DTIC ADA419964: Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

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PATHS DIVERGING?
THE NEXT DECADE IN THE
U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

20040219 138

William E. Rapp
STRATEGIC
STUDIES
INSTITUTE,

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PATHS DIVERGING?
‘THE NEXT DECADE IN THE US-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

William E, Rapp

Jenuary 2004
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
awcessarly reflect the offiistpoliry ar pesttion ofthe Department ofthe Army. the
Department of Defense ot the US, Government. This report is cleared for public
retest distribution uate

“The bulk: of this work was made potsble by the geneeous support frm the
(Council on Foreign Relations and Hitachi, ed, dering ay temarearan Intemational
Affi Fellow in Japan, 2002-03. T thank: Former rime Miniter ‘Yeruhieo
INakasone and Ambassador Yoshio Okswara for arcepting me 20 graciously at
the Institute for International Puli Shades Grkot Metwa Kenkyu Jo) in Toke,
[My colleagues al HIPS, ld by Profesor Taaio Ynkushii were of tremendous help
in guiding my study ef Japancee culture and policy. Finally, [would like to thank
LGeutenamt Colonel Thomas Horlandr, Sam Jameson Ed Rapp, Hajime Kitaok,
by. Robyn Lita, Dr. Andrew S:obell, Dr Sharon Beat, Colonel Miles Borack, PA
Robertson, Masatala Toh and Joc Flas fr ther insightfalcarments,

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FOREWORD

Currently, optimiom reigns among managers on both sides of the
US.Japanalliance for many reasons nat least of whichis the Japanese
support for the global war on terror. The Japanese arc emerging fron
Sidevades of military minimelisin and dependeney and beginning to
have serious dehates sbuvt their role in the world and the efficacy of
military power. This internal debate, however. has significant external
ramifications for Northeast Asia and the United States. A decade ago,
Henry Kissinger wrote that “the new world onder, with its multiplicity
of challenges, will almost certainly oblige a country [Japan] with so
proud of a past tn reexamine ts reliance ona single ally.”

In thie - monograph, Lieutenant Cotonel (0) William E. Rapp
explores the changing nature of Japanese socurity policy and the:
impact of these changes on the TLS.-Japan security alliance. He begins
his analysis by acquainting the reader with an inoider’s view of the
conificled Japanese conceplions of security policy and the vasious
ideational and structural restraints on expanding the role of the
ailitary. Next, he explores the events of the past decade that have
caused huge shifts in security potiey ane posture and predicts the
foture vectors of those changes within Japan. Finally, Lieutenant
Colonel Rapp overlays the fikely Japancne security fotore on the
allianoe and conchades that changes in the basic relationship between
the United States and Japan must occur ifthe alliance is to retain its
centrality 20 years from now.

Licutenant Colonel Rapp’s extensive research from both published
sourees and personal interviews with ranking Japanese and American
leaders and bureaucrats provides valuable and timely insights into
the changing nate of the relationship between these twa powers
‘The future of American security policy in the region is a topic of hot
and urgenily needed debate. The Stralegic Studies Institute is pleased
to publish this monograph as a contribution to tha discussion on both

sides of the Pacific Ocean,
UGLAB C. L hials at

Director
Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM E, RAPP, a Lientenart Colonel (P}in the LS, Army, is a
career soldier who has served ina variety of assignments around the
‘world. Mast recentlg, he served as a Council on Foreiga Relations
‘Hitachi International Affairs Fellow at the Institute for International
Policy Studies in Tokyo. Priar to that fellowship, he commanded
combat engineer battalion in Bamberg, Germany, served asa military
assistant in the Army Secretariat in the Pentagon, and held troop,
assignments in Tort Lewis, Washington; Fort Bragg, North Carolina;
and in Nainberg, Germany, He commanded an airborne engineer
‘company in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He
hols a BS. from the United States Militery Acadomy, an M.A,
politcal scence from Stanford University, and a Ph.D, in Political
Sclence (International Relations) from Stanford University He is a
graduate of the Command and General Staff College and is curently
attending the US, Army War Callege in Cartisle, Pennsylvania,
SUMMARY

Although the United States ts the sole superpower in the world,
it inereesingly faces an objcctives-menns shortfal! in attaining its
glohal interests unilaterally, Sustaining ils engagement in the for
reaches of the world requires the partnership of eapable, willing and
Jike-mvinded slales. Inthe Asia-Pacife region, the U 5.Japan Security
Alliance will remain vital to achieving both conntries’ national
Jntarests in the next 2 decades because of a lack of strategic options,
though the eornmitmentof both parmers is likely te be sorely tested
Should conditions atise that give either the Lunited States or Tapan
a viable alternative to advance stability and national intovests, the
alliance could be in doubt.

Tlaving depended on the United States for security for over 50
years, Japan is now actively trying lo chant ils new path fur the:
Future, Japan is in the eaidsi of a fundamental reexamination af ils
security policy and its role in jrternatinnal zelations Lhat will have,
a dramatic impact on Kast Asia and the Pacifie. Within Japan, many
see the lraditional means of security policy as being ext af batence
‘and vulnerable in the post-Cold War environment. ‘The wad of
‘economic diplomacy, engagement with intemational organizations,
anda minimalish military posture predivated ox a capable self-
dofmee force with American guarantees of protectin, heavily
sscighted towaed economic dipkmacy, is not seen by the Japanese
to be adequately achiewing Lhe national interests wd influence that
couatey seeks,

Regardinss of the more realist imperatives, fopani remains deeply
ambivalent towsrd eecority expansion, However, despite domestic
restraints, Japan will conlinue slowly and incrementally to remove
the shackley on its military sccunily policy. Attihutine! barriers,
sich oe pacifism, anlismilitétism, security Insulation, and desire for
consensins combine with instiuational barriers, ike coalition polities,
lack of budget space, and entrenched bureaucracy, to confound
rapid shiits in secuity policy, Unoagh Uiese chan, :

‘Taeeathivalrnee japan feels clouds the idcat path tp the: feture Sez
the neaion in ayiny ta find a way lorward among competing you's

sill events
cof preventing either entrapment or abandonment by the United
States and pursuing self-interest. Because Japan ia risk-averse, but
increasingly selt-aware, dramatic fin Jopanese terms} security policy
changes will continue to be made in small, but cumulative steps
‘These changesin security policy and public acquiescence tothem will
create pressure on the alliance to reduce asymmetries and offensive
‘burdens since the deat, long-term security future for Japan dors not
rely on the current role vis-A-vis the United States. Both Japan and
the United States mast move out of their comfort zones to create a
more balanced relationship that involves substantial consultation
and policy accoanmociation, a greater risk-taking Japanese role in the
maintenance of peace and stability of the region, and coordinated
action to resolve conflicts and promote prosperity in the region.
Because neither country has a viable alternative to the alliance
for the promotion of security and national interests in the region,
espocially given the uncertainties of the future trends in China and.
the Kerean Peninsula, for the next couple of decades the alliance
will remain central to achieving the interests of both Japan and
the United States, A more symmetrical alliance can be a positive
force for regionat stability and prosperity In areas of engagement of
China, proactive shaping of the security environment, the protection
‘of maritime commerce routes, and the countering of wespans
proliferation, terrorism, and drug trafficking, Without substantive
change, though, the contratity of the alliance will dimunish as
strategic alternatives develop for either the United States or Japan,
PATHS DIVERGING?
‘THE NEXT DECADE IN THE
U8-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE

Optimism reigns among cbservers of the Japanese andl American
alliance. The partnership is currently reveling in the stungest
Bilateral atmosphere it has ever seen, and the Junichiro-Goorge
selationship appears to eclipse even that purported to Ron and Yasu
in the mid-19B0s. A convergence of strategic interests over Korea,
Chino, and counterterrorism combines with America’s relief that
Japan is taking a more militarily assertive role in its own defense
and outside its borders.

“However, the tightening of the alliance and increased Japanese
solein the partnership today doesnot portend an even clover atliance
decades from now, While the security paths that both countries
‘currently are following appear to be converging nose, those voctors
are move Jikely to begin diverging once the Korean crisis is resolved
and Japanese military abilities to deal with toerorism and ballistic
‘missile thecats are more robust.

‘Within thenext devade, several wateeshed decisions will be made
by both countries that will provide a glimpse of the future of the
alliance, The ballistic rise defense decision appears to have been
made in the obvious favor of the alliance, However, the Japanase
Ihave not yet accepted the home porting of the USS Cari Vinson—a
nuclear aitcraft carrier—at Yokosuka Naval Base neur Tokgo, though
alliance managers remain confident On the olher side of the
Pacific, the Americans have not yet made a decision on the: grand
transformational issve of whether to emphasize access to bases in
‘ast Asia in Lea of the cunent forwaxel presence. These and other
strategie decisions arc highly intorrclated, and the ramifications for
the partnership wil be profound. Although the alliance is arguably
in the best shape in decades follovring the Japanese support for the
United States in the seconel Gulf Wer, the euphoria potentially masks
an underlying divergence of interests over the next several decades
and demands that hard choices rmist be faced and compromises be
made.
For the past 52 years, the security alliance brtween the United
States and Japan has served the interests of both countries well. For
myriad reasons, inefoding basing righls for American forces in this
important region, the provision of secuety so that Japan can rebuild
intoa strong democratic bulwark agains! totalitarian forces in Asia,
and reassurances to Asian nations about Japan's commitment not to
revisit fs policies of the 1980s and 1940s, the alliance has remained.
an important component of both counties’ security policy. This
importance islikely tobe tested in thecoming yearsas both the United
States and Japan review their strategic options and reconsider the
shape and character of this special elationship necessary to achieve
‘heir respective national interests in the increasingly troubled region
of Northeast Asia.

Currently in Northeast Asia there is considerable uncertainty
about the future for all countries involved in the region. ‘Ths
nuclear ambitions of an increasingly desperate North Korea have
Jed to serious ruptures in the US-Republic of Korea alliance
and greatly enhanced security fears in Japan. ‘Tho global war on
terrorism and widely perceived unilaterafism on the part of the
United States has, itonically, enhanced the confidante of Chira to
pottray itself as a multidimensional leader in Asis. The growing,
strength of the Kuontintang im Taiwanese politics and its agenda to
build’a clover relationship or ever. confederation with mainland
China after the presidential elections of March 2004 may upond the
security assurmptions of the region! Operation TRAQY FREEDOM,
hrs reinforced the coneept of transformation and povver projection
Srom a mare limited number of forward bases advocated so strongly
by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. while a: the same time
highlighting Amnetica’s need for allics in the war on testorismn. It is
a region awash in uncertainly, but une in which the United States
1nust romain firmly engaged lo puolec i vital itervats

Inthe breadth ofits rearh ani influence, the United Sais is ften
desctibed by nthers as hegemonic and the werle’s sole seperporren.
‘This fs a very clumsy caricature, however, Colin Povrell recently
quipped, “We arc se rorltlatera’ i: Keeps me up 26 hones a day
checking o7 everybody.” Ihe extent nf tha! reach aad Lhe means
necessat? for ae" dewing Aracvicaa inlersels around thes wurll peed