DTIC ADA480991: Intelligence and Technology. Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 46, 3rd Quarter 2007

13.5 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

i
p
4
J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R L Y Issue 46, 3d Quarter 2007
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University
J
F
Q

coming next in...
U.S. Strategic command
U.S. Pacific Command
Winners of CJCS and
SECDEF Essay Contests
plus
Enduring Choices
in British Defense Policy
The Phoenix Program and J
O
I
N
Contemporary Warfare
T

F
O
R
. . . and more in issue 47, C
E

4th Quarter 2007 of JFQ Q
U
A
R
T
E
R
L
Y

Intelligence and Technology
IS
S
U
E
J O I N T F O R C E Q U A R T E R LY FO
R Officer Attitudes
T
Y
-S Toward UAV Adoption
A Professional Military and Security Journal Ix
Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , 3d
Q
by National Defense University Press U
A Combating Terrorism
R
Institute for National Strategic Studies T
National Defense University, Washington, DC ER 2 with Socioeconomics
0
1070-0692()46;1-N 0
7
i
p
A P r o f e s s i o n A l M i l i t A r y A n d s e c u r i t y J o u r n A l 3
Cov 4 Score covers 1 & 4 no greater than 3/16” from the bind
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Intelligence and Technology Officer Attitudes Toward UAV Adption
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Combating Terrorism with Socioecoomics
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
National Defense University,Fort Lesley J. McNair,300 5th Avenue SW, REPORT NUMBER
Marshall Hall,Washington,DC,20319-5066
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 144
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Inside
Issue 46, 3d Quarter 2007
Editor Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) JFQ Dialogue
[email protected]
3
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Joint Doctrine Update
Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 4
Strategic Communication and National Security By James G. Stavridis
Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr.
Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 8 “Deconfusing” Lethal and Kinetic Terms
Book Review Editor Lisa M. Yambrick By Karl E. Wingenbach and Donald G. Lisenbee, Jr.
Associate Editors Jennifer C. Veilleux
Chaim E. Mandelbaum Forum
Design R ebecca J. White, Chris Dunham,
12
Gwynn Fuchs, and Jamie Harvey Executive Summary
U.S. Government Printing Office
14
Law Enforcement Technology, Intelligence, and the War on Terror
Staff Photographer SSgt D. Myles Cullen, USAF
By M.E. Bowman
Printed in St. Louis, Missouri
by 20 Technology, Intelligence, and Trust By James R. Howcroft
27
Eyes on Target: Intelligence Support to an Effects-based Approach
NDU Press is the National Defense University’s
By James B. Ellsworth
cross-component, professional, military, and
academic publishing house. It publishes books, 32
Applying Law Enforcement Technology to Counterinsurgency Operations
policy briefs, occasional papers, monographs, and
By Giles Kyser, Matt Keegan, and Samuel A. Musa
special reports on national security strategy, defense
policy, national military strategy, regional security 39
China’s ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications
affairs, and global strategic problems. NDU Press is
part of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, a By Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes
policy research and strategic gaming organization.
Special Feature
This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department
46
An Interview with James E. “Hoss” Cartwright
of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions
of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted 52
Global and Theater Operations Integration By Robert J. Elder, Jr.
without permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint
Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever 55
Joint Functional Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
material is quoted from or based on its content.
By James L. Denton
58
COMMUNICATIONS Warfighting in Cyberspace By Keith B. Alexander
Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly
62
online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more on upcoming Space Operations By William L. Shelton
issues, an electronic archive of JFQ articles, and
64
access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Integrated Missile Defense By Kevin T. Campbell
Constructive comments and contributions
66
are important to us. Please direct editorial A New Era in Combating WMD By James A. Tegnelia
communications to the link on the NDU Press Web
68
site or write to: Guarding Cyberspace: Global Network Operations
By Charles E. Croom, Jr.
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
National Defense University Press 71 Contesting the Information Battlespace By John C. Koziol
300 Fifth Avenue
Fort Lesley J. McNair 72 The Global Innovation and Strategy Center By Kevin Williams
Washington, DC 20319-5066
About the covers
Telephone: [phone]/DSN 325 JPuObliIshNed Tfo r tFheO ChRaiCrmEan oQf tUhe AJoiRntT ChEiefRs oLf SYtaff by NatIisosnuael 4D6e, f3edn Qseu aUrnteivre 2r0si0t7y
FAX: [phone]/DSN 325 cUom.Sin.g Pneaxct iinf.i.c. Command JFQ (cid:75)(cid:36)(cid:73)(cid:36)(cid:22)(cid:73)(cid:74)(cid:72)(cid:55)(cid:74)(cid:59)(cid:61)(cid:63)(cid:57)(cid:22)(cid:57)(cid:69)(cid:67)(cid:67)(cid:55)(cid:68)(cid:58) The front cover shows a collage of images from the U.S. Strategic Command Special
Email: [email protected] WSEiCnDneErFs Eosfs aCyJC CSo annteds ts Feature. The back cover shows (clockwise) Army Special Forces and Philippine Scout
JFQ online: ndupres3sd .Qnudarute.re, dJuuly 2007 pEiTC.4 nt.lnhoh u. QsdBenau nurtPiaderthr imimtnsoehorgpe r 2o neDC0 rii0henxa7 fo ri Pesoyisfrcn u oWeJseFgs eQ4a r 7Pra,fomalri ceaynd JOINTFORCEQUARTERLY pARPaharrmniilngiypeg prs tsioon ll diefiftsire i(enrU sgd . duSwr.r oiiAvnuirgnnm gdEy exP/deAi rnicnnzidgtsoear euhTweear ll Miircsemoecpyoaetnnernr sS )aaa;i ftbUsserSaern S fi( cUFreei. tSfivz.eg gNhheirtac avwlleydis/t Bhatnh orrd eoJ b.Uu eFgSllshaS ni nlJnoo gUihginpsa tnpPic)ea;sru R sMlu oJpoaynnpalego sBar trpr ,iar teries-ha
at Camp Viper, Iraq (U.S. Air Force/Edward D. Kniery); and Navy officer speaking with
ISSN 1070-0692 Chinese sailors during a joint search and rescue exercise (U.S. Navy/Ashley Hickman).
A APnrdo fseescsuirointAyl J MouilrintAArly 1070-0692()46;1-N PJubOliNsAhIa etPNIidnrobo snfyTtfo aieNtrlsu astDtihtFeoeieo nff enOCoanalhr s lMaRN eDi ariUelmCtiftnioeaaiEnvnrnyesa oe rlas fSnQUi tttdynhr, aUi eSvWte eeJcAoargussiiinrchtRi ytitSn yCtPg uTJhrtodeioeusiEensfrss,n RDoaflC LStYaff ISSUEFORTY-SIx,3 QUARTER 2007d OTCwInoofifmttwihecba elSralridot gAic nUeitogAAtnei VtTccPu eoerAdrno erdaofosonemr psidisstc miisoTo nencAhl nMoilloitgAyry And security JournAl
Commentary
PUBLISHER
Gen Peter Pace, USMC
74
The George C. Marshall European Center: Proven Model
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
or Irrelevant Prototype? By Timothy C. Shea
Stephen J. Flanagan, Ph.D.
Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies
80
American Military Culture and Strategy By Phillip S. Meilinger
ADvISORy COmmITTEE
87
On the Nature of Strategic Communications By Carnes Lord LtGen Frances C. Wilson, USMC National Defense University
BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman
Features MG Byron S. Bagby, USA Joint Forces Staff College
Col Jeremiah D. Canty, USMC Marine Corps War College
A. Denis Clift National Defense Intelligence College
90
Effects-based Operations and the Problem of Causality: Simple and Complex
ADM Edmund P. Giambastiani, USN The Joint Staff
By Zoltan Jobbagy Col Thomas Greenwood, USMC Marine Corps Command
and Staff College
96 Military Officer Attitudes Toward UAV Adoption: Exploring Institutional MG David H. Huntoon, USA U.S. Army War College
Brig Gen Jay H. Lindell, USAF Air Command and Staff College
Impediments to Innovation By James R. FitzSimonds and Thomas G. Mahnken
Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC The Joint Staff
104 RADM Gerard M. Mauer, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Shaping the Nuclear Landscape
RADM Richard J. Mauldin, USN The Joint Staff
By Paul I. Bernstein, John P. Caves, Jr., and John F. Reichart Maj Gen (S) Stephen J. Miller, USAF Air War College
BG Mark E. O’Neill, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
111
A JTF Training Dilemma: Component Rigor versus Joint Realism Maj Gen Teresa M. Peterson, USAF National War College
By Thomas E. Ward II LTG Walter L. Sharp, USA The Joint Staff
RADM Jacob L. Shuford, USN Naval War College
115 Log-centric Airbase-Opening Strategies in Korea Col David Smarsh, USAF Naval Postgraduate School
By Steven M. Anderson and Douglas A. Cunningham EDITORIAL BOARD
Stephen J. Flanagan National Defense University
120
Did the Coalition Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar Richard K. Betts Columbia University
By Carter Malkasian Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies
Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University
Interagency Dialogue Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University
Alan L. Gropman Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.) National Defense University
127
Combating Terrorism with Socioeconomics: Leveraging the Private Sector Douglas N. Hime Naval War College
By Miemie Winn Byrd Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College
Recall Col Anne E. McGee, USAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Thomas L. McNaugher The RAND Corporation
Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College
131
Joint Ground Logistics in the Falklands By Raymond E. Bell, Jr. William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. National Defense Intelligence College
LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) Hudson Institute
Book Reviews Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College
Col Thomas C. Skillman, USAF Air War College
136 COL Robert E. Smith, USA U.S. Army War College
Off the Shelf By Lisa M. Yambrick
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) Harvard University
137
Anthrax: Bioterror as Fact and Fantasy Reviewed by Zygmunt F. Dembek CONTRIBUTIONS
138 Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent
Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power
research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers
in the Post–Cold War World Reviewed by Barry D. Watts and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians
from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration
139 to the address on the opposite page or by email to smothermanj@
Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan
ndu.edu “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further
Reviewed by James Snyder information see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at
ndupress.ndu.edu.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University
not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the
Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal
designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and
shown above
other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security
policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security;
The table of contents shows Sailors from Riverine Squadron 1 and Marines from 2d Marine Expeditionary Force aboard riverine and developments in training and joint professional military
craft in Taqaddum, Al Anbar Province, Iraq (2d Marine Aircraft Wing/Michael Kropiewnicki); Marines discussing coalition education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to
operations with French sailor onboard USS John C. Stennis under way in Arabian Sea (U.S. Navy/Paul J. Jenkins); launch of
meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today.
Peacekeeper missile, the newest intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile (U.S. Air Force); and B–2 Spirit bomber followed by
F–117 Nighthawks (U.S. Air Force).
ndupress.ndu.edu
JFQ
Dialogue
DEADLINE
Approaching
for JFQ Issue 48
Open Letter to JFQ Readers
Joint Force Quarterly is distributed to senior interagency leaders as well as to all flag officers,
military Services, and combatant commands, and it is translated into several languages.
The journal has increased in size 150 percent over the past year, and the number of private
subscriptions is at a record level. JFQ owes its success to the high-quality manuscripts that
National Defense University Press receives from national security professionals in and out
of uniform. Thanks to the generous support of the National Defense University Foundation,
three JFQ authors each year receive special recognition for articles of exceptional quality.
Twenty professors from all senior military educational institutions convened on May 22–23
to judge articles from the July 2006 through April 2007 issues, and they awarded three $1,000
cash prizes to the authors of the articles they deemed to be most influential. The winning
authors will be acknowledged in the October issue of Joint Force Quarterly.
FEATURING:
U.S. Northern The JFQ staff would like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas
in concert with future thematic focuses. The following topics are tied to
submission deadlines for specific upcoming issues:
Command

AND september 1, 007 (Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008): December 1, 007 (Issue 49, 2d quarter 2008):
The Long War Focus on Air and Space Power
The Long War Homeland Defense U.S. Special Operations Command
U.S. Northern Command

and Homeland
March 1, 008 (Issue 50, 3d quarter 2008): June 1, 008 (Issue 51, 4th quarter 2008):
Weapons of Mass Destruction Focus on Naval Power
Defense
Stability and Security Operations National Security Council
U.S. Central Command
JFQ readers are typically subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next
level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and
Submissions Due by
lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the So what? question. That is, how does
September 1 your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the reader’s professional understand-
ing or performance? Speak to the implications from the operational to the strategic level of
2007 influence, and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or
jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be
interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submission
Guidelines. Share your professional insights, and improve national security.
Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.)
Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our
Editor, Joint Force Quarterly
Guide for Contributors. Share your profes-
[email protected]
sional insights and improve national security.
 JFQ / issue 46, 3d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
Joint Doctrine Update
Joint Chief of Staff J7 Joint Education
and Doctrine Division Joint Publications (JP) Revised,
Calendar Year 007
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States
JP 1–04, Legal Support to Military
Operations
The joint doctrine development com- recognizes the phrase Unified Action Armed JP –03, Geospatial Intelligence Support
munity continues its aggressive Forces. Finally, JP 1 introduces the joint defi- to Joint Operations
pace of publication revision. Among nition of unity of effort: “Coordination and JP 3–01, Countering Air and Missile
more than a dozen titles already signed this cooperation toward common objectives, even Threats
year, of most significance is the approval if the participants are not necessarily part
JP 3–03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction
of the Capstone joint publication in the of the same command or organization—the Operations
joint doctrine hierarchy. Joint Publication product of successful unified action.” The
JP 3–05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
(JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the exact wording of these definitions provides
and Procedures for Joint Special
United States, recently signed by the Chair- accuracy and precision to often confusing Operations Task Force Operations
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides relationships (that is, does unity of effort
JP 3–07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
the overarching, authoritative guidance for lead to unified action, or vice versa?). Simply
Procedures for Peace Operations
the employment of the Armed Forces. The stated, national strategic direction leads to
JP 3–07.5, Joint Tactics, Techniques,
importance of the Capstone publication unified action; successful unified action pro-
and Procedures for Noncombatant
cannot be overstated, particularly with its duces unity of effort. Evacuation Operations (renumbered
treatment of warfare and unity of effort. The revision of JP 1 followed shortly as JP 3–68)
“Foundations,” the first chapter of JP after the approval of the Keystone publications
JP 3–13.1, Electronic Warfare
1, captures for the first time in joint doctrine for personnel, operations, and planning (JPs
JP 3–15, Joint Doctrine for Barriers,
the intellectual framework surrounding 1–0, 3–0, and 5–0, respectively). With the pro-
Obstacles, and Mine Warfare
traditional and irregular warfare. At the jected approval of the revisions of the intel-
JP 3–16, Multinational Operations
crux of this discussion with regard to the two ligence and logistics Keystone publications
types of warfare is the fundamental differ- (JPs 2–0 and 4–0, respectively) anticipated JP 3–33, Joint Task Force Headquarters
ence between them—the strategic purpose. for later this year, joint doctrine will remain
JP 3–34, Joint Engineer Operations
Whereas traditional warfare aims to force a relevant, consistent, and beneficial to the joint
JP 3–35, Joint Deployment and
change in an adversary’s government or poli- warfighter. These documents will guide the
Redeployment Operations
cies, irregular warfare seeks to gain legitimacy doctrine for their subordinate publications.
JP 3–50, Personnel Recovery
and influence over a relevant population. Publication revision must not be
JP 1, the consolidated product of its viewed as an endstate, but rather a start- JP 3–60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting
previous version and JP 0–2, Unified Action ing point for common reference. The joint
JP 3–07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Armed Forces, also provides clarity with force—the combatant commands, Services, Procedures for Peace Operations
respect to the relationships between national and Joint Staff—has an inherent responsibil-
strategic direction, unified action, and ity to determine what fundamentally works
Joint Publications Near Revision
unity of effort. According to JP 1, National best throughout the planning, preparation,
(3d quarter, Fiscal Year 007)
Strategic Direction—governed by the Con- execution, and assessment activities of
stitution, Federal law, and U.S. Government operations. Capturing these best practices JP –0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support
policy regarding internationally recognized based on extant capabilities—the essence of to Joint Operations
law—leads to unified action. JP 1 redefines joint doctrine—serves to increase the overall JP 3–04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
unified action as the “synchronization, coor- effectiveness of the U.S. military. Procedures for Shipboard Helicopter
dination and/or integration of the activities of Operations
governmental and nongovernmental entities For access to joint publications, go to JP 3–07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations
with military operations to achieve unity of the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training
JP 3–6, Homeland Defense
effort.” Coordination, a word absent from Electronic Information System Web site at
JP 3–8, Civil Support
the previous definition, acknowledges the https://jdeis.js.mil (.mil users only). For those
lack of a hierarchical relationship between without access to .mil accounts, please go the JP 3–63, Joint Doctrine for Detainee
myriad organizations that may work together. Joint Electronic Library Web site at http:// Operations
Defense Department terminology no longer www.dtic.mil/doctrine.
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 46, 3d quarter 2007 / JFQ 
Strategic Communication levels. That is precisely our approach from
our headquarters in Miami looking south,
and we are working to add resources to this
and National Security
important—indeed, vital—aspect of our
mission in Central and South America and
the Caribbean.
In attempting to discover the right
By JameS G.StavriDiS approach for strategic communication in
the Southern Command’s diverse region, we
have examined a series of historical exam-
ples of strategic communication. Some of the
I don’t know what the hell this [strategic communication] is that Marshall is always
more famous include the announcements
talking about, but I want some of it. surrounding the assassination of Julius
—attributed to admiral ernest King during World War ii Caesar in the first century CE, Abraham
Lincoln’s campaign to publicize the Eman-
cipation Proclamation, and the Japanese
Empire’s “Economic Co-Prosperity Sphere”
in the mid- to late 1930s. More recent
Winston Churchill is said to have and specifically to the individual nine com- examples of strategic communication that
observed that the principal difference batant commands of the United States. we have examined include the announce-
between management and leadership is Our approach at U.S. Southern ment of involuntary feeding of detainees at
communication. Effective communication Command is to consider strategic Guantanamo Bay; publicity for a humanitar-
requires the leaders of an organization to communication as an enabling capability ian exercise in the Dominican Republic; and
take an early and persistent role in decid- for our policy and planning decisions and the cruise of the Navy’s hospital ship, USNS
ing how ideas and decisions are shaped and actions; provide truthful information about Mercy, through the Pacific. Each of the
delivered. Certainly in the national security those decisions or actions; communicate it recent case studies is worth thinking about
context, a leader can improve the effects of in a timely and culturally sensible fashion; in somewhat more depth as we consider
operational and policy planning by ensur- use messengers who are likely to be well an appropriate approach for the Southern
ing that the communications implications received; measure the results of our efforts Hemisphere.
of that planning are considered as early as diligently (clearly our hardest challenge
possible in the process. If planning is done and greatest shortcoming); and adjust both Case Studies
in this fashion, then it is likely that the com- message and method of delivery accordingly. The first case study was largely a public
munications associated with it will indeed In the Southern Command’s region—32 relations challenge and required a response
be strategic in their effects. countries and 13 territories including some at the tactical level. A group of detainees
Simply stated, the objective of strategic 450 million people speaking 4 principal in Guantanamo Bay’s detention and inter-
communication is to provide audiences languages and dozens of dialects—our view rogation facility began a large coordinated
with truthful and timely information that is that nothing we do is more important hunger strike on August 8, 2005. DOD
will influence them to support the objec- than strategic communication. This is a part policy is to always preserve the lives of the
tives of the communicator. In addition to of the world, thankfully, where it appears detainees, and, as a result, 43 hunger strikers
truthfulness and timeliness, the information highly unlikely that we will launch Toma- were enterally fed, using U.S. Federal Bureau
must be delivered to the right audience in a hawk missiles. It is, however, an area where of Prisons guidelines, which include use
precise way. This generalized approach can it is necessary to launch ideas, concepts, of a restraint chair and a very small diam-
be applied to essentially any organization, to information, conferences, viewpoints, eter flexible rubber tube inserted through
the Department of Defense (DOD) broadly, interviews, and the many other streams of the nostril, down the throat, and into the
data that constitute effective strategic com- stomach. A motion was filed in February
munication. It is, in every sense, our “main 2006 alleging torture through the use of
battery” at U.S. Southern Command. the restraint chair to assist in involuntary
As Newt Gingrich, an astute student feedings.
of strategic communication, has written, Given the DOD policy of preserving
“Strategic Communication in a real-time life, the leadership view at Guantanamo
worldwide information system is a branch Bay was that a detainee on a hunger strike
of the art of war comparable to logistics or requiring feeding clearly qualified as a
intelligence. It will require staffing, educat- lifesaving emergency. However, there was
ing and practicing at about the same level significant public outcry concerning the
of resources as intelligence or logistics to be procedure, which we failed to anticipate. In
admiral James G. stavridis, Usn, is Commander, successful.” It also will require the early and particular, the use of a restraint chair—nec-
U.s. southern Command. persistent involvement of commanders at all essary to accommodate the procedure—was
4 JFQ / issue 46, 3d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
STAVRIDIS
categorized as “torture,” despite the fact of the hospital ship USNS Mercy through up as anything other than imperialism.
that it is an entirely humane and common Southeast Asian waters in 2006. The cruise Again, this seems quite simple, but in prac-
procedure in U.S. and other prison systems was conceived as a follow-up to American tice, there are many in the world of strategic
worldwide to preserve life. assistance rendered during the tsunami communication who believe that a bad
The surprise negative press and crisis of late 2004 and early 2005, and the message can be sold effectively. It cannot.
false characterizations, which reinforced ship’s sailing a month later was designed to The strategic message must resonate with
challenges to DOD detention operations, show continuing U.S. involvement, commit- the audience because it shares appropri-
compelled the Department to conduct a ment, and presence in the region. During ate human values, such as liberty, justice,
reassessment of policies and procedures the course of the 60,000-ton ship’s cruise honesty, economic improvement, security,
in order to counter the impression that from May to September, the crew of nearly fair treatment, and so forth.
the United States had something to hide. 700 (including many volunteers from inter- Naturally, there are times when the
This campaign included a wide variety of national relief organizations) performed message is, in fact, bad news. The world will
tactical responses, which were orchestrated over $30 million in services and goods always be full of mistakes, disasters, failures,
loosely out of the Pentagon. They included transfers and saw over 200,000 patients. All and acts of incompetence. But when that
bringing a team of distinguished physi- of this was aggressively communicated using happens, the effort must be made not to spin
cians to Guantanamo to observe the pro- a detailed strategic communication plan. the truth, but rather to tell what happened
cedure; publishing articles on the process; The onboard public affairs team, supple- honestly, let people know truthfully how bad
emphasizing the lifesaving character of the mented by people in each of the various it was, apologize when warranted, pledge
operation and the common procedures used ports of call, was able to have a measurable improvement, and outline measures taken
in accredited prisons; and sending repre- impact on the impressions Southeast Asians to prevent reoccurrence. Torie Clark, in her
sentatives to conduct interviews with the have about the United States. excellent book on strategic communication,
media to describe the procedure in detail. describes this as “not trying to put lipstick
The commander of the Joint Task Force, Communication Guidelines on a pig.”
Rear Admiral Harry Harris, USN, had the Drawing on these three case studies, Understand the Audience. This is the
procedure performed on himself so that he as well as many others, we have developed a constantly rediscovered golden rule of stra-
could correctly describe it and personally series of principles that serve to guide strate- tegic communication. Too many commu-
refute allegations of torture. While an initial gic communication, with a focus on our own nicators develop plans in a vacuum without
challenge was apparent, particularly in not efforts in the Southern region. spending the necessary time and resources
correctly predicting the response to the Tell the Truth. The first principle is to understand the nuances of the audiences
feeding techniques, DOD eventually turned the simplest: always provide the truth to to whom they are pitching the product. A
the corner, and when publicity died down, the audiences with whom you are commu- classic example of this is in Central and
the vast majority of hunger-striking detain- nicating. Nothing will more quickly doom South America and the Caribbean, where
ees began eating again. strategic communication to failure than one message definitely does not fit all audi-
A second case study involved a even a single instance of falsehood. A stra- ences. Can there be two more different
humanitarian exercise (New Horizons) in tegic communication team can have superb countries in the world than enormous Por-
the Dominican Republic in the spring of messages, excellent messengers, a carefully tuguese-speaking Brazil and tiny English-
2006. Troops from U.S. Southern Command crafted plan—yet all of it can fail if they are speaking St. Kitts? Or more different than
were sent to participate in a series of joint proven to be lying about anything. This has Spanish-speaking, economically strong
endeavors with the Dominican armed forces been demonstrated most often in the history Chile and poverty-stricken French-/Creole-
to build clinics and dig wells. Unfortunately, of “damage control” types of strategic com- speaking Haiti? In each country or territory,
our strategic communication plan was not munication. Many political scandals, for to each group of people, during each par-
well executed, and as the Los Angeles Times example, tend to explode when revelations of ticular season, the audience is different, and
reported, “As the equipment and troops lying to investigators after the fact emerge, therefore the messages must be evaluated
amassed over weeks with little explanation as opposed to during or immediately after and tailored with the diverse qualities of the
in the local media, suspicions deepened that the initial malfeasance. The truth, through- receiver in mind.
the Americans were engaged in something out a program of strategic communication, Pull the Trigger Promptly. This seems
more than a humanitarian mission.” As a constitutes absolute bedrock. Tell the truth, self-evident, but all too frequently an excel-
result of not thinking through and execut- and emphasize that you do tell the truth. lent plan comes to naught because we are
ing a well-constructed strategic commu- Over the long run, it is unquestionably the unable to execute in a timely manner. Do
nication plan, our erstwhile effort actually best approach. not let “perfect” become the enemy of “very
created a negative backlash in the local Have a Good Message. All the bril- good.” In other words, develop a reasonably
media. We also need to link such events into liant strategic communication in the world good plan fast and execute it. Otherwise, it
3-year plans for strategic communication, will not sell a bad message, as the Japanese is far too easy to end up “back on your heels”
not treat each as an isolated event. Empire discovered with the East Asian in the world of the perpetual news cycle.
The third case study was an unquali- Co-Prosperity Sphere. A brutal, extractive Think at the Strategic Level. Public
fied success and involved the strategic regime that brought little or no benefit to affairs and strategic communication are two
communication associated with the voyage the “partner” nations could not be dressed very different things. A strategic communi-
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 46, 3d quarter 2007 / JFQ 
DIALOGUE | Strategic Communication
cator must stay at the strategic level and not tactical level is where public affairs and all administration that spice was added to the
dip down to the tactical level represented by the associated efforts are linked together and diet with strategic communication tactics
public affairs. Strategic communication con- execution of the plan occurs—all of it fast, (for example, describing the Soviet Union
sists of a wide variety of tools and processes furious, and energetic. This is not the cere- as the “evil empire” and President Reagan
within a command such as U.S. Southern bral part of the operation, but rather the place ordering, “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this
Command, to include public affairs, pro- where instant response, dynamic creativity, wall”). When looking at successful strategic
tocol, legal, political-military analysis, and good language skills matter most. communication plans, industry is often a
medical outreach, engineer and construc- Measure Results. So many strategic good guide. The performance of Chrysler
tion support, logistics, personnel, and many communication plans flounder because the Corporation under Lee Iacocca provides
more. Each has a role to play in effective implementers, thrilled with having devel- a wonderful example of a plan perfectly
strategic communication at the tactical or oped and “sold” the plan, are completely executed. To communicate his vision,
operational level, but none of them is a sub- consumed with execution—but then end up Iacocca began with a simple message that
stitute for a strategic plan operating at the not doing what is the most important single inspired customers and employees alike:
level of the entire theater, across time, space, step: measuring results. The absolute key “Quality, hard work, and commitment—The
language, and culture. At the strategic level,
the intellectual firepower of the command
must be brought most distinctly to bear. For a combatant commander, the place to “organize” strategic
Organize at the Operational Level to communication is at the operational level
Enable at the Tactical. For a combatant com-
mander, the place to “organize” strategic
communication is at the operational level. to effective communication is rolling out a stuff America is made of. Our goal is to be
This means that strategic communication plan, organizing it widely, executing ener- the best. What else is there? If you can find a
plans must be developed that can operate getically, and then measuring results. There better car, buy it!”
across subregional sections of the command are obviously many means of doing so, but a Chrysler’s remarkable turnaround
area. In U.S. Southern Command, we divide few crucial ones include polling by reputable resulting from Iacocca’s leadership shows
the region into four subregions: Andean local firms and backing up the polls with that following each of the principles
Ridge (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, an international polling firm; contacting above—from having a truthful plan to con-
and Venezuela); the Southern Cone (Argen- individual trusted and sensible interlocutors stantly measuring and adding spice—is the
tina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay); for candid assessments; monitoring articles best approach. In the case of U.S. Southern
Central America; and the Caribbean. By in journals, newspapers, and other publica- Command, we are constantly seeking new
organizing in this fashion, we can better tions; sampling Web content, including ways to describe the benefits of partner-
tailor messages, maximize resources, find blogs; observing television and radio cover- ing with the United States in our areas of
age; and working with a local public rela- expertise (for example, military-to-military
tions firm. We are in the infant state of this relations, counternarcotics, antismuggling).
at U.S. Southern Command but are working These can range from new techniques (use
hard to improve because it is the critical of unmanned vehicles and subsurface sur-
path for achieving results. veillance) to better packaged training for
Adjust Fire. No strategic communica- officers and soldiers of individual countries
tion plan is perfect from conception. All back in the United States. Mix it up!
must be put into practice and adjusted as Steady Pressure. Very seldom do strate-
time goes by. A way to approach measure- gic communication plans succeed overnight.
ment is to adopt a short-, medium-, and Just as careers of individuals take time to
long-term view. Short term is immediate build to fruition, a good strategic communi-
reactions, say 24 to 48 hours. Medium-term cation plan needs steady pressure over a sig-
measurement is after 30 to 45 days. And nificant period to bear fruit. In U.S. South-
synergies, and move out on the strategic finally, long-term measurement must occur ern Command, we have been working hard
plan that we have developed for the region at the 1-year point. After each of these over the long term to make improvements
as a whole. measurement windows, the plan should be across the board in reducing human rights
After organizing at the operational evaluated and recast, after reacting to what violations by military forces in a region with
level, we try to execute smoothly. Tactically, is working and what is not. a long tradition of such problems. This is a
in the sense of strategic communication for Add Spice. Strategic communication strategic communication plan that takes a
U.S. Southern Command, we are operating at should not be boring. A look at the “strategic long time, sometimes generations, to fulfill.
the individual national level. This is where all communication” of the Cold War by both It includes sending key officers and enlisted
the components of the strategic communica- sides shows a pattern of rote, predictable, leaders to schools in the United States; our
tion plan must fit together, and most particu- and almost entirely ineffective patterns of leadership giving speeches and writing
larly our plan must be fully coordinated and communication. It was not until late in the articles on the subject; hosting regional
synched up with the Embassy’s efforts. The Cold War with the arrival of the Reagan conferences, often including international
6 JFQ / issue 46, 3d quarter 2007 ndupress.ndu.edu
STAVRIDIS
human rights groups; and a myriad of other direction, media outlets should repeat mes- Command, have hired individuals and
initiatives. It is gradually bearing fruit, but sages, and trends should begin to turn. At sometimes commercial consulting firms
there will be setbacks. The key is applying such times, a determination must be made to participate. We can find thousands of
steady pressure. as to whether it is time to back out and let such entities by Googling “strategic com-
Bursts of Energy. The analog to steady the audience find its own way forward, apply munication.” But each strategic plan and
pressure, of course, is bursts of energy. In a final burst of energy, or continue steady each organization—and indeed each time
any strategic communication plan, there pressure. It is an art, not a science. a plan needs to be developed—may need a
will be moments when it is opportune to different set of thinkers. So look around the
hit with bursts of energy. Such a moment Recommendations organization and even outside it, especially
might be immediately before or after an In addition to the principles above, to non-U.S. sources of input and criticism,
international conference or a national elec- there are four final recommendations worth for advice, execution, measurement, and
tion; it might occur following a natural considering as we approach strategic com- judgment. Also, recognize that the “strategic
disaster; it could be on the anniversary of a munication in the 21st century. communication director” is more like the
particular event. A creative strategic planner First, strategic communication is the conductor of a band than an expert on a
is constantly looking for the right moment ultimate team sport. It must be done as given instrument. Moreover, give the direc-
to come in high and hard with a burst part of a joint, interagency, and commercial tor of strategic communication unfettered
technique. Such moments become efficient system. It does no good whatsoever to have access to the commander. At U.S. Southern
ways to increase “bang for the buck” of a a perfect strategic communication plan Command, our director of strategic commu-
particular event, speech, or other strategic that is ultimately contradicted by other U.S. nication attends the daily morning standup
communication resource. Government agencies, as—unfortunately—is with the commander, interacts constantly
Accepting Defeat and Moving On. Some often the case. Each plan must be vetted with the senior leadership of the command,
strategic communication battles are unwin- properly and hopefully become a combined and is a prime mover in every sense in our
nable. There will be moments when no effort. It should take into account what U.S. organization.
matter how effective the plan, the message private industry is doing in a given country Fourth, and finally, we in the business
is not going to have any effect. This can or region so that inherent contractions of national security must work together to
occur for a wide variety of reasons, generally between public and private institutions do arrive at a shared understanding of what
when the audience is simply unwilling to not undermine the entire effort. It must be constitutes strategic communication in an
listen to anything at all. For example, when crafted in a sensible, collaborative, collegial international context. This is an effort that
the Persian empire sought to invade Greece way and done in an appropriate voice. must involve practitioners at the Depart-
in 300 BCE, the Persian emperor Darius Second, at least for strategic com- ment of Defense, Department of State, and
crafted a clever strategic communication munication that goes beyond the shores indeed at all Cabinet organizations and
plan that sought to divide the Greek city- of the United States (a safe assumption for national agencies engaged in international
states and offered reasonably benign terms virtually everything we do in this arena), strategic communication on behalf of the
to any state willing to sign on with the Per- the international community must be con- United States. It is also an effort that can be
sians. But the Greeks were utterly devoted to sidered and often consulted. In other words, informed by those in private industry who
their nascent form of democracy and were the impact on individual countries and work in this milieu.
unreceptive, leading to war. Despite having international organizations should be con-
a rational message, a fairly good series of sidered, and—if possible—they should be In the end, working in strategic com-
messengers, and a coherent strategy, Darius part of the plan. In particular, international munication for national security is a bit
was unable to find an outcome other than organizations have resources that can be like working in a laboratory trying to find a
war. And when he was eventually defeated used in execution and even in planning, as cure for cancer. There are many false starts,
by a coalition of the Greek city-states, he was they were, for example, in the voyage of the mistakes, and incorrect leads. Resources are
wise enough to turn his attentions to the Mercy and the Pakistani earthquake relief often difficult to obtain, especially because
east and move on. So it must be, occasion- effort. Likewise, little can be done effectively it is often hard to show prime results. Steady
ally, in the world of strategic planning. in a foreign country without the cooperation pressure is generally the right solution,
Knowing When You Win. Sometimes of the host nation and regional organiza- and occasionally a true burst of energy can
the hardest thing for any strategic planner is tions. Often, they can contribute to strategic make great strides. There is unlikely to be a
not accepting defeat but rather recognizing messaging and should be consulted in many perfect single-point solution, but one should
victory. As a general rule, “winning” in the instances. While there are clearly excep- expect incremental progress, measured in
world of strategic communication is never tions, such consultations and cooperation years, and only a series of partial palliatives
clean and seldom obvious. If your charter is can frequently pay enormous dividends. obtained along the way. But it is all in a
to convince the populace of a given region Third, as we develop and execute worthy cause, the work is fascinating, and
that democracy and liberty are important our strategic communication plans, we in the end, the efforts of the strategic com-
values, it will not suddenly be obvious that should ask the simple question: Who are municator can be of enormous benefit to
you have succeeded. Tipping points are the thinkers? It is not inherently obvious the national security of the United States,
often hard to spot. But gradually, the bench- who is “good” at strategic communication. especially in the emerging complex world of
mark measurements should turn in the right Many commands, including U.S. Southern this unsettled 21st century. JFQ
ndupress.ndu.edu  issue 46, 3d quarter 2007 / JFQ