DTIC ADA473204: Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak

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2007 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak
5b. GRANT NUMBER
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6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Stephen Hosmer
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14. ABSTRACT
Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take down Saddam Hussein’s regime in
less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws upon
information derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of senior Iraqi military and civilian
officials to examine why the Iraqi resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. The research focused
on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces do so little fighting?
and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the
Coalition’s task more difficult and costly? These two questions encompass a number of related issues. The
monograph examines the battlefield consequences of Saddam Hussein’s strategic misjudgments and
preoccupation with internal threats; the poorly designed and executed Iraqi military strategy and
operations; the weak motivation and morale that permeated all ranks of the Iraqi military; and the
superiority in combat capability enjoyed by the Coalition forces. It concludes with observations about why
decisionmakers should be careful about the lessons they may seek to draw from OIF; how OIF paved the
way for the insurgency that has followed in Iraq; and how OIF may influence the behavior of future U.S.
adversaries. The monograph is intended for the use of military and civilian officials concerned with the
management, planning, and conduct of U.S. operations to deter and counter threats to U.S. interests from
enemy regimes and other hostile actors.
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Why the
Iraqi
Resistance
to the
Coalition
Invasion
Was
So Weak
stephen t. hosmer
Prepared for the United States Air Force
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States
Air Force under Contracts F49642-01-C-0003 and FA7014-06-C-0001.
Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning
Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hosmer, Stephen T.
Why the Iraqi resistance to the coalition invasion was so weak / Stephen Hosmer.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-8330-4016-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Iraq War, 2003– 2. Iraq—Armed Forces—Operational readiness. 3. Iraq—
History—1991–2003. I. Title.
DS79.76.H68 2007
956.7044'3409567—dc22
2007014369
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Preface
Coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were able to take
down Saddam Hussein’s regime in less than three weeks, at the cost
of relatively few Coalition casualties. This monograph draws on infor-
mation derived primarily from interviews with and interrogations of
senior Iraqi military and civilian officials, to examine why the Iraqi
resistance in March and April 2003 was so weak. The research focused
on two questions: (1) Why did the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican
Guard forces do so little fighting? and (2) Why did Iraqi leaders fail to
adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition’s
task more difficult and costly?
These two questions encompass a number of related issues.
The monograph examines the battlefield consequences of Saddam
Hussein’s strategic misjudgments and preoccupation with internal
threats, the poorly designed and executed Iraqi military strategy and
operations, the weak motivation and morale that permeated all ranks
of the Iraqi military, and the superiority in combat capability enjoyed
by the Coalition forces. It concludes with observations about why
decisionmakers should be careful about the lessons they may seek to
draw from OIF, how OIF paved the way for the insurgency that has
followed in Iraq, and how OIF may influence the behavior of future
United States adversaries.
The monograph is intended for the use of military and civilian
officials concerned with the management, planning, and conduct of
U.S. operations to deter and counter threats to U.S. interests from
enemy regimes and other hostile actors.
iii
iv Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
The research for this monograph was sponsored by the Direc-
tor, Plans and Programs, Headquarters, Air Combat Command, and
was part of a larger study of OIF conducted within the Strategy and
Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE. The research find-
ings also supported a larger study of OIF conducted within the Strat-
egy, Doctrine, and Resources Program of RAND Arroyo Center. The
Arroyo Center research was cosponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff,
G-3, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8.
RAND Project AIR FORCE
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ment center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with
independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development,
employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aero-
space forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Aerospace Force
Development; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Manage-
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Additional information about PAF is available on our Web site at
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ment center sponsored by the United States Army.
Additional information about RAND Arroyo Center is available
at http://www.rand.org/ard.
Contents
Preface............................................................................. iii
Summary.......................................................................... ix
Acknowledgments.............................................................. xxi
Abbreviations.................................................................. xxiii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction....................................................................... 1
The Weak Iraqi Resistance........................................................ 1
The Iraqi Failure to Exploit More-Effective Defensive Options.............. 3
Sources .............................................................................. 4
Organization of the Monograph................................................. 5
CHAPTER TWO
Saddam Made Strategic Miscalculations..................................... 7
Saddam Was the Only Decisionmaker Who Mattered ....................... 7
Saddam’s Decisionmaking Was Seriously Flawed.............................. 9
Saddam’s Decisions Were Distorted by Optimism and
Overweening Self-Confidence ............................................ 9
Saddam Had a Limited Grasp of International and Military Affairs.....11
Saddam’s Advisers Were Uninformed, Timid, and Sycophantic..........13
Saddam Had a Record of Strategic Blunders..................................15
Saddam Made Several Strategic Miscalculations in 2003....................18
War Could Be Avoided.........................................................18
Any Attacks Would Be Limited: Iraq Would Not Be Invaded............21
His Regime Would Survive an Invasion.................................... 22
v
vi Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was So Weak
The Consequences of Saddam’s Strategic Misjudgments.................... 27
CHAPTER THREE
Saddam’s Internal Security Concerns Weakened Iraqi Defenses
Against External Attack...................................................31
Saddam’s Personal Security Measures Were Extreme.........................32
Iraq’s Forces Were Shaped to Forestall Coups, Uprisings....................33
The Consequences of Saddam’s Fixation on Internal Security ............. 36
CHAPTER FOUR
Iraq’s Military Strategy and Operations Were Poorly Designed
and Executed ................................................................41
Saddam’s Military Strategy Was Flawed.......................................41
Regular Army Units Largely Remained in Prewar Deployment
Areas........................................................................ 42
The Republican Guard Was Deployed Outside Baghdad................. 43
Militia Forces Were Positioned Inside Cities................................45
Saddam’s Military Strategy Had Shortcomings and Vulnerabilities......47
Iraqi Defensive Operations Were Poorly Managed and Executed ..........55
Iraqi Command Arrangements and Practices Were Dysfunctional..... 56
Iraqis Had Warning of Hostilities, but Situational Awareness
Was Poor................................................................... 60
Iraqi Forces Were Poorly Positioned for Defense............................65
Iraqi Forces Were Poorly Trained.............................................69
Iraqis Had to Operate with Reduced Inventories of Old Equipment.......74
CHAPTER FIVE
Poor Motivation and Morale Decisively Undermined the
Iraqi Defense ............................................................... 77
Prewar Motivation and Morale Were Poor.................................... 77
Most Iraqis Saw Defeat as Inevitable.......................................... 80
Lack of Belief in the Justness and Necessity of the Cause....................83
The Previous Barriers to Desertion Eroded................................... 86
The Threat of Eventual Punishment Was No Longer Credible.......... 87
Officers No Longer Enforced Discipline.....................................89
Contents vii
Air Attacks Had a Devastating Effect on the Iraqi Capability and
Will to Fight................................................................. 90
Why the Fedayeen Saddam, Ba’athist Militia, and Foreign Jihadists
Were Motivated to Fight................................................... 98
The Fedayeen Saddam......................................................... 98
The Ba’ath Party Militia...................................................... 100
The Foreign Jihadists......................................................... 101
Many of the Paramilitaries Also Deserted................................. 103
The Effects of PSYOPS......................................................... 104
The Effects of the Capture of Baghdad....................................... 108
CHAPTER SIX
Superior Military Capabilities Gave Coalition Forces an
Overwhelming Advantage .............................................. 113
Iraqi Forces Could Not Withstand the Weight and Accuracy of
Coalition Firepower........................................................ 113
The Coalition Could Attack Iraqi Forces at Standoff Distances and
at Night...................................................................... 115
Coalition Armor Dominated in the Ground Fighting..................... 118
The Speed of U.S. Maneuvers Surprised and Demoralized the Iraqi
Defenders ................................................................... 119
CHAPTER SEVEN
Concluding Observations.................................................... 123
The Coalition’s Success Was Achieved Rapidly and at a Low Cost....... 123
But Decisionmakers Should Be Careful About the Lessons They
Draw from OIF ............................................................ 124
Generally Weak in War, Iraq’s Military Performance in OIF
Proved Even Worse Than Its Poor Showing in Desert Storm ...... 125
The Coalition Was Fortunate That Saddam Acted As He Did.......... 129
OIF Set the Stage for the Insurgency That Followed....................... 131
Iraqi Actions to Fend Off the Invasion Helped Shape and
Promote the Insurgency That Followed............................... 132
vii