Table Of Content

Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics MARTIN L. COOK “Let’sseewhowe’vegotheretonight.GeneralMoseley,AirForceChiefof Staff.GeneralPeterPace,ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff.Theystill supportRumsfeld.Right,youguysaren’tretiredyet,right?Right,theystill supportRumsfeld.Look,bytheway,I’vegotatheoryabouthowtohandle theseretiredgeneralscausingallthistrouble:don’tletthemretire!Come on,we’vegotastop-lossprogram;let’suseitontheseguys.” –ComedianStephenColbert 2006WhiteHouseCorrespondents’Dinner T hefactthatajokelikethatcouldbetoldinfrontofanaudienceincluding the President, Chairman of the JointChiefsof Staff, Air Force Chiefof Staff,and manyotherWashingtondignitariesspokevolumesforthestateof relations between senior military leaders and their civilian superiors. For thoserecentlyretiredgeneralofficerswhochosetogopublicwiththeircriti- cismsofthen-SecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeld(andbyimplicationthe Iraq policy), clearly the situation had reached a point where they felt it was partoftheirobligationtotheprofessionofarmsandtheAmericanpeopleto dissent.Suchintensecriticismfrommilitaryofficerswhopreviouslyheldpo- sitionsofgreatresponsibilityinimplementingtheAdministration’spolicies issomethingrarelyseeninAmericanhistory.Thisarticlewillattempttoas- sesstheethicalconsiderationsthatbearonofficerscontemplatingsuchaction in any future civil-military crisis. Military Professionalism Thequestionofthenatureofmilitaryprofessionalismandthedistinc- tive demandsofprofessionalobligations hasreceivedconsiderableanalysisin recentyears.Byfarthegreatestcontributiontothisdiscussionhasbeenfromthe 4 Parameters Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army War College,122 Forbes Avenue ,Carlisle,PA,17013-5238 REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 2008, Vol 38, No. 1 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 12 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Army,centeredontheArmyProfessionalismprojectatWestPointwhichculmi- natedinthepublicationofTheFutureoftheArmyProfession.1Theimpetusfor thatprojectandaseriesofrelatedarticleswasafearthatArmyofficerswerelos- ing a sense of their profession and itsobligations and risked becoming, in the wordsofDr.DonSnider,theprojectdirector,“amerelyobedientbureaucracy.” Inthefaceofthatperceivedrisk,Snider(andthemanyotherauthors ontheproject)calledforarenewedsenseofthedistinctivefeaturesofapro- fession,includingcommitmenttoabodyofabstractknowledgethatthepro- fession is obligated to apply and improve. That knowledge, the authors argued,constitutestheuniqueexpertiseoftheprofessionandcommitmentto it, the touchstone of intellectual independence required of the profession. An implication of that line of reasoning was that the profession’s membershaveanethicalobligationtoapplyexistingprofessionalknowledge to the highest degree possible when confronted with operational challenges, whilemaintaininganabilitytoadaptthatknowledgetonovelrequirementsand operationaldemands.Becausetheproject’sanalysisislinkedtotheparticular theoryofprofessionsdevelopedbyAndrewAbbott,whoviewsprofessionsas engageddiachronicallyinastruggleforprofessional“jurisdiction,”thisaspect of the analysis highlighted the need for any profession to “adapt or die” as it evolvesincompetitionwithotherclaimantsontheexpertiserelevanttoitsown historical areaof expertise.2 Ontheothersideofthisdebate,therewasaperceptionintheadminis- trationofPresidentClintonthatagooddealofthemilitarydisrespectedthePres- identpersonallyanddisapprovedofhisusesofmilitaryforce,especiallyinthe Balkans. Such interventions placed the military in arole that many within the professionconsideredinappropriateforamilitaryfocusedon“fightingandwin- ningAmerica’swars”(whatthen-ArmyChiefofStaffGeneralEricShinsekire- ferredtoas“theArmy’snon-negotiablecontractwiththeAmericanpeople”). Itwasinthatenvironmentthatanumberofwriterspennedcautions that the essential subordination of the military to civilian leadership was in question.Themostcomprehensiveandstridentoftheseanalyseswerethose ofThomasRicksinhisnovelASoldier’sDuty,whichimaginedthemilitary’s deliberate evasion of orders from its military superiors, and of Professor RichardH. Kohn at the University ofNorth Carolina.3 Dr.MartinL.CookisProfessorofPhilosophyandDeputyDepartmentHeadatthe USAirForceAcademy.HehaspreviouslytaughtattheUSArmyWarCollege,Santa ClaraUniversity,theCollegeofWilliamandMary,GustavusAdolphusCollege,andSt. John’sCollege.Heholdsmaster’sanddoctoraldegreesfromtheUniversityofChicago andabachelor’sdegreefromtheUniversityofIllinois. Spring2008 5 Morerecently,anumberofvoiceshavebeenraisedarguingthatpro- fessionalmilitaryadvicewasnotheededbytheBushAdministration’scivil- ianleadership.4Theconcernwasvirtuallytheoppositeofthatvoicedduring theClintonyears.Insteadofchoosinginsubordination,theclaimwasthatby deferring to the strongly held convictions regarding novel ways of war- fighting on the part of Secretary Rumsfeld and others in the hierarchy, the military’sleadershipacceptedwarplansandtroopnumbersatvariancewith their best professionaljudgment.5 Itwasinthiscontextthatseveralauthorsarguedthattheprocessofcon- gressionaloversightofmilitaryaffairswasbadlybroken,fortworeasons:Con- gresshadlargelyabdicateditsresponsibilityinrecentyears,andthecultureof theofficercorpshadevolvedanexcessivesenseofobligationtotheExecutive branchofgovernment,therebyneglectingtheequalifnotgreaterresponsibility togiveforthrightandhonestmilitaryassessmentstoCongress.6That,theseau- thorsargued,wasavenueinwhichitwaspartofaseniorofficer’sprofessional obligationtogivehisorherunvarnishedprofessionalopiniontocongressional membersandhearings. For nearly a decade, H. R. McMaster’s book Dereliction of Duty hasdeeply informed the ethosand self-understanding of theofficercorps.7 McMaster’sdemonstration of the complicity of theJoint Chiefsof Staff in the formulation and continuance of misguided policies in Vietnam has servedasacautionarytaleinmanythoughtfulofficers’minds.Accordingto General Anthony Zinni, former commander of US Central Command, “[then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General Hugh Shelton sent copies of McMaster’sbook to everyfour-star general in the US military. Themessagetous,afterweheardthisfromHughShelton,isthatwillneverhap- penhere.AndthemessagetousfromSecretary[WilliamS.]Cohenatthattime, too,isthatthedoorisalwaysopen,andyourobligationtotheCongress,whichis an obligation to the American people to tell them what you think, still stands strong.Andthat’stheexpectationthatwehave.Theydidnoteverwanttohear thatwehadaproblem,somethingstickinginourcraw,thatwedidn’tbringupto them,thatwedidn’thonestlyexpressifwefeltithadtobeexpressed.8 AsRichardKohnsummarizedthe“lessonlearned”fromMcMaster’s analysis,“TherewasadeepbitternessoverVietnamandthewaythe[service] chiefshadbeenco-opted....[Armyofficers]said,‘We’renevergoingtoputup withthisagain,we’renotgoingtobeputinthatpositionagainbycivilians.’”9 Anewdimensiontothisdebateemergedtwoyearsagowiththepublic criticismofAdministrationpolicyandofSecretaryRumsfeldinparticularbya numberofrecentlyretiredflagofficers.Inalmosteverycasetheseofficershad beenintheinnercircleofpolicyformationorexecutionoftheAdministration.10 6 Parameters This level of public criticism and dissent from such a large number of highly placed military leaders immediately following their service is without prece- dent. Never in American history have so many senior military leaders, appar- entlydevoidofpartisanpoliticalmotive,felttheneedorobligationtospeakout publiclyregardingpolicy andleadership duringanongoingconflict. Thenoveltyofthiseventinthemidstoftheextendeddebateaboutthe obligationsandnatureofmilitaryprofessionalismcriesoutfornormativeanaly- sis.Issuchcriticism,atleastonsomeunderstandingsofthecircumstancesand motivesofthecritics,indeedamanifestationofthehigheststandardsofmilitary professionalism?Orisit,onthecontrary,akindofreprehensibleandunprofes- sionalinsubordinationto dulyelectedpoliticalleadersandtheirappointees?11 It is important to set aside a number of potentially distracting related questionsbeforelaunchingintoanormativeanalysisofthisissue.First,thereis noquestionwhatsoeverofthelegalrightdefactoofsuchofficerstosayanything theywish.12Defactobecause,asRichardSwainhasrecentlyargued,retiredoffi- cers, since they are still technically part of the military and receiving military pay,mightarguablybeboundbyexactlythesamerulesasservingofficers.But therehasneverbeenanyinclinationtotakethatviewofthematterfromthelegal community.Asretiredofficers,theyregainfullFirstAmendmentlibertiesthat are necessarily somewhat curtailed while they are in uniform. Second, retired flagofficersusingtheirmoralandpoliticalweighttoattempttoinfluencepoliti- calmattershavealreadybecomearoutineevent.Everypresidentialcandidatein recentyearshasorganizedretiredseniorofficerstoofferendorsements.Surely, onemight argue,ifitisacceptableforretired officerstousetheirstatusin this wayforgeneralizedpartisanpoliticalendorsement,itshouldbeordersofmagni- tudemore appropriateforthemtooffercriticismsofpoliticalleadersandpoli- ciesnarrowlyfocusedon areasoftheirspecificmilitary expertise.13 Many observers have roundly criticized those retired officers on a number of counts. Dr. Don Snider, in an unpublished talk at West Point, argued that such criticism undermines the confidence of young officers, who mightthink“DidhereallyfeelthiswaywhenIwasfightingforhiminOpera- tion Iraqi Freedom, and if he did why did he not resign right then?”14 Evenmorescathingly,Dr.SnidercitedSamuelHuntington’sclassic statement that military people should stay out of political matters entirely, andassertedthattherevoltofthegenerals“...caststheArmyprofession,and itscurrentstrategicleadership(tootimidtospeakoutlikeus)inaverynega- tivelight.”15Inthisassessment,theretiredgeneralofficercriticsarecrossing a line demarcating political judgment from proper military expertise that ought, in Snider’s assessment, to be asharp and clear distinction. Lastly, before turning to a normative analysis of the problem, it is importanttoacknowledgeandthentrytosetasidethespecificpoliticaljudg- Spring2008 7 mentsregardingthewarinIraq.NowthattheUnitedStatesisfiveyearsinto it,clearlyalmostalltheassumptionsonwhichitwasbased(bothintermsof thejustifyingcausesandthepredictionsofhowitwouldplayout)havebeen shown to be incorrect, leaving to future historians the task of determining whatproportionswerearesultofself-delusion,duplicity,orhonestmistakes. Others,ofcourse,haveandwilljudgethesemattersdifferently.While itisimportanttoacknowledgethatthesejudgmentsandthefeelingssurrounding them aredeeply divisive to Americansociety, thepurpose of thisarticleis not criticismordefenseofspecificjudgments.Rather,thetaskathandistotry,even in the midst of political passions, to extend the normative thinking regarding militaryprofessionalismthathasbeenso helpfullyadvancedinrecent years. Toward a Normative Analysis Onewaytotrytoapproachaprobleminprincipleistoframeitasa hypothetical situation. It is important, of course, that the hypothetical be plausible in real-world terms and further, since this discussion arises from specificevents,thatitbeatleastonepossibleinterpretationofthoseevents. On the other hand, theadvantage ofthe hypothetical framing of the issue is thatitallowsustostatetheissueasamatterofin-principletermsratherthan be bogged down withevery detail ofspecific personalities and events. Supposeyou’reageneralofficerwhohasgivenfrequentandrepeated advicetopoliticalleadershipregardingthemilitaryfeasibilityofoperationaland strategicgoals.Supposeyouradviceisfirmthatthegoalssoughtcannotbeat- tainedbythemilitarymeansthecivilianleadersarewillingtocommit,ornotat- tainable(inyourjudgment)bymilitarymeansatall.Ofcourse,onecandeploy forcesinpursuitofthosegoals.It’sjustthat,inyouropinion,alleffortswillbe expendedinafutileend.Inparticular,youradviceaboutthesizeandcomposi- tionoftheforcerequiredtohaveanyhopeofachievingthestatedgoalsiscom- pletelydisregardedinfavorofanemploymentyoubelieveisdoomed tofail. Onceitbecameclearthatthepoliticalleadershipthoughtotherwise, yousalutedsmartlyanddidyourbesttocarryouttheadministration’sbidding. Now,youfindyourselfacoupleofyearsintothatdeploymentandhavingase- vere case of “I told you so.” You believe even morestrongly nowthen when you gavetheadvice atthe beginning,that yourinitial opinionswere correct. Attheoutset,youtoldyourself,“Icouldbemistaken,”and“Perhaps thepoliticalleadershipknowssomethingIdon’tknow.”Bynowit’sapparent you were initially correct and the political leadership did not in fact know anything that would have changed your judgment. So in your judgment the continuance of current policy will never achievepoliticalgoalsandwillresultincontinuallymountingcasualtiesand degradationofyourservice’sequipment,readiness,etc.Furthermore,you’re 8 Parameters aware that there are other threatsthat, because you’re deployed onthis one, youcouldn’tpossiblyfindtheresourcestodealwithmilitarilyifyouhadto. In such a circumstance, what do you do? Are you exactly where McMasterputtheJointChiefsofStaffinVietnam?Whatareyouroptions?You cancontinuetogoalong,diggingdeeperintowhatyouconsideranimpossible situation.Youcan’tovertlycriticizepolicyinuniformexcept,perhaps,byus- ingyourcongressionaltestimonyopportunitiestogiveyourunvarnishedopin- ions.Needlesstosay,iftheissueatstakeisameregarden-varietydisagreement regarding policy, no deep moral dilemma is involved. But if the policy is, in your carefully examined opinion, over a matter of extreme importance and threatenssignificantandlong-termcoststothemilitary,nationalinterest,and health of thebody politic, a genuinedilemma arises. If you retire, might it not in fact be part of your continuing profes- sionalobligationandyourresponsibilitytoyourfriendsandtroopsstillserv- ingtotrytoextricatethemfromthissituation?Mightitnotalsobeimportant forthefuturecredibilityofthemilitaryanditsleadershiptoshowindepend- ent professional judgment in such a situation rather than appear to be going along,only to havethehistoriansdocument thatthemilitaryleadership was yet again complicit concerning the realities it faced? These are difficult questions. Furthermore, one is rightly hesitant to makeanargumentthatinsubordinationisthecorrectchoice,becausetheriskis large that doing so willbe construed as permission for military leadersto rou- tinelyandpubliclydissentfromthepoliciesofelectedpoliticalleaders.Soifone istomakeacaseforpublicdissentofanysort,ithastobehedgedwithqualifiers and cautions. Any suchargument pertains only to the most extremesituations where,intheconscientiousjudgmentoftheseniorleader,whatisatstakeisthe fundamentalsecurityoftheUnitedStatesandtheconstitutionalprocesses. Aswasmentionedearlier,atoneextremeofthedebateistheposition articulatedbyRichardSwain.Swainarguesstrongly(andciteslaw)tomakethe pointthatretiredofficersareineverysensestillmembersofthearmedforces.He correctlypointsoutthattheyaresubjecttorecalltoactiveduty,takepayasretir- ees,andstillholdcommissions.Therefore,hearguestheyaresubjecttoexactly thesamerestrictionsasactive-dutypersonnel.Swainwrites: [I]tisatleastafalsepropositionthatuponretirementofficersreverttofullci- vilianstatusinsofarastheobligationstheyundertookattheircommissioning. Retirementisnotresignation.Itisamatteroffact,notinterpretation,thatre- tired officersremainmembersofthearmed forcesby law andregulation.... [U]nlesslikeGeorgeWashingtontheylaydowntheircommissionsbyresigna- tion,itisreasonabletoassumethattheyremainatleastethicallyobligedtoob- serve the limitationsimposed bycommissioned service,acceptedby the oath they made and commissiontheystillhold.16 Spring2008 9 WhileSwainmakesastronglegalcase,actualpracticeclearlytoler- atesmuchwiderlatitudeinconductbyretiredofficersthanthestandardhear- ticulates.Further,properlyused,theexpertiseofretiredofficerswhoarefreer to speakon policy than they were in uniform appears on balancea valuable national resource for informing public debate regarding those policies. De- prived of such input, the nation would have only the government’s position andthecomparativelynon-expertopinionofnonmilitarycommentators.Any attempttomakeSwain’sstandardtherealitywouldalmostcertainlybeused selectivelybyciviliansuperiorseagertosilenceretired-officercritics,while encouraging their supporters to continue as advocates. At the other extreme isthe view derived from someinterpretations ofMcMaster’sbook.Inthatview,seniorleaderswhohavestrongdissenting perspectivesfromanadministration’spolicyhaveanobligationtospeakout orresigninprotest.Determinednoteveragaintobethemoralequivalentsto President Lyndon Johnson’s “five silent men” (as the JCS were called), de- fendersof thisviewhark backtoGeneralHaroldK.Johnson’sretrospective reflections on his ownsilence: IrememberthedayIwasreadytogoovertotheOvalOfficeandgivemyfour stars tothe President and tell him, “You haverefused totellthe country they cannotfightawarwithoutmobilization;youhaverequiredmetosendmeninto battle withlittle hopeof their ultimate victory; andyouhaveforced usin the militarytoviolatealmosteveryoneoftheprinciplesofwarinVietnam.There- fore,IresignandwillholdapressconferenceafterIwalkoutofyourdoor.”17 Of course neither General Johnson nor any other senior leader did anysuchthingduringtheVietnamconflict.Formanyreaders,thelessonthey atleastthinktheylearnfromMcMasteristhat,shouldequivalenteventsoc- cur on their watch, they should be prepared to submit their resignations. Chairman Shelton’s comments, quoted from General Zinni previously, cer- tainlyseemtoimplyareadinessonhisparttotakepreciselythatcourseofac- tion, should the occasion have arisen. RetiredNavychaplain(Captain)GeorgeM.CliffordIIIattemptsto providethe kind of fine-grained ethical analysis this particular situation re- quires.He distinguishes four categories of issues which might raise the dissent issue in increasing levels of severity:  An assigned responsibility the officer can perform with minimal moral discomfort. Anassignedresponsibilitytheofficercanperformonlywithsub- stantialmoral discomfort. Anassignedresponsibilitytheofficercanperformonlyatthecost of significantly compromising his orher moral standards. 10 Parameters  An assigned responsibility the officer cannot perform.18 Theeasycases(atleasttheoretically)arethefirstandlastcategories. Thefirstiseasybecausetheofficer’sobjectionisnotmorallysignificant;the lastiseasybecauseitrisestothecategoryof“illegal orders”which officers are expected to disobey.19 Thedifficultcategoriesarethesecondandthird.Obviously,thereis no way to sharply demarcate between these categories, and individual offi- cerswilldrawthelineintheirownlivesandconductdifferently.AsClifford writes, “No officer, of any grade, who has a strong sense of morality will likelyserveforverylongwithoutbeingassignedaresponsibilitytowhichhe orshemorallyobjects.Yetunlessthesituationinvolvesgraveconsequences forothersorthenation,thenationrightlyexpectsmilitaryofficerstodotheir duty”—i.e.,obey.20Inotherwords,ifthemoraldifficultyremainsinthe“cat- egorytwo”levelforgivenofficers,theyshouldsubordinatetheirownmoral judgment to the necessities of obedience and goodorder. The dilemmaposed bythe third category cannot beso blithely dis- missed. While there is no bright line indicating when an issue is moving to thislevelofdiscomfort,asCliffordnotes,itdealsmostlywith“thedegreeand amountofharmorotherevilcausedbycomplyingwithanassignedresponsi- bility.”21Minimally,anofficerconfrontingaveryhighdegreeofharmwhich heorsheperceivestobetheconsequenceofapolicyfromwhichtheofficer strongly dissents has the obligation to make every effort to be heard. Of course,anofficerowesloyaltytociviliansuperiors,butthereareothercom- petingloyaltiesatworktoo:tomilitarysubordinates,tothehealthofthemili- taryservicesthemselves,andtothelong-termhealthoftheperceptionofthe moral integrity of themilitary services by their fellow citizens. Ofcourse,the“obligationtomakeeveryefforttobeheard”should, in almost every case, be in unambiguously appropriate venues. What are those? Behind closed doors with other senior leaders one would expect and hope for candid discussion by participants. Obviously (although in practice moredifficulttoaccomplish well), candor isappropriate beforeappropriate bodies of Congress, where senior leaders are expected and required to give honest military assessments.22 In the ideal situation, all participants would emergefromthesediscussionsfeelingthattheyhadexpressedtheiropinions, theyhadbeen“heard”attheappropriatelevel,andweresatisfiedthatevenif the decision were not in their favor, they could understand and accept the rationale. What aboutthe case when all does not go so well?In an article, re- tiredGeneralRichardMyersandDickKohnarguethat“therewasno‘truce’ betweenthemilitary and civiliansafter 9/11 because therehad never been a war. There was just thefriction and distrust (neveropen but exacerbated by Spring2008 11 Rumsfeld’sapproachandstyle)inherentinUScivil-militaryrelations.”23In otherwords,intheiranalysis,thesituationwasnotacrisisincivil-militaryrelations,butonlyasomewhatextremepositiononthenormalscaleoftension inherentin the American system. Clearly,theseniorofficerswhopublicly dissenteddidnotviewthe situationinthatway.Oneofthem,inaprivateconversation,calledita“con- stitutional crisis”andargued thatonly such agravesituation could possibly havemotivatedhimtobreachthenormalself-restraintofself-expressionby officers.Whatkindofdisagreementmightwarranttheconclusionthatthesit- uationwassoextremeandplacedthedecisionfirmlyinClifford’sthirdcate- gory ofmoral objection? Thefirstsuchcaseissoextremethatonemightargueitfallsintothe illegalordercategory—although notaccording tothe common definition of illegal orders, to violate the jus in bello rules of just war. The Nüremberg Trialsdistinguishedthreedistinctcategoriesofwarcrimes.Themorefamil- iar are violations of the law of war and crimes against humanity. The third, crimes against peace, is defined as “(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or wagingof a war of aggression or a war in violationof international treaties, agreementsorassurances;(ii)Participationinacommonplanorconspiracy for the accomplishment of any of theacts mentioned under (i).”24 AlthoughitishardtoknowpreciselywhatretiredLieutenantGeneral GregNewbold,oneofthecritics,meantwhenhedescribedIraqas“anunnec- essarywar,”itisreasonabletointerprethimassayingthathiscontinuedpartic- ipationinplanningthewarwouldmeanhewastakingpartinawarcrimeofthis type.Forthepurposesofmoralanalysis,theanalystdoesnothavetodetermine whetherheorsheagreeswiththatassessment,butonlythat(ifthisisthecor- rectinterpretation)GeneralNewboldsincerelybelievesittobethecase.That nooneintheUSgovernmentislikelytobeprosecutedforsuchacrimeinthe currentgeopoliticalenvironmentisalsoirrelevant.Onecancertainlyseewhy anofficerwhobelievesthesituationapproachesthislevelwouldbe,atamini- mum, inClifford’s category threeofmoraldistress. Another area where public dissent should at least be entertained whenappropriateisthecasewhereanofficerisascognizantaspossibleofthe detailsofthewarplanand,inthefullexerciseofhisorherprofessionalmili- taryjudgment,honestlybelievestheplanwillhavedisastrousconsequences forthenationandtheforcesabouttobecommitted.Thisisnotamatterofthe plan having simple flaws or weaknesses. Rather, the case has to appear as much as possible (for a matter which is inherently a matter of professional judgment) to being a recipe for disaster accordingto every principle of pro- fessionalmilitaryjudgmentavailabletotheofficer.Here,surely,ifthestan- dardforofficersistoexerciseprofessionaljudgmentratherthanlapseintothe 12 Parameters