DTIC ADA426668: JFACC: Who's in Charge? (Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1994)

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by  Defense Technical Information Center

1105Whitlow 10/7/97 9:26 AM Page 64
JFACC
Who’s Combat Camera Imagery (Marv Lynchard)
in Charge?
needs of joint commanders at all levels and
building the proper dynamics into joint de-
cisionmaking and tasking processes.
To gain some insight into possible solu-
By J. L. W H I T L O W
tions, one must first understand that we
simply do not fight in a functionally central-
ized fashion. This is evidenced by the Army-
Air Force AirLand Battle concept and the
T
here is unanimity that the Armed Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) con-
Forces will fight as a joint team in cept. Neither concept is about organization;
the future. Each of the services rather they involve teamwork and combined
has come a long way to make arms philosophies. The Navy’s surface, sub-
joint force a reality, but real difficulties re- surface, and aerospace systems are tightly
main in the area of command and control. It woven into a combined arms warfighting ca-
is time to take off the doctrinal blinders and pability. Service commanders must master a
look harder for the solutions. One concern is range of joint and component fires to decide
command and control of a battle and shape the next one. It follows
we do not wage functional joint air operations. The ca- that commanders must have adequate au-
pabilities, flexibility, and thority to direct actions necessary to accom-
fights, but we demand
multi-service character of plish their missions.
functional excellence
aviation make a Joint Force We do not wage functional fights, but we
Air Component Comman- demand functional excellence. That search
der (JFACC) important to most joint opera- for excellence requires striking a balance be-
tions. Some say that a JFACC’s actual respon- tween centralized, sub-optimized, functional
sibilities make the role more that of a efficiency and decentralized authority that
coordinator. Regardless, there is likely to be a subordinate commanders need in order to
JFACC in most large joint operations. What succeed. The JFACC identity crisis, the coordi-
then is the problem? Why do many dissent nator versus the commander, is nothing more
in reviewing joint doctrine on this subject? than different views of that balance.
Why are CINCs unable to agree on a con- Everyone agrees that a JFACC is indis-
cept? The answer lies in understanding the pensable. But instead of fashioning the orga-
nization desired, we appear to be forcing ex-
isting, unwieldy processes to work. For
Colonel J.L. Whitlow, USMC, is Chief of Staff,
various reasons, there is little innovative
Marine Forces Europe. He previously served as
thinking about procedures and processes
Director, Joint/Combined Doctrine Division, Naval
that could solve legitimate warfighting con-
Doctrine Command, and was Chief of Plans for
cerns. It is time to stop arguing and to start
the Air Force JFACC during Ocean Venture ’92.
64 JFQ / Summer 1994
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1994 N/A -
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JFACC Who’s in Charge?
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Whitlow
looking at the specific areas where progress have a “gut feel” that CAS should have a
can be achieved, namely, apportionment, high priority, he is very unlikely to disagree
targeting, a concept for a purple JFACC, and with the percentage of total sorties dedicated
a vision of the future. to it. The important thing to a JFC is not
whether there is 23 percent or 33 percent
Apportionment
CAS, but whether attack aircraft are available
What passes for apportionment guid-
when ground commanders need them. A
ance is not guidance at all. It is interesting to
JFC should state guidance and priorities in
note that the apportionment process found
terms of how he wants the war fought and
in joint doctrine to produce guidance was
leave percentages to analysts.
not used in Operation Desert Storm. How
Guidance. Most real JFC guidance for an
should the process work? What’s wrong with
air war will probably be off-line and not
the methodology? What kind of process can
about percentages among AAW, CAS, and AI.
be proposed that provides guidance from a
A JFC knows that airspace must be defended
joint force commander (JFC)? At present the
by AAW and CAS must be provided as
process goes something like this:
needed. A JFC’s on-line guidance should rec-
t the JFACC proposes apportionment to the ognize the relatively constant requirements
JFC by percentage and/or priority that should be
for AAW and CAS. This leaves AI. JFC guid-
devoted to various air operations and/or geo-
ance will better influence the total air war ef-
graphic areas
fort if a “main effort” is designated (the
t the JFC approves apportionment which is
most important thing the force is attempt-
usually specified in terms of percentages allotted
ing to accomplish that day) and associated
between anti-air warfare (AAW), close air support
(CAS), and air interdiction (AI) priorities within the AI category are pro-
t the JFACC then develops air tasking or- vided. For example, early in a campaign
ders (ATOs) and attack target lists using assets ap- when a JFC believes the force should focus
portioned to AI. on an enemy’s air capability, the priority is
At face value this seems to be a reason- offensive counter air (OCA). In a new phase
able process, but it does not really produce strategic targets may be more important and
guidance in a JTF environment. It is fraught AI—theater air interdiction—is the focus. As
with several problems, including percentages. an operation matures the ability to maneu-
Percentages Don’t Work. First, when deter- ver on the ground will be a priority and the
mining the percentage of air assets to task focus will be shifted to shaping the battle-
for the CAS, AAW, or AI role, the decision is field or battlefield air interdiction (BAI).
mostly a function of the force list, and not A primary factor in any sequence similar
of how a JFC wants to fight the war. In other to the one described above will be a JFC’s
words, many aircraft are only employed in a sense of phasing. By not forcing the appor-
certain role. Hence, attempts to provide tionment process to give a JFC a meaningful
guidance in terms of a percentage are often way to provide guidance appropriate for
nothing more than an approximation of the each phase, the system abdicates that re-
make-up of the force list, and not guidance sponsibility to a JFACC. In the fog of war,
on warfighting. But to arrive at percentages a when decisions are less than obvious, this
JFACC must almost write the ATO in ad- process failure pits one component against
vance and, to get requisite information, others for priority and provides for little
make preliminary decisions on targeting pri- more than a source of additional friction.
orities and the allocation of assets which The remaining question to be answered is
may or may not be in agreement with a JFC. how the guidance for joint force air opera-
When such effort goes into an ATO, it is tions should be changed.
very difficult to change without completely Givens, Main Effort, and Priorities. Forget
rewriting the plan, and a complete mindset percentages, neither component comman-
change by JFACC planners. Finally, percent- ders nor a JFACC need to be preoccupied
ages are a very poor way for a JFC to articu- with arbitrary percentages as aviation plans
late guidance. For example, while he may are transformed into an ATO. Instead one
should adopt a different way of thinking
about the air effort, and thus a different ap-
proach to articulating JFC guidance.
Summer 1994 / JFQ 65
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Defensive AAW should be a given. If A predominant relationship exits be-
threatened by enemy air, a joint force must tween priorities and the shifting phases of a
provide sufficient assets and a viable plan to campaign, for example:
protect them. If the threat is real, there is no
Phase I—create air superiority
higher priority. There is no need for
t main effort JFACC—kill enemy air
if forces are heavily percentages; a JFACC must ensure
power
engaged and need success. t priorities OCA, AI, BAI
CAS should be a given. Is it that
CAS, the world’s
simple? The answer is yes—from the Phase II—shape the theater
superpower should perspective of JFC guidance. If forces t main effort JFACC—kill enemy C2
be able to provide it are heavily engaged on the battle- and logistics systems
field and need CAS, the world’s su- t priorities AI, OCA, BAI
perpower should be able to provide
Phase III—shape the battlefield
it. While guidance is simple, planning and
conduct are not. Dedicating a percentage of t main effort Army, Marine, or Navy
the force to CAS will not ensure success or AOs
t priorities BAI, AI, OCA.
comfort a commander. There must be a vi-
able plan. Ground force commanders and a As campaign phases blend together,
JFACC must have a common understanding flexible priorities could optimize air efforts
of the following points: for the changing nature of the conflict.
In sum, it is senseless to have a JFACC
CAS flow plan
accept input, make assumptions, write a
t scheduled—capability (not numbers) syn-
skeleton ATO, apply the force list to it, arrive
chronized with ground scheme
t alert—prepared to surge with unexpected at percentages, propose them to a JFC, and
t divert—based on specified parameters have a JFC feed those percentages back to
the force—calling it apportionment guid-
CAS command/control/communication structure
ance. There is no need to build a “percentage
t viable, in place, and understood box” for a JFACC in order to ensure he is
t as uniform as it can be made, yet allow-
fighting the air war in accordance with JFC
ing each of the services to fight the way they are
wishes. The onus is on a JFC.
organized, trained, and equipped
A JFC must provide a good commander’s
Divert criteria intent to the entire JTF, with all that entails:
t consciously decide what authority a a sense of phasing, perceived end state, etc.
JFACC has to divert dual role aircraft from or be- As for the air war, he must build a force that
tween interdiction missions is capable of making air superiority and CAS
t consciously decide what missions are not a given. Then on a day to day basis, he must
to be diverted unless directed by higher authority
provide air apportionment guidance in terms
Apportionment guidance should be provided for of a main effort that applies to the entire JTF,
AI under two rubrics: and to priorities for air interdiction among
t main effort—the most important task now BAI, AI, and OCA. With this type of guid-
being accomplished by the entire force ance, a JFACC can fight the theater air war
t priority—for air interdiction among OCA and ensure unity of effort throughout the the-
(such as airfield strikes), AI (strategic targets), and ater, with air-capable component comman-
BAI (targets in ground commander’s AO). ders focusing on their areas of operation and
[AI here pertains only to theater-level targets, providing synergy to the joint campaign.
which conflicts with the joint definition. Either a
Targeting Process-es
new term is needed for theater targets or an
The term process-es is not a typo. It is
amended definition for AI as suggested. Also, the
term BAI must be entered in the joint lexicon as used to suggest a concept that is frequently
discussed below.] lost in orchestrating joint air operations.
Anyone who works in the world of joint air
operations can recite the targeting cycle by
rote: guidance, target development, weap-
oneering, force application (ATO), force exe-
cution, and combat assessment; then the
66 JFQ / Summer 1994
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Whitlow
interdiction missions flown within the
MAGTF AO. The term direct support sortieshas
been coined basically to frame the argument
about “who’s in charge” of their tasking and
control. Direct support sorties apply to both
CAS and interdiction missions within the
Marine AO.
The Navy’s need to conduct air opera-
Conway) tions at sea has long been accepted. But as a
mond T. jroesinutl ta itrh oisp enreaetdio nhsa,s a bnede inn tweriedsetl yis iugsnuoarlleyd eixn-
Ray pressed in terms of how much they can con-
magery ( tribute to the joint effort. The notion that the
Camera I Nanadv yt haalsto t hhea ss eaa naenedd tfhoer liinttteorrdailc tmionays obret ieasn,
mbat area of operationsfor a naval component com-
Co mander, has not generally been a joint con-
Navy F/A–18 Hornet sideration. This has been true except for oper-
landing aboard
ations within an Amphibious Objective Area
USS America.
cycle begins again. No one can match the (AOA), a recognized amphibious concept.
ability of the Armed Forces in targeting an A corps commander has no direct way
enemy strategically or operationally. There of obtaining a level of interdiction support
are extraordinary national assets and ad- by fixed wing aircraft in an AO. Instead tar-
vanced technologies that make everything gets must be nominated to a JFACC or JFC
seem possible. staff, then compete for priority with theater-
Yet when you look closely at the task of level targets. Perhaps this explains the
targeting from a complete theater perspec- Army’s great helicopter capabilities and
tive, you find that this simple cycle is not Army Attack Missile Systems (ATACMS). At
carried out at the theater level alone. It is least the Army has some control over these
done on various levels of command capabilities.
throughout the theater, in various areas of Notwithstanding control, something is
operation, at various speeds, and with vari- missing from the realm of joint warfighting.
ous degrees of sophistication. Hence, it is Each of the preceding descriptions was about
not a single, simple process at all. When you battlefield air interdiction (BAI), but the con-
envelope all process-eswith a very centralized cept does not exist in joint doctrine. The
approach to targeting, it is somewhat akin to term does not appear in the joint lexicon. In
driving a theater’s worth of round pegs into order to add clarity to the joint air tasking
one small, sub-optimized, square hole. process, we must promote the concept of bat-
To resolve this dilemma we must re- tlefield air interdiction and adopt the term.
spond not only to interdiction needs of JFCs need it to properly influence the battle.
JFCs—which is done pretty well—but also Who’s in Charge of Interdiction? With an
corps-level ground force and surface com- adequate vocabulary it is possible to ask
manders. Then we must link process-es at who’s in charge of targeting various parts of
the right points to prioritize correctly, target the battlefield. For theater-level targets JFCs
responsively, and allow the services to fight are obviously in charge and a JFACC is prob-
the way they are organized, trained, and ably the best placed to coordinate an attack.
equipped. Third, we must develop the hard- JFCs shape the theater and try to deliver the
ware and software capabilities that will make knockout punch. However, when JFCs assign
this possible. missions to subordinate commanders and
Bring Back the Concept of Battlefield Air In- give them AOs, those commanders should
terdiction. The methods of addressing a corps- be in charge of targeting in their AOs. Yet the
level commander’s need for interdiction in current process compels corps-level com-
his area of operations (AO) are not very clear. manders to nominate targets up the chain to
Marines talk of MAGTF and a need for direct JFCs for validationand prioritization.
support sorties which are primarily CAS and
Summer 1994 / JFQ 67
1105Whitlow 10/7/97 9:26 AM Page 68
w)
Steve Thuro
magery (
mera I
Ca
mbat
Co
Marine F/A–18 at
Aviano Air Base with
Air Force AWACS in What does target validation imply here? commanders who are in charge of their asso-
background. If it means corps-level commanders may not ciated AOs, and apportions by prioritizing
know what a valid fixed wing target is, then under three interdiction categories: theater
staffs have an education problem that needs air interdiction, battlefield air interdiction,
to be addressed. If it means that only JFC and offensive counter air.
staffs have adequate information and intelli-
A Purple JFACC
gence to determine if a target is valid, then
At first blush it seems that a JFACC
information and intelligence systems are in-
should inherently head a purple organiza-
adequate and must be fixed. But I suspect
tion, but there are several reasons why this is
that it means neither of these things; rather,
usually not the case. First of all joint doc-
it is confusion over who’s in charge of this
trine embraces the notion of dual hatting. It
segment of the battlefield and the victimiza-
is stated that a JFC will “normally designate
tion by a process that does not support com-
a JFACC from the component that has both
manders in their AOs.
the preponderance of air assets in the joint
And what is target prioritization? I do
operations area and the capability to com-
not believe that it means a JFC will prioritize
mand and control joint air operations.”
targets in a subordinate commander’s AO.
Conflict of interest in a dual hat situation is
However, if it implies that BAI targets must
inevitable—if not in deed, certainly in per-
always compete with theater targets for at-
ception, which is therefore detrimental to
tention, BAI will usually come up short. This
the joint force. You can argue that a JFC can
will likely remain true until such time as the
augment the JFACC organization with per-
ground war goes to hell in a handbasket, or
sonnel from other services and make it joint,
the importance of mission success in that
or that it is really the only way to organize
AOs take on theater-level significance. While
since components own all the necessary C2
this may be an exaggeration, my point is that
assets; but you cannot argue that it is purple.
we have a clumsy system in place that priori-
Another factor is that the air tasking
tizes aviation-related targets only at JFC-level.
and C2 system used in joint operations is
We need a true purple system that prioritizes
generally not joint, but Air Force. It was not
theater-level targets for theater commanders,
allows BAI-level targets to be prioritized by
68 JFQ / Summer 1994
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Whitlow
intended to be joint, but rather to support from other services. While it is obvious why
an Air Operations Center (AOC), a highly this is done, it is also clearly not an attempt
centralized Air Force C2 system that works to create a purple organization.
well for a single component. But as a theater What is the answer? Is a purple organiza-
matures, its complexity increases. While tion required? I believe we need an organiza-
separate AOs are created for various compo- tion that can focus on aviation requirements
nents, the system does not allow either hor- of all service components. We need an advo-
izontal and vertical communication or tar- cate—outside the Beltway—for a truly joint
geting dynamics. The Computer-Assisted air C4I system, so as not to create one in the
Force Management System—employed in same agonizing fashion that joint doctrine is
Desert Shield/Desert Storm—as well as the developed. This demands far more than ask-
Contingency Tactical Air Control Auto- ing components how many sorties they need
mated Planning System (CTAPS) are both tomorrow. It is a matter of setting up air
single-host computer sys- space, molding a joint air tasking system,
tems that do not support and establishing an environment in which a
we need an organization
interactive data base ex- JFC can accomplish the mission and the ser-
that can focus on aviation change or off-site direct vices can fight effectively the way they are
requirements of all service ATO input. organized, trained, and equipped.
Progress is being made It is time to stand up a purple JFACC in
components
in this area. CTAPS has been each theater. The associated operating doc-
designated a joint program trine for each theater, however, has to be
and a lot of effort is going into developing worldwide to facilitate the rapid introduc-
follow-on versions of its software. Work is tion of forces. Though it will not be a full-
also underway on joint requirements for time job, there should be permanent names
ATO. Such advances are significant, but doc- next to every JFACC position and the indi-
trine must be based on existing capabilities. viduals concerned should be trained. Doc-
Thus we must make the joint air C2 system trine must facilitate joint air operations
purple since it was not designed that way. whether or not a JFACC is dual hatted or
What about JFACC organization? Three designated from outside of the joint force
CINCs have come up with two different components. The structure should be based
JFACC concepts that attempt to force joint- on LANT/PAC CONOPS which is well con-
ness on what is basically an Air Force sys- ceived. Its individual members must be ex-
tem. Both approaches have problems. The pert and train with each JFACC iteration in
Atlantic/Pacific (LANT/PAC) concept of oper- theater. In small operations or at the begin-
ations (CONOPS) comes closer to creating an ning of campaigns, where it makes sense to
organization that is truly purple. I personally dual hat service component commanders,
fought hard for this concept, but it has a such individuals will join appropriate com-
down side. Although the internal staffing is ponent staffs. In large operations, it might
joint, it still maintains a dual hat approach be advisable to stand up a JFACC that is dis-
at the top (that is, the JFACC is normally a tinct from all joint force components. The
service component commander). And, while advent of a purple JFACC will free compo-
the organization’s line numbers are assigned nent commanders to focus on their missions
to each component to be filled, it is always a and optimize the things which each compo-
“pickup” game. There are no individuals per- nent does best.
manently assigned. Thus each operation dif-
The Vision
fers; the preoperation training burden is
The future is one in which the joint air
high and not well suited for crisis employ-
C4I system is real time and completely inter-
ment. Purple? Almost, but it may not meet
active, not single host; component air C4I sys-
our needs.
tems are the same or fully interoperable; con-
U.S. European Command (EUCOM), in
trolled input is made to ATO from off site and
contrast, has published a JFACC concept pe-
various sources; all services adopt air tasking
culiar to that theater. Aware that there may
methodologies that are similar to the joint
not be time to assemble a pickup team,
EUCOM augments the Air Force AOC with
liaison officers and weapon system experts
Summer 1994 / JFQ 69
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system; and every air capable component correct targets for a JFC, oblivious to where
may host a JFACC or alternately interact effi- JFACC responsibility rested in any given
ciently with a JFACC on a real time basis. phase. Each component contributed to the
A notional scenario under such a system joint air effort while fighting the war in its
might see the Navy arriving first on the respective AOR according to its own organi-
scene of a crisis, conducting initial air opera- zation, training, and equipment.
tions using an ATO and tasking system com-
patible with the joint air C4I system. The Who’s in charge? Operationally, anyone
ATO is initially written on a carrier and then can be. The vision is simple: any component
on a command ship as the Naval Expedi- can supply a JFACC; systems are interactive
tionary Force expands. As units arrive in the- and interoperable; components contribute
ater and are brought to bear, the ATO ad- efficiently to the joint air effort; and compo-
dress list grows to include them. At some nents fight in terms of their own organiza-
point a JFC is named and an officer from tion, training, and equipment. In reality,
within the naval component is designated until the next war breaks out, everyone is in
JFACC. Then the marines kick in the door charge. It will take a lot of work to create a
and come ashore. The land AOR starts to ex- truly joint air C4I system. We must look to
pand. A Marine air command and control what can be fixed now, like apportionment,
system is created and works well with a targeting, and organization. But such an ef-
JFACC afloat. Direct support sorties for the fort will be in vain unless a vision of the fu-
Marines are written into the ATO from forces ture is articulated and differences among the
ashore, yet they are deconflicted and sup- services are turned into joint force advan-
ported with tankers by a JFACC afloat. This tages. While there is real merit in a rainbow
could all appear on a single ATO, or applica- of service traditions, assets, and capabilities,
ble sections might be selected. that spectrum must be predominantly pur-
In another phase a JFC and his staff ple. This is not that difficult to grasp in con-
come ashore to coordinate with the Ameri- cept, but it will take time and tenacity to
can embassy and host nation. A decision is achieve in practice. It is worth the effort by
made to designate the Marine ACE comman- all of us to make it happen. JFQ
der as JFACC because of his proximity to a
JFC. JFACC cadre (from the standing theater
JFACC) come ashore. JFACC responsibilities
shift to Marine Allied Command, Europe
(ACE)—which is not a big deal since the
ATO and joint air operations continue.
Naval force direct support sorties now are
written into the ATO from afloat and decon-
flicted ashore. Liaison officers are added to
the JFACC staff as new capabilities and units
arrive in theater.
The theater then expands as the Marines
move out. Army forces are present in theater
and operational. Boundaries are drawn and
separate AOs for land forces unfold. The Air
Force AOC stands up. Marine expeditionary
airfields become operational and ACE relo-
cates with the Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) commander. A decision is made to
transfer JFACC responsibilities to the Air
Force component commander. Again, there
is no big deal, the ATO and joint air opera-
tions continue. The big guns are there and
each component focuses on its AO. The test
is that through all this time B–52s operating
from Guam received the ATO and struck the
70 JFQ / Summer 1994