DTIC ADA490792: The Brown Water Navy in the Mekong Delta: COIN in the Littorals and Inland Waters

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UnitedStates Marine Corps
CommandandStaffCollege
Marine Corps University
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Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentCommand
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MASTEROFMILITARY STUDIES I
TITLE: TheBrown WaterNavy in the MekongDelta:
COIN in the Littorals and Inland Waters
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF
MASTEROFMILITARY STUDIES
AUTHOR: LCDRRichard E. Sessoms
AY07-08
Oral Defense CommitteeMember: Lt. Co!. ¥.aryReinwald
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The Brown Water Navy in the Mekong Delta: COIN in the Littorals and
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Inland Waters
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Table ofContents
Page
DISCLAIMER i
PREFACE ii
EXECUTIVESUMMARY iii
INTRODUCTION , 1
INSURGENCY ' 2
GENISIS OFTIIEVIETCONG : 2
TIIEMEKONGRIVER 4
TIIEBUCKLEWREPORT 5
OPERATIONMARKETTIME ,: 5
IMPACT OFMARKET TIME 9
i~l OPERATION GAMEWARDEN 10
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IMPACT OFGAME WARDEN 13
TIIEMOBILERIVERINEFORCE 15
IMPACT OFTIIEMRF 17
OPERATIONSEALORDS 18
DEMISE OFTIIE BROWNWATER NAVy 19
CONCLUSION ' 22
CITATIONS AND ENDNOTES 25
APPENDIX A: MAPS 27
APPENDIX B: RIVERINE CRAFT 33
BIBLIOGRAPHY 44
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TheBrownWater Navy in the Mekong Delta:
COINin the Littorals andInlandWaters
DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARE THOSE OFTHE
INDIVIDUALSTUDENTAUTHORAND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE
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TheBrownWater Navyin the MekongDelta:
COINinthe Littorals and InlandWaters
Preface
Soon afterI was commissioned, I read LCDRDon Sheppard's Riverine: A Brown Water
Sailorin the Delta 1967. His workand the mission he describedcaptivatedme. This was the
first time I hadbeenexposedto a surfacewarfare officer serving outsidethe "BlueWater Navy."
His workhas inspiredme to servein severalunconventional surfacewarfare billets myself.
Mystudies ofvarious counterinsurgencies atUSMC CSC leadme to lookat the Brown
WaterNavyin a newlight. This papercombines my longtimeinterestinRiverine warfare with
mynewinterestincounterinsurgency operations.
I wouldliketo thankDr. Eric Shibuya, myMaster's ofMilitary Studies mentor, for his
patience and dedicationguiding me through thelongprocess ofputtingthis work together. I
owehimquite abitforkeepingme ontrackandreeling mein as I frequently found otherthings
"moreimportant" thancompletingthis paper.
Finally, I have to acknowledge myinspiration for allI do inmycareerand life; my two
heroes, Pop andDad. I know you're bothwith me always.
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TheBrown WaterNavyinthe MekongDelta:
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COINintheLittorals and Inland Waters
ExecutiveSummary
Title: TheBrownWater Navy; Counterinsurgency onthe Fly
Author: LieutenantCommanderRichard Sessoms, United States Navy
Thesis: TheBrownWaterNavy, createdinless than one year, conducted successful
counterinsurgencyoperations againsttheVietCong onlyto bemarginalizedbyits own
government's policyofVietnamization.
Discussion: In 1964the VietCongwas firmly entrenchedinthe MekongDeltaregion. Using
fear andterror tactics, theinsurgencygainedcontrol ofthepopulation creatinga safehaven for
themovementto thriveand expand. TheUnited States and the GovernmentofSouthVietnam
recognized theinfiltrationprobleminthe MekongDeltabuttheirmilitaryorganizations were
eitherunable orincapable to deal withtheproblem. Thegeography oftheregionmadeit
impossiblefor a U.S. Army orMarine Corps division to operate effectively and the South
VietnameseArmyand Navylackedthe training andequipmentto operate successfully. In
response to theseobstacles, SecretaryofDefense, RobertMcNamara, commissionedthe U.S.
Navy to develop afighting force capableofoperatinginthe delta and ridding the region ofthe ~
VietConginfluence. The Navyusedformain Operations: MARKETTIME, GAME WARDEN,
TheMobileRiverine Force, and SEALORDS to achieve these goals. Infour short years the
BrownWaterSailors experiencedmarked success withVietConginfluenceminimized and
resupply effortsrerouted to the tortuous Ho Chi MinhTrail. However, bythe end of1968
Americanresolve to fight a warin SouthVietnamhaddeterioratedandthe Governmentneeded a
wayout. PresidentNixon's Vietnamizationprogramprovidedthe exitfor American forces and
intum mitigatedthe BrownWaterNavy's successes oftheprevious four years.
Conclusion: TheBrownWaterNavyovercame tremendous obstacles inless than one yearto
create anddeploy aformidable fighting force to theMekongDelta. Infour years aggressive
strides against the VietConginsurgencywere achieved onlyto bemitigatedbythe effects of
Vietnamization.
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TheBrown WaterNavyin theMekongDelta:
COINin the Littorals andInlandWaters
Introduction
In 1964the MekongRiverDeltawas frrmly under thecontrol ofthe communist
insurgencyknown as the VietCong (VC). The absence ofmajorcities andphysical
infrastructure southofSaigonmade the areaidealfor the VC to establishitselfand thrive.
By 1964, United States Army and MarineCorps presencein SouthVietnamwas
increasing their assistance to theGovernmentofSouthVietnam. While progress was
made in theareas northofSaigon, the MekongDeltaremained virtuallyuntouchedby
American forces as well theArmy ofSouthVietnam(ARVN).
Dueto the Marine Corps' commitmentin the north andthe cumbersome nature of ,~,
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the Army InfantryDivisionin 1964, anew methodhad to bedeveloped to counterthe
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VietCongintheMekong Delta. This taskfell to the United States Navywhich hadno
real riverinecapabilityin early 1964. Inless than oneyear theUnited StatesNavy
developed arobustriverinecapability, the "BrownWaterNavy."
This paperwillexaminethe developmentofthe UnitedStates Navy's "Brown
WaterNavy" andits conductofcounterinsurgency operations. I willbeginby discussing
abriefhistoryofthe Viet Conginsurgency andits genesis in the Mekong Delta. NextI
will discuss theformation ofthe BrownWaterNavy throughits threeprimary operations,
MARKETTIME, GAMEWARDEN, andthe Mobile Riverine Force. Additionally, I
willexamine each operation's impactinthefight againstthe VCinsurgency. Finally, I
will discuss theeffects ofVietnamization onthe "BrownWaterNavy" whichultimately
reducedtheeffectsofthe counterinsurgency.
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TheBrownWaterNavyintheMekongDelta:
COINin the Littorals and InlandWaters
Insurgency
JointDoctrine defines an insurgency as an organizedmovementaimedatthe
overthrow ofaconstitutedgovernmentthrough theuse ofsubversionand armedconflict.1
FM 3-24further defines insurgency as an organized, protractedpolitico-militarystruggle
designed to weakencontrol and legitimacy ofan established government, occupying
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power, ofotherpolitical authority whileincreasinginsurgent control.
Inorderto succeedin acounterinsurgencyoperation onemust strive to gain
control ofthepopulation. Bard O'Neilidentifies four critical areas which mustbe
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addressedin orderto gain control; control the physicalenvironment, win popular support,
l~)\ address needs ofthepeople, andlegitimacy ofthe local government.3 In SouthVietnam
the targetofboththe VC and the U.S. forces were thepeasants. Thesewere the "fence
sitters" who had noreal alliance to eitherthe communists orthe GVN. Theseindividuals
were easytargets for the VCbecausethey were ableto address theirneeds and solong as
they acquiesced to VC they livedin relative security. The GVN was virtuallyunseenin
theremoteprovinces ofthe MekongDelta givingthe VC nearfree reign anduncontested
control oftheregion.
The Genesis ofthe VietCOllg
Subsequentto the French defeat at DienBienPhu, the GenevaAccords divided
Vietnaminto theDemocratic Republic ofVietnamintheNorth andthe Republic of
Vietnaminthe South. TheAccords providedfor aperiod offree movementin which
citizens ofeithernew country couldmovefreely from oneto the other. The Communist
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TheBrownWaterNavyin theMekongDelta:
COINin theLittorals andInlandWaters
ledHanoiregime tookfull advantage ofthis provision, choosingto keep nearlyfifteen
thousandcommunistsupporters inplaceinthe Southwhilebringingnearly seventy
thousand more Southerners to the Northfor training and laterreinsertion.
Ho ChiMin, theCommunistLeaderoftheDemocraticRepublic ofVietnam,
hopedto conquerthe Souththroughpolitical agitation. He orderedhis supporters inthe
South, known as theNationalLiberationFront(NLF) to buildup a clandestinemilitary
force preparedto conductafull scalerevolutionary war. This force becameknown as the
VietCong.4 TheCommunistPartyofNorthVietnamemployedMao Zedong's theory of
protractedpopularwaras the central strategyfor theVC.5 Although the VC hadamain
force elementwhich couldoperateintraditionalinfantryorganizations (i.e. battalions, ';
,r-, regiments and/ordivisions) itfocusedprimarilyon phaseone andtwo operations of
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Mao's protractedwartheory. TheNorthVietnameseArmy (NYA) focused onphase
threeandregulararmyoperations prosecuting the majorityoftheconventional aspects of
the war.
TheVietConginfrastructure (VCl) or shadow governmentwas the non-military
politically functioning elementoftheinsurgency. TheVClmission was to supportthe
military elementandfurther spreadthemessageby enlargingthecadre. The VCl
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flourished in theearly 1960's,recruiting nearly three thousand members permonthfrom
the poorhamlets inthe South. By 1964, all 16provinces within the MekongDeltafell
underVC control orinfluence. Itis estimatedthatnearly 75 percentofthe Delta
populationwas controlledor subjectto theintimidation oftheVietCong.6 Populations in
the largercoastalvillages andcities remained somewhatloyalto the GVN.
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TheBrownWaterNavy in theMekongDelta:
COINinthe Littorals and InlandWaters
TheDeltaprovideda safehavenfor theVietCongto recruit, train, create arms
caches, andbuildsupplies. TheVietnameseArmy was not willing to patrol therivers
and moveinto the Viet Congcontrolledestuaries as they were outnumberednearly two to
one.? Basicallyunchecked, the VietCongthrived. Theybecame extremely adeptat
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using thewater networks to further theircause. Theyhaddevelopedinto a challenging
foe, well schooledin the arts ofwar, after fighting the Frenchfor eightyears in the
IndochinaWarand the SaigonNationalists for the lastten years. "Manywere fishermen
and hunters, which gavethem anatural affinityfor the land and water, a natural patience,
and a greatingenuitywhenitcameto devisingmethods ofkilling."s
The Mel{ongRiver
VietCohg operatedrelativelyuncheckedpartially due to corruption and the
GVN's inabilityto establishitselfas alegitimate entitybut also due to therelative
isolationtheMekongDeltaprovidedfrom the rest ofthe country. The delta stretches
from the GulfofThailandnorth to the Cambodianborderand eastto Saigon. Although
the areaencompasses less than 25 percentofthe totalland areaofSouthVietnam, over
50percentoftheSouthVietnam's population of9millionresides within the delta.9 The
Mekong and Bassacrivers form themajorwaterways oftheregion with countless
tributaries andcanals coveringtheentire expanse. The societywas nearly 100percent
agrarian, producingover 80percentofthe SouthVietnamrice crop.
The areawas difficultto maneuverbyland dueto thelackofroad networks and
periodicprolongedflooding in various areas. The 3,000 nautical miles ofrivers, canals,
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and streamswas the life-bloodoftheregionprovidinglocals ameans oftransportation,
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