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1529 Campbell Pgs 3/13/02 8:44 AM Page 72 (cid:2) Sub-Saharan Africa and the Unified Command Plan By J O H N E. C A M P B E L L Amphibious training at Cap Serrat. man) Ross Seth Navy ( S. U. T he United States is in a posi- the environment, respond to the full tion to play a key role in spectrum of crises, and prepare for the improving the security en- future. The geographic CINCs are re- vironment in Africa. One sponsible for the planning and con- suggested initiative is establishing a re- ducting of all military operations, in- gional command for the continent. cluding military engagement activities, According to the Annual Report to and serving as the single point of con- the President and the Congresssubmitted tact for all military matters within by the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal their theaters of operations.” The Year 2001, regional commands “shape Secretary’s annual report emphasizes that the primary responsibility of uni- Lieutenant Colonel John E. Campbell, USAF, is assigned to Headquarters, Air fied commanders remains the develop- Combat Command, and previously served as special assistant to the Supreme ment of strategic and contingency Allied Commander Europe. 72 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02 Report Documentation Page Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to) 00 00 2002 N/A - Title and Subtitle Contract Number Sub-Saharan Africa and the Unified Command Plan Grant Number Program Element Number Author(s) Project Number Task Number Work Unit Number Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington D C 20319-5066 Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) Address(es) Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images. Abstract Subject Terms Report Classification Classification of this page unclassified unclassified Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract unclassified UU Number of Pages 4 1529 Campbell Pgs 3/13/02 8:44 AM Page 73 Campbell plans for military operations. In prac- Conducting physical tice, however, CINCs spend much of exam,MedFlag. their effort on implementing the shape, prepare, and respond functions of national security strategy. Indeed, since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, regional CINCs have gained more stature and may have be- come the single most influential fig- ures helping shape and implement foreign policy within their regions. According to an account in The Wash- ibnugdtogne tPso sot,utthsiedye “ocfo nWtraoslh hineagdtoquna rtthearst A. Douglas) tloontagl “$jo3c8k0e ymedil lwioitnh ad iypeloamr”a atsn adn hd aivne- Rasheen teeigllnig penolciec ya.”g1enDcuireisn gto t hseh a1p9e9 0Us. Sp.o fwoerr- Squadron ( sthheifitre bdu tdog eCtaINryC ms ipgrhimt.arily because of munications m Continental Challange Co In the case of Africa, the poten- 100th tial of a CINC to influence regional affairs is diffused because responsibility is divided between three of the been reactive rather than proactive, for a transformation of U.S.-African re- five regional unified commands—U.S. causing the military to undertake a lations with European Command (EUCOM), U.S. continuing series of contingency oper- emphasis on democratic and pragmatic ap- Central Command (whose geographi- ations.2 The prospects for future inter- proaches to solving political, economic, cal boundaries include Djibouti, ventions are high. The United States and environmental problems, and develop- Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Soma- will, according to this rationale, re- ing human and natural resources....Our lia, and Sudan), and U.S. Pacific Com- quire the capacity to intervene with immediate objective is to increase the mand which has responsibility for military forces. The only way to make number of capable states in Africa, that is, Madagascar. these interventions efficient and effec- nations that are able to define the chal- Of these commands, challenges tive is assigning proponency to a dedi- lenges they face, manage their resources to man) facing EUCOM in operating effectively cated headquarters. effectively address those challenges, and Ross in the region are the most daunting. The underlying assumption is that build stability and peace within their bor- Seth Its area of responsibility stretches from the current arrangement—dividing ders and their subregions.3 U.S. Navy ( nANfoArrTitcOha.e arInnts d E mEuauriornop pfeoe actunos sSiesuc bucl-reSiatayrhl.y aT roahnne Amobfarjneiccdtasi— vaedmso aeorsne n gao cttc heonrmseuepr leius “hntehidfai tea sdnt rdac totehmgaict- Braanse Ad froinca ,t htihse a pssreimssmareyn cto onfc eSrunb -iSsa nhaa-- CINC is dual-hatted as the Supreme diplomatic and political goals are tionbuilding. Further, it appears that Allied Commander Europe, with head- achieved.”But does a dedicated head- Washington perceives the greatest secu- quarters at Mons, Belgium, while quarters put the operational cart before rity challenge as the lack of democratic EUCOM headquarters is located in the strategic horse? The answer lies in states and the inability of states to gov- Stuttgart, Germany, with day-to-day returning to the fundamental purpose ern. The strategy concludes, “prosperity operations run by his deputy. Given of such a command—supporting na- and security...depends on African the command’s many roles, coupled tional security strategy. leadership, strong national institutions, with the increasing importance of en- and extensive political and economic gaging around the world, the added re- Guidelines for Engagement reform.”4 sponsibility of managing affairs in A National Security Strategy for a While the current administration Africa might exceed the ability of a Global Age (December 2000) continues has yet to publish a new national secu- unified commander in Europe. to emphasize the longstanding practice rity strategy, there is no indication that One arguement for creating a uni- of shaping the international environ- African security will receive greater fied command for Sub-Saharan Africa ment, responding to threats and crises, prominence. While many things have is that foreign policy in Africa has and preparing for an uncertain future. changed since he was sworn in, Secre- tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld This strategy is implemented through stated during his confirmation hear- integrated regional approaches. It calls ings before the Senate Armed Services Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 73 1529 Campbell Pgs 3/13/02 8:44 AM Page 74 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM Committee in January 2001 that and control of military operations. In- A regional command is not the “We’re not geniuses at nationbuild- deed, while a unified command might answer to building viable states and ing.”5 The implication is that the mili- provide better focus on Africa, doing governable societies in Sub-Saharan tary will be less involved in these tasks so may not be consistent with national Africa. In fact, such a command might in places like Sub-Saharan Africa. De- policy. The danger in creating such a actually hinder the process by placing spite the interest of some in the ad- command would be to place DOD out too much emphasis on the military ministration in dealing with issues front of, and perhaps out of step with, and diverting attention and resources such as the AIDS pandemic, military the rest of the foreign policy appara- from nationbuilding. Accordingly, it engagement will likely be limited to tus. What needs emphasis is ensuring appears that Washington should not promoting regional stability and ad- that the military plays a proper role in create a unified command. vancing U.S. interests with modest in- Africa based on national security strat- That said, the United States vestments in ways and means for the egy—and then organizing efforts to should improve its ability to manage foreseeable future. best achieve national objectives. military engagement. While EUCOM EUCOM is implementing these ef- Some analysis have suggested that activities will play an important role, it forts through its Africa Engagement in the future U.S. interests will be to should be within a coordinated foreign Plan, which has several objectives: “promote regional stability, economic policy effort. Instead of establishing a maintaining freedom of navigation, prosperity, and democracy to combat new unified command, the geographic providing prompt response to humani- transnational threats.”6 Military in- boundaries for the EUCOM area of re- tarian crisis, and promoting stability, volvement will be almost exclusively in sponsibility should be redrawn to democratization, and military profes- the form of humanitarian assistance. match the Department of State con- sionalism. These goals translate into a Importantly, the study called for the cept for the region, essentially the Sub- litany of endeavors, most notably the United States to shift from crisis re- Saharan area. And as outlined in the sponse to peacetime engagement current national security strategy, en- in order to better shape condi- gagement should be targeted at the military engagement will likely tions. Specifically, it called for this subregional level. In particular, redraw- be limited to modest investments transition to be accomplished ing unified command boundaries will through training programs like keep the major subregional actors, in ways and means the African Crisis Response Initia- ECOWAS, SADC, and EAC, in the com- tive and small unit training exer- mand area of responsibility. African Crisis Response Initiative, Africa cises through the Joint Combined Edu- The United States should also bet- Center for Strategic Studies, humanitar- cation Training Program. Its assessment ter coordinate with European Allies. ian assistance, military medical exer- further suggested better coordination EUCOM is in the best position to assist cises, demining, and security assistance. with European partners to leverage col- here since it has a long history of All are concerned primarily with train- lective efforts. While military activities working with them through NATO. ing militaries in basic peacekeeping op- have their limited place, some have Many Alliance members also have tra- erations, humanitarian assistance, and concluded that “African institutional ditional ties to Africa, particularly the the mechanisms of civilian control. Fur- development is the single most impor- United Kingdom, France, Belgium, The ther, the concept for implementing the tant objective.”7 Netherlands, and Portugal. strategy is through subregional engage- Richard Holbrook, former U.S. EUCOM should also take the lead ment. This approach is focused on Ambassador to the United Nations, in advocating better international mili- leveraging resources, fostering collective summed up African needs to Congress: tary education training (IMET) oppor- security, and creating responses for “[The United States has] an interest in tunities. Such efforts are the basis for peacekeeping and humanitarian opera- helping Africans resolve their conflicts training foreign military leaders on the tions. The subregional organizations in and ridding their societies of horrible fundamentals of civilian control of the Africa are the Economic Community of diseases like HIV/AIDS. And we have military and provides professional mil- West African States (ECOWAS), Eastern an interest in helping Africa’s people itary education through schools in the Africa Cooperative (EAC), and Southern build societies based on democracy, United States. Many European allies Africa Development Community liberty, and political freedom.”8 have similar programs and thus can re- (SADC). Actual command activities Still other proposals call for reas- inforce the civilian control concept. focus on small unit training with lim- surance rather than deterrence; con- Accordingly, IMET for Sub-Saharan ited military to military contact. solidation or creation of state institu- African militaries can be coordinated tions, and building a regional security within Europe by EUCOM and be part Modesty Rules community. The keys to creating vi- of engagement strategy. Creating a Sub-Saharan unified able states lie in support from the in- The Joint Chiefs of Staff could also command fails to address the funda- ternational community for state build- create a new subregional command as mental issues. The problems of engage- ing, with more emphasis on police, part of EUCOM to manage the African ment in Africa are not primarily, or justice, and correctional services. even substantially, about command Specifically, there needs to be less of a military focus.9 74 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02 1529 Campbell Pgs 3/13/02 8:44 AM Page 75 Campbell SOF training Senegalese soldiers. wood) Under D. David Squadron ( mera Ca mbat Co 1st engagement strategy. Further, this head- unified command exclusively for the re- 4Ibid., p. 65. quarters could provide a second theater gion would overemphasize the military 5Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Rumsfeld’s New special operations command. Today, aspect of foreign policy. Although there Order,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 84, no. 3 EUCOM has a single such command for are steps the United States can take to (March 2001), p. 67. 6Institute for National Strategic Studies, its entire theater of operations. An addi- ensure that the military is best prepared Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Tur- tional capability would expand the to conduct engagement, it should not bulent World(Washington: National Defense command’s ability to engage on the create a regional command until Africa University Press, 1999), p. 162. right level, with the right means, con- becomes a greater focus of national se- 7Ibid., p. 167. sistent with national objectives. Special curity strategy. JFQ 8Richard C. Holbrooke, “Text: Hol- Operations commands are uniquely brooke Briefs U.S. Senate on U.N. Peace- qualified to participate in engagement. NOTES keeping in Africa,” July 12, 2000, http:// Their principal missions include foreign www.eucom.mil/africa/usis/00jul12.htm. 1Dana Priest, “A Four Star Foreign Pol- internal defense, which involves pro- 9See Jakkie Cilliers, “South Africa and icy?” The Washington Post,September 28, tecting societies from lawlessness. Col- 2000. Regional Security,” Institute for Security Studies, briefing to the Sub-Saharan Africa lateral activities include coalition sup- 2Richard G. Catoire, “A CINC for Sub- regional studies group, Air War College, port, demining, security assistance, and Saharan Africa? Rethinking the Unified March 12, 2001. humanitarian assistance. Command Plan,” Parameters, vol. 30, no. 4 (Winter 2000–01), pp. 112–13. Foreign policy and security strat- 3President of the United States, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age egy for Africa are focused on building (Washington: The White House, 2000), credible states and democratic gover- p. 62. nance. Sub-Saharan Africa does not involve the same vital U.S. interests as other geographic areas represented by existing unified commands. Creating a Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 75