DTIC ADA426673: The People's Liberation Army Looks to the Future

6 Pages·0.61 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

0525 Hawkins Pgs 2/24/01 10:08 AM Page 12
(cid:2)
The People’s
Liberation Army PLA training along
China’s coast.
Looks to the FuturePhotos (Xinhua)
World
Wide
P/
A
By C H A R L E S F. H AW K I N S
W
estern analysts have to defeat the superior” with an eye
long known that Bei- fixed on the year 2030. This is an am-
jing is modernizing its bitious effort to undertake but by no
armed forces; indeed means unachievable.
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is With the possible exception of the
undergoing a transformation. Through United States, China has analyzed the
innovation in doctrine, organization, implications of RMA more than any
and technology—the fundamental in- other nation. Although the impact of
gredients of a so-called revolution in modern weaponry was predicted by
military affairs (RMA)—China is pursu- the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s, the
ing a capability to allow “the inferior wake-up call for the People’s Liberation
Army came with the Persian Gulf War.
Major Charles F. Hawkins, USAR (Ret.), is the director of the Historical Evaluation Stunned by the near dominance of
and Research Organization Library and associate editor of the International American systems, which bested Soviet
Military and Defense Encyclopedia. and Chinese equipment in the air and
12 JFQ / Summer 2000
Report Documentation Page Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it

does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED
2000 N/A -
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
The People’s Liberation Army Looks to the Future
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
Center for Counterproliferation Research National Defense University REPORT NUMBER
Washington, DC 20319-5066
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The original document contains color images.
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE UU 5
unclassified unclassified unclassified
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
0525 Hawkins Pgs 2/24/01 10:08 AM Page 13
Hawkins
on the ground, the Chinese scrambled
to understand what had happened. People’s Republic of China
In fact, Chinese analysts have
Defense Budget: Estimated at $14.5 billion for 2000; the gross domestic
been investigating high-tech warfare
product in 1999 was $732 billion ($4,000 per capita).
since the early 1980s as the Falklands,
Manpower: China, a nation of 1,255,000,000, has a total of 168,483,000
Becca Valley, and air strikes on Libya
men between 18 and 32 years of age. Combined active and reserve strength
stimulated their interest. But their ef-
is estimated at 3,070,000. Terms of service are two years, selective conscrip-
forts did not gain support from the
tion. Active forces include some 1,000,000 conscripts and 136,000 women; re-
central government until more re-
serve forces may total as many as 600,000 members (all services).
cently. China relearned the lessons of
Armed Forces: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) includes five compo-
Desert Storm in the Taiwan Strait dur-
nents (estimated active strength): ministry of defense staff/centrally-con-
ing 1996 when its forces did not per-
trolled units (130,000, not included elsewhere), strategic defense forces
form well in bad weather, and U.S.
(100,000-plus), ground forces (1,700,000 soldiers) with some 7,060 main battle
naval forces operated at considerably
and 700 light tanks, naval forces (220,000 sailors) with 65 submarines (includ-
longer distances with greater real-time
ing 1 nuclear-powered ballistic-missile boat) and 60 principal surface combat-
data and effective military power. With
ants, 368 patrol/coastal craft, and 39 mine warfare vessels; some 5,000
the realization that they lagged at least
marines; naval air with 25,000 personnel and 507 shore-based combat air-
a generation behind technologically,
craft), and air forces with 420,000 members and over 3,000 combat aircraft.
Beijing redoubled its efforts.
Paramilitary Formations: Peo-
Then, in 1999, NATO launched
ple’s Armed Police (1,100,000 members
air strikes against Serbia which
of internal security, border defense,
once more demonstrated the gap
guards, and other organizations).
between China and the West.
American technology moti- Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance, 2000–2001 (Ox-
vates Chinese research. Historical
ford: Oxford University Press for the Interna-
analysis, policy issues, and opera- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000).
tions research, though important,
are only of secondary interest.
Word and Deed Parade marking PLA
founding.
The Chinese make a distinc-
ua)
otos (Xin titioarny baefftawirese nan ad r ae vmoliulittiaorny rienv moliul-- and Vstarraitoeugiss tAs mhearviec ainn ffluuetunrcoeldo gCihstis-
P tion. They regard the former as a
World process that can be managed— nese thinking on military affairs, ac-
AP/Wide agnudid isneeg Athmee roincag oaisn gso pmreohceosws cAo rmdeinmgb teor Cofa pthtaei nN aZvhaaln Rge Zsehaarochzh Coenng-.
ter, he cites the Tofflers, William
well. The latter will come about
Owens, and Martin Libicki, and says
when the RMA process is mature,
that the push of information technol-
perhaps in 15 to 30 years. It will
ogy on RMA has forced the PLA navy
be the revolution that actually
cPinhrfeaocnrimsgioeasnt i otghnue id doeesmdt aimnbaluinsnchiete indoo notswr daitnehrd-. World Photos tdZohe acanicscgie oprentc sto hgranatti zhceoesn rt chtehep at“sna dd tvrihavnee t arpgelaevtsef orasrnmed.
standing, China is preparing for Wide disadvantages of using commercial off
P/ the shelf technology.” Its use promotes
this future. But it can’t prepare A
interoperability, he indicated, but
everywhere or in all things
“may make it easier for an enemy to
equally. PLA thinking calls for picking Many are technological and others are
exploit an opponent’s systems.”
its developmental challenges carefully more theoretical, while still others look
First hand experience is also stud-
and concentrating efforts prudently. at the impact of change on the People’s
ied to explain the interaction between
To meet this daunting task, Chi- Liberation Army and operational capa-
advanced weaponry and low tech pro-
nese analysts are gathering data from bilities. In short their research extends
cedures. The shootdown of an F–117
all available sources in the West. They to technology, doctrine, and organiza-
stealth fighter over Serbia during Oper-
feel the effort can’t be focused until all tion, with a view to how these three
ation Allied Force was examined by Shi
possibilities are uncovered and under- areas will affect operational output.
Peixin. His explanation of the trap,
stood. The effort is dynamic. Individual
using successive radar sets, short acti-
researchers focus on an array of topics.
vation times, and communications
linkage and processing at the final
Summer 2000 / JFQ 13
0525 Hawkins Pgs 2/24/01 10:08 AM Page 14
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
SAM launch site, was both insightful cause for complacency. China has built in Beijing: “It wasn’t the equal of
and mathematically lucid. leapfrogged past competitors before. ours, but it was very impressive by any
Huang Haiyuang, a senior re- Chinese missile development owes standard. And they did it in a year.”
searcher who has traveled widely in much to Tsien Hsue-shen, a native Although technology is highly
the West, summarized seven PLA tech- born scientist who studied in the important, it isn’t the only thing that
nological priorities: United States at CalTech and MIT, occupies PLA planners. They need
(cid:2) information operations and warfare helped found the Jet Propulsion Labo- something to bridge the gap between
(cid:2) air and missile technology ratory, and worked on classified proj- today and their vision of 2030. That
(cid:2) precision guided munitions ects during World War II. On the eve of something is found in the domain of
(cid:2) defensive weapon technology becoming an American citizen, Tsien doctrine and organization.
(cid:2) unmanned aerial vehicle technology got caught up in the Cold War hysteria Landpower. Over the past 15 years
(cid:2) military space technology of McCarthyism. Rejected by the na- there has been significant change in
(cid:2) naval carrier (air-to-ship integration). tion he sought to adopt, he returned to the way PLA forces operate in the field.
Huang explained that the People’s Lib- China and became the undisputed fa- Before rapprochement with the Soviet
eration Army has embarked on a two- ther of its missile program. Union in the 1980s, its forces on the
phased plan to scale down into a Tsien’s expertise was recently northern frontier altered their defen-
smaller, higher quality force while ex- merged with an emphasis on computer sive posture from forward deployed to
ploring new concepts and then to technology. When the impact of the arrayed in depth and were thus better
Cultural Revolution wore off in able to absorb and defeat a Soviet of-
the People’s Liberation Army has the early 1980s, Beijing turned to fensive before it could reach the
the burgeoning computer market. industrial area around Beijing. Making
embarked on a two-phased plan
Convinced that other countries this doctrinal shift came not from ad-
to scale down and focus on high such as the United States, Japan, vanced technology but from doubling
and Singapore held an unsurpass- ground transportation assets in front-
technology applications
able lead in hardware, China em- line divisions. Increased battlefield mo-
phasized software development bility was key and has become the new
focus on high technology applica- and hasn’t been disappointed. For ex- cornerstone of land operations.
tions. The first phase is well along, ample, in the late 1990s Chinese mili- Seapower. The PLA navy has been
though he added a concluding cau- tary analysts and systems engineers reinventing itself since the early 1980s.
tion: “the individual is still the key in took an unclassified tour of a suite of Of the navies in Asia, it has the most
fast-paced warfare.” simulations at a federally funded re- manpower with an afloat tonnage and
search and development center in the number of combatant ships rivaled
Emerging Capabilities United States. This past year it was re- only by Japan, with India and Taiwan
The Chinese are trying to catch ported that a similar suite had been a distant third and fourth. In the
up in a military competition that they decade before 1993, China increased
know can’t be won under ordinary cir-
cumstances. They are attempting to
achieve extraordinary advantages with
a few niche capabilities while treading PLA exercise in the
Taiwan Strait.
water elsewhere. Can the People’s Lib-
eration Army accomplish stovepipe
breakthroughs in key areas while
maintaining others at minimal levels
of acceptable performance? It remains
to be seen, but the West should not
discount such an effort.
Indeed, in some areas the Chinese
have demonstrated exceptional ad-
vances. Missiles and artillery are their
strong suit, as one American military
colleague observed. After touring the
country in 1996 and seeing firepower
demonstrations and intercepts by sur-
fraaerceset a -tbooof- uatithr w em hPieLsrsAeil ’sew sec, ohwneev rceeo ninntci oltuhndeae l1d 9f,o 3“r0tcshe.”es Photos (Xinhua)
Tevheer ,s tsautgeg eosft st htehiar tr othckise tm fiogrhcet sn, ohto wbe- Wide World
P/
A
14 JFQ / Summer 2000
0525 Hawkins Pgs 2/24/01 10:09 AM Page 15
Hawkins
Photos (Xinhua)
PLA guided missile World
destroyer. Wide
P/
A
its surface combatant ships by a factor Since the mid-1990s the Chinese have Airpower. We have also seen
of two and its mine warfare and sup- concentrated on amphibious lift. Orga- changes in the air and airborne forces,
port vessels by a factor of six, for the nizational changes, although benefici- notably the ability to transport troops
highest afloat-support ratio in Asia. aries of technology, were not predi- rapidly anywhere within national bor-
cated on it. They ders. In addition to establishing a divi-
change has enabled the PLA navy to alter would have hap- sion-sized rapid reaction force, other
pened in any event, army units have conducted brigade-
its maritime strategy from coastal defense
and change has en- sized experiments in high-tech warfare.
to limited power projection abled the PLA navy
Current and Future Concepts
to alter its maritime
strategy from coastal The main difference between ap-
During the same period amphibious defense to limited power projection proaches to warfare is that the United
lift capacity stagnated and the number and sustainability. States tends to focus on systems and
of submarines fell by half. China has eschewed an aircraft processes while China keys on objects,
The afloat support ratio has great carrier capability. Although it would be or the object-space of war. Americans
significance. At .63 front line support a source of national pride, such a believe they will dominate any object-
vessels to every principal surface com- costly platform is something it chooses space in battle if they get the processes
batant, it is three times greater than to defer. PLA would be hopelessly out- right and employ the better systems.
Australia, the nearest regional competi- classed by the United States for the But Chinese theorists focus on the ob-
tor. A high afloat support ratio indi- foreseeable future and, given increas- ject first and use that knowledge to de-
cates a capability to conduct long- ingly sophisticated unmanned aerial fine the systems and processes to
term, long-range operations. And a vehicles, future carriers may be quite achieve success. As a superpower we
ua) level of .20 or better signifies good sus- different. Furthermore, the immediate have the luxury of affording our ap-
otos (Xi tainability while .10 or less is poor. athreea sE aosft ianntde reSsotu tahre Cthhien lai tStoearas—ls,a raenads pchrooaicceh b; ufto tro effoflilcoiwen tchye irtsh.ey have no
P
Wide World wlahnedr-eb aospeder aaitricornasf t caannd bme ifsasiclielsit.ated by
P/
A
Summer 2000 / JFQ 15
0525 Hawkins Pgs 2/24/01 10:09 AM Page 16
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
Senior Colonel Chen Bojiang initially victorious invading army. the Balkans, cloning, Microsoft, hack-
studied for a year in the School of Chen believes this is no longer the ers, the Internet, the euro, the Asian fi-
Diplomacy at Georgetown University case. No enemy would “let themselves nancial crisis, as well as the world’s
on a Ford Foundation grant. He has so easily be involved in a protracted final and only superpower—the United
published two books since returning to war with China,” though China might States. These are sufficient. They pretty
his post at the Academy of Military Sci- be defeated, because of the excessive much constitute the main subjects on
ences in June 1998, both researched cost of campaigning. Moreover, given this planet for the past decade.”
during his American stay. These have overall Chinese strategy, “It is also un-
made him a celebrity in Chinese mili- allowable to have a protracted war. One should not be surprised that
tary circles. Under the conditions of new history, some analysts try to understand and
One of Chen’s themes is research the main task of the country is to carry explain the success of American mili-
on high-tech warfare, which he notes out the economic construction...mil- tary technology in their own terms.
has the “feature of variety.” He claims itary actions must be [quickly accom- Nor is it amazing that lacking the
that of its patterns “warfare has plished in] scope and time.” Chen wherewithal to compete technologi-
reached a new phase, namely, forming wraps up the argument stating that cally in the near term these analysts
a cubic warfare with land, sea, air, and “attack as the main resort has an ex- would propose alternate views on doc-
space closely combined.” Together traordinary importance on the high- trine and organization to counter a po-
with the electromagnetic spectrum, tech battlefield.” tential U.S. threat. But there is a cau-
these are the object-space to be domi- Another survey of future warfight- tion. Some Chinese defense analysts
nated. Loosely defined, cubic warfare ing concepts appeared in 1998. Unre- also are guilty of altering the evidence
might be seen as the rationale for Chi- stricted Warfare by Senior Colonels and making selective use of data to suit
nese joint operations. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui is themselves or the Communist Party.
Chen’s analysis, like that of many widely read in military circles within Some interpretations are so patently
of his fellow analysts, often turns to China and has attracted attention in flawed that one wonders if rhetorical
information warfare and operations: the West for urging multiple means— analysis has reached a new plane. This
“High-tech warfare has the feature of military and nonmilitary—to strike the is all the more reason to insist on
information confrontation.” The com- United States. Hacking into Web sites, transparency in peacetime interaction.
mand, control, and intelligence system targeting financial institutions, com- JFQ
“is the prerequisite not only for hard mitting terrorist acts, using the media,
weapons to play a role, but it is also and conducting urban warfare are Research on this article was facilitated by
the target first attacked by the oppos- among the methods proposed. the author’s contacts with Chinese defense
analysts over the last decade. In recent years
ing side in war. The main [feature] is In an interview that appeared in
he has both lectured at the China Defense
pluralistic confrontation, including the June 1999 in Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, a Science, Technology, and Information Center
acquirement and anti-acquirement, daily newspaper published by the and co-hosted the Sino-U.S. Military Develop-
control and anti-control, as well as Communist Party Youth League, Qiao ment’s Workshop in Beijing.
usage and anti-usage of information.” noted “the first rule of unrestricted
Although this may not be regarded warfare is that there are no rules, with
as particularly earthshaking, Chen’s nothing forbidden.” He argues that
analysis leads him to insights into how “strong countries make the rules while
the People’s Liberation Army may con- rising ones break them and exploit
duct itself in the future. Citing the three loopholes....The United States breaks
warfares—mobile, positional, and guer- [U.N. rules] and makes new ones when
rilla—Chen has asked rhetorically: these rules don’t suit...but it has to
Should high-tech warfare operations be observe its own rules or the whole
protracted or quick? The answer seems world will not trust it.”
obvious to many in the West. Not nec- Questioned about Unrestricted
essarily in China, however. Warfare, other PLA officers were quick
A great historic strength has been to point out that its ideas had no offi-
a large landmass. Combined with a cial status and did not represent the
vast population from which to draw doctrine of either the military or gov-
fighters, that has meant China can ernment. A pat answer or indicative of
conduct protracted wars—mobile, po- divided thinking inside the People’s
sitional, or guerrilla. The ultimate suc- Liberation Army? Perhaps both.
cessful protracted conflict is the ab- Qiao and Wang have written that
sorption over many generations of an “one war changed the world,” and
rightly or wrongly that technology is
found at the heart of that change. As
proof they indicate that “it is only nec-
essary to cite the former Soviet Union,
16 JFQ / Summer 2000