DTIC ADA462021: A Nation at War. Annual Strategy Conference (17th) Held at Carlisle Barracks, PA on 11-13 April 2006

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CONFERENCE REPORT
A NATION AT WAR
Seventeenth Annual Strategy Conference
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
April 11-13, 2006
Edited by
Colonel (Retired) John R. Martin
January 2007
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A Nation at War
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ISBN 1-58487-273-X
ii
CONTENTS
FOREWORD ....................................... v
INTRODUCTION .................................. 1
PANEL I. THE HOMELAND SECURITY CONTEXT:
NATIONAL ACCESS VS. NATIONAL SECURITY
General. ........................................ 7
Border Security: A Foreign Perspective
by Ms. Susan Sim ........................... 23
PANEL II. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT:
COALITION BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE
General ....................................... 33
Coalition Building
by Lieutenant General (Retired)
Christian Delanghe .......................... 53
PANEL III. THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT:
THE RESERVE COMPONENTS AT WAR
General ....................................... 61
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Building a Defense Force for the 21st Century
by Dr. William J. Perry ....................... 81
PANEL IV. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT:
GLOBALIZATION VS. NATIONAL SECURITY
General ....................................... 87
Globalization and U.S. National Security:
An Overview of Some Basic Issues
by Dr. Edward M. Graham ................... 97
iii
The Economic Rise of China:
Commercial Threat or Blessing?
by Dr. Leif Rosenberger ..................... 115
The Dollar as a Commodity of Strategic
National Interest
by Mr. John D. Lange ....................... 125
PANEL V. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT:
COMPETING LEGAL ISSUES
General ...................................... 129
Justifying the American Way of War
by Professor Michael F. Noone ............... 143
The Nation at War
by Rear Admiral (Retired) Jane G. Dalton ..... 149
Competing Legal Issues: A European Viewpoint
by Professor Charles Garraway .............. 163
CONCLUSION ................................... 189
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES ...................... 193
iv
FOREWORD
The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Strategy
Conference each year addresses a major security issue of
relevance to the United States and its allies. Recognizing
that the ultimate symbol of the nation’s commitment
is “boots on the ground,” the USAWC focuses the
Strategy Conference on the subject’s implications for
ground power. The conference brings together top
national security strategists, senior military leaders,
media, university faculty, and the policymaking
community to consider, discuss, and debate topics
concerning America’s national security strategy. The
2006 conference was designed to help frame vital
questions that offer insights on the conference theme:
“A Nation at War.”
The phrase “A Nation at War” evokes images of
mobilization of the nation’s resources: military surely,
but also the government, industry, and the population.
Thus far in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),
though, the mobilization has not been on the scale
seen in past “global” wars. As the Nation approached
the 5-year mark of the start of the GWOT, the USAWC
focused the attention of its Seventeenth Annual
Strategy Conference on whether or not the evidence
supports the continuing assumption that the Nation
is really at war. Some would insist that the answer is
obviously yes. The conference studied this question in
depth with panels on the homeland security aspects,
the international context, the legal foundation for the
war, and the associated economic and domestic policy
issues. The conclusion was that the answer to the
question is not as clear as first thought. Much of the
evidence suggests that the Nation—or at least some
parts of it—is not at war.
v
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to provide
this summary, analysis, and associated papers from
the 2006 conference.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
vi
INTRODUCTION
Is America at war? To the soldier under attack
today from a roadside bomb or a group of insurgents
in Iraq, the answer seems clear: a resounding yes. The
same unequivocal response would have emanated
from Afghanistan in 2002, although that theater has
suffered from inattention in the intervening years. In
Afghanistan, the answer to the war question is a bit
harder: soldiers in Kabul recognize that they are at
“something other than peace,” but may not be sure
that they are at war . . . and with whom. As one draws
farther and farther from the theaters of war, confusion
increases about whether or not the Nation is really at
war. Even in some parts of the Defense Department,
bureaucracy—in the most pejorative sense of the
word—reigns, providing examples that suggest even
the agency charged with prosecuting the war is unable
to instill in all its people the urgency that should attach
when a nation is involved in an existential fight. Military
personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan sometimes
can see the faults of their own Department, but are
more likely to focus their attention on other parts of
the government. In 2005 (and undoubtedly continuing
in 2006), senior leaders in Iraq increasingly were
asking, “Where’s the rest of the U.S. Government?”
The State Department, with its significant investment
of personnel and other resources in Iraq, is protected
somewhat from the implied criticism, but many parts
of the diplomatic corps also are missing the expected
sense of urgency. Perhaps worst of all is the answer
that would come from the broad American public.
Their vocal response might be affirmative, but except
for those families with loved ones in the military, there
1
might be scant tangible evidence that the Nation is at
war.
Part of the confusion stems from the nature of
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The war is
certainly existential, but judging the performance of
the nation by the standard of the fight for the nation’s
life in World War II is wrong. Even in World War II,
some parts of the United States—government and
public—might have been only marginally affected,
but the overwhelming majority of the country felt
in daily life the sacrifices required for the war effort.
Mobilization was immense; American industry was
mobilized on par with the nation’s citizenry. Although
some actions—like saving tin foil to be used in building
battleships—were more symbolic than significant,
virtually every American was acutely aware of his or
her role in the war. When making comparisons against
the World War II standard, analysts of today’s GWOT
can not be faulted for suggesting that the Nation really
is not at war.
A better standard to use for comparison would
perhaps be the Cold War. The Department of Defense
(DoD), in its Quadrennial Defense Review and other
documents, has recognized that the United States is
engaged in “. . . what will be a long war.”1 During the
Cold War, the nuclear threat sometimes seemed like the
Sword of Damocles hanging over the head of the U.S.
populace, but faith in deterrence—even that provided
by mutually assured destruction—allowed Americans
to continue with their everyday lives. Industry was
able to focus on products other than military materiel,
contributing to the strength of the economy that was
key in the eventual defeat of the Soviet Union. The
analogy with the Cold War is not perfect: the economy
may be of less importance in the GWOT than finding
2
the intellectual capital to win the diplomatic and
informational “battles” that lie ahead. Nonetheless, the
Cold War paradigm is probably more appropriate for
a comparison with today’s GWOT.
For the U.S. Army War College’s Seventeenth An-
nual Strategy Conference, the Strategic Studies Institute
proposed analysis of several of the many dimensions
of the GWOT. Recognizing that no conference could
hope to be comprehensive in such an analysis, the
conference organizers decided to concentrate on five
distinct aspects of the current war, hoping to touch in
some way on each of the elements of national power.
1. Defending the nation’s borders (addressing—at
least in part—the informational element of national
power). When in a war—either of the Cold War or
World War II variety—defense of the borders is an
imperative. One side of a current political debate
suggests that open borders are the more desirable
alternative. While not specifically addressing the
national security risks, the pundits on this side of the
equation point out that tightening borders and limiting
foreign entrance into the country are accompanied by
real costs: economic costs, intellectual costs, and costs
in international goodwill. Finding the balance between
open and tightly-constricted borders presents a major
national security challenge.
2. Building and maintaining international support
(addressing an issue for the diplomatic element of
national power). Even a “unilateral” preemptive
attack requires the support of other nations, whether
organized in a loosely-bound coalition or bonded
together as allies in a legally-binding treaty. In Iraq
and other recent operations, some part of that support
simply has served a legitimizing function. Absent an
international mandate—from the United Nations (UN)
3