DTIC ADA442714: Cyberwar and Information Warfare: A Revolution in Military Affairs or Much Ado about Not Too Much?

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
CYBERWAR AND INFORMATION WARFARE: A REVOLUTION IN
MILITARY AFFAIR!3 OR MUCH ADO ABOUT NOT TOO MUCH?
LONGER ESSAY (5605)
CHARLES A. RAY/CLASS OF 1997
MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS
SEMINAR M
PAPER SPONSER CAPT STEVE DOYLE
FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER. COL JOHN ZIELINSKI
FACULTY ADVISOR. DR TERRY DElBEL
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1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED
1997 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1997 to 00-00-1997
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Cyberwar and Information Warfare: A Revolution in Military Affairs or
5b. GRANT NUMBER
Much Ado About Not Too Much?
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
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National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. REPORT NUMBER
McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000
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a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 33
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
P CYBERWAR AND INFOR~TION WARFARE: A REVOLUTION IN
MILITARY AFFAIRS OR MUCH ADO ABOUT NOT TOO iVfCCH?
Introduction
Throughout recorded history there have been a number of major changesm the
way wars are fought that have been related m some degree to changesm technology
Lookmg back on these changes,a nd at the changest hat are bemg causedb y the raprd
advancesi n today’s technology, many people assertt hat we are m the nndst of a
revolution m rmhtary affans (RMA) The Department of Defense’s Office of Net
Assessmentd efines an RMA as “a major changem the nature of warfare brought about by
the mnovatrve apphcatrono f technologresw hich, combmed wnh dramatrc changesm
rmhtary doctrme, and operatronalc oncepts,f undamentally alters the charactera nd conduct
of operatrons“ l A study of history reveals, however, that technology does not, m and of
itself, change the way arn-nesc onduct the busmesso f waging war For example, while the
arrmeso f the French Revolutron comcrdedw nh the begmmngs of the Industnal
Revolutron, it was the mcorporatron of the people mto the war effort through the Zevkee n
masse whrch had the most profound impact on how war was waged after 1815 ’ And
furthermore, despite the profound Impact of the kv&e en masse, rt was not revolutronary
m a senseo f having sprung full blown at that precise penod m hrstory 3
Smce the dawn of trme, when the tribal army emerged from the armed tnbe,
warfare has been characterizeda s follows Mrhtary orgamzatronsa re formed for enher
defensrveo r offensive purposes,t o protect the tnbe or natron or to defeat an enemy who
had somethmg the tnbe or nation coveted Consequently, they are by nature conservatrve
Sudden alterations m the way armies conduct operations, mtroduced without testmg and
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Low-tech adversaries can sometimes
give us a run for our money.
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proof of then efficacy, can render an army incapable of fulfillmg its basic purpose When
new battlefield technology 1sm troduced,m thtanes typrcally approachr t wanly, retammg
much of the old way of doing thmgs to ensurea capabrhty of meetmg known or expected
threats, or until the old way is demonstratedt o be no longer capable of coping with
threats This 1sn ot to argue agamst adopting new technologies, for armres must still
prepare to cope with peer adversaries As long as we live in a world where the fruits of
technology are not evenly drstrrbuted,h owever, the modem army must keep a foot m both
camps - retammg the abrhty to deal with the known threat of technologically less advanced
foes while preparmg for the unknown. It is evolution then, rather than revolutron, which
setst he upper lmnt of change,a nd the farlure to find the proper balance between the
known and the unknown can causew asted resourcesa nd lost opportunmes
What makes the current age appearr evolutronary 1st he drzzymg speeda t which
new technologies are mtroduced With the end of the Cold War, future threats are rll-
defined or unknown. Under such condmons rt 1sp rudent to make haste slowly This 1s
not to argue that change is not necessary We must contmually change to keep pace with
a changing world, while at the same trme, retammg the capability to meet more tradmonal
.
threats “There 1sa tendency to want to reduce complex mstnutronal behavior to simple
one-dimensional characterizations. ‘revolutronary technology holds the answer to the
future of war,’ or ‘wrthout any external threats there 1sn o need for advanceds trategic
thmkmg “’ 4 The new technologies, those exlstmg and those yet unknown, will have to be
integrated mto our force structure, tactics and securq planning process But, history
arguest hat change, when it comes, will be m responset o a host of factors and, m the final
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Balancing old and new technology - no easy
task.
?- analysis, technology mtght prove to be one of the least stgmfrcant. While we cannot afford
to ignore new technologres,b ecauseo f the possrblllty of a technologrcal leap by a potential
adversary,w e also cannot afford to assumet hat possessrono f advancedt echnology alone
will ensure that we will prevail over less advanceda dversarres What 1sn eededi s a
balanced approach- mamtenanceo f sufficient existing capabllny while, at the same time,
preparmg for the unknown
From Greece to Macedon
In the 5th Century BC the Greeks mtroduced mobrhty and an increasedu se of
cavalry and mtssrle weaponsw hich for a trme prevailed over the mass formatrons
commonly m use at the trme In the end, the declme of Greecea s a power was due to clvrl
decay and incessantc rvrl wars 5
Philip of Macedon, a prince from a petty and senn-barbancn orthern kmgdom, had
been a prisoner m Thebes and in 371 BC observedt he Theban victory at the battle of
Leuctra Philip was impressedb y the victory, but at the same time saw the shortcomings
of the Theban tactics When he took over the throne, he undertook to build what became
the world’s first truly national standing army 6 The army that Philip built and bequeathed
.
to his son Alexander, though it drd possesss ome technologrcal mnovatrons,a lso creatively
employed exrstmg technology that was centuneso ld
Recogmzmg that the phalanx, though excellent for defense,w as inadequatef or
offensive operations, Philip mtroduced the sanssa, a speart hat was 21 feet long as
compared to the Greek pike which was never longer than about 14 feet At the same time,
he extended the depth of the phalanx from eight to sixteen ranks “On level ground this
n
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mobile human fortress was mvmcrble when rt bore down wrth locked shields and bnstlmg
points “’ To protect the vulnerable flanks and rear, Philip developed supportmg light
infantry which rncluded archersa ndJ avelinsa nd addedm obrhty to the force In Phrhp’s
time, effective engmeso f war had been known for centunes,sb ut their use had been
restrrctedt o sregecraft. In a truly mnovatrvem ove, Philip addeda n artrllery arm to his
force In addition, he ongmated the idea of carrying only the essentialp arts of the
engines, relying on local trees to supply the timbers which made up the heaviestp arts
With some changesm name, both the balhsta and the catapult lasted until the late Middle
Ages before any srgnrficantc hangesm artillery were mtroduced
Twenty-two years after he left Thebes as a hostage,P hrhp appeareda t the gates of
the city with his new army to challenge the supremacyo f Greece With a force of 40,000
he defeated a numencally superior force This samea rmy, under Philip’s son Alexander,
crossedt he Hellespont four years later to challenge the known world
The Dark Ages
From nse to fall the Roman Emprre’s only slgmfrcant technologrcal contnbutions
to warfare were the pdum and the gladrus.’ The mtroductron of the legion, a more
tactrcally flexible formation than the phalanx, was probably more m~lnar~lys r~gmficant.
After Rome’s demise, barbarian tnbes, the Goths and Vandals, held sway rmhtanly for a
few generations,b ut followed the empire into obscunty The Visrgoths ruled Spam until
the eighth century, but were regularly beatenm encountersw ith the Franks and were an
easy conquest for the Saracens
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r”
“All three peoples disappearedf rom history, and with them vanishedt he last
chenshed traceso f Roman n-&tax-ys lull m the West Another cycle had been completed,
and the methods of warfare reverted to their crudest begmnmgs “lo
In the sixth century Franlush war bands were merging mto a kmgdom of sorts
The sons of Clovesh ad developed mto able war leaders and his domam extendedt o
include half of Germany, most of France, and the terntory that IS now Switzerland and the
Low Countnes. At the begmnmg of the seventhc entury this domam had become the
foremost power m Europe and was the only force capable of stopping the Moonsh
mcurslon which had reachedF rance by 732 The defeat of the Moors, however, relied
entirely on bulk and, it was not until the accessiono f Charles the Great (Charlemagne)
that any effort was made to improve the quality of the forces “Charlemagne retamed the
pnnclple of universal service but formed hs subjectsm to small groups, each being
required to send one well-armed man instead of several wretchedly equipped peasants“ I’
This formed the basis of the feudal system which becamet he foundation of European
-es The technological advancemento f this penod was the invention of the stirrup m
the early 800s which, by providing a stable mounted platform, enabled the mtroduction of
.
cavalry shock tactics which persistedw ith only mmor modlficatlons through the 19th
century The first sign&ant use of cavalry against mfantry, however, was not until 1066
at the battle of Hastings when Norman forces defeatedt he army of Kmg Harold
With Cross and Crossbow
The next significant technological developmentm warfare occurred m the eleventh
century becauseo f the arbakst, or crossbow This was, m fact, a balbsta on a small
scale, but rt fired a small bolt which could pierce the best Eastern armor, and could be
fired from a prone positron The bolts were also cheapera nd less bulky than arrows,
though it was slower becauseo f the requirement to wmd the winch after each shot. The
crossbow was mentioned m the battle of Hastings m 1066, but rt was merely a novelty
until the Crusades Combmed with the shock tactrcso f the Chnstran army, the penetrating
mtssile attack of the crossbow was key to the defeat of Eastern forces at Jerusalem,A rsuf
and Jaffa
In the thnteenth century the English dominated the rmhtary scenet hrough
employment of the longbow The national weapon of England, the ax-foot longbow had
greater accuracy, penetration and range than the crossbow or the shorter bow, and was
able to penetratet he armor of French knights In addition, the longbow could be fired
faster than the crossbow “Still, for all of the supenonty of then new weapon, the English
owed far more to tactrcs,o rgamzatron and natronal spent “I2 Whrle the lowborn men of
Europe remamed serfs, the Magna Charta had unfettered the English and for the first time
m the Middle Ages the men m the ranks were serving as paid professional soldiers rather
than levy on the part of then feudal masters
.
Gunpowder
The use of explosrvec ompoundst o propel nnssrlesh ad a profound effect on the
conduct of war, m that rt had increasedl ethality and allowed lulls from greater distances
Yet, for all of this impact, gunpowder, like other mventrons mentioned, did not alter
rmhtary operations for a long penod after rt was invented The Chinese had a form of
gunpowder as early as the tenth century, which was used pnmanly in ntuals and
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