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1129 Sokolsky Pgs 3/12/02 2:31 PM Page 46 (cid:2) European Missile Defense— Issues and Options by R I C H A R D D. S O K O L S K Y Secretary of Defense at Nordic talks in Torku,Finland. Ward) D. R. D ( O D T he NATO reaction to the political and economic realities. The September 11 terrorist at- United States should not try to force tacks on the United States missile defense on Europe. Nor should underscores the heightened this issue be viewed as an exclusively European recognition of threats to NATO project or a test of Allied fealty. Western security originating from be- At the same time, the Allies need to face yond the borders of member nations. the potentially damaging consequences Nonetheless, the European Allies re- of remaining vulnerable to ballistic mis- main wary of plans to extend missile sile attack while the United States defenses to their continent. In trying to builds defenses against such a threat. change attitudes toward missile defense Hammering out a responsible within NATO, the administration will NATO missile defense policy will be need to consider European interests and far more difficult if the transatlantic debate becomes polarized between those who believe Europe will never Richard D. Sokolsky is a visiting senior fellow in the Institute for National agree to missile defenses and those Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and the coauthor of Persian who argue that the continent must be Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions. protected regardless of its own wishes. 46 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02 Report Documentation Page Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to) 00 00 2002 N/A - Title and Subtitle Contract Number European Missile Defense Issues and Options Grant Number Program Element Number Author(s) Project Number Task Number Work Unit Number Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington D C 20319-5066 Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) Address(es) Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images. Abstract Subject Terms Report Classification Classification of this page unclassified unclassified Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract unclassified UU Number of Pages 6 1129 Sokolsky Pgs 3/12/02 2:31 PM Page 47 Sokolsky The real choice is not between a com- Combat Information prehensive defense or none. Rather it Center aboard is between a region that remains to- USS John S.McCain. tally vulnerable to ballistic missile attack and one that follows a strategy of differentiation, wherein some Allies pursue varying levels of protection against missile threats of different ranges on different timetables. The United States and its Alliance partners should agree on a division of labor for constructing a European missile defense system. America should take primary responsibility for intercepting longer-range missiles in the boost and midcourse phases, relying on sea- based systems and limited ground and air-based capabilities. Europeans Barry) sfohro utledr macicneaplt dperifmenasrey, rpesaprotincsuiblailritlyy Gloria J. against shorter-range missiles. Pacific ( Making the Case Group, The administration of President mera Gsileeo rdgeef eBnusesh p rhoagsr apmle dwgieldl ptrhoatte citt sA mlliiess- mbat Ca Co and friends. As a result, senior officials Fleet no longer talk about national missile defense but about systems for Allied and global protection. The logic of in- will, and unilaterally build its own mis- there is growing awareness within the cluding European Allies is compelling. sile defense system. In addition, they Alliance that threats emanating from Allied participation in dealing with re- are hardly likely to make missile de- beyond Europe, such as terrorism and gional crises is critical to sustaining do- fense a high priority for themselves pri- proliferation of weapons of mass de- mestic and international support for marily because they do not feel particu- struction, can endanger Western secu- Ward) the use of force by the United States. A larly threatened by ballistic missiles in rity, and that new defense capabilities D. Europe vulnerable to attack could be the hands of rogue states. Nor do they are required. Thus it is worth evaluat- R. D ( deterred from dealing with regional see missile defense as an effective re- ing the three available options. O D crises that threaten vital Western secu- sponse to terrorist organizations that Theater missile defense system. One rity interests. A deterred Europe could might someday threaten European soil alternative is relying on current NATO inhibit the United States from re- with nuclear, biological, or chemical plans for missile defense systems to de- sponding to aggression, or NATO weapons. For the foreseeable future, few fend limited areas against ballistic mis- countries exposed to missile attack siles with less than interconti- might sit on the sidelines while the few governments will be prepared nental range. This approach United States bears the brunt of de- offers several advantages. While to devote scarce resources to a fending European interests. still contentious, it is less contro- Yet if the strategic logic is com- European missile defense system versial than a more comprehen- pelling, the political and economic real- sive global system that would ities across the Atlantic work the other governments will be prepared to devote shield the continental United States way. Most Europeans continue to har- scarce resources to a European missile and potentially Europe as well. A more bor serious reservations about U.S. mis- defense system in order to help pre- modest system could cause fewer diplo- sile defense policy and would prefer to serve freedom of action to conduct matic problems with Russia and China. replace the Antiballistic Missile Treaty military interventions outside Europe. Moreover, some systems currently with a new regime regulating the de- under development could shield ports The Options ployment of missile defenses. They do and cities in border areas against not want the United States to withdraw In the long run, America’s strategic shorter-range missile attacks and under from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, as logic may trump European misgivings. certain circumstances could guard the President recently announced it Indeed, while European wariness about against strategic ballistic missiles. missile defenses has not disappeared as a result of the events of September 11, Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 47 1129 Sokolsky Pgs 3/12/02 2:32 PM Page 48 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM Slaughenhaupt) mes F. Atlantic (Ja Group, mera UunSdSe Crwapaey .Saint George mbat Ca Launching target Co track vehicle, Fleet Hawaii. Few Allies have shown much in- from missile attack. This put the Al- terest in comprehensive theater missile liance on a track to make a decision on defense. The United States has sought program development in 2004. Ameri- to persuade a skeptical NATO to ac- can cooperation with Germany and quire such a capability since the mid- The Netherlands continues to grow. 1990s. Despite endorsing cooperation The U.S.-German-Italian medium ex- and reaching an agreement to share tended air defense system program, theater missile defense early warning which has faltered over the years, ap- information in 1996, scant progress pears to be back on track. Germany, was made in developing and deploying Italy, and The Netherlands are consid- an Alliance-wide capability for the pro- ering collaborative research, develop- tection of forward deployed forces, let ment, and procurement of ship-based alone European home territory. tactical ballistic missile defense sys- has rReceecievnedtl ya, shhoowt ienv ethr,e tahrem p. rIong Jruanme Galante) tloemwesr. -tIitearl yp raongdr a mTus.r kTehye asere a pnudr southinegr 2001, two teams of defense industrial Nick companies were selected to design a Navy ( system for protecting deployed forces U.S. 48 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02 1129 Sokolsky Pgs 3/12/02 2:32 PM Page 49 Sokolsky ships deployed in the Mediterranean Briefing on missile or Atlantic or in a less controversial lo- intercept testing. cation such as Turkey. Sea-based midcourse system. The United States and NATO could also deploy a sea-based system for midcourse interception. For instance, as a first line of defense in a multilayered system, the United States, with the participation of selected Allies, could deploy Navy theater-wide defense on Aegis platforms in the far eastern Mediterranean. The second tier could be a littoral defense of Allied territory deployed in the Baltic Sea, English Channel, or North At- Mitchell) lfailnl ttihc.e Tghaips mbeitdwceoeunrs efo irnwtaerrdce pdte pwlooyueldd Terry systems and U.S.-based midcourse sys- D ( tems for homeland security. O D This approach offers several advantages. It avoids the more politically charged step of deploying mis- initiatives could provide terminal de- Ground-based midcourse system. An sile interceptors on European soil. A fense against shorter-range systems and architecture including ground-based sea-based system might be easier to form one tier of a multilayered system. interceptors and radars located in Eu- justify domestically insofar as it could Nonetheless, the prospect for co- rope for midcourse interception of be portrayed as a logical extension of aupt) ompaeirnast iuonnc oenrt amino raet cbaepsat.b Mle odsetf emnesems breer- lUonnitge-dr aSntagtees mcoiussldil easls oa ipmroevdid ea ts otmhee tthoe d ceuferrnedn tf oNrAwTaOrd p droegprlaomy,e dd efsoigrcneesd. en mes F. Slaug cpaonoudlin cfyta,rc ipeer soa h ghraaovmset , loaofnn dcgo famuvnpodeiidtniengdg d dmeicfiiflsiiictoaunrlyst diamnefdue nmEsue rp ofropore tUaenc.S t.ti eoArnlrli iteoosfr. y Tb ooa gtpahri onAvsmtid Mee rmiidcadaxlne- Depxaeprptelinociyspimvaete inootnp ap. toN sretAuaT noOift ficeeorss u frnoertl raEiteiuvsr eoclpyoe uianlnd- Atlantic (Ja acunrdr ennotn amctiliivtiatriye sd aerme afnodcsu.s Aeds ao nre spurlot-, Eloacsat ttehdr eiant sC, eonnter asli tEe uwroopueld, pneerehda ptos bine pstoaonld tihnegi rs enaa-vbaals eadss eftosr cteo fionr mth ae Group, gorfa tmroso ptos opproervaidtien glo owuetrs-itdiee rN pArToOte ctteirorni- tPhoela nCdz.e Tchhi sR ienptuegbrlaicte,d G terarnmsaantlyan, toicr MFinedaliltye,r rtahnise aonp toior nt hweo uNlodr tphr oAvtidlaen otipc-. mera tory. No ally has a missile shielding ca- architecture would offer equal protec- erational flexibility because sea-based Ca mbat pability beyond basic point defense, tion to all NATO members. The United assets in the Mediterranean and else- Co and all rely on the United States to States would own and operate the sys- where around Europe could, with ade- Fleet provide upper-tier protection of for- tem but depend on a host country for quate strategic warning, swing rela- ward deployed multinational forces. basing facilities. tively easily into position to counter Furthermore, the systems under con- This option has serious draw- missile threats. sideration are limited to a missile backs. Ground-based interceptors Benefits would have to be weighed threat range of 3,500 km, rendering would employ existing midcourse against the fact that sea-based systems technologies and thus will pose a greater threat to Russia the ground-based sites on European share the same vulnerabili- further north they are deployed be- ties to countermeasures as cause they will have a significantly in- territory could raise Moscow’s hackles U.S.-based interceptors. creased capacity to intercept Russian The political acceptability missiles. In addition, unless the loca- them significantly less capable against of ground-based deployments in Eu- tion of potential threats allowed the intercontinental ballistic missiles, and rope would be highly uncertain and far United States to deploy sea-based plat- are not optimally designed for a conti- more problematic than sea-based alter- forms that could intercept missiles nent-wide shield. Portions of Northern natives. Additionally, ground-based launched at both it and its Allies, Euro- Europe can be reached by Iranian or sites on European territory could raise pean countries would need to build Iraqi missiles of greater than 3,500 km Moscow’s hackles since they could dedicated sea-based assets to defend range and would therefore require threaten Russian strategic forces. Some their own territory. strategic interceptors. of these political and diplomatic risks Boost-phase intercept system. Boost- could be mitigated by placing x-band phase systems intercept ballistic mis- radars, which are required for warhead siles shortly after they are launched. tracking and discrimination, aboard Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 49 1129 Sokolsky Pgs 3/12/02 2:32 PM Page 50 (cid:2) JFQ FORUM An architecture using ground-, sea-, U.S.and Russian officials and air-based boost-phase interceptors discussing ballistic offers several significant advantages in missile defenses. overcoming political, technical, and operational challenges. Their over- whelming benefit is their ability to defend both the United States and Eu- rope against missile threats of any range. They could also be deployed in locations that would not threaten Chi- nese and Russian strategic capabilities. Based outside national territories, they offer greater potential for multinational cooperation. Because missiles would be intercepted in the early part of their trajectories, an effective system could prevent the deployment of de- coys, countermeasures, and other pen- etration aids. Finally, mobile boost- Ward) phase systems can be moved forward D. to deal with specific threats, providing D (R. O greater operational flexibility. D One approach combining ground-, sea-, and air-based boost-phase interceptors could be described as the south- missile defense sites elsewhere in Cen- the Washington Treaty, raised the Al- ern or Turkish option. Under this tral Europe. Given Turkey’s threat per- liance’s collective consciousness about scheme, which could also serve as the ceptions and extensive participation in threats to Western security in the first line of defense for the ground- and European missile defense, this ap- emerging strategic environment aris- sea-based midcourse options, ground- proach should be broadly acceptable to ing from outside Europe. Moreover, a based boost-phase interceptors and x- the public, particularly since it would terrorist attack on European soil com- band radars could be deployed in boost the country’s influence and parable to those on the United States southeastern Turkey to deal with an stature within the Alliance. Finally, for could create a sea change in attitudes Iraqi ballistic missile threat to NATO both technical and operational reasons, toward homeland security against and U.S. territory. It could be supple- Turkish-based systems founded on asymmetric threats. But whether this mented with sea-based interceptors in boost-phase intercept technologies change, if it does occur, will be trans- the Black Sea to defend against ballistic should be less threatening to Russia. lated into specific funding and pro- missiles flying trajectories out of north- There are operational challenges. grammatic commitments on missile ern Iran. The Air Force airborne laser Most significantly, because of the short defense remains an open question. In system operating from Turkish air bases time available for launch detection and fact, most experts believe that it could also be a component of this plan. tracking, command and control of would take a ballistic missile attack on A major benefit of the Turkish op- these systems would almost certainly European territory with weapons of tion is the opportunity for cooperation. need to be automated, rendering opera- mass destruction—a scenario most For example, those members who plan tional command and control problem- governments on the continent still re- to field theater systems now or later, in- atical. Also, systems would need to be gard as highly unlikely—to bring cluding Germany, Italy, The Nether- deployed within hundreds of kilometers about a cataclysmic shift in attitude. lands, and Turkey, could deploy these of the launch site; thus ships operating Consequently, the challenge remains capabilities to defend Turkish missile in the eastern Mediterranean could not for the United States and its Allies to defense sites and other facilities. NATO intercept Iraqi or Iranian launches. design a transatlantic system that is countries could also deploy combat air- politically logical, operationally effec- The Way Ahead craft or naval assets to protect sea- and tive, technically feasible, diplomati- air-based systems operating from the It remains to be seen whether Eu- cally sensible, and fiscally affordable. Black Sea and Turkish airfields. These rope will ever embrace the American Finding a responsible policy for the Al- deployments could be made on a rota- strategic rationale for European missile liance will be far more difficult if the tional basis as part of a multinational defense. Certainly the events of Sep- debate becomes polarized between unit, and some of the development and tember 11, and particularly the NATO those who assert that Europe would operation costs could be met out of the decision to invoke its collective never accept missile defenses and NATO infrastructure account. In addi- defense obligations under Article 5 of those who blithely assume that the Al- tion, the option would avoid the politi- lies will march in lock-step with an cally sensitive question of land-based American vision. 50 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02 1129 Sokolsky Pgs 3/12/02 2:32 PM Page 51 Sokolsky It should be possible to steer a would take primary responsibility for Theater high altitude middle course. Ground-, sea-, or air- intercepting missiles in the boost and air defense missile. based boost-phase intercept systems midcourse phases as the first line of de- deployed in Turkey and the Black Sea fense in a multilayered architecture could be the first line of transatlantic while the Allies accept primary respon- defense. The second layer would be sibility for terminal defense, particu- sea-based midcourse systems operating larly against shorter-range missiles. in the easternmost corner of the Mediterranean and in waters around Even if Europeans were to accept a the periphery of NATO countries. The minimalist but realistic role in devel- last tier in this layered system could be oping a missile defense system for land-based and/or ship-borne plat- their territory, consensus on building it forms for close-in terminal defense of is likely to prove elusive unless the ports and cities. United States is ready to accept some In addition to maximizing opera- degree of free riding. Moderating U.S. tional effectiveness, a mix of mobile ambitions for Allied contributions, systems for interception of missiles in while a bitter pill to swallow, might be all three phases of flight offers flexibil- a price worth paying to realize the Ward) ity in dealing with the full range of OD strategic benefits of extending the mis- D. Middle Eastern missile threats. Such a D sile defense deterrent to Europe while D (R. broad architecture can be easily adapted avoiding another divisive issue in the O D as technologies and threats change. Ad- transatlantic relationship. ditionally, it offers ample opportunities most members will be to temporize Most Europeans still feel safer for different forms of burdensharing until the technological feasibility of today than at any time in fifty years. and for NATO participation to evolve missile defense systems, especially the Prior to September 11, European mis- naturally. The most effective architec- more politically palatable sea-based sile defense was virtually unimaginable. ture will meet operational requirements options, has been demonstrated and But in the future, America’s Allies may while allowing individual Allies to other more immediate priorities have be more sensitive to threats to their ter- choose among a mix of moderately been met. ritory arising from an arc of instability low-cost defense systems. If a multilayered system is ever to stretching through the greater Middle The Allies need to decide for be constructed, compromises will be re- East and Persian Gulf and along the en- themselves whether they require a quired on both sides of the Atlantic. tire Asian littoral. Whether or not these missile defense system and are willing The United States will have to be pre- dangers loom larger in the European to pay for it. Absent a catastrophic pared to develop a flexible design that strategic calculus, the impediments to allows Allies to plug into it in missile defense should not be under- the Allies need to decide for varying ways, depending on the stated. Nevertheless, the road map laid evolution of threat perceptions, out here could lead to the future de- themselves whether they require advances in ballistic missile deployment of effective Allied protection a missile defense system fense technologies, and changes in and help coax reluctant NATO govern- domestic political and economic ments down the path the United States event that shocks European govern- circumstances. For their part, European has chosen at a price they and their ments into action, such a consensus is Allies will need to choose among a publics are willing to pay. JFQ likely to evolve slowly in most coun- broad range of options, with each countries if at all, and will be driven as try deciding what it wants based on its The International Institute for Strategic much by internal political and eco- requirements and resources. Studies published an earlier version of this article under the title “Imagining European nomic conditions as by geopolitical Moreover, if the Allies decide they Missile Defence” in Survival, vol. 43, no. 3 developments. At the same time, need an extra missile defense insurance (Autumn 2001), pp. 111–28. NATO probably needn’t make a de- policy, a transatlantic division of labor ployment decision for several years. and burdensharing will be needed for First, the Alliance contribution is most the architecture that meets the threat, likely to evolve out of theater missile minimizes political and financial costs, defense developments, and the sys- and assuages Russian concerns. Taking tems under consideration will not be these considerations into account, the deployable until later in the decade. United States and its NATO Allies Second, and equally important, it will should consider a high-low division of take several years of development and labor. Specifically, the United States testing before Washington can com- mit to a specific architecture. In view of these factors, the natural instinct of Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 51