DTIC ADA442005: Culture Counts: Cultural Bias in the National Security Strategy

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NATIONAL DEFENSEU NIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Culture Counts:
Cultural Bias In the National Securrty Strategy
t
Timothy D. Andrews
Class of 1998
Course 5601
Seminar L
Dr. Stafford Dr. Detbel
Faculty Seminar Leader Academic Adviser
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Culture Counts: Cultural Bias in the National Security Strategy
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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
The May 1997 document entltied A Naflonailecurlty Strategy for a New Century
offers an ambrtlous lnternatlonal agenda for an epoch whtch has thus far been marked
by domestic concerns about the costs of malntatnlng a powerful U.S. presence around
the world. Funding for the conduct of dlplomatlc operations has plunged almost 50
percent In real terms over the past 15 years, and the end of the Cold War brought a
one-third cut In defense spending. Meanwhile, A Naf/onalSecur/fySfrategyldentlfies
many new challenges and potential threats to U.S. national interests. None assumes
the magnitude of the vanquished Soviet threat or implies the expenditures the US.
Incurred In countering It. But, collectively, they demand that more resources be
devoted to national security than either the American body politic or our national
leaders have thus far seemed inclined to commit.
It would be tempting to dlsmlss A NationalSecuMy Strategy as a collection of
insubstantial platitudes intended for public consumption and to ask for a copy of the
“real” strategy. But such an approach would ignore the genuine views that underlie this
Hue-Jacketed document and the extent to which it IS likely to frame the terms of debate
- both In public and wlthrn the Admlnlstratlon - over how and with what means the
strategy should be Implemented. Instead, this outline of strategy should be taken at
face value and Its expltclt and implicit content analyzed rigorously, so that appropriate
resources and means may be applied to the attainment of priority goals and objectives.
Assumptions are critical, if often implicit, elements of any strategy document.
They form the foundation upon which the strategy’s analytical framework IS built. If
Important assumptions are erroneous, the valldlty of the entlre strategy 1sc aiied Into
F~~:XTY OF US ARMY
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1 FT LssleyJ . McNair
WashingtonD, C 203194066
question. This brief essay will examine one apparent implicit assumption and discuss Its
lmpllcatlons for the overall fegslbrllty of A Nac!ona/SecurlfyStrategy.
From the inception of the Republic, Americans have viewed representative
democracy as superior to other forms of political organization According to James
Madlson,l a republican democracy could prevent the debllrtatlng effects of factional
conflict, and fellow Federalist John Jay argued that It could reduce the frequency of
war.2 Today, the terms “democracy” and “representative democracy” are essentially
synonymous In public discourse, and we ascnbe additional benefits, for ourselves and
for others, to democratic systems 3
However, representative democracy IS a part of Western culture. The rebellious
colonists of North America could c&e their lack of representation with good effect to
Justify calls for Independence from the U.K. only because the U.K. had a parliament
Fundamental concepts of democracy flowed from the Athenians and were modified by
European theorists, such as Locke and Rousseau, to address the realities of emerging
nation-states Over the eight generations between the founding of the United States
and the end of the Second World War, most European states experimented - some
more successfully than others - with democratic systems.
Representative democracy has much shallower roots In other parts of the world.
Many African ethnic groups Integrated democratic elements into their political systems
’ James Madison, “The Federalrst No. 10,” In Cooke, Jacob E, ed , The Federallst(Middletown Weslyan
Unrversrty Press, 1961), p 61
* John Jay, “The Federalist No 3,” In Cooke, op clt, pp 16-17
3 “Underprnnrng U S rnternatronal leadership IS the power of our democratrc Ideals and values In
designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy supports American values and
enhances our security and prosperity Democratic governments are more lrkely to cooperate wrth each
before the advent of European colonialism, for example. However, colonial political and
economic structures precluded democratic practice on a nation-state scale until shortly
before Independence In most cases. Their experiences often did not compare favorably
with that of Welmar Germany. Other concepts, such as nearly complete freedom of the
press and free market economies, are often linked to democratic political systems but
are not necessarily precluded by other forms of government. However, they, too, are
Western concepts that do not necessarily resonate with non-Westerners. Kishore
Mahbubanl, a top official of Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once commented:
The greatest myth that an Amencan Journalist cherishes IS that he IS an underdog, the
lone ranger who works against monstrous bureaucracies to uncover the real truth, often
at great personal risk I never understood this myth when I was In Washington. Cabinet
secretaries, senators, ambassadors and generals promptly return the phone calls of
Journalists and cultivate them assiduously None would dare tell an American Journalist
on a major paper to go to hell A key assumption of the American Constitution IS that
unchecked power leads to It-responslblllty. It IS therefore puzzling that many American
Journalists assume their unchecked power will do no fundamental harm 4
Mahbubani also questions more generally the American emphasis on lndlvldual
“nghts”, arguing that too much freedom may be inlmrcal to the society as a whole.
After reviewing statistics on crime, divorce and out-of-wedlock births, he remarks:
An outsider must conclude that the seductive notion that any social obllgatlon IS only a
dlmlnutlon of lndlvldual freedom has played a key role In undermlnrng the family as an
institution.5
Mahbubanl stresses that he and “most East Asians have no desire to see the
United States fall off a cliff.” In more ways than one, the American presence has been
‘Immensely clvlllzlng” for East Asia, opening “East Asian minds to the most generous
other against common threats and to encourage free and open trade and less likely to wage war or
abuse the rights of their people,” A National Securi~ Strategy, p 2
4 Klshore Mahbubanl, ‘Go East, Young Man,” in The Washmgton Quarter&(Vol 17, No 2), p 13
5 Ibid, p 11
aspects of Western civilization.” The purpose of his article IS to warn the United States
that it ‘IS approaching a cliff of which it seems as yet blissfully unaware.”
Certain parallels can be drawn between the circumstances of the United States
today and of the Roman Empire at the outset of the Pax Romana nearly two mlllennla
ago. The Romans had succeeded In pacifying and promoting their values and ideals
within most of the Classical world. In their view, what lay beyond was uncultured,
barbarian and not worthy of significant attention beyond a need to protect Imcerlal
borders from occasional Incursions. This parallel should not be overdrawn; the U.S. has
extended Its cultural reach over far more of the planetary surface than the Romans ever
did, and the Romans probably knew less of the potential threats beyond their borders
than U.S. pollcymakers know of the challenges that face Amenca today. Nonetheless,
“American hegemony IS receding.“’ Unlike the Romans, who confronted essentially
every challenge within their sphere, the U.S. does not wish to (and practically cannot)
take action or cause others to take action against every challenge that arises within the
much larger sphere of the entire planet. Oddly, however, A Nat!onalSecur@Gtrategy
Implies that the U.S. can successfully confront almost every Identifiable challenge to ts
national security.
Cultures are particular ways of accompllshlng the things that make life possible-the
perpetuation of the species, the transmission of knowledge, the absorption of the shocks
of change and death Cultures differ In the relative Importance they attach to time,
noise, safety, cleanliness, violence, thrift, Intellect, sex and art These differences In turn
Imply differences In social choices, economic efficiency, and polrtlcal stablllty. Cultures
compete (and) happy endings are not guaranteed In all cultural encounters 8
‘Ibid,p 6
’ Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Clvllzatfons and the Remaking of World Order(New York Simon &
Schuster, 1996), p 91
’ Thomas Sowell, Mlgratlons and Cultures. A World l/lew (New York Basic Eiooks, 19961, p 379 and pp
384-385
The modern strategist plays down culture and mindset at srgnrficant risk. As a
member of my committee noted in his critique of NATO expansion, “The West simply
cannot, overnight, undo Russian thinking that has existed for fifty years.”
Culture counts, and not all Ideals are universal. Some cholesterol IS required for
cells to reproduce, but too much can be most unhealthy. A measure of faith In the
rightness of the American way of life and values IS appropriate and may even be
necessary In light of the American tradition of demanding “morality” of its security
policy. But A NationalSecurityStrategyis suffused with an unhealthy level of
enthusiasm for American culture - an implrcrt assumption that our way of life IS so
universally attractive that all will hearken to it. Such an approach may draw In and
engage many readers, but It may also conceal obstacles to attaining strategic goals.
As we enter the twenty-first century, we have an unprecedented opportunity to make our
nation safer and more prosperous. Our mllltary might IS unparalleled; a dynamic global
economy offers increasing opportunities of American Jobs and American Investment; and
the community of democratic nations IS growing, enhancing the prospects for polItIcal
stablllty, peaceful conflict resolution and greater hope for the people of the wor1d.l’
Underprnnlng [U.S.] International leadership IS the power of our democratic ideals and
values I1
The convlctlon that American society, for all Its flaws and blemishes, IS the best society In
the world runs deep in the American soul So, too, does the conviction that American
society need not contemplate fundamental changes In the new global era.l*
A fundamental dlffrculty with A NaflonalSecuMy Strategy Is the extent to which It
subsumes under “democratic values” aspects of American culture - such as a woman’s
“nght” to ‘reproductlve freedom” or the media’s “right” to dlssemmate false InformatIon
’ Robert Smith, LTC, USAF, Untitled and Unpublished Paper for Course One at National War College, p 1
lo A Nat/onalSecur/ty Strategy, preface, p I.
l1 Ibid, p 2
about public figures as long as It does not do so with malicious intent - which are not
perceived In many other cultures to be fundamental, Ineluctable components of any
democracy. Huntington points out that early leaders of Pakistan, Singapore and St-1
Lanka played down their training at elite British universities and appealed to traditional
cultural values to motivate people and win their supp~rt.‘~
As Western power declines, the ability of the West to Impose Western concepts of human
nghts, Ilberallsm, and democracy on other clvlllzatlons also declines, and so does the
attractiveness of these values to the [target] clvlltzatlons l4
All nations - not Just the U.S. - engage In national security strategy development.
Because the U.S. looms large In the IJvorld, many of these countries often devote great
resources to understanding America and Americans. We must take similar steps. U.S.
national security strategy cannot be developed In Isolation from an understanding of
how and from what perspectives other states view us and our culture, because there IS
an Inevitable feedback loop. In the “global village” there wrll be many houses, and they
will not all have the same floor plan or furnishings. If the U.S. IS to remain secure and
to prosper In this era, our pollcymakers must recognize differences In national and sub-
national cultures and account for how these differences affect a country’s interaction
with the rest of the world. To the extent that we assume that all peoples are basically
alike and that most of them want to be like us, we run a serious risk of overslmpllfylng
the challenges to our national security, underestlmatlng the costs of addressing them,
and overestimating our prospects of doing so successfully.
‘* Mahbubam, op c/t, pp 5-6
l3 Huntington, op cd, p 93
l4 Ibid, p 92