DTIC ADA412500: Gateway. Volume 13

29 Pages·1.1 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

inside:
Volume XIII: Number 4 (2003)
Human Systems IAC 3 The Role of Science and
G Technology in
ATEWAY Countering Terrorism
inside:
4 A Unified Model of
Security Inspection
Published by the Human Systems Information Analysis Center 5 Vigilance and
the Price of Freedom
6 A Safe and Secure System
7 Bringing to Light the
Meaning of Information
8 Advocating for
Human Factors
9 Airbus Aircraft Security
10 Security Initiatives
of the ALPA
11 Air Force Applications to
Aviation Security Issues
12 Special Working Group on
Human Factors in
Homeland Defense
13 Human Systems Technology
and Aviation Security
14 Calendar
16 The Human Factors of
Civil Aviation and
Human Factors in
Transportation Security
Homeland Security
17 Lessons Learned
18 Police Performance and
Sandra G. Hart Human Factors Research
19 Improvement of
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Information Analysis Center
hto provide different perspectives on the role that actions already initiated by airlines,
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will play in meeting these national objectives. are described in the articles by Canto VInAfo, rtemcahtnioicna lAlyn amlyasnisa gCeedn bteyr tahdem Aiinr-
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dmarized in excerpts from a national research government is playing is described by
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Committee on Science and Technology for and commercialized technologies MEfcfeLcetaivne,n VeAs.s Directorate, Wright-
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Endsley suggest ways in which human factors agencies to the war on terrorism),
t aMnc eLnedano,r sVeAm.ent by the Department of
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hresearch originally conducted with other appli- Bellenkes (the role of committees in DefeTnhsee a oprp ethaera HnSceIA oCf. an advertisement
continued on next page… in this newsletter does not constitute
an endorsement by the Department of
Defense or the HSIAC.
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01-01-2003 Newsletter xx-xx-2002toxx-xx-2003
4.TITLEANDSUBTITLE 5a.CONTRACTNUMBER
Gateway 5b.GRANTNUMBER
XIII
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Unclassified
6.AUTHOR(S) 5d.PROJECTNUMBER
Hart,SandraG; 5e.TASKNUMBER
Drury,ColinG;
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Hancock,PeterA;
Szalma,JamesL;
Endsley,Micaet.al.;
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13.SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES
14.ABSTRACT
Thisnewslettercontainsarticlesonthefollowing:TheRoleofScienceandTechnologyinCounteringTerrorism;AUnifiedModelofSecurity
Inspection;VigilanceandthePriceofFreedom;ASafeandSecureSystem;BringingtoLighttheMeaningofInformation;Advocatingfor
HumanFactors;AirbusAircraftSecurity;SecurityInitiativesoftheALPA;AirForceApplicationstoAviationSecurityIssues;Special
WorkingGrouponHumanFactorsinHomelandDefense;HumanSystemsTechnologyandAviaitonSecurity;TheHumanFactorsofCivil
AviationandtransporationSecurity;PolicePerformanceandHumanFactorsResearch;andImprovementofBuidlingEvacuations.The
newsletteralsocontainsacalendarofhumanfactorseventsaswellasHSIACproducts.
15.SUBJECTTERMS
HSIACcollection;HumanFactors;AircraftSecurity;CivilAviation;TransportationSecurity;PolicePerformance;Research;Building
Evacuations
16.SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONOF: 17.LIMITATION 18. 19.NAMEOFRESPONSIBLEPERSON
OFABSTRACT NUMBER Darrah,Sara
SameasReport [email protected]
(SAR) 28
a.REPORT b.ABSTRACT c.THISPAGE 19b.TELEPHONENUMBER
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified InternationalAreaCode
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…continued from previous page
sharing ideas, coordinate implementation of solu-
tions), Steele (the role of DoD), and Neiderman
(recent and planned human factors activities
being undertaken within the Transportation
Security Administration to improve airport secu-
rity). Articles by Zedlewski and Vila focused on
the role of law enforcement, especially lessons we
can learn from first responders to September 11th,
the role of the federal government in supporting
state and local governments, and challenges cre-
ated by shortages of qualified police officers and
equipment in need of better human factors. Groner
deals with post-disaster responses, focusing on
improving building egress.
These fourteen articles offer just a sampling of
the many different roles that human factors pro-
fessional might play in preventing future terrorist
attacks, coping with such events should they occur
again, and mitigating the consequences. By work-
ing with government agencies and industries most
directly involved in promoting national security,
the field of human factors can demonstrate its
relevance and value yet again. n
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2 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 3
Human Factors Issues in the National Academies Report
Making the Nation Safer:
The Role of Science and Technology in
Countering Terrorism
National Academies of Science
In June of 2002, the National Academies decontamination specialists), so user This article may be
released Making the Nation Safer: The Role interfaces must also be based on the ordered from the National
of Science and Technology in Countering best human factors research. This will Academies Press at
Terrorism. This report identifies actions, including be a particular issue in the design and (888) 624–7645 or
deployment of available technologies, that can be implementation of sensor systems for (202) 334–3313 or online at
taken immediately, and it points to the urgent need the detection of various threats, such as http://www.nap.edu/catalog/
to initiate research and development activities in biological or chemical agents, nuclear 10415.html. The report is
critical areas. Understanding human factors will materials, explosives, or conventional also available on the web
be an essential step in successfully implement- weapons. at: http://books.nap.edu/html/
ing any new counterterrorism technology, and the One example of an area where stct/index.html
importance of taking human factors into account human factors will be particularly
in the design of all systems, particularly those used critical is in the development and Making the Nation Safer
by first responders, is a general principle underly- deployment of security system concepts was written by a National
ing many of the recommendations made in the for use in transportation systems, such Academies committee co-chaired
report. as the design of airport security check- by Lewis M. Branscomb,
Virtually all technologies are subject to the real- points that are more efficient and less Emeritus Professor of
ity that human agents and social organizations are error-prone. Human factors expertise Public Policy and Corporate
necessary to implement and operate them. Thus is necessary for crafting layered secu- Management and Emeritus
a key aspect in the effective deployment of any rity systems that, as a whole, increase Director of the Science,
of the technologies discussed in this report is the the perceived risk of getting caught Technology, and Public Policy
ease and effectiveness of use of information and and maximize the ability of security Program, Center for Science and
other technical outputs by the people they are personnel to recognize unusual and International Affairs, John F.
intended to support. Often, the weakest part of suspicious patterns of activity and Kennedy School of Government,
the system is the (frequently neglected) human behavior. Recognition of human factors Harvard University, and
link. Overlooking the human element can make it is important for ensuring that the role Richard D. Klausner, Executive
more difficult for people to do their jobs and, ironi- of people in providing security is not Director of Global Health, Bill
cally, significantly reduce the effectiveness of the determined by default on the basis of and Melinda Gates Foundation.
security technologies. In the worst case, the entire what technology promises, but rather The report is a product of the
system may be rendered useless. Thus, human- as a result of systematic evaluations work of one hundred and
centric design and an improved understanding of of human strengths and weaknesses eighteen people on a parent
the factors that contribute to systematic human that technology can both complement committee and eight panels;
c errors are essential. and supplement. Indeed, it may turn the authors’ expertise covered h
a t
si Research is needed so that appropriate, informed out that some technologies do not hold a wide range of relevant tp
h decisions about deployment of new counterterror- promise because they are inferior to, or areas, including systems :/
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il ism technologies can be made. Whether a secu- incompatible with, the performance of engineering, bioterrorism, and ia
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rity system will be effective depends on how the human users—for instance, they might transportation systems security.
c. system is used, by whom, and for what ends. If interfere with the performance of flight .d
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d the primary purpose is deterrence, the needed crews, bus drivers, or screeners. Thus c
c. technical capabilities of the system are different expertise and research on human fac- .m
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than if it is for warning of potential attacks or tors will need to be one of the key i
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/ for controlling access to an area. The background elements of the new Transportation h
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2 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 3
A Unified Model
of Security Inspection
Colin G. Drury, Ph.D.
Colin G. Drury, Ph.D., is A major part of homeland security A model of how human operators and auto-
UB Distinguished Professor policy still focuses on detection mated components cooperate to provide security
of Industrial Engineering, of threats before they can harm inspection is proposed. The model is based on a
University at Buffalo, SUNY. the public. Particularly for various generic description of inspection operation func-
He is a member of the National modes of public transportation, an array tions in security as well as many other domains
Research Council and Federal of equipment and procedures has been such as manufacturing and aviation maintenance.
Aviation Administration developed for threat detection. These The functions of inspection are set-up, present,
Committees responsible for are challenged by an ever-expanding search, decide, and respond. Each function pro-
transportation security. set of threat objects that range from vides a link between the actual task and existing
weapons to improvised explosive quantitative knowledge about human and auto-
devices and chemical and biological mation performance (e.g., visual search theory
agents. Each threat-detection system is or various decision theories). The model applies
composed of humans and machines. to x-ray screening, bulk explosive detection, trace
Typically, each system is designed as a element detection, hand searches and even remote
stand-alone measure with specific per- surveillance.
formance objectives (e.g., probability of With a unified model, we can begin to link
detection, probability of false alarm and overall errors (e.g., misses, false alarms, delays)
resource use/throughput time) and very to potential reasons for these errors (e.g., skill-
specific applications of human factors based search failures or rule-based mistakes). We
(e.g., the design of an operator interface can also demonstrate that decisions about how to
or development of a training program). allocate the generic functions between human and
Unfortunately, system designers often machine can be based on performance predictions.
use only a fraction of the available This allows customers, designers, and developers to
human factors knowledge base, largely focus innovation on system needs, as a complement
because they do not know that such a to more traditional, technology-driven approaches
knowledge base exists beyond meeting to automation. It also allows system designers to
written customer requirements. consider a wider variety of human factors design
interventions, thereby improving threat inspection
and, ultimately, homeland security. n
E-mail? For more information please contact:
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/h GATEWAY by E-mail? University at Buffalo, SUNY ://
il Department of Industrial Engineering ia
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c. If so, please E-mail your address to 3B4u2ff aBleol,l NHYe ll 1H4a2l6l0 .d
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4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 5
Vigilance and
the Price of Freedom
Peter. A. Hancock
James. L. Szalma, Ph. D.
When we have to act as a concerted physical barriers erected to exclude Peter Hancock is Provost
group or use a common convenience, unauthorized individuals from enter- Distinguished Research
such as mass transportation then indi- ing secure areas, selection barriers professor in the Department
vidual freedoms come into conflict with collective must be erected for other individuals of Psychology, the Institute for
rights. Conjoint and reciprocal security intrinsic who work in the system and for whom Simulation and Training, and
to social interaction is being sought now more the everyday vigilance of passenger at the Department of Civil and
visibly in aviation and somewhat less visibly in control is easily circumvented. Environmental Engineering
other forms of transportation and communication. Security background checks and cross- at the University of Central
Perhaps in advancing security in their own realm, referencing with emergent National Florida. He currently holds
aviation professionals can set the common exam- databases should provide help in a courtesy appointment as
ple. The fundamental challenges for human factors this regard with support from human a research scientist at the
in security are to: factors professionals who are expe- Massachusetts Institute of
1. Devise ways of distinguishing what rienced in dealing with the problem Technology (MIT) and as
potential and actual sources of communal of information overload. Screening an Adjunct Senior Research
threat exist personnel with ground access to Scientist at the Transportation
2. Provide valid and accurate assessment aircraft and control facilities as well as Institute of the University of
methods to distinguish such threats those who fly in a professional capacity Michigan. Professor Hancock is
3. Indicate avenues of action by which or have privileged access (e.g., flight the author of over four hundred
threats can be excised or rendered harmless. attendants, Federal Air Marshals) will referenced scientific articles and
be a Herculean task. publications as well as editing
To meet these challenges, we suggest three The field of human factors consid- numerous books. His theoretical
avenues to pursue in our collective efforts to ers the security problem as one of works concern human
combat terrorism: distinguishing signal from noise. In relations with technology and
1. Improve personnel selection and training this context, the signal is the source the possible futures of this
2. Design of systems to support sustained of threat (a person or what he symbiosis.
attention or vigilance possesses) and the “noise” (or, more
3. Possible control of aircraft beyond the properly, the non-signal) all other forms Jim Szalma holds a
cockpit alone. of non-threats. Since the occurrence of Ph.D. from the University of
threats are so rare, and non-threats so Cincinnati in experimental
In the present NAS, the pilot is in control and predominant, the detection process fits psychology and has been a
responsible, although control is also mediated the scientific definition of vigilance (see faculty member at Farmington
c by air traffic personnel who provide guidance Warm, 1984). A quintessential com- on Long Island. He has just h
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si and direction. Thus, one role of vigilance lies in ponent of laboratory vigilance tasks is joined the University of Central tp
h the selection and the training of flight deck and “event rate”, or how often stimuli are Florida MURI-OPUS group :/
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il ATC personnel to deny individuals who seek to presented to observers. In the case of where he directs a number ia
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usurp control for nefarious purposes access to passenger screening, this might be the of projects concerning stress
c. air traffic control facilities and the commercial number of people who pass through and performance response. .d
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d flight deck. Since this function has not yet failed, a detector per unit time. Embedded in His particular expertise is on c
c. to our knowledge, political will is likely to be event rate is “signal rate” or the pro- vigilance and response capacity, .m
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i slow to react to this potential threat over known portion of events that are targets. In and he has published a number il
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:/ threats. Inevitably, concern has focused on public laboratory testing, realistic event rates of papers in this area. h
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tt access to the flight-deck as this was the approach are presented (e.g., one event every ia
h used by the September terrorists. In addition to continued on page 20… c
4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 5
A Safe and
Secure System
Sandra G. Hart
Sandra Hart is the The field of human factors has reduce threats from the physical and operational
Special Advisor for Strategic much to contribute to the environment in which aircraft operate.
Planning to the Chief of the national goal of preventing Recent safety improvements have benefited from
Human Factors Research and future terrorist attacks against the the growing recognition that patterns or sequences
Technology Division at the flying public: of events in combination threaten aviation safety
National Aeronautics and 1. Tools to predict the impact of more than do individual failures of human,
Space Administration (NASA) proposed changes in equipment, machine, or system. In commercial aviation,
Ames Research Center. She has procedures, and regulations on layers of protection such as triply redundant flight
worked in the field of aviation system efficiency and effectiveness critical hardware and software, hardware and soft-
human factors for more than 2. Human-centered techniques ware reliability requirements, layers of automation
thirty years. for designing interfaces and backed up by manual reversion modes, standard
analyzing task and system operating procedures, checklists and crosschecks,
requirements to allocate stringent training and qualification standards and
functions optimally among conservative certification processes have resulted
humans and technologies in fewer accidents. However, the percentage of
3. Improved training and these accidents attributed to “human error” has
selection approaches. remained stubbornly high. These layers of pro-
tection are redundant, parallel, and independent;
Human factors can serve as a line one pilot cross-checks the other, pilots monitor
of defense against hastily designed or automated subsystems, air and ground systems
implemented security measures that detect deviations from the plan or values that
inadvertently threaten aviation safety. exceed vehicle, human, or system safety margins.
In fact, lessons learned from the suc- By design, they offer many opportunities to pre-
cessful application of human factors vent, detect, remedy or mitigate failures, making
to aviation safety might offer valuable it most unlikely that multiple risk factors will
insights about challenges that must be occur in close succession and combine unopposed
overcome to ensure aviation security. to create a nonrecoverable failure. Thus, the rare
For half a century, the aviation com- accidents that do occur often represent the nearly
munity has identified potential failure random co-occurrence of events, some of which
points and threats based on research, might have had little impact under other circum-
operational experience, and analysis of stances. Although historical rates of accident types
c accident and incident data. Engineers and causes can be computed and actual statistics h
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si identified and reduced the likelihood projected it is impossible to predict precisely when tp
h of single-point failures of aircraft struc- another accident will occur. :/
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il tures, avionics, controls, linkages, and The situation is somewhat different in aviation ia
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displays and elements of the ground- security, although it is equally important to the
c. based infrastructure. Human factors reliability and economic viability of commercial .d
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d researchers identified and tried to aviation. Security has received less attention than c
c. eliminate the causes and consequences safety, primarily because there have been few .m
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of human errors in the air and on the successful challenges to the national airspace. i
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/ ground. Many disciplines worked to Well-documented failures of checkpoint screeners, h
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6 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 7
Breaking through the Data Glut:
Bringing to Light the Meaning of Information
Mica Endsley
Today, it is possible to gather and trans- critical task, it is necessary to under- Mica Endsley is president of
mit vast quantities of data. However, this stand how people process and utilize SA Technologies in Marietta,
unprecedented access to data has failed information in their decision making Georgia, where she conducts
to produce hoped for leaps in understanding activities. Incoming data from tech- research in the areas of
because there is a huge gap between the glut nological systems, the environment, situation awareness, decision
of data produced and disseminated and users’ fellow team members, and others must making, and integrating
abilities find and process the information they real- be brought together as an integrated humans with automation.
ly want amongst all that is possible (see Figure 1). whole understood by the individual. She is involved in developing
This gap challenges many in positions crucial to Situation awareness (SA) is a term used advanced user interfaces for
security and homeland defense—the intelligence to represent this internalized mental command and control, medical
analyst who may read thousands of messages model of the current state of the envi- and aviation operations.
to unearth a terrorist plots, an American soldier ronment. This integrated picture is the
who must integrate and coordinate the activities central organizing feature around which
of widely distributed units in a foreign country all decision making and action takes
surrounded by hostile combatants as well as civil- place. Thus, although the key to cop-
ians, and millions who need to be able to detect ing in the information age is developing
information attacks by hackers. Just as informa- systems that support SA, the failure of
tion is a tool in our arsenal, it also serves as a tool current technologies to do so leaves
of those who seek to undermine the U.S. and its human operators, analysts and system
institutions. users vulnerable to error.
A key benefit of focusing on SA is
Data Produced Information Needed that it tells us how to combine and
understand data. Instead of loading
Find
decision makers with hundreds of
Sort
pieces of miscellaneous data provided
haphazardly, SA requirements tell
system designers how to bring that
data together to form meaningful
Integrate
integrations and groupings that can
Process
be easily absorbed and assimilated in
time-critical situations. The SA-Oriented
c Design process (see Figure 2) provides h
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si More Data ≠ More Information a means to improve human decision tp
h making and performance by optimizing :/
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il Figure 1. The Information Gap (from Endsley, 2000b) SA in system design (Endsley, Bolte, & ia
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Jones, in press). This method has been
c. A central truth of the post-technological age is .d
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dt that success (and even survival) depends on rapid- SA SA–Oriented SA ic
c. ly sorting through, understanding and assimilating ReqAuniarleymsiesnts PrDiensciigpnle s Measurements .m
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vast quantities of data; “…only those who have i
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tt the handy facts can make it” (Bennis, 1977). To Figure 2. The SA-Oriented Design Process ia
h create systems that support people in this highly continued on page 22… c
6 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 7
Advocating for
Human Factors
Geoff Mumford, Ph.D.
Geoff Mumford, Ph.D., is Much of what we did after We are indebted to the many psychologists who
Director of Science Policy for September 11, 2001, was accompanied us on multiple visits to meet with
the American Psychological simply an extension of what congressional staff on Capitol Hill to explain their
Association (APA). He is a the American Psychological Association research as the legislation was evolving.
behavioral pharmacologist by (APA) Science Policy Office does day Involving scientists in those informal meet-
training and a private pilot to day—get scientific information into ings was one mechanism by which we tried to
with vested interests in aviation the hands of people who can make use infuse human factors research throughout the
safety and security. of it. But now the goal was to make process, but a formal mechanism was also in the
sure that Congress and emerging agen- making. The Aviation and Transportation Security
cies and departments were aware of Act called for the establishment of a Scientific
what existing human factors research Advisory Panel to “…review, comment on, advise
might suggest about how to proceed. the progress of, and recommend modifications
This included thinking about how to in…” Transportation Security Administration
incorporate human factors research into (TSA)-funded research and development. In
the next generation of security measures February 2002, APA nominated a dozen psycholo-
and how to improve the infrastructure gists with expertise in human factors research to
for conducting human factors research be considered for that panel. In March 2002, we
for the future. received a reply from the Undersecretary’s office
By the end of September 2001, indicating that the Security Subcommittee of
dozens of congressional committees FAA’s Research and Engineering and Development
and subcommittees were vying for juris- Advisory Committee (REDAC) would form the
diction over a large number of counter- foundation of the new Panel. We are pleased to
terrorism initiatives. Revising transpor- note that Dr. Colin Drury, a contributor to this
tation security in general and airline edition of Gateway is on that panel. As of press
security in particular was at the top time, however, it was unclear when additional
of the congressional counter-terrorism members would be named and how TSA would
agenda. Many human factors research- deal with multi-modal oversight issues.
ers responded to calls for vignettes The TSA legislation authorized a fifty million dol-
about how their findings might help lar annual research appropriation. Although much
solve existing security problems or was allocated for the deployment of new technolo-
shape a security research agenda. We gies, the bill also called for the Federal Aviation
c further condensed that information into Administration to consider establishing higher h
a t
si briefing materials for interested con- education and training centers for all aspects of tp
h gressional staff. House and Senate ver- aviation security and safety. Presumably, there :/
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il sions of an aviation security bill (H.R. would be a strong emphasis on applied human ia
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3150 and S. 1447, respectively) sought factors research in those settings. How TSA might
c. to optimize the effectiveness of security evolve further as part of the new Department of .d
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d screening operations, but differed over Homeland Security remains to be seen. We are c
c. how to manage the security-screening working to reinforce the importance of human .m
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workforce. The President signed the factors research with the core of that proposed i
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/ compromise legislation that called for department by regularly visiting staff leftover from h
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tt federalizing the workforce into law the Office of Homeland Security. They appear to be ia
h (P.L. 107–71) on November 19, 2001. continued on page 22… c
8 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 9
Airbus Aircraft Security
Captain Rudy Canto
With safety as its prime concern, Airbus the cockpit. In addition, a toggle con- Captain Rudy Canto is the
set up an aircraft security task force trol in the cockpit enables the crew to Director of Flight Operations
immediately after the tragic events of control access to the cockpit and secure Technology for Airbus North
September 11. Since then, the task force has been the door in case of need. America. He has worked as a
working diligently with customers and actively The new cockpit doors are just one production test pilot, instructor
contributing to industry and government task forces of a series of complementary mea- pilot, check airman, and senior
in the United States. and Europe to minimize risks sures being made available by Airbus. management pilot on numerous
related to the threat of terrorism in air transports by These also include a stand-alone video large transport category aircraft
identifying and investigating solutions that could be camera system that allows the flight for more than thirty years, and
implemented in the very short term, as well as crew to monitor the cabin area outside holds a bachelors degree in
medium and longer term. In parallel to the task the door from the cockpit. The full mechanical engineering from
force activity, Airbus initiated a series of meetings provisions for this system are being the University of Florida.
with representatives from airline associations, sixty installed as standard on all Airbus
airlines, five airworthiness authorities, and other aircraft. In addition, Airbus developed
manufacturers in the U.S. and Europe to review two approaches for ensuring that the
aircraft security improvements. transponder signal from an aircraft to
Airlines and the authorities reacted positively air traffic control cannot be interrupted
to various Airbus proposals to enhance aircraft in the event of an attack. And, to further
security. For example, the Airbus proposal for improve communication between cabin
reinforcing cockpit doors on single-aisle Airbus and cockpit crews, Airbus has found a
aircraft was reviewed and approved by the Federal way for each to alert the others should
Aviation Administration (FAA), DGAC, European an emergency situation arise. n
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) and other regula-
tory authorities. Airbus has since issued detailed addresses
design plans and associated service bulletins and
kits for the cockpit door modifications. Similar
modifications were developed for other Airbus
needed!
aircraft and conversion kits were made avail-
able to all customers for in-service aircraft by
May 2002. Downtime to retrofit in-service air-
craft was kept to an absolute minimum; airlines
c could retrofit a door on Airbus single-aisle air- If your address label does NOT include a complete street address, h
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si craft within forty-eight hours. Aircraft from the P.O. Box, or ZIP code, please provide us with this informa- tp
h production line have been fitted with the doors tion. We are trying to comply with the regulations of the U.S. :/
/ /
il as standard since August 2002. All associated Postal Service. Without this information we cannot guarantee your ia
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certification and engineering costs were assumed continued receipt of the Human Systems IAC GATEWAY. Please
c. by Airbus. The new cockpit door protects the E-mail changes to [email protected] or mail changes to: .d
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d flight crew from unauthorized entry while also c
c. delivering a number of safety contingencies. It Human Systems IAC GATEWAY .m
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features reinforced attachments, a reinforced and AFRL/HEC/HSIAC, Bldg. 196 i
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/ bulletproof main door panel, an escape panel, elec- 2261 Monahan Way h
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tt trical door latching, an electronic entry pad located WPAFB, OH 45433–7022 ia
h in the cabin, and a warning light and buzzer in c
8 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 Human Systems IAC GATEWAY Volume XIII: Number 4 9