF MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES MajorJoseph A. Farley, USMC .1,.' AY07-08 r4 Mentorand Defense 0 mber: Charles D. McKenna, PhD. ~ Approved: , Date: :Aq. ItF~rL. '2e>tJ f:t OralDefense CommitteeMember: ~o\-o T.«.\PI.:::ll:::.\ ~tb Approved: ~~.--,..........,.l-'-'''-/=\t--+A;~:.....'"'I _ ~ <~g Date: .Lf () Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Completing the Philosophy of the Ethical Warrior 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development REPORT NUMBER Command,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University,2076 South Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 39 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 ExecutiveSummary Title: Completingthe Philosophy oftheEthical Warrior Author: MajorJosephA. Farley, United States Marine Corps Thesis: TheMarine Corps canmaintain a"WarriorEthos," that ifinternalized in thehearts and minds ofits Marines, will be sufficientto enablethem to successfullymeet the ethical challenges ofthe COIN or asymmetrical warfare environments. This is possible ifthe Marine Corps adopts astrategy that more clearly defines its ethos and inculcates withinits Marines a depth of understanding ofitthat will result intheir ability to bettertranslate their ethos into "ethics" in application onthe battlefield. The current ambiguityinMarine Corps ethics canbe clarified with astrategyfocused primarily intwo areas: -Defining andjustifying the increasedrisk to Marines in COIN -Determining Marine roles in situations and the corresponding levels ofrisk , Discussion: The basis ofthe values expressedby the Marine Corps is the ideal oftheequality of human life. However, the linkage ofthis ideal to the various tangible risk-acceptance situations possible inthe COIN environmenthas notbeenfirmly established. Risking the lives of "buddies" to potentiallysavethe lives ofstrangers onforeign soil is counter-intuitive to the traditional Marine Corps "ethos" and often difficult tojustifyunder the guise ofnational defense. o Reflexivekilling is psychologicallyharmful to Marines whenthe moral reasoning behindthe killing is notfirmlyjustifiedin all circumstances, and it is not conduciveto the COIN environmentwhere moral autonomy is required to support ethical reasoning withincomplex situations. There are ethical constructs relative to risk-acceptancethatcorrespondto different roles that Marines will assume on 21st centurybattlefields, and Marines m1.,lstbe capable of shifting among these differentroles in orderto make decisions that are morally and ethically correct according to their responsibilities onthe battlefield. TheMarine Corps' ethical warrior philosophycanhave the depth andflexibility to address the ethical requirements ofidentityroles spanning the spectrum ofconflict ifthe Marine Corps focuses its ethics education on clearly defining the requirements ofthose roles interms ofrisk and sacrifice andhow Marines should assess situations in orderto determine which role should apply. Conclusion: TheMarine Corps' ethical warrior philosophy is awell-conceived model that can beuseful as the cognitive framework thatencompasses the range ofroles and responsibilities that are possible for Marines to fill within the spectrum ofconflict and provides "humanitarianvalue" unity among those roles. However, the Marine Corps must morefully develop the idea ofthe primacy ofthe protection ofhuman life-the ideathat Marines, when inthe role ofprotectors, musthold the lives ofthose whom they protect at ahigher value than their own and at ahigher value thanthose oftheirfellow Marines. The level ofriskthatis required to be acceptedby Marines inthe protectorrole mustbe articulated in correspondingterms. This includes developing humanitarian values and solidifyingtheirrisk-acceptance implications. Additionally, the Marine Corps musteducateMarines so that they are able to assess situations, determine their roles inthose situations relativeto all others involved, and then clearly establish whatlevels of o risk-acceptance apply. Table ofContents /~ I \ Page DISCLAIMER ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .iii I. ETHICS IN QUESTION 1 Defining and Justifying the IncreasedRisk to Marines inCOIN 4 DeterminingMarineRoles in Situations and the Corresponding Levels ofRisk 4 II. THEMARINE CORPS' RENEWED FOCUS ONETHICS 5 III. MARINE CORPS "COREVALUES" 7 IV. THE "ETHICALWARRIOR" OFTHE MARINE CORPS MARTIALARTS PROGRAM ; 8 V. "SOMETHINGLARGER" 10 VI. THE LOGICALPROBLEM OF"NATIONALDEFENSE" 11 o VII. REFLEXIVE VS. REFLECTIVE ACTION 12 The Needfor Reflexive Action 13. TheDangerofReflexive Action ; 14 The Needfor "Reflection" : 14 VIII. WARRIOR AND POLICE "ETHICS" 16 IX. THEETHICS OFTHEPEACEKEEPER 18 X. "SUPERIDENTITY" AND THEETHICALWARRIORPHILOSOPHy 20 XI. SUMMARY OFTHEARGUMENT 23 XII. COMPLETINGTHEETHICALWARRIORPHILOSOPHY 24 NOTES 26 BIBLIOGRAPHY 32 o 1 DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OFTHE INDIVIDUALSTUDENTAUTHOR AND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE VIEWS OFEITHERTHE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDETHEFOREGOING STATEMENT. o QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OFALLOR ANY PART OFTHIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE. o r~ ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I greatly appreciate the guidance and encouragementofDr. Paolo Tripodi, without which my research would certainlynothave ventured into all ofthe areas thatit did. Additionally, without the continualprodding, tempered by extraordinarypatience, ofDr. Charles D. McKenna, this paperwould probablystillbe anincomplete draft. iii (~\ I. Ethics in question Thefinal reportofthe MentalHealthAdvisoryTeam(MHAT) IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom05-07, which was published on 17November2006 bythe Office ofthe Surgeon, MultinationalForce-Iraq andthe Office oftheSurgeon General, United States ArmyMedical Command, containedfindings thatraisedserious concerns andprompted immediate action atthehighestlevelsin the United States Armed Forces. This report on thefourth in aseries ofassessments thatbeganin 2003 was thefirst thatincluded, at the requestofthe Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, results ofquestions posedto soldiers andMarines regarding "battlefieldethics." To theUnited States Marine Corps, aninstitutionthatis self-professed andwidelyregarded as having the highest ofmoral standards and conductinbattle, the results werehumbling:1 o - Only38% ofMarines agreed thatnon..:combatants shouldbe treated with dignity andrespect (comparedto 47% ofsoldiers.) - 17% ofMarines believedthatall non-combatants shouldbetreated as insurgents. -44% advocated torture ofprisoners ifrequiredto savethe life ofa Marine. - Only24% ofMarines surveyedwould riskhis/herown safetyto help a non combatantin danger. Thesefindings, while troublingin anycontext, represent amentality amongMarines thatclearly does notsupportmission success inthe currentcounter-insurgency (COIN) environments ofIraq and Mghanistan. LieutenantGeneralJames Mattis, the current CommanderoftheUnitedStates JointForces Command, andthe Commanding General ofFirstMarineDivision during Operation Iraqi FreedomI, in akeynote address to Marine Corps Command andStaffCollegein Quantico, Virginiaon7 September2007, o spoketo an audienceconsistingprimarilyofMarine Corps Majors oftheimportance of 2 ~. keeping "the moral high ground at all costs, to includethe cost oflosing some ofyour young Marines.,,2 According to the Marine Corps WarfightingPublication (MCWP) 3- 33.5, Counterinsurgency, "COIN is war amongstthe people,,,3 where Marines mustbe "preparedto takesomerisk;,,4 the publicationfurther identifies thatthe COIN environment creates the need for increased ethical considerationofrisk and ties the willingness ofMarines to acceptitto the Marine Corps "WarriorEthos:" Combat...often obligates Soldiers and Marines to acceptsomerisk to minimizeharmto noncombatants. This risktaking is anessential part of theWarriorEthos. Inconventional conflicts, balancing competing responsibilities ofmissionaccomplishment withprotection of noncombatants is difficultenough. Complex COIN operations placethe s toughest ofethical demands on Soldiers, Marines andtheirleaders. Consideringthat only 1/4ofMarines are willing to risk their ownsafety for anon- combatant, it would appear that most Marines have notinternalized a"WarriorEthos" o that includes the acceptance ofrisksufficientfor themto operate suq.::essfully in a COIN environment. Ifthe Marine Corps is to retainits role as aflexible and adaptable conventional force inreadiness, itwill need to maintainthe abilityto operate with exceptional skill across the entire spectrum ofconflict-this is the expectedreality ofwarfare in 21st Century. FrankHoffmanwrites inPreparingforHybrid Wars, that conflict inthe 21st Century will likelybe characterizedby "hybridwars" that "do not allow [theUnited States] the luxury ofbuilding single missionforces." Hoffmannotes the implication ofhybrid wars for the Marine Corps is thatitwill require "abalancebetween ourpotent conventional combat capability and our Small Wars tool kit,,6 Achievingthis balancenot onlyhas implications pertainingto training and materiel, but also includes the challenge of o preparingpersonnel mentallyto operateinenvironments requiring radically different 3 I codes qfbehavior. Lieutenant General SirJohnKiszely, the director ofthe Defence Academy ofthe United Kingdom who in2002 served inIraq as theDeputy Commanding General ofthe Multi-National Force Iraq, captures the nature ofthis challenge inhis article "Learning aboutCounterinsurgency" published inMilitaryReview inMarch2007: To be capable ofwarfighting, an army needs to have as its characteristic cultural spirit, orethos, onewhich is warfighting oriented...Butto be capable ofoperations otherthan war...an armyneeds its soldiers to have a perception ofthemselves as something otherthan warriors...Combining these two cultures is remarkably difficult; it is remarkably difficult for an army to bereally good atbothwarfighting and counterinsurgency.? Canthe Marine Corps maintaina "WarriorEthos," that ifinternalized inthe hearts and minds ofits Marines, will be sufficientto enable them to successfullymeet the ethical challenges ofthe COIN or asymmetrical warfare environments? Assuming that the o answer is yes, a question ofequal importance is, canthis ethos be comprehensive enough to deal with the ethical considerations and psychological demands ofCOIN without compromisingthe Marines! ability to fight in conventional or "kinetic" combat engagements wherethebalance ofrisk is secondaryto the requirements for immediate and aggressive violent action? This paper argues that the answerto both questions is "yes," providedthatthe Marine Corps adopts a strategythat more clearly defines its ethos and inculcates within its Marines adepth ofunderstanding ofitthat will result intheir abilityto bettertranslate their ethos into "ethics" in applicationonthe battlefield. The current ambiguity inMarine Corps ethics canbe clarifiedwith astrategyfocused primarily intwo areas: 4 r-:, _Defining andjustifyingthe increased risk to Marines in COIN Thefirstareaoffocus is the more detailed development ofthe rationale behind the acceptance ofrisk inthe COIN environment. Currentlythere is a logical gap inwhat can be categorized as the philosophy ofthe "ethical warrior"-the application ofMarine Corps "values" onthe battlefield-inthat it does not clearlyprovide aframework for risk-based decisions by defining why itmay benecessaryfor Marines to place the protectionofthe lives ofthepopulation ofaforeign nation as ahigherprioritythan the protection ofthe lives ofthemselves ortheir Marines. This framework mustbe logically complete ifit is to withstand the crucible oflife and deathreckoning in combat. The counterintuitiveideathat it "makes sense" for aMarineto riskhis orher life and/or the lives ofhis orher~uddies, potentiallywidowing their spouses and orphaning their o children, in orderto avoid potentialharmto non-combatants, mustbefirmly substantiated inthe mind ofthe Marine ifthis riskhas any hope ofbeing accepted. -DeterminingMarine roles in situations and the corresponding levels ofrisk The second area offocus involves educating Marines concerningthe application ofthe ethical warriorphilosophy withinthe entire spectrum ofconflict, orteaching them to interpretthephilosophy withinthe context ofoperational scenarios. Specifically, this involves educationthat would enable aMarineto assess a situation, determinehis orher role inthatsituationrelative to all others involved, and thenclearlyestablishwhat level ofrisk-acceptance is warranted. While the Marine Corps gives much attentionto educationregardingrules ofengagement (ROE) and law ofwar (LOW,) itgives less emphasis onthenuances ofcategorizingwhen rules ofprotectingnon-combatants apply versus whenrules ofproportionality and discriminationto minimizeharmto non- (~)