Table Of Content1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 88
Do We Need An
Information Corps?
By M A R T I N C. L I B I C K I and J A M E S A. H A Z L E T T
Monitoring large screen U.S. Navy (Tim Masterson)
displays aboard Aegis
W
missile cruiser arfare is a changing art, a fact technology in one hundred hours as Opera-
USS Vincennes. clearly illustrated by the events tion Desert Storm. Yet in the Gulf, for all
in the Persian Gulf during the modern dimensions of that conflict,
1990–91. The type of human military operations were conducted with
behavior reflected by the Hundred Years weapon systems that had been designed and
War can now be manifest with modern fielded in the 1970s: Patriot missiles,
Summary
Warfare is about to enter a new phase that will upset the traditional balance between information and force.
As firepower becomes an appendage to information, organizational transformations will begin to underpin a
new architecture. A separate Information Corpscould guide this revolution, create common doctrine for the
diverse requirements of information warriors, and facilitate liaison among civilian information agencies. Such
a corps could also obviate the need for the services to integrate their data systems because standardization
would exist from the outset. Moreover, the corps could foster innovations more consonant with the logic of
the information revolution than would be the case if the services were left to their own devices. But even
though the proposal for such a corps has merit, a number of issues concerning its likely impact on operational
autonomy, the critical functions of operational units, and certain joint imperatives must first be addressed.
88 JFQ / Autumn 1993
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1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 89
Libicki and Hazlett
Abrams tanks, Aegis cruisers, a suite of fight- rather units of force information no
ers (F–14s/–15s/–16s/–18s), Apache heli- are fire support for in-
longer serves
copters, and even the Airborne Warning and formation systems.
units of force—
Control System (AWACS). At the same time, The necessary
the operation of those platforms, and their and sufficient corol- rather units of
augmentation by powerful information sys- lary to this transfor-
force are fire
tems, suggests that the revolution in warfare mation is about orga-
support for
is about to enter an entirely new phase. Fu- nization. Current
ture changes will be most successfully structures are built information
adopted by systems which have been the around legions of op-
systems
most thoroughly structured. erators, served by
Information, in sum, is the principal dif- lesser communities,
ference between eras. Granted, the benefits such as intelligence (as well as logistics, engi-
of both strategic and tactical information neering, communications, etc.). In this con-
have never gone unnoted; they have been text lesser is not meant in a strictly pejora-
decisive in many battles. What is new is the tive sense. However, in any unit which
sheer size, speed, and volume of the infor- combines this discipline, the operators take
mation flow needed to achieve superiority in command. Moreover, although career tracks
combat. Information superiority is emerging are similar up to a certain level, operators
as a newly recognized—more intense—area clearly make up a much higher percentage of
of competition. The result may be the up- the top ranks (O8s and above) than they do
ending of the relationship between informa- of the officer corps as a whole. On the other
tion and force. Thus it may be the time to hand, if information warriors belonged to a
form a future force to examine future warfare separate organization (be it a corps, service,
issues, like how to best deal with the infor- or command), their relationship to the
mation revolution by developing the requi- whole would undergo a concomitant and
site strategies to exploit it. perhaps necessary adjustment.
The existing relationship between
Rationalizing a Corps
weaponry and information is similar to the
The purpose of the Armed Forces is to
relationships among weapons systems and
fight and win wars. Winners in the future
other supporting elements such as command
will take advantage of the fruits of the infor-
and control, logistics, and personnel. Opera-
mation revolution—including global posi-
tions sit atop; all else supports them. Current
tioning systems, global surveillance, and
weapons have accommodated the informa-
space-based sensors—while the losers will
tion revolution by taking advantage of addi-
not. To win one must be organized to take
tional data inputs, but the military remains
advantage of the opportunities offered by
organized around units of force. This architec-
the information revolution.
ture may soon become obsolete. Instead,
A separate corps and an associated com-
those who prevail tomorrow may build their
mand structure linking operations and intel-
forces around a central information process-
ligence will facilitate effective joint opera-
ing core. Such a core would launch informa-
tions, promote the information revolution
tion probes into the media of war (that is, in
in warfare, unify the disparate information
land, air, sea, or space warfare, or the entire
elements and give them an identity, create a
spectrum), gather, transform, fuse, and har-
common ethos for information warriors, and
ness the returning stream and ladle results in
provide a unified interface with civilian in-
strategic synchrony directly to fire-control
formation infrastructures.
units or indirectly to operators. In either case,
Jointness. The farther platforms can see
the traditional relationship between informa-
and shoot, the larger their battlespace, and
tion and force will be turned on its head. In-
the more service-specific battlespaces inter-
formation no longer serves units of force—
sect with each other. Aircraft of the Navy and
Air Force use the same Air Tasking Order.
Data collected by Air Force assets guide Army
Martin C. Libicki and Commander James A. Hazlett, USN, are movements. National sensors alert anti-tacti-
both senior fellows in the Institute for National Strategic cal ballistic missile forces of missile launches.
Studies, National Defense University.
Autumn 1993 / JFQ 89
1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 90
INFORMATION CORPS
All the services use the same satellite systems. where follow-on data collection efforts have
Another factor that demands interoperable, to be focused, or whether and when fire con-
or single, information systems is the tremen- trol solutions have to be generated. The in-
dous annual increase in the volume and vari- teroperability requirements of such a pack-
ety of data collected. age are therefore demanding.
Most importantly, there is transition in The need for interoperable information
how wars are fought and the diminished systems has been widely recognized by the
local ties between seekingand shooting. Today senior leadership within DOD. Earlier this
the two usually are closely linked. Although year Secretary of Defense Les Aspin observed
prepped by intelligence reports, a tank must in a graduation address at the National De-
both find and kill the target itself. Yet, other fense University, “Most of our systems for
forms of warfare have already experienced the dissemination of intelligence imagery
the separation: strike operations are planned cannot talk to each other.” The principal
from externally collected data; anti-subma- joint command and control initiative (“C4I
rine warfare operations use an elaborate lo- for the Warrior”) is exclusively about inter-
calizing program prior to administering a operability, and all new information systems
coup de grace. The Joint Surveillance and Tar- must be able to communicate jointly. Unfor-
get Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and tunately, history suggests that after-the-fact
AWACS support an efficient cue-and-pin- standardization frequently leads to unsatis-
pointing system. The advent of precision- factory results. Why?
strike systems that use both absolute and rel- t Standardization is a long-term process
ative positioning (that is, latitude, longitude, that accommodates new developments only after
bearing, range, course, and speed) is at hand. long delays. Over the next twenty years the per-
The growing proliferation of sensor systems centage of new applications to existing ones is
implies that the targeting systems of tomor- apt to grow greatly; intelligent filters that corre-
row must be able to fuse data collected from late and process multispectral and nonelectro-
a wide variety of sources. Such fusion means magnetic sensory data are on the threshold of
major growth.
that seamless interoperability is being de-
t Standards developed by competing inter-
manded for missions ranging from single-
ests often choose a least-common-denominator
shot targeting all the way to situational
approach, letting each side agree to disagree at
awareness by CINCs.
the expense of interoperability.
To illustrate the value of an integrated t Emphasis on data interoperability ignores
perspective consider a hypothetical Un- the growing role of software interoperability.
manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensor package
Therefore, in the case of the sensor
and how it might be developed—not only its
package, development by different platforms
hardware, but also its software, communica-
groups increases the possibility that each
tions, integration with other data units, and
system stands alone and makes complete
most importantly its doctrine and concept
data fusion that much harder to achieve.
of operations.
An Information Corps is an alternate
UAVs can serve all services, and on their
route to data integration. Instead of the ser-
own each service would develop a package
vices and DOD agencies (and the multiple
to fit its own mission profiles and support
communities within them) attempting to
their own platforms. Yet it can be expected
merge information collection and dissemi-
that the data flows from UAVs would go to
nation systems, the functions would be car-
common data receptors and would have to
ried out by a single organization that oper-
meld with other joint data collection assets
ated under centralized doctrine and
including ground-based sensors, higher-alti-
command. Data would be standardized from
tude aircraft, and space sensors. To the ex-
the start; internecine politics that allow
tent that each sensor package performs its
components to agree to disagree would be, if
own on-board processing, it may wish to
not eliminated, then substantially muted.
take advantage of common neural training
What would otherwise be a conflict between
regimens and pattern recognition tools. Data
from the various sensor packages—which
could come from any of the services—have
to be analyzed in real time to determine
90 JFQ / Autumn 1993
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Libicki and Hazlett
Navy
S.
U.
the need for innova- the battlefield, the grid atop it grows tighter,
tions in data collec- smaller, and stealthier. Objects can be found
tion, and the subse- faster and tracked more reliably. True,
S. Navy oqunelyn tt hnaete dw thoi crhe phoarst tthode abye’ss t—weaarve etrhs—emasnedlv tehs el aUrgnei tpeldat fSotramtess ahnads
U.
been standardized, are thus tomorrow’s targets. Yet as sensors,
Receiving information
would be muted as well. Successful innova- processors, and communicators grow smaller
from E–2C Hawkeye.
tions would be integrated into the whole and cheaper, comparably effective grids can
much earlier in their development. be built from networks of distributed sensors
A related rationale emerges from the which collectively would be more robust
emphasis on Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Today than complex platforms (e.g., it is harder to
and in the future the services will be increas- take down a million balloons than a dozen
ingly cobbled together by JTFs. Such organi- JSTARS). The contest between industrial-era
zations, which usually are made up of a platforms and information-era networks will
chunk of this and a chunk of that, demand increasingly favor the latter (even though
that most chunk commanders (and key staff stealth will postpone the inevitable for
members) know each other beforehand. A some). Forces with fewer manned platforms
coterie of information warriors whose spe- suggest radically different capabilities for the
cialty is preparing the battlefield image but military of today. History suggests that orga-
who are attached to different operating units nizations may resist change but to their ulti-
is already integrated. Acting as the glue, they mate disadvantage.
can help bring together far more fine- No one questions the overwhelming rela-
grained units. tive superiority of the U.S. Armed Forces, and
Innovation. The information revolution for that reason our manned platforms would
is almost a cliche. Less well accepted is the logically be the last to be threatened or
threat that it will pose to the concept of copied. A potential competitor would be fool-
putting men and women in steel, titanium, ish to challenge our dominance by a strategy
or ceramic boxes to fight wars. Why are plat-
forms at risk? As more data is collected over
Autumn 1993 / JFQ 91
1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 92
INFORMATION CORPS
that copied our force
Mobile satellite dishes
structure. Forces built
in Somalia.
around information sys-
tems constructed from
commercially available
components, however,
would pose a more seri-
ous threat—one which
contests our reigning
paradigm. Thus, it would
be far more attractive to
challenge us in that way.
Although an Infor-
mation Corps may not Center
be inherently more in- mera
novative than the ser- Ca
vices, it is more likely to mbat
Co
pnuorvsautei otnhse tkhinadt sa cocf oirnd- Joint
with the logic of the information revolution.
Left to themselves, the Armed Forces will in-
cwoirthpo irnaftoer minafotiromna tteiochnn ionltoog iwese aaps opnlrayt,f obrumt Center
support rather than with platforms as fire mera
Ca
support to an information grid. An informa- mbat
tion Corps, however, would take an entirely Co
different approach from the outset, empha- Joint
sizing the information grid as central. Con- Communicating in
stituent elements and doctrine for such a Somalia.
grid would be evaluated on their ability to
locate, track, and evaluate objects and events platforms such as Aegis, AWACS, JSTARS,
passed for conversion into fire-control solu- and UAV contingents. Other functions
tions and servicing. Such a service or corps which technology may soon enable are not
would be an institutional advocate for a even listed for obvious reasons; when they
paradigm shift, and would, by its advocacy, do emerge the soup will be even thicker.
better prepare for a threat which comes from This is just the point. The various sub-com-
a different direction. munities in the information-based warfare
Unity. The common argument against community see themselves as disparate
creating a completely new organization is players. Each relates to one or two others at
that its planned functions are all being done most, and they all lack the common unify-
by someone else. When this question is ing doctrine of operations. Information war-
posed, however, the compo- riors are more than simply communicators,
information warriors are sition of the group varies data processors, or intelligence agents. They
widely: the Director for are all part of a global structure that would
more than simply commu-
Command, Control, Com- become apparent with the creation of an In-
nicators, data processors, munication and Computer formation Corps.
or intelligence agents Systems (J–6) on the Joint Culture. A related reason for integrating
Staff, Defense Information various DOD informational elements into a
Systems Agency, Defense single corps is to provide information war-
Mapping Agency, Space Command, and in- riors with status, culture, and an ethic. The
telligence agencies—all without going into issue of respect is relatively straightforward.
the services. Under the latter are functions As information becomes more important, so
such as command and control, electronic does cultivating the ability to develop and
warfare, meteorology, oceanography, infor-
mation processing, and high-information
92 JFQ / Autumn 1993
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Libicki and Hazlett
manipulate it. DOD needs to attract these
Infosphere
people not only as contractors but more im-
portantly as operators. Successful military
organizations must deploy not only superior
information systems, they must also be able
to fix, adapt, and maintain them in battle in
Global Positioning Satellites
real time. Yet an aspiring officer today would
be advised to specialize not in information
but in operations. Even the Air Force—the
most information-intensive service—is ori-
ented toward its fighter pilots as the Navy is
to ship and submarine drivers and naval avi-
Recon Satellites ators. Top echelons in other specialties such
as administration, material management,
and command and control are often as-
signed from the ranks of operators. This pro-
cedure makes sense if various specialties call
Weather Balloons
for similar skills and the best are attracted to
operations; an elite is an elite regardless of
what it does, and it could as easily be merg-
ers and acquisitions. However, if the skills re-
Probes
quired to be a good information warrior are
different from the qualities and ethos
needed to be an operator or these skills re-
quire long, specialized training, then the sys-
tem makes less sense. The best people avoid
information and those who remain do not
JSTARS
get the consideration their views deserve.
An Information Corps offers the possibil-
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) AWACS
ity of separate and more appropriate training
and career management as well as an ethos
for an information warrior. As computers get
more sophisticated, training necessary for
Land Radars their effective use may get longer. The infor-
mation warrior must know not only pro-
gramming but systems integration and sys-
Special Operations Forces
tems theory, communications, security,
artificial intelligence, logic in all its many
Ground Sensors
forms (classical, fuzzy, and convergent), and
Ships
statistical techniques. The information war-
rior must also know the customer’s needs:
the commander’s intent, doctrine, and strate-
gies. In addition, the information warrior
should know something about specific media
(land, sea, and space). Sending a college grad-
uate to the field for a few tours of general ex-
Submarines
pertise interspersed with training classes and
then expecting first-rate information tech-
niques in a more specialized tour later may
Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS)
not be adequate. The amount of information
necessary to be an information warrior is im-
mense, and the time required to master it
Autumn 1993 / JFQ 93
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INFORMATION CORPS
the amount of information will have to be at the Liaison. Just as the information space of
expense of more gen- the various services is converging, so too is
necessary to be an information
eral command in- the information space of the defense and
warrior is immense
struction. If this commercial sectors. DOD uses commercial
tradeoff is to be made communications satellites and bought the
voluntarily, the results have to be rewarded bulk of Spot’s imagery in the Gulf War; and
commensurately. An integrated Information boaters use the DOD Global Positioning Sys-
Corps with clear career paths and opportuni- tem. The defense and commercial sectors
ties for command and success would do this. swap weather data, and the DOD Global
As for ethos, a divergence between oper- Grid is the military version of the National
ators and information warriors must be ex- Information Infrastructure (which is a com-
pected. Discipline under fire places a pre- ponent of a global infrastructure). An Infor-
mium on certain qualities: courage, mation Corps would play a major role in the
decisionmaking, instinct, self-control, loy- development of a national information strat-
alty, and so forth. The information warrior, egy and a complementary national military
by contrast, must be highly intelligent, cre- information strategy.
ative, independent, flexible, tenacious (to Like the sign which reads “Call Miss
counter infamous 3 a.m. computer bugs), Utility Before You Dig,” both communities
and maybe somewhat eccentric. The exam- will have to shake hands before one or the
ple of Admiral Grace Hopper will not excite other adds, subtracts, or alters its infrastruc-
a tank commander any more than General tures. DOD used to formally liaise with
George Patton excites a bit twiddler. These AT&T when the latter was still dominant in
qualities are not necessarily antithetical, and telephony in the United States. Since then,
some qualities—common sense, judgement, the number of information players has mul-
contrapuntal thinking, decisiveness—are tiplied, and not just because AT&T has been
uniquely common to all warriors regardless rent asunder. In addition, as the DOD need
of weapons. To seek such qualities in opera- for information intensifies, and its assets
commingle with commercial systems, the
volume of interaction will greatly exceed
what one community can cope with. A com-
mon point of contact on the civilian side—
with its public and private players—will
never happen; but a common point of con-
tact on the military side is quite possible. A
separate Information Corps would provide
not only a common point of contact but
common doctrine and outlook. With a na-
tional information strategy and a national
military information strategy human proto-
my
Ar cols would not have to be reestablished
S.
U. every time the two worlds come in contact.
Apache helicopter
equipped with high- Functions of a Corps
tors and not information warriors further
tech sensors and Determining what an Information Corps
relegates the latter to subordinate status.
guidance systems. does (on formation, its duties will be those of
Ethos, status, and training issues suggest
the units which comprise it) is thus tanta-
the need for an Information Corps as well as
mount to delineating the borders between
a unified or specified information com-
the corps and the services from which it
mand. The latter could produce unity of op-
would grow. The first concern is doctrine.
eration, advocates for change, and liaison,
The transformation of the Army Air Corps
but not doctrine, status, or continuity (e.g.,
into the Air Force was more than a catch-all
information warriors who are evaluated by
for those who flew planes; it was also an ex-
other information warriors) that such a
pression of a theory of war, to wit: the ability
corps needs.
of airpower to transcend the ground situa-
tion and transform strategic conflict through
94 JFQ / Autumn 1993
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Libicki and Hazlett
aerial bombardment. The Marine Corps, in and subs fight subs, so too would data corps-
its evolution as a separate service, similarly men on one side fight those on another.
has built a doctrine of amphibious warfare. More specifically, data corpsmen would
Each service maintains its ability to compre- spend their time confounding the other
hend war from its perspective. side’s operations in the electromagnetic
An Information Corps would also have spectrum or disrupting the operations of
its doctrine. As alluded to above, the doctrine their net. This concept alone may be too
would support a primary mission of the narrow a basis for a corps and is susceptible
Armed Forces: to develop and exploit a com- to improvements in telematics technology,
mon integrated image of battlespace. This in- which may make it harder to interfere with
tegrated image would, of information systems. A second and con-
course, be divided and tentious notion is that any operation that
apportioned to meet the involves information, or alternatively com-
needs of various warfight- mand and control, in its broadest context
ers. Slicing and dicing should be part of a corps. But this is too
would entail analysis, fil- broad a definition. Not only does everyone
tering, enhancement, cor- deal in one respect or another with informa-
E. Taylor) rwehlaattioevne, rd ealtsae fiuss iroenq,u iarnedd tvioolnv,e btuhte ctoomp mlevaenld o af nad h cieornatrrcohly t. eTnod ss utgog ienst-
Charles tToh ea sismisat gdee, ciins iotunrmn,a kisi nagn. atonp -Ilnefvoerlm caotriposn wCitohrpins DwOouDl dt ob ewchoimche tthhee
Air Force ( idmepciosritoannts cwomhipcohn ernatn fgoer esevrevri cteos umseu sstu crehp oar tc oisr pps retosu cmopllteucot,u ps.r oHcoewss-,
S.
U. from strategy to weapons transmit, and present information and then
Coordinating informa- control. The bounds of convey the resulting orders is not.
tion on a weapons
such a system would vary from situation to The core of a compact corps and its asso-
systems situation
situation. In some cases a coherent image ciated command would consist of elements
board.
would be used for centralized decisionmaking which gather, assess, and distribute both sili-
(such as an Air Tasking Order); in other cases con- and human-based information: an info-
an image would call forth efforts to collect sphere (see figure on page 93). Space would
further information (launching sensors). be a central component, since virtually every
Some fire control solutions would be auto- current use of space (viz., surveillance, com-
matic, to take advantage of evanescent oppor- munications, navigation) is directly involved
tunities that a decisionmaking hierarchy in information. Added to that would be
would only slow down. Other images are chunks of the intelligence business, and the
background to on-the-spot decisions (tanks creation, operation, and maintenance of
should not have to relay pictures of targets to fixed-site command and control assets, infor-
a central grid for a go-ahead before engaging mation collection such as ground-based radar
them). Clearly the usefulness of a unified and the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS),
image depends on what percentage of the in- mapping, and meteorology.
formation involved in making a decision is How far an Information Corps should
generated by the shooter (coupled with what extend into mobile information collection,
share of the processing necessary to transform in the infosphere, is a difficult question. Plat-
data into decision is supplied by external al- forms as diverse as AWACS, JSTARS, Aegis,
gorithms). The doctrine is predicated on the P–3 squadrons, unmanned aerial vehicles,
assumption that nonlocal information (from artillery trajectory indicators, portable
other units or remote sensors) and analysis radars, and the like are information-inten-
(from artificial intelligence) will rise in rela- sive and thus similar to fixed-site informa-
tive importance. tion systems; but not every function (like
Two other reasons for organizing an In- airplane driving) on such platforms is appro-
formation Corps are only now beginning to priate for the data corps. Consider an Aegis
emerge. One is the concept of information cruiser: it certainly collects a considerable
as a realm of battle; just as tanks fight tanks, volume of data, and much of it could be
transformed into actionable targets for other
platforms, but most of its functions call for
Autumn 1993 / JFQ 95
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INFORMATION CORPS
total data, a fixed-site data
corps would become increas-
ingly marginal. It would be
valuable for strategic surveil-
lance and distributed interac-
tive simulations.
Including mobile elements
in an Information Corps intro-
duces command problems.
Each unit of an Information
Corps would have to report
my
Ar through its administrative
S.
U. chain of command, but it
Plotting incoming would have to respond to the
artillery on a Firefinder my operational chain of command
system. S. Ar as well. Who, below the CINC
U. or JTF commander, deter-
mines, for instance, when and
other skills. Which among equipment main- where to deploy sensors? Who determines
tainers, screen watchers, situation assessors, whether an aircraft is used for reconnais-
and communicators should be data corps- sance, electronic warfare, strike operations,
men? Should they be permanently or tem- or emitter dispersion? Do such needs re-
porarily assigned? spond to the requirements of the travelling
A tougher question will involve the mix unit (ship) or the deployed units of some in-
of military and civilians in an Information formation command (or under centralized
Corps. Should it be a defense or joint organi- control if not command)? All of these issues
zation? Some functions of an information can be resolved over time or may be eclipsed
service can be best performed by military by circumstances (if ships disappear from
personnel with varying degrees of expertise the inventory, shipboard problems do also),
and experience of the weapons systems with but that will take some effort.
which they must interface. Other positions A related objection is that even plat-
will have to be filled by computer geeks who forms whose exclusive mission today is to
are not disposed to military service. gather information may not necessarily re-
tain that character. Consider the vignette
Objections to a Corps
about UAV sensor packages. If the developers
The difficulty in delineating an Informa-
of this hardware and doctrine are informa-
tion Corps suggests that creating one is
tion warriors rather than operators, they
somewhat problematic: it must interface
may not appreciate the potential of a UAV as
with other command and control organiza-
a weapon rather than simply as a data col-
tions, will remove critical functions of an
lector. This problem can be managed and
operational unit, and may perhaps relieve
should be addressed as the acquisition proc-
some of the pressure of jointness.
ess is adjusted to the post-Cold War era.
Autonomy. Single-service cohorts are gen-
Criticality. Every organization is an in-
erally capable of operating autonomously in
formation organization; moreover, informa-
tactical environments, with little help
tion is power. Removing information cadres
needed from the others. For the most part an
from such an organization could lead to
Information Corps could not. If the corps
several unintended consequences. The latter
would be limited to fixed-site facilities, it
may be tempted to duplicate its lost capabil-
could at least function autonomously, but its
ities—no important organization in the Fed-
value would depend on its ability to provide
eral Government, for instance, leaves policy
data to others—it could complete few mili-
analysis to others. Besides wasting resources
tary missions on its own. But with dispersed
it reintroduces the very coordination short-
sensors and emitters (e.g., UAVs, buoys, lis-
falls an Information Corps was designed to
tening posts) gathering a larger share of the
overcome. Alternatively, affected military
units may simply ignore the information
96 JFQ / Autumn 1993
