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DTIC ADA426630: Do We Need An Information Corps? (Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1993) PDF

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Preview DTIC ADA426630: Do We Need An Information Corps? (Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1993)

1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 88 Do We Need An Information Corps? By M A R T I N C. L I B I C K I and J A M E S A. H A Z L E T T Monitoring large screen U.S. Navy (Tim Masterson) displays aboard Aegis W missile cruiser arfare is a changing art, a fact technology in one hundred hours as Opera- USS Vincennes. clearly illustrated by the events tion Desert Storm. Yet in the Gulf, for all in the Persian Gulf during the modern dimensions of that conflict, 1990–91. The type of human military operations were conducted with behavior reflected by the Hundred Years weapon systems that had been designed and War can now be manifest with modern fielded in the 1970s: Patriot missiles, Summary Warfare is about to enter a new phase that will upset the traditional balance between information and force. As firepower becomes an appendage to information, organizational transformations will begin to underpin a new architecture. A separate Information Corpscould guide this revolution, create common doctrine for the diverse requirements of information warriors, and facilitate liaison among civilian information agencies. Such a corps could also obviate the need for the services to integrate their data systems because standardization would exist from the outset. Moreover, the corps could foster innovations more consonant with the logic of the information revolution than would be the case if the services were left to their own devices. But even though the proposal for such a corps has merit, a number of issues concerning its likely impact on operational autonomy, the critical functions of operational units, and certain joint imperatives must first be addressed. 88 JFQ / Autumn 1993 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 1993 N/A - 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Do We Need An Information Corps? 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Center for Counterproliferation Research National Defense University REPORT NUMBER Washington, DC 20319-5066 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images. 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE UU 10 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 89 Libicki and Hazlett Abrams tanks, Aegis cruisers, a suite of fight- rather units of force information no ers (F–14s/–15s/–16s/–18s), Apache heli- are fire support for in- longer serves copters, and even the Airborne Warning and formation systems. units of force— Control System (AWACS). At the same time, The necessary the operation of those platforms, and their and sufficient corol- rather units of augmentation by powerful information sys- lary to this transfor- force are fire tems, suggests that the revolution in warfare mation is about orga- support for is about to enter an entirely new phase. Fu- nization. Current ture changes will be most successfully structures are built information adopted by systems which have been the around legions of op- systems most thoroughly structured. erators, served by Information, in sum, is the principal dif- lesser communities, ference between eras. Granted, the benefits such as intelligence (as well as logistics, engi- of both strategic and tactical information neering, communications, etc.). In this con- have never gone unnoted; they have been text lesser is not meant in a strictly pejora- decisive in many battles. What is new is the tive sense. However, in any unit which sheer size, speed, and volume of the infor- combines this discipline, the operators take mation flow needed to achieve superiority in command. Moreover, although career tracks combat. Information superiority is emerging are similar up to a certain level, operators as a newly recognized—more intense—area clearly make up a much higher percentage of of competition. The result may be the up- the top ranks (O8s and above) than they do ending of the relationship between informa- of the officer corps as a whole. On the other tion and force. Thus it may be the time to hand, if information warriors belonged to a form a future force to examine future warfare separate organization (be it a corps, service, issues, like how to best deal with the infor- or command), their relationship to the mation revolution by developing the requi- whole would undergo a concomitant and site strategies to exploit it. perhaps necessary adjustment. The existing relationship between Rationalizing a Corps weaponry and information is similar to the The purpose of the Armed Forces is to relationships among weapons systems and fight and win wars. Winners in the future other supporting elements such as command will take advantage of the fruits of the infor- and control, logistics, and personnel. Opera- mation revolution—including global posi- tions sit atop; all else supports them. Current tioning systems, global surveillance, and weapons have accommodated the informa- space-based sensors—while the losers will tion revolution by taking advantage of addi- not. To win one must be organized to take tional data inputs, but the military remains advantage of the opportunities offered by organized around units of force. This architec- the information revolution. ture may soon become obsolete. Instead, A separate corps and an associated com- those who prevail tomorrow may build their mand structure linking operations and intel- forces around a central information process- ligence will facilitate effective joint opera- ing core. Such a core would launch informa- tions, promote the information revolution tion probes into the media of war (that is, in in warfare, unify the disparate information land, air, sea, or space warfare, or the entire elements and give them an identity, create a spectrum), gather, transform, fuse, and har- common ethos for information warriors, and ness the returning stream and ladle results in provide a unified interface with civilian in- strategic synchrony directly to fire-control formation infrastructures. units or indirectly to operators. In either case, Jointness. The farther platforms can see the traditional relationship between informa- and shoot, the larger their battlespace, and tion and force will be turned on its head. In- the more service-specific battlespaces inter- formation no longer serves units of force— sect with each other. Aircraft of the Navy and Air Force use the same Air Tasking Order. Data collected by Air Force assets guide Army Martin C. Libicki and Commander James A. Hazlett, USN, are movements. National sensors alert anti-tacti- both senior fellows in the Institute for National Strategic cal ballistic missile forces of missile launches. Studies, National Defense University. Autumn 1993 / JFQ 89 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 90 INFORMATION CORPS All the services use the same satellite systems. where follow-on data collection efforts have Another factor that demands interoperable, to be focused, or whether and when fire con- or single, information systems is the tremen- trol solutions have to be generated. The in- dous annual increase in the volume and vari- teroperability requirements of such a pack- ety of data collected. age are therefore demanding. Most importantly, there is transition in The need for interoperable information how wars are fought and the diminished systems has been widely recognized by the local ties between seekingand shooting. Today senior leadership within DOD. Earlier this the two usually are closely linked. Although year Secretary of Defense Les Aspin observed prepped by intelligence reports, a tank must in a graduation address at the National De- both find and kill the target itself. Yet, other fense University, “Most of our systems for forms of warfare have already experienced the dissemination of intelligence imagery the separation: strike operations are planned cannot talk to each other.” The principal from externally collected data; anti-subma- joint command and control initiative (“C4I rine warfare operations use an elaborate lo- for the Warrior”) is exclusively about inter- calizing program prior to administering a operability, and all new information systems coup de grace. The Joint Surveillance and Tar- must be able to communicate jointly. Unfor- get Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and tunately, history suggests that after-the-fact AWACS support an efficient cue-and-pin- standardization frequently leads to unsatis- pointing system. The advent of precision- factory results. Why? strike systems that use both absolute and rel- t Standardization is a long-term process ative positioning (that is, latitude, longitude, that accommodates new developments only after bearing, range, course, and speed) is at hand. long delays. Over the next twenty years the per- The growing proliferation of sensor systems centage of new applications to existing ones is implies that the targeting systems of tomor- apt to grow greatly; intelligent filters that corre- row must be able to fuse data collected from late and process multispectral and nonelectro- a wide variety of sources. Such fusion means magnetic sensory data are on the threshold of major growth. that seamless interoperability is being de- t Standards developed by competing inter- manded for missions ranging from single- ests often choose a least-common-denominator shot targeting all the way to situational approach, letting each side agree to disagree at awareness by CINCs. the expense of interoperability. To illustrate the value of an integrated t Emphasis on data interoperability ignores perspective consider a hypothetical Un- the growing role of software interoperability. manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) sensor package Therefore, in the case of the sensor and how it might be developed—not only its package, development by different platforms hardware, but also its software, communica- groups increases the possibility that each tions, integration with other data units, and system stands alone and makes complete most importantly its doctrine and concept data fusion that much harder to achieve. of operations. An Information Corps is an alternate UAVs can serve all services, and on their route to data integration. Instead of the ser- own each service would develop a package vices and DOD agencies (and the multiple to fit its own mission profiles and support communities within them) attempting to their own platforms. Yet it can be expected merge information collection and dissemi- that the data flows from UAVs would go to nation systems, the functions would be car- common data receptors and would have to ried out by a single organization that oper- meld with other joint data collection assets ated under centralized doctrine and including ground-based sensors, higher-alti- command. Data would be standardized from tude aircraft, and space sensors. To the ex- the start; internecine politics that allow tent that each sensor package performs its components to agree to disagree would be, if own on-board processing, it may wish to not eliminated, then substantially muted. take advantage of common neural training What would otherwise be a conflict between regimens and pattern recognition tools. Data from the various sensor packages—which could come from any of the services—have to be analyzed in real time to determine 90 JFQ / Autumn 1993 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 91 Libicki and Hazlett Navy S. U. the need for innova- the battlefield, the grid atop it grows tighter, tions in data collec- smaller, and stealthier. Objects can be found tion, and the subse- faster and tracked more reliably. True, S. Navy oqunelyn tt hnaete dw thoi crhe phoarst tthode abye’ss t—weaarve etrhs—emasnedlv tehs el aUrgnei tpeldat fSotramtess ahnads U. been standardized, are thus tomorrow’s targets. Yet as sensors, Receiving information would be muted as well. Successful innova- processors, and communicators grow smaller from E–2C Hawkeye. tions would be integrated into the whole and cheaper, comparably effective grids can much earlier in their development. be built from networks of distributed sensors A related rationale emerges from the which collectively would be more robust emphasis on Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Today than complex platforms (e.g., it is harder to and in the future the services will be increas- take down a million balloons than a dozen ingly cobbled together by JTFs. Such organi- JSTARS). The contest between industrial-era zations, which usually are made up of a platforms and information-era networks will chunk of this and a chunk of that, demand increasingly favor the latter (even though that most chunk commanders (and key staff stealth will postpone the inevitable for members) know each other beforehand. A some). Forces with fewer manned platforms coterie of information warriors whose spe- suggest radically different capabilities for the cialty is preparing the battlefield image but military of today. History suggests that orga- who are attached to different operating units nizations may resist change but to their ulti- is already integrated. Acting as the glue, they mate disadvantage. can help bring together far more fine- No one questions the overwhelming rela- grained units. tive superiority of the U.S. Armed Forces, and Innovation. The information revolution for that reason our manned platforms would is almost a cliche. Less well accepted is the logically be the last to be threatened or threat that it will pose to the concept of copied. A potential competitor would be fool- putting men and women in steel, titanium, ish to challenge our dominance by a strategy or ceramic boxes to fight wars. Why are plat- forms at risk? As more data is collected over Autumn 1993 / JFQ 91 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 92 INFORMATION CORPS that copied our force Mobile satellite dishes structure. Forces built in Somalia. around information sys- tems constructed from commercially available components, however, would pose a more seri- ous threat—one which contests our reigning paradigm. Thus, it would be far more attractive to challenge us in that way. Although an Infor- mation Corps may not Center be inherently more in- mera novative than the ser- Ca vices, it is more likely to mbat Co pnuorvsautei otnhse tkhinadt sa cocf oirnd- Joint with the logic of the information revolution. Left to themselves, the Armed Forces will in- cwoirthpo irnaftoer minafotiromna tteiochnn ionltoog iwese aaps opnlrayt,f obrumt Center support rather than with platforms as fire mera Ca support to an information grid. An informa- mbat tion Corps, however, would take an entirely Co different approach from the outset, empha- Joint sizing the information grid as central. Con- Communicating in stituent elements and doctrine for such a Somalia. grid would be evaluated on their ability to locate, track, and evaluate objects and events platforms such as Aegis, AWACS, JSTARS, passed for conversion into fire-control solu- and UAV contingents. Other functions tions and servicing. Such a service or corps which technology may soon enable are not would be an institutional advocate for a even listed for obvious reasons; when they paradigm shift, and would, by its advocacy, do emerge the soup will be even thicker. better prepare for a threat which comes from This is just the point. The various sub-com- a different direction. munities in the information-based warfare Unity. The common argument against community see themselves as disparate creating a completely new organization is players. Each relates to one or two others at that its planned functions are all being done most, and they all lack the common unify- by someone else. When this question is ing doctrine of operations. Information war- posed, however, the compo- riors are more than simply communicators, information warriors are sition of the group varies data processors, or intelligence agents. They widely: the Director for are all part of a global structure that would more than simply commu- Command, Control, Com- become apparent with the creation of an In- nicators, data processors, munication and Computer formation Corps. or intelligence agents Systems (J–6) on the Joint Culture. A related reason for integrating Staff, Defense Information various DOD informational elements into a Systems Agency, Defense single corps is to provide information war- Mapping Agency, Space Command, and in- riors with status, culture, and an ethic. The telligence agencies—all without going into issue of respect is relatively straightforward. the services. Under the latter are functions As information becomes more important, so such as command and control, electronic does cultivating the ability to develop and warfare, meteorology, oceanography, infor- mation processing, and high-information 92 JFQ / Autumn 1993 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 93 Libicki and Hazlett manipulate it. DOD needs to attract these Infosphere people not only as contractors but more im- portantly as operators. Successful military organizations must deploy not only superior information systems, they must also be able to fix, adapt, and maintain them in battle in Global Positioning Satellites real time. Yet an aspiring officer today would be advised to specialize not in information but in operations. Even the Air Force—the most information-intensive service—is ori- ented toward its fighter pilots as the Navy is to ship and submarine drivers and naval avi- Recon Satellites ators. Top echelons in other specialties such as administration, material management, and command and control are often as- signed from the ranks of operators. This pro- cedure makes sense if various specialties call Weather Balloons for similar skills and the best are attracted to operations; an elite is an elite regardless of what it does, and it could as easily be merg- ers and acquisitions. However, if the skills re- Probes quired to be a good information warrior are different from the qualities and ethos needed to be an operator or these skills re- quire long, specialized training, then the sys- tem makes less sense. The best people avoid information and those who remain do not JSTARS get the consideration their views deserve. An Information Corps offers the possibil- Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) AWACS ity of separate and more appropriate training and career management as well as an ethos for an information warrior. As computers get more sophisticated, training necessary for Land Radars their effective use may get longer. The infor- mation warrior must know not only pro- gramming but systems integration and sys- Special Operations Forces tems theory, communications, security, artificial intelligence, logic in all its many Ground Sensors forms (classical, fuzzy, and convergent), and Ships statistical techniques. The information war- rior must also know the customer’s needs: the commander’s intent, doctrine, and strate- gies. In addition, the information warrior should know something about specific media (land, sea, and space). Sending a college grad- uate to the field for a few tours of general ex- Submarines pertise interspersed with training classes and then expecting first-rate information tech- niques in a more specialized tour later may Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) not be adequate. The amount of information necessary to be an information warrior is im- mense, and the time required to master it Autumn 1993 / JFQ 93 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 94 INFORMATION CORPS the amount of information will have to be at the Liaison. Just as the information space of expense of more gen- the various services is converging, so too is necessary to be an information eral command in- the information space of the defense and warrior is immense struction. If this commercial sectors. DOD uses commercial tradeoff is to be made communications satellites and bought the voluntarily, the results have to be rewarded bulk of Spot’s imagery in the Gulf War; and commensurately. An integrated Information boaters use the DOD Global Positioning Sys- Corps with clear career paths and opportuni- tem. The defense and commercial sectors ties for command and success would do this. swap weather data, and the DOD Global As for ethos, a divergence between oper- Grid is the military version of the National ators and information warriors must be ex- Information Infrastructure (which is a com- pected. Discipline under fire places a pre- ponent of a global infrastructure). An Infor- mium on certain qualities: courage, mation Corps would play a major role in the decisionmaking, instinct, self-control, loy- development of a national information strat- alty, and so forth. The information warrior, egy and a complementary national military by contrast, must be highly intelligent, cre- information strategy. ative, independent, flexible, tenacious (to Like the sign which reads “Call Miss counter infamous 3 a.m. computer bugs), Utility Before You Dig,” both communities and maybe somewhat eccentric. The exam- will have to shake hands before one or the ple of Admiral Grace Hopper will not excite other adds, subtracts, or alters its infrastruc- a tank commander any more than General tures. DOD used to formally liaise with George Patton excites a bit twiddler. These AT&T when the latter was still dominant in qualities are not necessarily antithetical, and telephony in the United States. Since then, some qualities—common sense, judgement, the number of information players has mul- contrapuntal thinking, decisiveness—are tiplied, and not just because AT&T has been uniquely common to all warriors regardless rent asunder. In addition, as the DOD need of weapons. To seek such qualities in opera- for information intensifies, and its assets commingle with commercial systems, the volume of interaction will greatly exceed what one community can cope with. A com- mon point of contact on the civilian side— with its public and private players—will never happen; but a common point of con- tact on the military side is quite possible. A separate Information Corps would provide not only a common point of contact but common doctrine and outlook. With a na- tional information strategy and a national military information strategy human proto- my Ar cols would not have to be reestablished S. U. every time the two worlds come in contact. Apache helicopter equipped with high- Functions of a Corps tors and not information warriors further tech sensors and Determining what an Information Corps relegates the latter to subordinate status. guidance systems. does (on formation, its duties will be those of Ethos, status, and training issues suggest the units which comprise it) is thus tanta- the need for an Information Corps as well as mount to delineating the borders between a unified or specified information com- the corps and the services from which it mand. The latter could produce unity of op- would grow. The first concern is doctrine. eration, advocates for change, and liaison, The transformation of the Army Air Corps but not doctrine, status, or continuity (e.g., into the Air Force was more than a catch-all information warriors who are evaluated by for those who flew planes; it was also an ex- other information warriors) that such a pression of a theory of war, to wit: the ability corps needs. of airpower to transcend the ground situa- tion and transform strategic conflict through 94 JFQ / Autumn 1993 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 95 Libicki and Hazlett aerial bombardment. The Marine Corps, in and subs fight subs, so too would data corps- its evolution as a separate service, similarly men on one side fight those on another. has built a doctrine of amphibious warfare. More specifically, data corpsmen would Each service maintains its ability to compre- spend their time confounding the other hend war from its perspective. side’s operations in the electromagnetic An Information Corps would also have spectrum or disrupting the operations of its doctrine. As alluded to above, the doctrine their net. This concept alone may be too would support a primary mission of the narrow a basis for a corps and is susceptible Armed Forces: to develop and exploit a com- to improvements in telematics technology, mon integrated image of battlespace. This in- which may make it harder to interfere with tegrated image would, of information systems. A second and con- course, be divided and tentious notion is that any operation that apportioned to meet the involves information, or alternatively com- needs of various warfight- mand and control, in its broadest context ers. Slicing and dicing should be part of a corps. But this is too would entail analysis, fil- broad a definition. Not only does everyone tering, enhancement, cor- deal in one respect or another with informa- E. Taylor) rwehlaattioevne, rd ealtsae fiuss iroenq,u iarnedd tvioolnv,e btuhte ctoomp mlevaenld o af nad h cieornatrrcohly t. eTnod ss utgog ienst- Charles tToh ea sismisat gdee, ciins iotunrmn,a kisi nagn. atonp -Ilnefvoerlm caotriposn wCitohrpins DwOouDl dt ob ewchoimche tthhee Air Force ( idmepciosritoannts cwomhipcohn ernatn fgoer esevrevri cteos umseu sstu crehp oar tc oisr pps retosu cmopllteucot,u ps.r oHcoewss-, S. U. from strategy to weapons transmit, and present information and then Coordinating informa- control. The bounds of convey the resulting orders is not. tion on a weapons such a system would vary from situation to The core of a compact corps and its asso- systems situation situation. In some cases a coherent image ciated command would consist of elements board. would be used for centralized decisionmaking which gather, assess, and distribute both sili- (such as an Air Tasking Order); in other cases con- and human-based information: an info- an image would call forth efforts to collect sphere (see figure on page 93). Space would further information (launching sensors). be a central component, since virtually every Some fire control solutions would be auto- current use of space (viz., surveillance, com- matic, to take advantage of evanescent oppor- munications, navigation) is directly involved tunities that a decisionmaking hierarchy in information. Added to that would be would only slow down. Other images are chunks of the intelligence business, and the background to on-the-spot decisions (tanks creation, operation, and maintenance of should not have to relay pictures of targets to fixed-site command and control assets, infor- a central grid for a go-ahead before engaging mation collection such as ground-based radar them). Clearly the usefulness of a unified and the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), image depends on what percentage of the in- mapping, and meteorology. formation involved in making a decision is How far an Information Corps should generated by the shooter (coupled with what extend into mobile information collection, share of the processing necessary to transform in the infosphere, is a difficult question. Plat- data into decision is supplied by external al- forms as diverse as AWACS, JSTARS, Aegis, gorithms). The doctrine is predicated on the P–3 squadrons, unmanned aerial vehicles, assumption that nonlocal information (from artillery trajectory indicators, portable other units or remote sensors) and analysis radars, and the like are information-inten- (from artificial intelligence) will rise in rela- sive and thus similar to fixed-site informa- tive importance. tion systems; but not every function (like Two other reasons for organizing an In- airplane driving) on such platforms is appro- formation Corps are only now beginning to priate for the data corps. Consider an Aegis emerge. One is the concept of information cruiser: it certainly collects a considerable as a realm of battle; just as tanks fight tanks, volume of data, and much of it could be transformed into actionable targets for other platforms, but most of its functions call for Autumn 1993 / JFQ 95 1302 Libicki 10/8/97 2:18 PM Page 96 INFORMATION CORPS total data, a fixed-site data corps would become increas- ingly marginal. It would be valuable for strategic surveil- lance and distributed interac- tive simulations. Including mobile elements in an Information Corps intro- duces command problems. Each unit of an Information Corps would have to report my Ar through its administrative S. U. chain of command, but it Plotting incoming would have to respond to the artillery on a Firefinder my operational chain of command system. S. Ar as well. Who, below the CINC U. or JTF commander, deter- mines, for instance, when and other skills. Which among equipment main- where to deploy sensors? Who determines tainers, screen watchers, situation assessors, whether an aircraft is used for reconnais- and communicators should be data corps- sance, electronic warfare, strike operations, men? Should they be permanently or tem- or emitter dispersion? Do such needs re- porarily assigned? spond to the requirements of the travelling A tougher question will involve the mix unit (ship) or the deployed units of some in- of military and civilians in an Information formation command (or under centralized Corps. Should it be a defense or joint organi- control if not command)? All of these issues zation? Some functions of an information can be resolved over time or may be eclipsed service can be best performed by military by circumstances (if ships disappear from personnel with varying degrees of expertise the inventory, shipboard problems do also), and experience of the weapons systems with but that will take some effort. which they must interface. Other positions A related objection is that even plat- will have to be filled by computer geeks who forms whose exclusive mission today is to are not disposed to military service. gather information may not necessarily re- tain that character. Consider the vignette Objections to a Corps about UAV sensor packages. If the developers The difficulty in delineating an Informa- of this hardware and doctrine are informa- tion Corps suggests that creating one is tion warriors rather than operators, they somewhat problematic: it must interface may not appreciate the potential of a UAV as with other command and control organiza- a weapon rather than simply as a data col- tions, will remove critical functions of an lector. This problem can be managed and operational unit, and may perhaps relieve should be addressed as the acquisition proc- some of the pressure of jointness. ess is adjusted to the post-Cold War era. Autonomy. Single-service cohorts are gen- Criticality. Every organization is an in- erally capable of operating autonomously in formation organization; moreover, informa- tactical environments, with little help tion is power. Removing information cadres needed from the others. For the most part an from such an organization could lead to Information Corps could not. If the corps several unintended consequences. The latter would be limited to fixed-site facilities, it may be tempted to duplicate its lost capabil- could at least function autonomously, but its ities—no important organization in the Fed- value would depend on its ability to provide eral Government, for instance, leaves policy data to others—it could complete few mili- analysis to others. Besides wasting resources tary missions on its own. But with dispersed it reintroduces the very coordination short- sensors and emitters (e.g., UAVs, buoys, lis- falls an Information Corps was designed to tening posts) gathering a larger share of the overcome. Alternatively, affected military units may simply ignore the information 96 JFQ / Autumn 1993

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