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UnitedStatesMarine Corps CommandandStaffCollege Marine Corps University 2076South Street Marine Corps CombatDevelopmentcommand Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES TRANSFORMINGUSMC INTELLIGENCE TO ADDRESS IRREGULARWARFARE SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT OFTHEREQUIREMENTS FORTHEDEGREE OF MASTER OFMILITARY STUDIES \ Maj Matthew A. Reiley, USMC AY-08 ===================================================================== OralDefense CommitteeMember: _~~=o.....:...:....:......:::== Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Transforming USMC Intelligence to Address Irregular Warfare 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps REPORT NUMBER Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University 2076 South Street,Quantico,VA,22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 74 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREINARETHOSE OFTHE INDNIDUAL STUDENTAUTHOR AND DO NOTNECESSARILYREPRESENTTHE VIEWS OFEITHERTHEMARINECORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ORANY OTHER GOVERNMENTALAGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDETHEFOREGOINGSTATEMENT. QUOTATIONFROM, ABSTRACTIONFROM, ORREPRODUCTION OF ALLOR ANY PART OFTHIS DOCUMENTIS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENTIS MADE. ii ExecutiveSummary i Title: TransformingMarine Corps Intelligence to Address IrregularWarfare Author: MajorMatthew A. Reiley, UnitedStates Marine Corps Thesis: The challenges ofIrregularWarfare andthe nature ofthe Marine Corps as the nation's I "911" force demandthei!1telligence communitymodifyits training, doctrine, and organizationto 1 ensurethe MAGTF commander's intelligencerequirements are met. Discussion: Sincethefall ofthe SovietUnion andthe endofthe ColdWar, the worldhas become significantlyless polarized. Theconsequences ofthis condition have dynamically alteredthe balancethathadexisted afterWorldWarII andhas leftmanycountries without the economic and securityblanket to which they had grown accustomed. This global instability, in addition to a dramatic increase inIslamic terrorism, has forced the United States to become increasinglyinvolvedin small conflicts around the globe. These conflicts haverangedin complexity as well as intensity, butthe one consistenttheme is thattheyrarelyinvolve military action with aconventional foe. Anotheraspect ofthese conflicts is thattheyhave a tendency to emerge quickly and with little warning. TheMarine Corps' role as the nation's "911 force" demands thatit be preparedto face theseirregularwarfare challenges with little orno preparation time. This presents a dauntingchallenge when considering the deployedMarineAir GroundTaskForce (MAGTF) will more than likelybe expectedto function both in amilitary capacity as well as aconduitfor otherelements ofnational power. This places an extremelyheavyburden ontheintelligenceunits supportingthese efforts. Intelligence supportinirregularwarfare demands precision, restraint, cultural familiarity, and linguistic competencethatexceeds whatis requiredfor conventional conflicts. Thesetypes of activities take significant amount oftime to cultivate as well as to maintain proficiency. Fortunately, the preponderance ofthe new challenges canbe achieved with existingresources andrevolve aroundbuildingthe capabilities oftheindividualMarine. Conclusion: To conductintelligence collection and analysis in irregularwarfare the Marine Corps will need to change certain aspects ofintelligence structure, training, and doctrine. Most ofthis will notbe straightforward and will require staunch supportfrom theMarine Corps' seniorintelligenceleadership to be successful. iii TableofContents Page DISCLAIMER .ii EXECUTIVE SUMMARy .iii PREFACE vi INTRODUCTION 1 CHARACTERIZINGTHEIRREGULARWARFAREENVIRONMENT 2 Definingthe IWThreat. 2 Determining Where IWWillBeWaged .4 E)(]PANDINGLANGUAGE CAPACITy 6 ExpandingMarine Corps IntelligenceLanguage Capabilities 6 Balancing Language Skills Betweenthe Active andReserve Components 9 Coalition Partnerships 9 J INTELLIGENCE COLLECTIONAND ANALYSIS DEMANDS UNIQUETO IW 11 Census Operations, CompanyLevel Intelligence Cells, andMAGTFIntelligence..11 Expanding Collection andAnalysis Focus 14 Intelligence Operations andEvidence 17 INTELLIGENCETRAINING '" 19 CareerProgressionto Enhance SkillDevelopment '" 20 TargetDemographic to ReceiveIntelligenceTraining 21 CONCLUSIONS 22 APPENDIX A-THREEPRIMARYPILLARS OFTHEDEFENSESTRATEGy 24 APPENDIXB- SIXPOSSIBLEINDICATORS OFLEGITIMACy 25 APPENDIX C-PRIMARY SUPPORTINGTASKS FORIRREGULAR WARFARE 26 iv APPENDIXD- RELATIONSHIP BETWEENIW, SSTR, AND MCO 28 APPENDIXE- ARC OFINSTABILITy 29 APPENDIXF- INTELLIGENCEMOS DESIGNATIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 30 APPENDIXG- RESIDENT LANGUAGEPROGRAMS OFFERED ATDLI. 33 APPENDIXH- DLPTSKILLLEVELDESCRIPTIONS 37 APPENDIX1- CENSUS FORMEXAMPLE '" 39 APPENDIXJ-EQUIPPINGTHEFORCEFORIW .40 APPENDIX K- HARNESSING OPEN SOURCEINTELLIGENCE. .43 ACRONYMS 46 GLOSSARY ~ 48 ENDNOTES 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY 57 v PREFACE The dramatic challenges ofapost 9/11 worldhave radicallyincreased the needfor timely and accurateintelligence in orderto achieve success ontoday's battlefield. While assignedto the National SecurityAgency and IMarineExpeditionaryForce (MEF) ordeployed to Afghanistan andIraq, I frequently observedspectacularindividual performances that satisfied these amplifiedintelligence demands. However, I observed one significantproblem: those individuals fulfilling complex intelligence demands couldrarely attributethese skills to aresult ofthorough preparationbytheintelligence ormilitary supporting establishmentpriorto the individual's deployment. Thus, in OperationEnduringFreedom andOperation IraqiFreedom success hingedonthe abilities ofindividuals versus institutionalprocesses. Overthe course of· the last seven years the intelligence communityhas failed to sufficientlyrebuild ortransformits training, doctrine, andorganizationto supportthe current andfuture demands ofirregular warfare (IW). Transformation while embroiledin multiple conflicts is tremendously difficult, f butitis absolutelyessential to shift success from individualperformanceto institutional excellence. The goal ofthis paperis to identify areas where the Mmine Corps can improveits intelligence capabilitiesin orderto be preparedto face the current andfuture IWthreats. Although there are numerous positive initiatives currentlyin place andmore being established, my researchfocus was designed to identify where Marine Corps intelligence is still deficientin relation to IW. Research andconclusions are also predominately orientedtowards the active duty component although some topics have Marine Corps reserve implications. Theinformation residentinthis paperis currentthrough the winter of2007-08. Therefore, certain deficiencies vi andrecommendations may eitherberecognizedor alreadybeinginstitutedwithin theMarine Corps intelligence community. Whilemaking theserecommendations, I am very cognizantofthe need to maintain a capabilityto support aconventional force thatcan ensure the vitalinterests ofthe nation. Some oftheserecommendations are minor adjustments to the current system, butothers will be contentious and significantly deviate from the currentmethodology. Whether we can achieve themquickly or overalengthyperiodoftime, the goal mustbe to ensure we can fight and win both conventional andirregularconflicts with the most effectiveness possible. I amextremely grateful to the Marines and civilians who helpedme gatherreference material, as well as providedme opportunities to interview themin theirvarious areas of expertise. Inparticular1'dlike to thank Col JayBruder, LtColMikeLindemann, Maj Mike Challgren, Maj AndyWeis, CaptRuss Harris, andMSgtTawniaConverse from Headquarters Marine Corps; Maj HenryBlackshearfrom Marine Corps Systems Command; LtColFredEgerer from Marine Corps IntelligenceSchools; andMr. SteveFosterfrom theMarine Corps IntelligenceActivity. Theseindividuals went out oftheir way to providenie doctrinal references, pointpapers, andpersonal opinions which helpedto influence rriy conclusions. Imust also recognize the contributions ofDr. DonaldF. Bittner, LtCol James Herrera, andMaj Randy Pughintransforming my concepts into acoherent and administratively complete document. Thelast person I wouldlike to recognizeis my wife, NoraPencola. Absent her organizational competenceto tie thoughts togetherand sequenceideas, this paperwouldnever have madeitto print. In addition, herpatience and supportneverwavered despite quite afew longnights committedto theresearch andconclusions associated with this paper. vii INTRODUCTION Inthepost-September 11 world, irregularwarlare has emerged as the dominant form ofwarlare confrontingtheUnitedStates, its allies and its partners; accordingly, guidancemust accountfor distributed, long-duration operations, includingunconventional warlare, foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, andstabilization andreconstruction operations.1Quadrennial DefenseReview (2006) The operational environmentthe Marine Corps will face inthefirst halfofthe 21st centuryis significantly different than that ofprevious decades. The longstandingobjectives to defendthe homeland and conductconventional campaigns abroadnow include athird objective: To "[p]revailinthe Waron Terror andConducth-regularOperations.,,2 Thesenational defense pillars andtheirrelationship with one anotherare outlinedinAppendix A. Achievingthese national defense objectives will require a shift from the time-honoredrole ofthe Marinerifleman to "locate, close with anddestroy the enemythrough fire andmaneuver," to a host ofmissions not militaryinnature. At the heart ofthis changeis the necessity to conductirregularwarlare (IW). The primaryobjective ofIWinvolves achievingpopular support ofthe people and denying itto the adversary.3 Although the Marine Corps intelligence community4has experiencedsignificantsuccess inIW wagedin both Afghanistan and Iraq, this success is more attributableto individualperformancethan doctrine, training, and organizational techniques designedto operate in such environments. The epicenterofIWencompasses the concept ofwaging a warofideas to garnerpopular support andcreate orderratherthan simplykilling orcapturing an enemy. Popularsupport is necessary to establishlegitimacyfor friendly forces andthe government ornon-state actorbeing supported. FM3-24identifies six criteriato assess whatconstitutes legitimacyin relation to the 5 specific conflict andthese are listedinAppendix B. Gaining control andestablishing legitimacy with thepopulation cannotbe achieved solelythrough the application ofmilitary 1 power. It also requires abreadth ofskills traditionallynotrequiredto conductMajor Combat 1 Operations (MCO). To defeat these threats the Marine Corps must prepareitselfto playa I supportingrole to interagency organizationsbetter organizedto deliverthe otherinstruments of national power. The 2006 QDR stated"althoughmany U.S. Government organizations possess knowledge and skills neededto peIiormtasks critical to complex operations, they are often not charteredorresourcedto maintain deployable capabilities,,,6 thus potentiallyrequiring the Marine Corps to act as aproxyon behalfofother government agencies. In orderto prepare for these new challenges, Marine Corps intelligence must adapt to satisfyintelligenceneeds forboth these otherelements ofnational powerin parallel with military demands. In light ofthese adaptations, athree-foldapproachis required: language and cultural competencies must expand, I collection and analysis methodologies mustbemodified, andregional training centers with, modulartraining solutions designedto caterto specific conflictrequirements mustbe established. CHARACTERIZINGTHE IRREGULARWARFARE ENVIORNMENT Definingthe IW Threat IrregularWmare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state andnon...;state actors for legitimacy andinfluence overthe relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetlic approaches, though itmay employthefull range of military and othercapabilities, in orderto erode an adversary's power, influence, andwill. Itis inherently aprotractedstruggle that will testthe resolve ofour nation and ourstrategicpartners.? -Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept The geopoliticalrelationships ofthe 21stcentury are moreinterwoven than everbefore. Global trade, access to information, and advancements in technologyhas createdconditions in ) whichregional instabilityhas far-reaching effects. Instability due to telTorism, civil war, rampantcrime, COlTUpt governments, failed states, weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) proliferation, ornaturaldisasters canhave global effects that WalTant arange ofresponses by the 2