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Cavalry Transformation: Are We Shooting the Horse Too Soon? A Monograph by Major Louis B. Rago, II United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Academic Year 01-02 Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES MONOGRAPH APPROVAL Major Louis B. Rago, II Title of Monograph: Cavalry Transformation: Are We Shooting the Horse Too Soon? Approved by: _________________________________________ Monograph Director COL William J. Miller, MS, MMAS _________________________________________ Director, School of COL James K. Greer, MMAS Advanced Military Studies _________________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Program Abstract Cavalry Transformation: Are We Shooting the Horse Too Soon? by Major Louis B. Rago, II, United States Army, 67 pages. The transformation of the Army from its current “legacy” structure to the Objective Force is predicated on the realization of significant technological advances and the evolution of a “general-purpose” combat force. Today’s forces, “Legacy Forces” in the transformation lexicon, are highly dependent upon specially trained and equipped cavalry organizations. Currently, cavalry units provide robust capabilities for reconnaissance, surveillance and security along with ground combat capabilities commanders may use in economy of force roles. Simultaneously, the transformation of armored cavalry units to Interim Force Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) organizations will significantly diminish the organization’s capability to independently execute the traditional cavalry tasks requiring contact with an enemy force. The current transformation plan culminates with fielding of the Objective Force Unit of Action and the likely elimination of specialized cavalry forces. Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks are assumed by ISR-suite equipped platforms while force-oriented tasks are executed by Future Combat System (FCS) equipped general-purpose units. As the transformation progresses through the Interim Force and eventually to the Objective Force, the current doctrinal and organizational foundation of cavalry diminishes then disappears. The consequences of military failure in future conflict are obviously dangerous and potentially catastrophic. According to Cohen and Gooch, failure to learn is one of the most common types of military failure. The analysis of the critical assumptions related to the future of cavalry highlights the current transformation’s possible failure due to an overreliance on technology. The RSTA squadron of the Interim Force has been organized to operate using the expected, but not yet available, technologies capable of meeting the traditional cavalry roles in the Objective Force. In the case of the United States Army’s transformation and its decisions involving the future of cavalry a learning failure is becoming evident. The concepts for the Objective Force and the organization of its interim cavalry force seem to ignore the historical lessons learned on the limitations of technology in combat. Another potentially critical failure is a failure to anticipate. This assumption that the US will maintain technological superiority over all potential adversaries is also reflected in the organization of Interim Force Cavalry units or RSTA squadrons. A potentially more catastrophic type of military failure is the failure to adapt. The potential for a failure of adaptation increases. Beyond the purely tactical potential for adaptation failure is the potential for force wide failure from lack of training and experience. Although military failure for the Objective Force is not a foregone conclusion, the potential for one or more types of failure is present. The current Objective Force Concept and Transformation Campaign Plan display opportunities for military failure in all three domains. Ensuring that the interim cavalry force is able to conduct the full array of traditional cavalry roles requires increasing the organic firepower resident in the RSTA squadron’s ground troops. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................2 WHAT IS CAVALRY?..........................................................................................................5 THE FUTURE OPERATIONAL AND THREAT ENVIRONMENT......................................23 CAVALRY AND THE OBJECTIVE FORCE CONCEPT......................................................30 ANALYSIS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS.................................................................................41 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................59 GLOSSARY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS.......................................................................68 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................70 1 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ‘Is it Not Treason to Cry Down the Horse?’ - Title of an inter-war period article in Cavalry Journal1 Today the United States Army is in the midst of a bold and necessary transformation. This transformation is bold not only on its scope, but also because it is predicated on revolutionary technologies not yet fully realized. Furthermore, change is necessary because the world in which the Army will operate has fundamentally changed. Since the end of the Cold War the environment of conflict has changed radically. No longer are potential threats to American and allied security identified, well defined and relatively predictable. Today, and even more so in the future, the environment within which the Army will operate is ill defined and complex to the point that it is nearly unpredictable. In order to meet this challenge, the Army is in the process of transforming itself into a new and more capable Objective Force. The transformation of the Army from its current “legacy” structure to the Objective Force is predicated on the realization of significant technological advances and the evolution of a “general-purpose” combat force. This future general-purpose combat force will be equipped and trained to conduct ground combat functions currently divided among several separate and specialized sub-components of the Army, including infantry, armor, field artillery and armored cavalry. The general-purpose force “will possess inherent versatility to operate effectively anywhere in the spectrum of operations without substantial augmentation or mission tailoring”.2 In particular, many of the traditional roles of cavalry will be divided between networked general- purpose combat forces and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems. 1 William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939. (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), p.64. 2 Design parameters for the “General Purpose, Full Spectrum Capability” in TRADOC Pam 525- 3-91 (Draft), Objective Force Maneuver Unit of Action Concept, (Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 29 August 2001), p. 28. 2 Today’s forces, “Legacy Forces” in the transformation lexicon, are highly dependent upon specially trained and equipped cavalry organizations. Currently, cavalry units provide robust capabilities for reconnaissance, surveillance and security along with ground combat capabilities commanders may use in economy of force roles. As the transformation process progresses, cavalry units will leverage high-technology systems that enable them to vastly improve their ability to perform surveillance and reconnaissance tasks out of contact with an armed adversary. Simultaneously, the transformation of armored cavalry units to Interim Force Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) organizations will significantly diminish the organization’s capability to independently execute the traditional cavalry tasks requiring contact with an enemy force. Aggressive reconnaissance or “fighting for information” and most security or ground combat missions currently assigned to “legacy” cavalry units cannot be executed by Interim Force RSTA organizations without significant augmentation. The current transformation plan culminates with fielding of the Objective Force Unit of Action3 and the likely elimination of specialized cavalry forces. Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks are assumed by ISR-suite equipped platforms while force-oriented tasks are executed by Future Combat System (FCS) equipped general-purpose units. As the transformation progresses through the Interim Force and eventually to the Objective Force, the current doctrinal and organizational foundation of cavalry diminishes then disappears. It is the author’s contention that, assumptions based on anticipated capabilities, the future threat environment and tentative employment techniques have led to a belief that many of the functions performed by cavalry organizations today, such as aggressive reconnaissance and economy of force operations, will no longer be necessary in future conflict. Consequently, the current vision of the Objective Forces does not include specialized units that are trained and 3 See Glossary. Unit of Action is defined as the “standing organizations with organic capabilities based on battlefield functional areas (BFAs)—maneuver, fires and effects, maneuver support, maneuver sustainment, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, etc.—represented today by echelons of sections through brigade.” (Maneuver Unit of Action Concept, 29 AUG 01). 3 equipped to execute the cavalry roles found in current doctrine. As with most well planned transformations, the doctrinal and organizational changes proposed through the Army’s transformation to the Objective Force are based on a few important assumptions. These assumptions define how the organizational structure and doctrine will evolve from the current force to the Objective Force. If one or more of these assumptions prove false, the result could potentially lead to the loss of a necessary capability and its supporting force structure. The purpose of this monograph is to identify and assess the key assumptions upon which the Objective Force Concept postulates the accomplishment of functions currently assigned as cavalry roles. Based on this assessment, a logical judgment will be made on the necessity for maintaining a specialized force to execute these current roles and functions. Finally, should there be any shortcomings identified, the monograph will recommend necessary modifications to the Transformation Campaign Plan and Objective Force Concept. In order to provide a thorough analysis, the assumptions will be evaluated using historical precedent, the tenants of classical military theoreticians and the opinions of modern military scholars, and professionals. Using these tools, an evaluation will be made as to the validity of these assumptions. Further assessments will be made of assumptions deemed to be valid to determine how effectively they are addressed through current transformation plans and concepts. Assumptions determined to be invalid will be explored further to identify potential second and third order effects upon current plans. These findings provide the essential elements necessary for determining the need for a specialized, cavalry force in the future. The history of the last one hundred years is replete with examples from another bold and necessary transformation of armies that resulted in military failures and scores of soldier’s graves. The hope underlying this monograph is, to paraphrase noted military historian Sir Michael Howard, that we get this transformation “as close to right as possible.” Part of achieving that goal is answering the question – Are we shooting the horse too soon this time? 4 CHAPTER TWO WHAT IS CAVALRY? Army troops trained to fight on horseback or in armored vehicles.4 Cavalry is defined by the warfighting functions it is associated with and the roles5 it is responsible to fulfill for the army as a whole. The purpose of this chapter is to define cavalry, its roles and associated functions, against which the future concepts and operating environment may be evaluated. Since the intent is to identify a definition that has withstood the test of time, this chapter will identify cavalry by the functions it has been associated with and its particular roles rather than the means used to execute them. This chapter will trace the evolution of cavalry from its entrance on the battlefield some 3700 years ago through its current missions and organizations. The evolution of cavalry as its coincides with each of the major evolutions in warfare will be discussed to identify its enduring roles. The functions normally associated with cavalry and their related missions provide the baseline of necessary capabilities that will be used to evaluate the pertinent aspects of the Objective Force Concept and the Future Operating Environment in subsequent chapters. The Dawn of the Horse Since the time when man and horse first appeared together on the battlefield, a distinct role of cavalry began to evolve. Around 1700 BC, the horse made its first significant impact upon the battlefield. The horse drawn chariots of Egypt, Mesopotamia and western China provided a new and impressive technological advance in warfare. The formation of a specialized arm of an army combining horse, man, carriage and weapon offered a greatly increased capability in warfighting. 4 Webster’s Dictionary (1987). s.v. “Cavalry.” 5 See Glossary. For the purposes of this monograph, the author defines “functions” as those tasks or sets of actions necessary for the army, as a whole, to perform an operation or mission. “Roles” are 5 This combination of vastly increased speed of attack and ranged firepower, provided by the bow, revolutionized warfare. From this ability, the first role of cavalry was identified – shock action. The original mounted arm had been born capitalizing on an ability to deliver psychological shock through speed and firepower.6 Shock action continued to serve as the primary role of cavalry through several iterations of change over the next 1500 years. With the advent of the stirrup and improvements in horse breeding, mounted warfare was able to evolve beyond the chariot. Soon warriors were able to fight directly from the horse further increasing speed and mobility. The result of these advances solidified the role of cavalry by bettering its ability to penetrate lines and paralyze the enemy’s ability to react while providing the friendly army enhanced tactical flexibility.7 The capability provided by a specialized cavalry arm contributed to sometimes stunning, if unexpected, military feats. Attila the Hun’s victories over Rome and Ghengis Khan’s triumphs in Central Asia illustrate only a few of the numerous examples occurring between the time of the horse’s introduction and through the period of the Roman Empire.8 During the golden era of Rome, the cavalry began to assume the additional roles of security and reconnaissance due to its great mobility and ability to fight effectively. The Roman wars of conquest depended upon the movement of large armies over great distances and through hostile territory. During battle the cavalry’s role remained much the same, breaking the enemy line through shock action and fighting from the horse with bow and blade. However, during the march the cavalry began to assume a new role. Although the Romans continued to use light infantry, defined as functions normally attributed to or the responsibility of a specific branch, arm or component. 6 John Keegan, A History of Warfare. (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), pp.155-76. Keegan provides a detailed description of the introduction of the chariot on the ancient battlefield. He asserts that the chariot was a revolutionary military-technological breakthrough leading to victory for those that possessed it and defeat for those that did not. This military innovation remained almost preeminent for several hundred years. 7 Robin Cross, ed. Warfare – A Chronological History. (London: Quarto Publishing, 1991), pp.11- 14. This reference focuses on the enhanced tactical flexibility and shock value of both the chariot and cavalry fighting as mounted warriors in the Assyrian and Babylonian armies between the ninth and fifth centuries BC. Cross explicitly states that cavalry was used as “mounted warriors” vice scouts and messengers. 6 normally drawn from local populations, for scouting duties the cavalry gained the responsibility for securing the main body. While the infantry marched methodically by road, the cavalry capitalizing on its mobility, speed and fighting ability provided a covering force to the front and guarded the flanks. As the size of the Roman Empire grew the security role of cavalry also increased. The flexibility of cavalry forces coupled with a robust combat capability made them well suited for frontier security duties and service as a mobile reserve between dispersed armies. Undoubtedly the importance of cavalry had significantly increased as did the scope of its roles.9 Into the Middle Ages, cavalry remained an important military arm charged with responsibilities in both direct combat functions and security. As the heavily armored mounted warrior began to achieve almost preeminent status during this period, a great deal of effort was undertaken to innovated means to mitigate his capabilities. Two of the most significant military- technological advances of the Middle Ages were the introduction of the English or Welsh long bow and the Swedish pike. The increased range, speed of fire, and accuracy of the long bow provided significant threat to cavalry. Additionally, a line of infantry armed with pikes allowed for a viable defense against the cavalry charge and almost eliminated the possibly for penetration of the line and the desired shock effect. More than anything else, these two innovations caused a return to parity between the cavalry and infantry arms. Although the execution of cavalry roles became more difficult, they did not change. Cavalry remained a quick, highly mobile combat arms charged with shock action and security. However, shock action could now only be achieved through a coordinated effort with the infantry and the bowmen. This trend of coordinated actions between specialized arms of an army continued to effect the roles of cavalry into the Era of Gunpowder period. As the Era of Gunpowder dawned, the cavalry was charged with the roles of 8 Keegan, pp.177-217 9 Cross. pp.39-59. Cross suggests that by the end of the third century, cavalry had superseded infantry in the Roman order or battle. He takes this to be a significant statement as to the premium applied to cavalry’s mobility and fighting potential especially along the frontier and in the eastern portion of the Empire. 7