DTIC ADA490412: Preemptive Strike Policy of the U.S.: An Argument for Adjustment to the National Security Strategy

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TITLE: PREEMPTIVESTRIKEPOLICY OFTHEU.S.: ANARGUMENTFOR
ADmSTMENTTO THE NATIONAL SECURITYSTRATEGY
SUBMITTED INPARTIALFULFILLMENT
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MASTER OFMILITARYSTUDIES
MAJORLEEA. CRACKNELL, USMC
AY07-08
er: Dr. CharlesD. McKenna
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Preemptive Strike Policy of the U.S.: An Argument for Adjustment to the
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National Security Strategy
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ExecutiveSummary
Title: PreemptiveStrikePolicy oftheU.S.: An Argumentfor Adjustment to the National
SecurityStrategy
Author: MajorLeeA. Cracknell, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: As rogue nations andnon-state actors like Al Qaeda andHezbollah present
difficultchallenges for future administrations charged with the defense ofAmerican
interests, the UnitedStates mustrevise its preemptive strikepolicyin orderto retainits
legitimacy while allowingfor unquestionable application ofmilitaryforce.
Discussion: History has shown thatnations who have chosen to launch preemptive
strikes in the face ofimminent attackhave turnednumerical ortechnicalinferiorities into
victory. However, the recentpolicyfailure leadingto the invasion ofIraq has led to
questions about the legitimacy ofthe preemptive strike policy outlinedin the United
States National SecurityStrategies of2002 and 2006.
In orderto maintainlegitimacy ofthe policy, the National S'ecurityStrategy (NSS) should
berevisedto advertise the intentions moreclearly. Threerecommendations are proposed
to adjust the NSS toreflect areality more befitting today's political climate. First, the
UnitedStates shouldjustify anyfuture preemptive attacks by clearly defining the present
danger, establishingproportionality oftheresponse, and gainingthe consent ofthe
international community. Second, the United States shouldconsiderpreemptive actions
againstspecific targets versus launching acostly andpotentiallyprolongedpreemptive
war against a nation. Finally, the United States cannot afford to launch unilateral actions
againstfuture threats. Itmust strive to earninternationalrecognition for a preemptive
attackin orderto buildtheframework for potential coalition participation.
The UnitedStates faces many emergingthreats to global stability. Ifthe UnitedStates
launches apreemptive attackto neutralize specific threats, itmustensurethat the
legitimacy ofsuch attacks isjustifiedto the international community. Two examples
providecontrasting examples ofjustifiedandunjustified attacks: the Israeli preemptive
attackon the Arab armies priorto the Six-DayWarof 1967, andthe UnitedStates
preventive attackonIraq in 2003.
Conclusion: The National SecurityStrategy ofthe United States presents aclear
definition ofAmerica's intentions, and sends a strict warning to its adversaries. However,
in orderto maintaininternational supportfor such actions inthe future, the NSS must
clarifythe criteriafor launching apreemptive attack. Ourinternational alliances are too
importantto lose; the UnitedStates cannot afford to launch unilateral actions against the
threats thatfuture administrations mayface in thefuture. The current draft ofthe NSS
does notclearly define these intentions, so itneeds to be revisedin orderto provide
assurance to our global partners that we only attack when we orour allies are directly
threatenedby an adversary.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
lliTRODUCTION 1
PREEMPTIVEACTION 1
APOLICY OFPREEMPTIVE ACTION 4
SHORTFALLS OFTHENSS 6
RECO~~ED CHANCJE4tl 8
RECO~~ED CHANCJE4t2 9
RECO~~EDCHANCJE4t3 10
PREEMPTIVEATTACKCASESTUDY: SIX-DAYWAR OF 1967 ' 11
PREEMPTIVEATTACKCASESTUDY: OPERATIONIRAQIFREEDOM.... 13
APPLICATIONTOFUTURETHREATS 15
CONCLUSION : 20
E~NOTES 21
BIBLIOCJRAPHY...... . 25
INTRODUCTION
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In September2002, President GeorgeW. Bushissued a stern warning towards the
enemies ofthe United States, particularlytowards terrorists and therogue nations that
supportthem, in theNational SecurityStrategy (NSS). He outlined astrategy which
would allow the UnitedStates to strikebefore an adversary had a chance to attackfirst.
This policyofpreemptionincludedthe notion thatconventional threats were not the only
targets ofthis strategy. The definition of"imminentthreat" hadbeen adapted to include
unconventional threats, such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, andHamas.! However, the
application ofthis new strategyinIraqinMarch 2003 producedunfavorable results,
highlighting the needto make significantchanges to this strategy. Preemption as aform
ofself-defense)s legal; internationallaw favors the use offorce when faced with an
imminent attack? Justifying these actions intheinternational arenais another matter. As
rogue nations and non-state actors present difficult challenges for future administrations
chargedwith the defense ofAmericaninterests, the United States mustrevise its
preemptive strikepolicyin orderto retainits legitimacywhile allowingfor
unquestionable application ofmilitaryforce.
PREEMPTIVEACTION
Preemptive action has always been analogous to self-defense. Throughouthistory,
many countries havefavored preemptivemilitary action to gain an advantage before an
impending conflict. TheRomans viewed preemptive attack as ameans ofdefendingits
empire, andinvokedthis form ofself-defense quite aggressively? Rome's destruction of
Carthage during theThirdPunic Wars is aclassic example ofthe Roman execution of
preemptive war.4 The Japanese navy conducted apreemptive attackonthe gathering
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Russian fleet atPortArthur onFebruary 8, 1904,justfourhours before a formal
declaration ofwar was issued. This action gave the Japanese asignificant advantage that
ultimatelyledto aJapanese victoryduring the Russo-Japanese War.5 Anotherclassic
example ofpreemptive warfareis the Israeli attackonthe Arab armies to beginthe Six
DayWar of 1967. Egypthad an'ayed asignificant force ofbombers that could strike at
Israel's military andindustrial centers, as well as an army ofover 100,000 ground troops
within the Sinai Peninsula. Israel launched apreemptive, coordinated air and ground
strike to disable Egypt's airforce and surprise the Egyptiantroops on the Sinai before
they had a chanceto attackIsrael. Israel gainedthe advantage, and the Arab armies never
recoveredfrom this earlyloss ofmomentum.6 As historyhas shown, the nation that
chooses to launch thefirst strike can tum anumerical ortechnical inferiority into victory.
First strike attacks fall into two distinctcategories: preventive andpreemptive.
Preventive attacks are those attacks launchedto counter an adversary's growing
superiority. Such attacks are meant to counter a threat beforethey leadto an
insurmountable advantage. Preventive attacks are motivatedbythe drive to fight sooner
rather than laterin orderto counteraperceivedor growingimbalance that mightfavor an
adversary's offensive or defensive capabilities, andnot necessarily to counter an
imminent attack.? Thesetypes ofattacks generate considerable controversy in that
militaryforce is usedbefore an imminentthreatis present, which canleadto questions
about the legitimacyofthe operation(s).
Aprominentexample ofapreventive attack was the Japanese aerial attackonPearl
HarborinDecember 1941. Although the United States was notpreparing for an attack
againstJapan, the Japanese naval fleet launchedits infamous surprise attackto disable the
3
u.s. PacificFleet atPearlHarborin orderto reduceits ability to respond to Japanese
hostile actions throughout Asia.8 Amelican naval power at the timeposed a credible
threat to Japanese expansionplans, butthe attack was launched before the United States
hadconceived anyintentions ofgoing to war with Japan.
In contrast, apreemptive attackis launchedwhen thereis direct evidence ofan
impending attack. This type ofactionis motivatedbythe desire to strike an adversary
who has shown clear signs ofattacking. Bylaunching apreemptive attack, the beliefis
thatthefirst strike wouldoffset an adversary's capacityto gain the momentumin any
pendingbattle. This point was illustratedin the aforementioned examples ofpreemptive
actions throughout history. The UnitedNations (UN) charter, which defines the right to
national self-defensein Article 51 ofChapterVII, typicallyfavors preemptive actionover
preventive action, as do intemationallaws regarding the use offorce.9 Justifying a
preemptive actionis not difficult, ifthe actions are applied correctlyin accordance with
the principles ofself-defense.
Is preemptive actionlegitimate? Thereis no clear answer. When preemptive actionis
launchedinthe true contextofself-defense andjustifiedto the worldaudience, then there
maybeless argument aboutits legitimacy. Often amisinterpretation ofself-defenseis
whatleads nations to trouble when executingthis type ofaction. According to J. E.
Fawcettin theDigestofInternationalLaw, three elements constitute the framework
necessary to declare self-defense for the purpose ofinvoking Article 51 ofthe UN
Charter: present danger, proportionality, and consent. Present dangerrefers to the
unequivocal intention ofan adversary to attack. Proportionalityrefers to the limitations
oftime andforce necessary to remove onlytheimminentthreat. Consentpertains to
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conformity oftreaty arrangements andlaws previouslyestablished. When preemptive
actionis considered and these three elements are factored into the decision-making
process, justificationfor the action is likelyto face less opposition on the international
arena.
A POLICY OFPREEMPTIVE ACTION
TheUnitedStates National SecurityStrategyof2002 presented an interesting shiftin
strategic thought. Everypresidential administration sincethe close ofWorldWarIThas
adopted apolicy ofdeterrence as the core ofits security strategy, primarilyto deter
Soviet attempts to extendits spheres ofinfluence around the world. However, with the
collapse ofthe SovietUnionin 1991 and the emergence ofanew, transnational threat
that becamemore visible afterSeptember 11, 2001, this strategyinevitably needed to
adaptto deal with this emerging securityrisk.11 PresidentGeorge W. Bush andhis staff
recognizedthe fact thatthis new, unconventional adversary couldnotbe containedby
traditional methods, so heintroducedthe concept ofpreemptivewarfare as a stern
warning to anypotential enemies ofthe UnitedStates.12 PresidentBush contends)inthe
NSS that the "UnitedStates has long maintainedthe option ofpreemptive actions to
counter asufficient threat to ournational security.,,13 Although this concept has always
beenimplied as asubset ofself-defense, the shiftin strategycameinthe direct statement
ofanintention to use preemptiveforce to attack a threat.14
TherevisedNSS ofMarch 2006 outlines the same "firststIike" policy, butwith a
reducedtone. Thenew message points outthat "taking action neednotinvolvemilitary
force", which indicates thatnon-kinetic measures will also be used to mitigate terrorist
activity. The threat ofpreemptive attackis aimed directly atrogue nations andterrorists
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who possess the capability ofusing weapons ofmass destruction (WlVIDs). However,
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PresidentBushinseIted a clausein the preemptive attack strategythatis certain to cause
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controversyin anyfuture attacks. He states that "underlong-standing principles ofself
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defense, we do notrule outthe use offorce before attacks occur, even ifuncertainty
remains as to the time andplace ofthe enemy's attack."IS By definition, a preemptive
attackis validifanimminentthreatis anticipated. However, ifthereis uncertainty about
the time andplace ofsuch an attack, then the attackbecomes more preventive in nature
than preemptive. Many Americans undoubtedly will align themselves with a defense
policythatprotects themfrom enemy attack, butwill they be willingto accept apolicy
that allows the United States to attackjust on the notion that an enemy attackmight
appearlikely? This creates tremendous implications for the UnitedStates, and any
preemptive attackconductedonthis basis mightcauseconsiderable damage tothe
reputation ofthe United States.
TherevisedNSS of2006 does outlinenon~kinetic means to counterthese
unconventional threats, in addition to the option ofpreemptive action. Thesemeans are
encouraging, as theyencompass all the instruments ofnational power, andnotjust the
military arm. Thesemeans can also "soften" theregion in which an unconventional
threat operates beforepreemptivemilitary action vyouldberequired. First, the Bush
administration has championedthe cause ofdemocracy throughout the world. Byplacing
powerin the hands ofthe people andencouraging elected governments to protectbasic
humanrights, maintain orderwithin their sovereignborders, andlimitthe reach oftheir
governmentpower, an areashouldbecomeless proneto harboring telTorists. TheUnited
States will employits vastdiplomatic, economic, andpoliticalresources, as well as its