DTIC ADA456063: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program

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DEFENSE
AND ARMS
CONTROL
STUDIES
PR OGRAM
A nnual Report
MASSACHUSETTS
INSTITUTE ilr(cid:3)T)`
OF TECHNOLOGY
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1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED
1994 N/A -
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology Defense & Arms Control Studies
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Program
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Security Studies Program Massachusetts Institute of Technology 292 REPORT NUMBER
Main Street (E38-600) Cambridge, MA 02139
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a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE SAR 32
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DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
STUDIES PROGRAM
The Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program is a graduate-level,
research and training program based at the MIT Center for International Studies. It
traces its origins to two initiatives. One is the teaching on international security topics that
Professor William Kaufmann began in the 1960s in the MIT Political Science Department.
The other is the MIT-wide seminars on nuclear weapons and arms control policy that Pro-
fessor Jack Ruina and Professor George Rathjens created in the mid 1970s.
The Program's teaching ties are primarily but not exclusively with the Political Science
Department at MIT. The DACS faculty, however, includes natural scientists and engineers
as well as social scientists. Of particular pride to the Program is its ability to integrate
technical and political analyses in studies of international security issues.
Several of the DACS faculty members have had extensive government experience. They
and the other Program faculty advise or comment frequently on current policy problems.
But the Program's prime task is educating those young men and women who will be the
next generation of scholars and practitioners in international security policy making. The
Program's research and public service activities necessarily complement that effort.
The Center for International Studies is a major unit of the School of Humanities and Social
Sciences at MIT and seeks to encourage the analysis of issues of continuing public concern.
Key components of the Center in addition to DACS are Seminar XXI, which offers training
in the analysis of international issues for senior military officers, government officials, and
industry executives; and the MIT Japan Program, which conducts research and educational
activities to further knowledge about Japanese technology, economic activities, and politics.
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
292 MAIN STREET (E38-603)
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139
[phone]
FAX [phone]
COVER PHOTO: MINUTEMAN STATUE
BATTLE GREEN, LEXINGTON, MASSACHUSETTS
PHOTOGRAPH BY HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
t is less than five years since the Berlin Wall was breached and less than three since the
Soviet Union collapsed. Thus no one should be surprised that the United States has yet to
formulate a coherent defense strategy for itself, let alone organize a framework for cooperative
security among the major nations of the world. For more than fifty years America maintained
exceptionally large military forces, mobilized important portions of its industry and science
for defense, and found cause to fight several major wars far from its shores. It is surely to be
expected that the nation would want at least a brief respite from international
responsibilities when the Cold War ended.
But it is not just a collective desire for a vacation that delays the formulation of a coherent
defense policy or the implementation of a design for world order. To begin with, we tend to
exaggerate the role of formal planning in guiding our action during the Cold War or even the
Second World War. In both conflicts the military believed that vastly more human and
material resources were needed to meet the threat than elected officials dared to seek from
the American public. As Carl Builder has pointed out, the persistent gap between proclaimed
requirements and fieldable forces made a mockery of most planning efforts. Defense decisions
were always as much the product of a struggle among bureaucracies for relative advantage
and Congressional interests than they were an exercise in rational analysis. The wait then for
a logical, finely calibrated strategy to be put in place when a threat on the scale of Fascism or
Communism is absent will likely be a very long one indeed.
A prerequisite for a post Cold War strategy, it would seem, would be a public consensus on
America's role in the world. Every war has its political lesson, the public consensus about
the experience, that then guides future policy. The lesson at the end of the First World War
was that the United States should avoid getting involved in power struggles among European
nations. This lesson kept the United States from taking part in the League of Nations and
other fora where international disputes would later be considered. Because the consensus
was so strongly held it was extraordinarily difficult to get the United States involved in the
fight against Hitler even though the Nazi threat was not only to Europe, but also to our own
web of relationships with Europe, and, indeed, the entire world. It took an attack against our
territory by an Axis power and a declaration of war by Hitler to engage us fully.
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
__ __________(cid:3)____________________
Of course, the lesson of the Second World War, a most of them? The debate though is currently quite
lesson which the U.S. military helped craft, was the confused as some on the political left urge an active
REPORT OF
opposite one - that the United States should be world role for the United States, but refuse to cite
THE DIRECTOR
prepared to defend its prime international interests Cold War experience as justification while some on
wherever and whenever they are challenged. With this the right wish to maintain preparedness, but find no
lesson we came to support very large standing forces role for American forces in tempering the chaos of
for the first time in our history and sought the place- the post Cold War world.
ment of these forces across the globe. We developed
a two ocean Navy, a forward deployed Army, and an The prevailing policy of large defense budgets (our's
Air Force that was the embodiment of our greatest essentially equals that of all other nations combined)
technological achievements. Our unwillingness to and only limited world engagements, as much a
ignore challenges to this strategy, no matter how compromise as it appears to be, is not sustainable
distant, debatable or difficult to meet, led to the costly politically. First, without the likelihood of significant
involvements in Korea and Vietnam. engagements, the combat readiness of the forces will
be eroded by ever increasing pork barrel demands on
The debate over what will be the political lesson of the the defense budget. Second, without a consensus on
Cold War is just beginning. Many appear to believe
that the Soviet Union collapsed because of the pressure
of American military preparedness. Some even claim
that it was the specific burden of trying to match President
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative that fatally
exhausted the Soviet Union. However, others think
this is absurd and argue that it was the Soviet Union's
persistent and vast internal problems that forced the
collapse. In their view the Soviet system gradually
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rotted away from corruption, repression, and inefficiency. LL
Important implications for American defense budgets
and foreign policy would follow a resolution of the
debate. Should the United States always challenge
aggression or simply isolate itself from aggression?
Do we need to keep large forces or can we demobilize
During the Cold War we knew where to look
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
where force should be used, the ability to accept A=,A j ` ` . i
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even limited casualties in overseas deployments will be
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near nonexistent.
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It is these and related issues that have absorbed the
attention of the Program during the past year. The .'j. ",=- "^,' 2:
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Program is built around several Working Groups, each .__
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a research collaboration of faculty, graduate students, qe-K~~o.,, n·,
and visitors and each with a distinctive focus and
REPORT OF research style. For example, the New Directions i~
Group, led by Professors George Rathjens, Carl Kaysen
THE DIRECTOR
and Jack Ruina, has examined when and how the United Cobra breakthrough - U.S. attacks on July 27, 1994
States might participate in international humanitarian
and peacemaking interventions. My own Defense
Politics Group has studied the casualty issue, this year Professor Barry Posen's Conventional Forces Group
inviting each of the armed services to describe their has nearly completed its analysis of breakthrough
models for estimating casualties and reflecting on recent armored battles. Through a series of carefully
experience with casualty producing deployments of formatted case studies of Western Front battles
American forces. during the Second World War, the Group is seeking
general lessons about this crucial type of military
The Defense Industries Working Group, which I also operation. The battles, from Normandy to the Rhein,
lead, spent the year exploring the political dynamics are celebrating their anniversary this year.
that sustain or close major defense production lines
such as those for fighter aircraft and warships. It also DACS' Defense Technology Group, which is led by
looked into the administration's conversion, defense Professor Theodore Postol, has had an important
procurement reform, technology promotion, and indus- role in shaping public debate over ballistic missile
trial base policies. Much of the Group's activities defenses. Their critical analysis of Gulf War Patriot
were undertaken in conjunction with the MIT Lean missile-Scud intercept engagements eventually won
Aircraft Initiative, a research project based in the MIT wide acceptance after much official disparagement.
Aeronautics and Astronautics Department and supported More recently the Group has been analyzing implica-
by the Air Force and a consortium of aircraft contractors. tions proposed theater defense systems have for the
viability of the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. Here
Work on a parallel set of issues forms the agenda of the too their work is likely to have an important impact
Post Soviet Security Project, the new name for Professor on public policy.
Stephen Meyer's long established Group. Political
turmoil in and around Russia, however, adds a level of Nuclear proliferation issues have been a long term
difficulty to policy making that is fortunately absent specialization of the Program. Dr. Marvin Miller
from the American experience. Proliferation risks, has led much of the effort in recent years which
although perhaps exaggerated, make the prosperity of includes analysis of proliferation experience and
the Russian defense industry a topic of broad interest. risks in the Middle East and work on American
Acute environmental problems in Russia, many a legacy counter proliferation initiatives. In February DACS
of the Cold War, also attract attention. Here there are cosponsored with the Natural Resources Defense
more parallels with the American situation, which is the Council a symposium in Cambridge on U.S. nuclear
focus of DACS' Defense Environmental Group. policies which brought together many officials and
DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
academic specialists for free ranging discussions of
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current policy trends relating to nuclear weapons.
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DACS cosponsored two other symposia during this
year. In October we helped the MIT Industrial Liaison
Program organize a symposium on defense industry
conversion with a special focus on federal and state rI
assistance for company initiatives. About 100 officials
and company representatives attended the sessions
which have since served as a model for others wishing r-Do REPORT OF
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Q.
to be involved in aiding conversion. THE DIRECTOR
A second workshop, this one cosponsored by the
Lean Aircraft Project, was held in April in conjunction I :
with the General James H. Doolittle Dinner and had
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as its focus acquisition reform proposals. Jimmy
Doolittle was not only a Second World War hero,
but also one of the first PhDs in aviation engineering
What is next for Livermore? What is next for the
from MIT, having received that degree in 1925
defense industries?
while a junior officer in the Army Air Corps. DACS
is helping organize an annual tribute to General
Doolittle who symbolizes the long involvement MIT
and the Boston area has had with military aviation in C.V. Glines, Doolittle's biographer, to discuss General
the United States. Doolittle's distinguished career; and David Lampe of
MIT to discuss MIT's role in military science and
The inaugural session brought together Air Force and technology. The accompanying workshop on acquisition
defense researchers to hear General Ronald Fogleman, reform also had an excellent cast: MIT's Richard
USAF, Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Samuels on Japanese military technology policy;
Command, to discuss Air Force acquisition policy; Brooking's Tom McNaugher on prospects of reform;
a Senate staff aid Brig. General John Douglass (USAF
Ret.) on current legislation; and OTA's Jack Nunn on
the industrial base problem.
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We have several departures and a retirement to note.
1LHi- My long time administrative assistant Judith Spitzer,
0WLD usually a keen observer of the current scene, somehow
01HC misread the end of the Cold War as the end of history
C00ID0 and decided to move over to the MIT Technology and
a_ Society Program where history never ends. As an
audit reveals nothing missing except Judy, I can wish
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her well. All of us though must express our sincere
appreciation for her dedication and good spirit. Fortu-
nately, she is nearby and endorses her replacement,
Will they be frequentflyers? Annmarie Cameron.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 7
Unlike our students, our military fellows have a set involved with our students and have to be considered
time to leave. We benefitted from having Captain essentially DACS associates. They are: Stephen
Ted Wile of the Navy and Major Mike Hodge of the Van Evera, a leading theorist in international
Air Force with us for the year. Military fellows give relations, Ken Oye, Director of our host institution,
us special insight into the organizations and issues we the MIT Center for International Studies, and a well
study. Captain Wile heads off for the U.S. naval staff known specialist in international trade and security
in London and Major Hodge returns to flying at issues, and Richard Samuels, Chair of the Political
Nellis AFB in Nevada. Science Department, home base for several of us,
Director of the MIT Japan Program, our upstairs
REPORT OF Jack Ruina, one of our founding fathers, and long neighbor, and a widely recognized specialist in the
time director of the Program, retired from teaching Japanese defense industry.
THE DIRECTOR
in June. His accomplishments in engineering, security
studies, government service and university adminis- We are grateful to our several sponsors: the Carnegie
tration are many, but we would put the establishment Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the
of DACS near the very top of the list. Such achievement John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the
allows no retirement from the Program. We are W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund,
pleased to report that Jack will retain an office with the John Merck Fund, the Department of Defense, the
us and will continue to pursue several research and Department of Energy, the Sloan Foundation, the
writing projects under the DACS banner. MIT Lincoln Laboratory, MITRE Corporation, and
the MIT Lean Aircraft Initiative.
The annual report gives me opportunity to thank
those who have helped us during the year. Three
colleagues in political science have been especially Harvey M. Sapolsky
8 DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
FACULTY
HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY is Professor of Public Policy
and Organization in the Department of Political
Science and Director of both the Defense and Arms
Control Studies Program and the MIT Communica-
tions Forum. Dr. Sapolsky completed a B.A. at
Boston University and earned an M.P.A. and Ph.D.
at Harvard University. He has worked in a number
of nublic nolicv areas. notablv health. science. and
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defense and specializes in effects of institutional
structures and bureaucratic politics on policy outcomes. In the defense field he has served
as a consultant to the Commission on Government Procurement, the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense, the Naval War College, the Office of Naval Research, and the RAND
Corporation, and has lectured at all of the service academies. He is currently focusing his
research on three topics: interservice and civil/military relations; the impact of casualties
on U.S. use of force; and the structure of defense industries. In July 1989 he succeeded
Professor Ruina as Director of the MIT Defense and Arms Control Studies Program.
Professor Sapolsky's most recent defense-related book is titled Science and the Navy, and
is a study of military support of academic research. A volume on telecommunications
policy he co-edited has just appeared.
CARL KAYSEN is David W. Skinner Professor of
Political Economy Emeritus in the Program in
Science, Technology, and Society and a Senior
Lecturer at the MIT Center for International Studies.
Dr. Kaysen earned his B.A. in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania, and his Ph.D. at Harvard
University, where he was an economics professor
from 1950-1966. From 1966 until 1976, when he
came to MIT, he was Director of the Institute for
Advanced Study in Princeton and from 1961-1963
he was the Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Kennedy.
He has served as a consultant to RAND, the Defense Department, and the CIA. A member
of the Committee on Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dr.
Kaysen is currently engaged in organizing a project under the Committee's auspices on
emerging norms of justified international intervention.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 9
STEPHEN M. MEYER is Professor of Defense and Arms Control
Studies and Director of Soviet Security Studies at MIT. Prior to
FACULTY
joining the MIT faculty in 1979, he was a post-doctoral fellow
at Harvard University's Center for Science and International
Affairs. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor in 1978. Dr. Meyer's areas of particular interest are
defense decision-making, military economics, force planning and analysis, and arms control in the
former Soviet Union. His current work examines the rise and fall of Soviet military power and the ways
in which domestic organizations and institutions influenced Soviet defense policy. Dr. Meyer serves as
an advisor on Soviet security affairs to several U.S. government agencies and has testified numerous
times in open and closed hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, the Senate Armed
Services Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence.
MARVIN M. MILLER is a Senior Research Scientist in the Depart-
ment of Nuclear Engineering and a member of the MIT Center
for International Studies. After undergraduate work at the City
College of New York he earned an M.A. in Physics from the
University of Rochester and a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering
from the Polytechnic Institute of New York. Prior to joining
MIT in 1976. Dr. Miller was an associate nrofessor of electrical
engineering at Purdue University working on laser theory and
applications. His current research interests are arms control, particularly nuclear proliferation, and the
environmental impacts of energy use. He has studied proliferation issues since 1977, including both
country-specific and generic problems. In the former, his main interests are in the Middle East and
South Asia, while in the latter he has concentrated on international safeguards and export controls for
sensitive nuclear technologies. From 1984 to 1986, Dr. Miller was a Foster Fellow with the Nuclear
Weapons and Control Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and is
currently a consultant on proliferation issues for ACDA, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
10 DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL STUDIES PROGRAM
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