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(cid:2) Storm Over A–10 providing close air support. the Desert DOD (H.H. Deffner) A New Assessment By B E N J A M I N S. L A M B E T H E ven before the first bomb fell, predicted allied casualties in the thou- some observers believed the sands. The final authorizing order air campaign held the prom- from the President to the Commander ise of winning the Persian in Chief, Central Command, acknowl- Gulf War. But overall there was ram- edged that losses could reach 10 per- pant uncertainty over whether air- cent of fielded coalition ground forces. power could assure the outcome with- Despite such concerns, the conse- out a major ground offensive that quences of initial air operations on might entail a notable loss of life. shaping the war could not be denied. Computer models using traditional Opening attacks against command and assumptions about attrition warfare control facilities and integrated air defenses proved uniformly successful, with some 800 combat sorties Benjamin S. Lambeth is a senior staff member at RAND who has flown 35 types of launched at night under radio silence military aircraft; he is also the author of Russia’s Air Power in Crisisand The against important targets. Only one Transformation of American Air Power. 30 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 2000 N/A - 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER A New Assessment 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Center for Counterproliferation Research National Defense University REPORT NUMBER Washington, DC 20319-5066 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images. 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE UU 5 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Lambeth coalition aircraft was lost—a Navy B–52G taking off F/A–18—presumably to an infrared during Gulf War. missile from a MiG–25. Over the next three days, the air campaign systemati- cally struck targets on the strategic and operational levels, gaining unchal- lenged control of the air and freedom to operate with near impunity against enemy airfields, ground forces, and other assets. When a cease-fire was declared five weeks later, most observers acknowl- edged the roles of all elements of the coalition, albeit with interpretations largely drawn along service lines. How- ever, the prevailing view was that m) Desert Storm was the apotheosis of air- Putna power. The only question that remained Chris was whether the conflict pointed to the D ( O D predominance of airpower in future wars and thus to a need for a new way of viewing military operations. The conflict has been thoroughly found in the relative rate of allied com- medium altitude unmolested by either documented. The Gulf War Air Power bat aircraft losses. Sortie rates remained SAMs or fighters. Second, the eleventh- Survey, modeled on the strategic bomb- roughly constant throughout the six hour introduction of joint surveillance ing survey after World War II, con- weeks of fighting. Yet the coalition in- target attack radar system (JSTARS) air- tributed an analytical point of depar- curred nearly half of its aircraft losses craft permitted commanders to iden- ture for examining the campaign. The (17) in the first week as low-level oper- tify fixed and moving objects on a facts are not in dispute, but their ations were needed to penetrate Iraqi large enough scale to make informed meaning remains contentious. air defenses, which had not been fully force commitments and execute lethal neutralized. Another eight were attacks against ground force targets, Unprecedented War downed in the final week as low-alti- day or night. Third was the realization Control of the air over Iraq was tude operations were resumed to sup- during battlefield preparation that in- essentially achieved during the open- port the ground campaign. Losses were frared sensors and laser-guided bombs ing moments of Desert Storm. In con- largely due to optically-tracked antiair- could find and destroy dug-in tanks. trast to the tentativeness of Operation craft artillery and infrared surface-to- All these factors gave U.S. airpower an Rolling Thunder against North Viet- air missiles (SAMs), which could not be unprecedented edge in joint warfare nam, virtually every target category in located from the air. against ground forces. the master attack plan was hit on the Suppressing enemy air defenses The air campaign highlighted the first night—simultaneously to maxi- (SEAD) and early neutralization of the fact that airpower embraces not only mize shock effect. That made the Iraqi air force were the most acclaimed Air Force capabilities but Navy and Ma- airpower achieve- rine assets as well as Army helicopters ments. Yet they only and missiles. The first impact on open- early air control operations were secured a buy-in con- ing night was not a precision weapon quintessentially strategic, depriving Iraq dition for enabling delivered by a stealth fighter but a airpower to demon- Hellfire missile launched from an at- of both defenses and situation awareness strate real leverage: tack helicopter against an air defense engaging an enemy site. Airpower harnesses all combat opening round of Desert Storm the wholesale with virtual impunity and combat support elements of the largest air offensive since World War II. through precision standoff attacks. Armed Forces, including space and in- Early air control operations were This point is key to understanding the formation warfare, that exploit air and quintessentially strategic, depriving capability that airpower revealed for space. Accepting that air warfare in- Iraq of both defenses and situation the first time during Desert Storm. volves every service is an initial step awareness. Perhaps the clearest indica- Three factors allowed airpower to toward properly assimilating the tion of what air dominance meant was draw down Iraqi forces sufficiently so changing role of airpower. the ground offensive could advance, The argument between land and secure in knowing that the enemy was air warriors over who deserves more badly degraded. First, the SEAD cam- credit for the victory is like arguing paign freed aircraft for operations at Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 31 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM AH–64s and OH–58s F–14As during Desert at forward operating Storm. base. Parsons) Dave D ( O D Wagner) Dean D ( O D over which blade of the scissors cut Looking Forward Operationally, the desert was an the paper. Because of battlefield prepa- As effective as coalition aircraft ideal environment for airpower, ration by airpower, U.S. forces suffered proved from the first night, it is mis- though distances to target and foul only 148 killed and 458 wounded out leading to conclude that such a display weather were complications. Although of a half million deployed. For much of airpower should be expected in the effective if used properly and with de- the same reason, less than 2 percent of future. The coalition was extremely termination, applying airpower over the 220,000 rounds of tank ammuni- fortunate with respect to entry condi- Bosnia and against Serbia proved to be tion shipped to the theater was fired tions. U.S. Central Command (CENT- much more challenging than it was in combat. COM) had five and a half months to against Iraq. And the future holds plan, build up, and train in theater. It more, not fewer, cases like the Balkans. was not a come-as-you-are war. 32 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 Lambeth In addition, Desert Storm was fa- AV–8Bs refueling on cilitated by an unusual degree of inter- USS Nassau. national cooperation. A firm U.N. Se- curity Council mandate authorizing the use of all means necessary to eject Iraq from Kuwait, a broad-based multi- national coalition, and Soviet diplo- matic support were all essential. More- over, the coalition enjoyed a basing infrastructure that left little to be de- sired, thanks largely to the U.S. military assistance provided to Saudi Ara- bia over four decades. But had allied aircraft not been based within a rea- sonable operating radius, the air campaign would have unfolded quite dif- ferently. The United States cannot always count on such cooperation. The Bush administration enjoyed strong domestic support during the Gulf War, including backing by an ini- tially reluctant Congress. In addition, DOD (Scott Allen) there was the advantage of a strategi- cally and tactically inept enemy which failed to move against Saudi Arabia armed combatants on both sides Center of the Debate early in the buildup. What is more, poised for immediate action along the Much of the post-Gulf War debate Iraq misjudged everything that mat- demilitarized zone, there would be over airpower involves whether attacks tered: whether the United States close ground combat from the start. against center of gravity targets, de- would go beyond words and muster Airpower would likely assure allied fined as leadership and infrastructure the staying power and domestic sup- ownership over North Korea following assets in and around Baghdad, signifi- port once committed, allied cohesion, the outbreak of a full-fledged war and cantly shaped the outcome. But this reduce losses by blunting an ar- obscures the question of the real con- much of the post-Gulf War debate mored attack, drawing down tribution of airpower by falsely bifur- enemy theater missiles and ar- cating the air campaign into strategic over airpower involves attacks tillery, and gaining situational and theater dimensions. There was a against center of gravity targets control by forcing opponents to clear distinction in Desert Storm be- remain underground. It could tween efforts to achieve coalition ob- engage in so-called bunker plink- jectives quickly and painlessly and the stance of Moscow, the effects of ing, although many North Korean facil- concurrent attempts to affect the abil- modern airpower, the strength of de- ities are sufficiently secure from air at- ity of Iraq to make further trouble in fensive fortifications around Kuwait, tack below ground that land forces the postwar world. This second goal and the prospect of drawing the coali- would need to dig them out. But air- involved taking full advantage of an tion into attrition warfare with high power would be unable to defeat an ar- ongoing effort to diminish Iraq’s ca- casualties. In sum, the operational set- mored and mechanized infantry inva- pacity as a regional power. ting of the conflict was uniquely con- sion alone. It could not simply combat Airpower in Desert Storm has genial to airpower. enemy ground troops for forty days been most criticized for its less than re- while the other side did nothing. On sounding performance on the second Worst Case Scenario the contrary, there would be plenty of count. Yet it is an inappropriate yard- The Desert Storm model breaks fighting for all allied force elements. stick for measuring effectiveness. It was down quickly in the case of Korea, Overall the generous fortune the on the critical but less appreciated first where the Army and Air Force have coalition enjoyed in Desert Storm war- count—prompt air dominance and the powerful needs for mutual respect be- rants a measure of humility as well as systematic destruction of fielded forces cause of interdependence. Although caution in drawing any conclusions. For on the ground—where airpower met airpower would surely be a key, no war example, because Iraqi fighters never the preconditions for winning the war. fought there would allow the luxury of intruded into Saudi airspace, coalition Aside from the controversial infrastruc- fewer than 200 casualties. North Korea early warning, reaction time, and inter- ture attacks (no more than 10 percent would presumably fight for its survival ception capabilities were never truly put and resort to weapons of mass destruc- to the test of aerial combat. tion. Moreover, with over 500,000 Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 33 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM or other catastrophic accident, to ap- Iraqi MIG–25 destroyed preciate how crucial aircrew skills and during Desert Storm. the ability to adapt under stress were to the success of the air campaign. Desert Storm confirmed what high-tech weapons, coupled with com- petent leadership and good training, can do against less-endowed forces. Yet ultimately the war was not about systems or technology, although some weapons and combat support systems were star performers. It was more about consensus building and the for- mulation of national goals, diplomacy and leadership in pursuit of those goals, and planning and coordinated action by professionals in employing military power, notably airpower, to achieve them once negotiations and Otero) economic sanctions failed. Insofar as D (J. Desert Storm heralded a revolution in O D the American way of war, it was the fu- sion of all these ingredients in a winning combination. JFQ of strike sorties in the war), what mat- antiradiation missiles, APR–47 threat tered most was the direct use of air- radar emission sensors on F–4Gs, laser- power for the declared mission of liber- guided bombs, and JSTARS aircraft, ating Kuwait. among other systems. Without these Over time the Persian Gulf War capabilities, the war could have proven has become seen as less than a tower- far more protracted and costly. ing strategic success. Many objectives However, the euphoria over tech- were unattained. Moreover, a debate nology must be qualified. Two points has arisen over the decision to termi- made by Les Aspin, while Chairman of nate the ground offensive at the 100- the House Armed Services Committee, hour mark, when ground and air cam- warrant mention: “One, the equip- paigns started to make the most of ment worked and was vindicated exploitation. Yet as an exercise in ap- against its critics. Two, we know how plying force, the operation was any- to orchestrate its use in a way that thing but inconclusive. makes the sum bigger than all the parts.” The second point is no less crit- Hardware Victory ical. Though F–117s were indispensa- Some maintain that technological ble in achieving tactical surprise and magic accounted for the lopsided early control of the air, for example, coalition victory. That view reflects the force multiplier of particular note what has been described as the perva- was the way in which coalition assets sive technological utopianism of Amer- were synergized. ican culture, which holds that all prob- High technology was pivotal, but lems can be solved by the proper was not the single determining factor. technological solutions. Yet that is The training, motivation, leadership, likely to prove a hollow argument tactical expertise, and other attributes once history has the final word. demonstrated by all the services were The technological edge that the important to the outcome. One need coalition exercised made an important only consider the demanding task of difference. Silver bullets with effects getting 400 fighters airborne and mar- disproportionate to their numbers in- shaled at night in radio silence, refu- cluded F–117s, AGM–88 high-speed eled several times, and flying under tight timelines without a missed tanker connection, let alone a midair collision 34 JFQ / Winter 2000–01