DTIC ADA403469: Peacekeeping in West Africa

7 Pages·1 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

1629 Leatherwood Pgs 3/13/02 8:48 AM Page 76
(cid:2)
Peacekeeping
mpshire)
Ha
m
Navy (Ji
S.
U.
in West Africa
By D AV I D G. L E A T H E R W O O D
I
nstability in West Africa presents natural disasters. Responding to these
U.S. decisionmakers with a conun- contradictory pressures, successive ad-
drum. The domestic imperative to ministrations have largely relied on
avoid entangling new commit- Africans to maintain peace and secu-
ments abroad is tempered by the CNN rity on their continent. While consis-
effect—the need to do something to al- tent with Chapter VIII of the United
leviate the plight of those ravaged by Nations charter, this approach has
armed conflict, disease, famine, and practical limitations.
A look at support for Nigerian mil-
itary intervention in West Africa, using
events in Liberia and Sierra Leone as
David G. Leatherwood currently is chief of policy in the Directorate of Operations at case studies, reveals more cause for cau-
the Defense Intelligence Agency where he formerly served as senior representative tion than optimism. Though demo-
to U.S. European Command. graphics and globalization have both
76 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02
Report Documentation Page
Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to)
00 00 2002 N/A -
Title and Subtitle Contract Number
Peacekeeping in West Africa
Grant Number
Program Element Number
Author(s) Project Number
Task Number
Work Unit Number
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number
National Defense University Institute for National
Strategic Studies Washington D C 20319-5066
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s)
Address(es)
Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s)
Distribution/Availability Statement
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
Supplementary Notes
The original document contains color images.
Abstract
Subject Terms
Report Classification Classification of this page
unclassified unclassified
Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract
unclassified UU
Number of Pages
6
1629 Leatherwood Pgs 3/13/02 8:48 AM Page 77
Leatherwood
West Africa
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
MALI
Nouakchott
NIGER
Senegal River
SENEGAL
Dakar
THE Niger River
Banjul Niamey
GAMBIA
Bamako
Ouagadougou
Bissau
GUINEA BURKINA FASO
BISSAU GUINEA BENIN NIGERIA
Conakry
Abuja
SIERRA LFrEeeOtoNwEn GHANA TOGO Benue River
CÔTE
er
Monrovia D’IVOIRE Lake Volta Porto Novo Riv
er
LIBERIA Abidjan Lome Nig CAMEROON
Accra
Malabo
EQUATORIAL GUINEA Yaounde
Gulf of Guinea
mela J. Farlin) mANbiiguleijatra,i arpnyo lmiaciyidlmi.t aaIkrnye r’tssh fpreea qsrtuu esanhctc lotyom c iaptesli stsihhset- ssgwiogvenelilrfenidcm atneont 6tm ,0oa0ft 0eB ruwiraiklt ihnsiuanp Fpmaosoront, tfthrhose.m Wfr otihtnhet
Squadron (Pa mrpeececontr.t dsS iuinnp eptnohsriuts rfrinoegrg a orredng,gi oohnionawgl e sovtaepbre,i rliaistty is.o uIntsss- gi1aa9ni9n 0teo.d wF cnigoshn ottiurnotsgl i dowef aaoslf l f Mitehroecn erm oinavji oat hrb eLy i fbliaertsret-
BGohaarndai,nFgo Ccu–s5 Rinelief. Communications ifNnuin gWedrsei,as tep qAruofrifpiitcmsa seiensg tmm, eaisnngtdus itodrfea ditnh. iaPnto gcu oirnuintnog- y6ane0a0dr, ;0C 0aoˆn0t e s edos’tuIivgmohaitrt eer.def u2g0e0 ,i0n0 0S iedriread Lwehonilee
786th try’s military, as well as the U.S. con- Events in Liberia concerned Niger-
tractors involved. But American largess ian officials for several reasons. The be-
does not contribute to regional conflict leaguered Doe was an ally of Nigerian
resolution and may indeed retard it. military dictator Major General
contributed to a contagious anarchy, at
Ibrahim Babangida. Taylor, with re-
its heart regional instability is not Troubled Corner of the World
puted ties to Libya, also represented a
caused by these phenomena, nor is it
The latest chapter in Liberia’s sad threat to stability beyond Liberia’s bor-
spontaneous. State sponsorship of in-
history can be traced to an armed inva- ders. More immediately, three thou-
surrection from neighboring states is at
sion led by Charles Taylor. In Decem- sand Nigerian citizens residing in
the root, and inappropriate interna-
ber 1989, Taylor, who had fled to the Liberia had been rounded up by NPFL
tional responses to this combination of
United States to escape corruption and moved to the interior as hostages.
invasion and rebellion have only com-
charges, returned to his native Liberia The safety of the Nigerian embassy in
pounded the problem.
leading a rebel band of 160. There they Monrovia became increasingly precari-
Ensuring the success of Nigeria’s
confronted the dictatorial regime of ous as well.
fledgling democracy has become a ra-
Samuel Doe, a former noncommis- At Babangida’s suggestion, the
tionale for significant increases in U.S.
sioned officer who had come to power Economic Community of West African
through a coup in 1980. Taylor’s Na- States (ECOWAS) dispatched troops to
tional Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 77
1629 Leatherwood Pgs 3/13/02 8:48 AM Page 78
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
parties’ tactical considerations than
President Obasanjo.
good faith. As these agreements invari- Nigeria
ably broke down, ECOMOG vacillated
Defense Budget. $340 million for
between agendas favoring various
2000; the gross domestic product
factions, and its mission alternated be-
in 2000 was $53 billion ($1,359
tween peacekeeping and peace enforce-
per capita).
ment. An apparent agreement between
Taylor and Babangida cleared the way Manpower. With a population of
for Liberian elections and a peace agree- 113,007,000, Nigeria has a total of
ment that finally held in 1997. 16,749,000 men between 18 and
Episodes of individual valor in the 32 years of age. Active military
Nigerian contingent within ECOMOG strength is 78,500.
were marred by widespread corruption.
Armed Forces.Nigeria has an army
The priority for many Nigerian troops,
of 62,000 with 200 main battle
who sometimes went months without
tanks; a navy of 7,000 sailors with
pay, was personal profit. Looting was
one frigate and eight patrol and
common. Corruption became institu-
Stikkel) tionalized and ever more efficient as c9o,5a0s0ta pl ecrrsaofnt;n aenl da nadn 8a6i rc ofomrcbea tw aitirh-
C. the group’s presence in Liberia dragged
D (Helene oennd oeavveor rsse ivne nL iybeeariras . cIelnlitceirte edc oonno rmubic- craft and 10 armed helicopters.
DO ber, timber, U.N. humanitarian aid, Source:International Institute for Strategic Studies,
The Military Balance, 2001–2002(Oxford: Oxford
drugs, and diamonds. Criminal profits
University Press for the International Institute for
made sustaining deployment abroad an
Strategic Studies, 2001).
Liberia in August 1990 to contain the end unto itself.
civil war. Its multinational military en- Nigerian involvement in the
Diamonds Are Forever
tity was termed the ECOWAS Ceasefire group was unpopular domestically.
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), al- While the public generally accepted The conflict in Liberia is inex-
though there was no ceasefire in effect their government’s argument that orably linked with the strife in Sierra
at the time of its dispatch. The force Libyan-sponsored instability spreading Leone. In March 1991, NPFL forces
initially consisted of Gambian, Ghana- from Burkina Faso had to be con- crossed into the country from Liberia.
ian, Guinean, Nigerian, and Sierra tained, many perceived the cost as ex- Aimed at capturing the diamond min-
cessive. The national wind- ing areas, the offensive was led by for-
Nigerian-dominated intervention fall from oil revenues during mer Sierra Leonean Corporal Foday
the Persian Gulf War was Sankoh. A close friend of Taylor, Sankoh
was perceived as a partisan effort
consumed by the deploy- had previously attended training with
ment. As Nigeria’s economy him in Libya and worked with him in
Leonean troops organized in national faced harder times, deployments support of Blaise Campaore’s coup in
contingents. The commander was abroad became increasingly controver- Burkina Faso. The Revolutionary United
Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo, sial. National records put the total Front (RUF) Sankoh founded in Sierra
but the overwhelming majority of the spent on ECOMOG by past military Leone was largely an offshoot of NPFL.
troops and key leaders were Nigerian. governments at $8 billion. A year after the RUF invasion, the
The Nigerian-dominated interven- Ultimately, the Nigerian-led inter- government fell to a military coup led
tion was perceived by most Liberians vention in Liberia merely delayed a by 28-year-old army Captain Valentine
as a partisan effort against Taylor. NPFL transfer of power from one corrupt Strasser in April 1992. In 1993,
forces that had encircled Monrovia im- despot to another. It neither saved Strasser’s National Provisional Ruling
mediately engaged ECOMOG troops Doe nor stopped Taylor. The arrival of Council, with the assistance of $18
on the edge of town. When Doe was the Nigerians in August 1990 very million in U.S. military aid, was able to
murdered shortly after the arrival of likely saved residents of Monrovia regain the diamond mines in the south
ECOMOG, Quainoo was removed and from starvation, but it also kept the and east previously lost to the rebels.
replaced by a Nigerian general. The factions who fought Taylor fed and These gains were short lived, however.
command remained in Nigerian hands armed for years. By prolonging the pe- Sierra Leonean soldiers themselves
throughout the conflict. riod in which Liberia was divided began to engage in illegal mining, ex-
ECOMOG held Monrovia from without a single sovereign, ECOMOG porting the diamonds through Liberia
1990 to 1992 but made little progress in did little nationbuilding. as RUF rebels had. Government rev-
expanding its area of control. Thirteen enues remained low and rebel activity
ceasefires between warring factions were picked up. Guinea, countering RUF in-
negotiated in the following years, appar- cursions into its diamond-mining re-
ently motivated more by the warring gions, conducted cross-border raids on
78 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02
1629 Leatherwood Pgs 3/13/02 8:48 AM Page 79
Leatherwood
Malu was away in Nigeria at the time
Nigerian soldiers con-
of the coup. Once back, he took the
ducting live fire drill.
lead in a dual track strategy of negotia-
tions with AFRC and simultaneous
preparing for a military solution. The
Nigerians and AFRC/RUF agreed to re-
store democratic government to Sierra
Leone, but the accord was never imple-
mented. In February 1998, almost a
year after the coup, ECOMOG troops
from Nigeria took Freetown from
AFRC/RUF.
Nigeria’s primary interest in Sierra
Leone was diamonds. Indeed, dia-
monds are at the heart of the current
mpshire) cRoUnFf ldicitasm ino nWd eesxt pAofrrtics,a .f oTrh ee xbaumlkp loef,
Ha
m valued at $75 million annually, con-
Navy (Ji tinue to leave Sierra Leone through
S. Liberia. The complicity of the Liberian
U.
government has been documented by
the United Nations.
The mounting cost of the opera-
the insurgents in Sierra Leone. Further RUF. The November 1996 agreement, tion in Sierra Leone and unfavorable
confusing the situation was the emer- known as the Abidjan Peace Accord, military conditions on the ground
gence of the Sobel phenomenon, as required the rebels to disarm, demobi- caused Nigeria to threaten to pull its
more and more government troops be- lize, and transform into a political troops out despite the prospect of
came soldiers by day and rebels by party. The accord was overtaken by mineral wealth. Kabbah then signed
night. By 1995 the insurgents had the Lome Accords with Sankoh on
taken back the Sierra Leone diamond Nigeria’s primary interest in July 7, 1999, under pressure from mul-
mines, consolidated control of the Sierra Leone was diamonds tiple foreign benefactors. This peace
northern half of the country, and agreement called for the U.N. Ob-
threatened Freetown. server Mission in Sierra Leone (UN-
Lacking a credible military force, events before it could be implemented. OMSIL), which had evacuated Free-
the Strasser junta hired mercenaries to Major Johnny Paul Koroma of the town in December 1998, to return to
counter RUF. In exchange for a prom- Sierra Leone army and twenty confed- monitor implementation.
ise of future mining revenues, Execu- erates stormed a Freetown prison on
tive Outcomes, based in South Africa, May 25, 1997, released 600 prisoners, Wave the Blue Flag
deployed men to Sierra Leone in May and overthrew the elected govern-
The U.N. Security Council author-
1995. Using two contracted MI–17 ment. Through the Armed Forces Rev-
ized the expansion of UNOMSIL to 210
gunships and a Sierra Leonean MI–24 olutionary Council (AFRC), Koroma
military observers in August 1999. The
helicopter, mercenaries in Sierra and his followers then declared them-
Nigerian military, presented with an
Leonean uniforms recaptured all the selves the new rulers and invited RUF
opportunity to legitimize their efforts
diamond-mining centers within nine to join them. The rebels marched into
with a U.N. imprimatur and also re-
months. Their military prowess did an already anarchic Freetown and Kab-
ceive funding, reconsidered its deci-
not save Strasser. He was ousted in a bah fled to Guinea. From his exile in
sion to withdraw. Thus Nigerians
military coup led by defense minister Conakry, he requested Nigerian inter-
formed a large part of the contingent
Brigadier General Julius Mada Bio in vention under the terms of their bilat-
when a force of 6,000 U.N. Mission in
January 1996. Bio arranged for elec- eral pact. Just as scheduled elections in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers
tions as a precursor to a return to civil- Liberia heralded the imminent end of
was authorized by Resolution 1270 in
ian rule and negotiated a ceasefire one prolonged Nigerian military opera-
October 1999.
with RUF. tion abroad, another beckoned.
In early May 2000, RUF kidnapped
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah emerged ECOMOG headquarters in Mon-
hundreds of Zambian and Kenyan U.N.
from the March 1996 elections as the rovia sluggishly planned and executed
personnel who had deployed to moni-
President of Sierra Leone. On taking of- the overall Nigerian military response
tor compliance. The British decided to
fice, he terminated the relationship to the Sierra Leone coup. Force com-
intervene as RUF rebels massed 85 kilo-
with Executive Outcomes, signed a bi- mander Lieutenant General Victor
meters north of Freetown at Rogberi
lateral defense pact with Nigeria, and
Junction. With little faith in the Nigeri-
negotiated a peace agreement with
ans or U.N. forces, Britain sent its own
Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 79
1629 Leatherwood Pgs 3/13/02 8:48 AM Page 80
(cid:2)
JFQ FORUM
rushed to find surrogates. Senegal
Evacuees assembling
agreed to deploy troops to Liberia as
in Freetown,Assured
part of ECOMOG in return for $15
Response.
million in aid. Another $19 million
was provided to Kenya and Tanzania.
Babangida’s decision to annul the
Nigerian elections was the chief hurdle
U.S. policymakers had in helping West
Africans contain Charles Taylor. The
United States joined other Western na-
tions in imposing sanctions against
Nigeria. U.S. sanctions included a ban
on military services and the sale and
man) repair of equipment, as well as restric-
Heile tions on visas for Nigerian government
M officials. The U.S. military ability to
Richard track and influence regional events de-
Air Force ( cWliansheidn gatso na dreescuidlet do nf otth eto s raenpclaticoe nitss.
S. defense attaché, who was completing
U.
his tour of duty, leaving an Air Force
major as the senior defense officer in
the attaché’s office. Meanwhile, in the
soldiers. The air force flew in 400 ring—and what is remarkable about
downsized embassy in Monrovia, a sin-
troops to Freetown under a Common- the methods employed to contend
gle Army lieutenant colonel was re-
wealth mandate. Some 800 marines fol- with them is how little schemes varied
sponsible for covering both Liberia and
lowed aboard HMS Ocean, a new am- from past ineffective responses to in-
Sierra Leone.
phibious assault carrier. Quick action, stability. Troops on U.N. peacekeeping
In late 1994 and early 1995, Peter
to include helicopter assaults on ad- missions in recent years, restricted to
Chaveas, a senior Foreign Service Offi-
vancing rebels, saved the capital from acting in self defense, have frequently
cer with extensive experience in Nige-
falling again. confused their mandate of impartiality
ria, moved on from his position as Di-
Contrasting with the British per- with neutrality. The result has often
rector of the West Africa Office. Dane
formance in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL been a force prone to appease aggres-
Smith, who replaced him at the State
got off to a rough start. Hampered by sors and unsuited to oversee true disar-
Department Bureau of African Affairs,
internal bickering and a fluctuating sit- mament, demobilization, and reinte-
was stretched thin by his additional
uation on the ground, the United Na- gration of former combatants. Equally
duties as special envoy for Liberia. Po-
tions was quickly caught in the ECO- damning, the duration of deployments
litical appointee Susan Rice took over
MOG trap of alternating between has proven difficult to curtail. This in-
the African Affairs Office at the Na-
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. ertia takes on even greater immediacy
tional Security Council (NSC). The net
The UNAMSIL mandate was extended in civil wars, where prolonging the
effect of these changes was to consoli-
and expanded in August 2000, author- temporarydivision of states undermines
date NSC leadership on West African
izing offensive action. domestic and international stability.
matters in Washington.
Reports reached the United Na-
Significant changes were also oc-
On the Sidelines
tions in September on illegal diamond
curring at EUCOM. General James
trading between senior Nigerian mili- American military actions at the Jamerson, USAF, took over as Deputy
tary officers and RUF. Rather than in- outset of the West African crises were Commander in Chief in July 1995. The
vestigating the allegations made by the restricted to noncombatant evacuation Commander in Chief, General George
impolitic UNAMSIL commander, the managed by U.S. European Command Joulwan, USA, immediately used him
U.N. removed him. India and Jordan, (EUCOM). Operation Sharp Edge re- to initiate a program of proactive en-
the two most capable militaries within moved American nationals from gagement. Nigeria’s pariah status and
the mission, then announced that they Liberia between April 1990 and Janu- instability in Liberia, however, resulted
would withdraw their forces. Another ary 1991. A similar mission, put to- in minimal command interaction with
tenuous ceasefire was signed in No- gether so hastily it was not named, those states.
vember 2000. Few suspected any peace performed evacuations from Sierra U.S. assistance to ECOMOG now
would follow. Leone from April 29 to May 4. took discrete forms. The U.S. Govern-
Meanwhile, an armed conflict in As U.S. decisionmakers resolved to ment worked through contractors to
Guinea further illustrated the transna- stay out of conflicts in the region, they provide Nigerians in Liberia with trucks,
tional nature of West African proxy in-
radios, and helicopters in 1996 and
surgencies. Events there had a familiar
1997. Behind the scenes cooperation
80 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 2001–02
1629 Leatherwood Pgs 3/13/02 8:48 AM Page 81
Leatherwood
with Nigeria’s dictatorship, while clearly
Evacuating civilians to
not in the spirit of sanctions, was never-
USS Kearsarge,Sierra
theless welcomed by many in Congress.
Leone,1997.
A New Era—Perhaps
The death of military dictator
General Sani Abacha in 1998 had a
profound impact on the entire spec-
trum of U.S. relations with Nigeria.
When both Abacha and his prominent
civilian opponent, Chief M.K.O. Abi-
ola, died of heart attacks in the sum-
mer of 1998, that curious coincidence
set the stage for a return to democracy.
General Abdulsalam Abubakr oversaw
a transitional government, undertak-
ing dramatic political reforms and Kulik)
swttiocrihoetehdkd iGnuthl eiaenn egyrr eeaaialnn rO s e olloufe fsc Aetaigbonuan nce h tlOheaca’bstta e dstdaoe noagjktooh v p.te hlRarencene-- Keasarge(Aaron
S
ment in May 1999. He initiated sweep- US
ing changes, ousting many senior offi-
cers in the course of consolidating
power and reforming the military, re- The military transformation train- should distinguish, however, between
tiring 17 generals, and then removing ing promised to the Nigerians has also what is good for Nigeria and what is
the chiefs of all three military services. proven a source of friction. It consists good for smaller countries in West
From 1999 to the present, U.S. of a three-part process conducted by Africa. Regional hegemons by nature
foreign policy has focused on Nigeria an American contractor, Military Pro- retard the sovereignty of weaker states
as the region’s key state. The idea be- fessional Resources Incorporated, in- in their areas of influence. Nigeria,
tended to reprofessionalize the with its endemic corruption and other
the death of dictator Sani Abacha Nigerian Ministry of Defense. vestiges of its recent past, is not yet ca-
Phase one, completed in 1999 at pable of instilling lasting stability in
had a profound impact on U.S.
a cost to the U.S. Agency for In- other countries.
relations with Nigeria ternational Development of $1
million, entailed an assessment Whatever the approach to conflict
hind this strategy is that limited for- of necessary actions. Phase two, at a resolution in West Africa, it must en-
eign assistance is best spent on a state combined cost to the United States compass all of the affected states to
that is aware of its potential to exercise and Nigeria of $7 million, was initiated succeed. It must also better coordinate
regional hegemony and willing and as- in late 2000. As the process drags on, the use of statecraft and military force,
sertive enough to do it. This anchor the military is showing irritation with a complicated endeavor given the mul-
state strategy, which gained momen- perceived U.S. insensitivity to Nigeria’s tiplicity of actors and interests. A
tum under Bill Clinton, has been national sovereignty. The honeymoon decade of Nigerian intervention has
adopted by the Bush administration. is apparently over. made this much clear: peacekeeping
Thomas Pickering, the Under Sec- Sierra Leone remains one issue of alone will not induce stability. JFQ
retary of State and an ambassador to contention. The challenge facing the
Nigeria in the early 1980s, flew to international community is how to
Abuja to discuss training for Nigerian stop the violence without perpetuating
troops in July 2000. Operation Focus that nation’s partition. The United
Relief initially involved 3d Special States has opted to treat conflict reso-
Forces Group providing 10 weeks of lution in Sierra Leone primarily as an
training to seven battalions—one ancillary aspect of its détente with
Ghanaian, five Nigerian, and one Nigeria. The fate of Nigeria, with Sub-
Senegalese. Nigerians welcomed the Saharan Africa’s largest population and
proffered equipment but bristled at its only megacity, is enormously im-
training. Citing their greater combat portant. Its embryonic democracy
experience, they saw little to gain must be nurtured in every way, to in-
from U.S. instruction. clude the sort of military engagement
the United States has undertaken. One
Autumn/Winter 2001–02 / JFQ 81