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JFQ Joseph Pgs 10/1/96 11:25 AM Page 64 n JFQ FORUM Regional Implications of NBC PROLIFERATION By R O B E R T G. J O S E P H T he proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and of increasingly capable ballistic and cruise missiles as delivery systems of choice, represents a central threat to U.S. security interests and the use of force as an in- strument of U.S. national strategy. In response to this growing threat, the United States is pursuing a two-track approach. The first, designed to prevent proliferation, consists of bolstering traditional non-proliferation efforts—such as arms control, export controls, and security assistance and assurances—to dissuade any potential proliferator from pursuing NBC and missile programs. The second track, referred to as counterproliferation, consists of defense initiatives across a broad range of activities—from doctrine to training and leadership development to acquisition—designed to protect against the strategic and tactical consequences of proliferation Agile Provider ’94. should prevention fail. 64 JFQ / Autumn 1995 Report Documentation Page Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to) 1995 N/A - Title and Subtitle Contract Number Regional Implications of NBC Proliferation Grant Number Program Element Number Author(s) Project Number Task Number Work Unit Number Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number Center for Counterproliferation National Defense University Washington D. C. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) Address(es) Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images. Abstract Subject Terms Report Classification Classification of this page unclassified unclassified Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract unclassified UU Number of Pages 6 JFQ Joseph Pgs 10/1/96 11:25 AM Page 65 Joseph Greater Middle East: Proliferation Profile Source: Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995. Non-proliferation objectives have While a large majority of the nuclear weapons in its post-Cold War long been given high priority by the members of the international commu- defense posture, a number of hostile United States, which has taken the nity has supported the creation of states are actively pursuing NBC lead in establishing international legal these legal norms and abides by them, weapons. In fact, as evidenced by the norms against the possession and the a growing number of states have re- diffusion of dual-use technologies and use of NBC weapons. The 1972 Biolog- jected or manipulated the norms and the wide-scale use of chemical ical Weapons Convention and as yet associated safeguards to gain access to weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and other unratified 1992 Chemical Weapons proscribed technologies. For example, conflicts, barriers to possessing and Convention are expressions of this ef- like North Korea and Iraq before it, using these weapons are actually erod- fort. The Clinton administration’s em- Iran’s formal adherence to NPT—while ing. Recent Iraqi admissions provide phasis on indefinite extension of the actively pursuing nuclear weapons—is further evidence which supports this Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) a cynical display of contempt for these conclusion. U.N. officials have ac- as well as its advocacy of a comprehen- legal norms and its ability to circum- quired documents revealing that, sive test ban are more recent indica- vent international controls. Iran’s while the United States was deploying tions of the desire to prevent prolifera- membership in good standing in the forces to the Gulf in the autumn of tion through arms control. Paralleling treaty regime, which permits it to take 1990, Iraq began to fill bombs and these regimes, the United States has advantage of access to technologies ap- Scud warheads with chemical and bio- long sought to promote multilateral plicable to weapons, clearly demon- logical agents for use against coalition export controls for sensitive technolo- strates the limitations of arms control forces as well as Israeli and Saudi cities. gies and materials. The Nuclear Suppli- approaches. Similarly, the willingness The documents also show that, follow- ers Group, Australia Group, and Mis- of suppliers to provide this technology, ing its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq em- sile Technology Control Regime are in this case Russia, demonstrates the barked on a new crash effort to pro- prime examples of this effort. The on- limits of export controls. duce one or two nuclear bombs. This going U.S. attempt to transform the In part as a consequence, a signifi- effort, which was in addition to a long- Coordinating Committee on Multilat- cant paradox is now evident in the se- standing program to enrich uranium eral Export Controls (COCOM) into a curity environment: while the United for nuclear weapons, included a plan non-proliferation export control orga- States has renounced possession of of- to recover by April 1991 weapons- nization is another example. fensive biological and chemical grade uranium from safeguarded ra- weapons and is fundamentally reduc- dioactive fuel supplied by France for ing its nuclear stockpile and the role of the Osirak reactor. Miller) The utility and effects of NBC S. Air Force (Jill Rpanorodbl eiofrentr Gtaht. ieJo ofnsa eRcpuehlste yias o rdcfih rt ehacett otNhra eot iNfo tanhtaielo WCneaanlr tD Ceeorf lfeloenrgs eeC .oUunnivteerr-sity wawneedaap psoocnnaslse d hoiafffv eterh bceeiyrr ttuahsiene . t ayWtptehr iiboleuf twneuse actplheoaantr U. Autumn 1995 / JFQ 65 JFQ Joseph Pgs 10/1/96 11:25 AM Page 66 n JFQ FORUM Logistic choke points are vulnerable targets. make them particularly useful tools for stability in vital regions where the partners can command in theater. In political intimidation, chemical and United States has long-standing secu- this context, NBC weapons and mis- especially biological weapons pose rity commitments and the forward siles are prized as effective tools for co- presence of its forces. In the ercion against neighboring states and greater Middle East, an area for deterrence (for example, to deter in the greater Middle East nearly half of special concern, nearly the United States from intervening in the countries possess or are devel- half the countries already the region). Moreover, as demonstrated possess or are developing by the extensive use of chemicals and oping NBC weapons and missiles NBC weapons and missiles. ballistic missiles in the Iran-Iraq war Of these, Iran, Iraq, and and Iraq’s preparations for the use of other challenges. When compared to Libya stand out as the near-term biological weapons in the Gulf War, nuclear weapons, both are relatively threats to the United States. Given the these weapons are also viewed as hav- easy and cheap to acquire, and because dynamics of the region, other coun- ing great strategic and tactical value. the requisite support facilities lack tries such as Syria could quickly join Iran is embarked on a significant unique signatures, they are far less vul- these three states. arms buildup across the board, includ- nerable to attack. Moreover, post- ing aggressive NBC programs. Although The Threat to the Area 1960s advances in biotechnology make Iran signed the Chemical Weapons the use of biological weapons against Often considered rogue states, Convention, it subsequently expanded targets such as airfields and ports more Iran, Iraq, and Libya have objectives and upgraded its chemical warfare pro- feasible. Further, high-lethality, multi- which are inimical to U.S. interests and gram. According to open source esti- ple-delivery modes (including covert), therefore see the United States as a seri- mates, its chemical warfare program and limited ability to detect—and thus ous obstacle to achieving their goals. can produce hundreds of tons of agents defend against—biological weapons All appear to regard NBC weapons and annually, primarily choking and blister have serious implications for deter- missiles as valuable instruments for agents. A biological weapons program rence and warfighting. pursuing their regional political and dating back to the early 1980s has ad- Perhaps the most troubling impli- military ambitions and for overcoming vanced to the point where it probably cation from a U.S. political-military the conventional superiority that the has produced biological agents and perspective is that, of those states pur- United States and potential coalition weaponized a small quantity of those suing NBC and missile programs, a sig- agents. Iran’s nuclear program is ex- nificant number pose direct threats to pected to take eight to ten years to produce its own weapons, perhaps five if 66 JFQ / Autumn 1995 JFQ Joseph Pgs 10/1/96 11:25 AM Page 67 Joseph R. Tricoche) eicnlvetaaesrni owtnioe anopn to oan lslr erosenulacmtee edf r teihsesedu eqfrsuo iemnstd iinfcoatret renn iuats-- Marine Corps (J. tsaiugorrneeae lm bseaencnacttu iopsnee rs.mt hFiietns a UlBlya.,Ng ih.n d claaedrag sete om- fdiereae-- U.S. velop, test, and produce missiles of ranges up to 150 kilometers, Iraq has held onto missile support equipment and propellant that can be used for longer-range missiles. In fact, since the Gulf War, Iraqi agents have success- fully acquired critical missile compo- nents from abroad in violation of the U.N. sanctions. Libya, though possessing less indigenous expertise than Iran or Iraq, has actively sought both chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and may be pursuing biological and nuclear weapons. Tripoli has in- vested heavily in building chemical weapons produc- Ybanez) tTiaorhnu pnalahn atns da tis Raassbetsase da ntdo Pedro have a weapons stockpile of Ttpaeenhricreean.n cG eg,i evwtesnh feotrheree ii tgI rnias q acis lseeixasr-- Sthceu dP erresmiaani nGsu ilnf. S. Air Force ( ainnte crlveluea sdgti an1s.0g 0I n tm oadnudss ittoaifor dna g teoan ntitsds, that the program was U. 300-kilometer range Scud much further advanced missiles, Libya has report- than assessed by the intelligence com- example, Baghdad has retained a sig- edly arranged to buy extended-range munity, and given the certainty that nificant amount of chemical weapons Scud–Cs and perhaps No Dongs from Iran will receive outside help, the time production equipment and is assessed North Korea. While its biological and required to acquire a crude nuclear to have preserved stockpiles of chemi- nuclear weapons programs are cur- weapons capability will likely be less cal agents and munitions. Some chem- rently assessed to be in the R&D phase, than official estimates. In its pursuit of ical weapons production could be re- Tripoli is seeking to transform its bio- ballistic missiles, Iran has acquired the sumed in weeks. Iraq’s offensive logical research program to produce extended-range Scud C from North biological program, which produced weaponized agents. Libya operates a Korea and is expected to receive the thousands of gallons of anthrax bacte- small nuclear research facility and is al- 1000-plus kilometer No Dong–1 from ria and botulism toxin, is of the great- leged to be recruiting Russian scientists the same source. est concern. While recently admitting to help establish a nuclear weapons Iraq’s NBC and missile programs to stockpiling massive amounts of bio- program. Experience—the launch of suffered a major setback with its defeat logical agents which it claims to have ballistic missiles against Lampadusa in Desert Storm. Many key facilities destroyed, neither war nor inspections and the use of chemical weapons in were heavily damaged or destroyed have completely degraded Iraq’s capa- Chad—reveals that the Libyan leader- from the air and others rendered inop- bility. Production of biological agents, ship sees these weapons as politically erable through continuous intrusive if not ongoing, could begin at any and militarily useful. Qadhafi’s ex- inspections. Nevertheless, despite ef- time. Similarly, Iraq still retains the ex- pressed desire to be able to strike the forts by onsite U.N. personnel, Iraq has pertise and technological base to re- United States with long-range missiles avoided detection and destruction of sume its uranium enrichment pro- is further indication. critical elements of its NBC infrastruc- gram, including machine tools and ture, as well as existing stockpiles of centrifuge designs. Even though its nu- chemical and biological weapons and clear program has clearly been dis- missiles. As a result of its costly but rupted, Iraq’s continued deception and successful efforts, it can resume its programs soon after inspectors leave. For Autumn 1995 / JFQ 67 JFQ Joseph Pgs 10/1/96 11:25 AM Page 68 n JFQ FORUM tion) as well as reassessments of coali- Threat Ranges tion objectives and resolve. If Iraq had possessed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles able to strike Western Eu- rope, for example, forming and maintaining a Desert Storm-type coalition would have been even more difficult, if not altogether problematic. It is important to remember that deterrence works in two directions. Just as the United States will seek to deter an adversary from using NBC weapons, an enemy will seek to use the possession of these weapons to deter Ameri- can and coalition forces from intervening and bringing to bear overwhelming conventional superiority. Failing to deter the United States, an NBC-armed enemy could decide to employ these weapons to drive up U.S. and allied ca- sualties for political and military impact. In order not to be deterred, the United States must demonstrate—to a potential enemy and to itself—that using NBC weapons will not produce political and military benefits that out- weigh the associated risks. For deterrence to succeed, the United States must have—and be perceived to have—the capability and will to prevail in an NBC environment and Source: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. retaliate against an enemy, holding at risk assets of value that can be attacked and destroyed if an enemy undertakes the action which was to have been deterred. Given the importance of forg- Regional Deterrence The use or threat of use of NBC ing and maintaining coalitions in re- The possession of NBC weapons weapons against U.S. and coalition gional conflicts, U.S. deterrent posture and missiles by states like Iran, Iraq, forces in the greater Middle East, unless must also be credible to prospective and Libya raises the risks of engaging limited to small-scale tactical employ- partners. To be credible, deterrence in the area and complicates coalition ment such as chemical weapons on the must demonstrate consistency of pur- building, undermines deterrence based battlefield, could have major strategic pose as well as determination over the on conventional superiority, and and tactical repercussions for accom- long haul. The U.S. reputation for re- threatens the U.S. ability to conduct plishing missions and objectives, affect- solve among allies and potential ene- operations. Consequently, it is essen- ing deployment into theater, sustaining mies alike is affected by its actions over forces, and conducting com- time and across the spectrum of secu- bat operations. For example, rity policy. for deterrence to succeed, the United large concentrations of Deterrence remains the first line States must have the capability and troops and equipment pre- of defense against NBC weapons, and will to prevail in an NBC environment sent a major vulnerability to the basic elements of deterrence must NBC attack. In a region like be maintained and strengthened. How- the Gulf with relatively few ever, traditional approaches to deter- tial to rethink how such weapons airfields and ports, business as usual is a ring NBC use in an unstable region could be used against the United States formula for disaster. such as the greater Middle East are in- or coalition partners in a regional con- Any NBC use would almost cer- herently uncertain. Many of the condi- text and what must be done to deter tainly fundamentally alter the political tions that contributed to deterrence in and defend against them. nature of the conflict as well. Even the threat of use could lead to pressures (such as driving wedges in the coali- 68 JFQ / Autumn 1995 JFQ Joseph Pgs 10/1/96 11:25 AM Page 69 Joseph the Cold War are not present—for ex- deterring NBC use. For this reason, it is be a joint solution. Inside and outside ample, mutual understandings of the necessary to resist further attempts to DOD, many initiatives in R&D, doc- implications of NBC use and effective delegitimize U.S. possession of nuclear trine, gaming, and force planning communication. In the final analysis, a weapons. (such as special operations forces) are deterrent strategy requires knowledge underway. Problems do exist, however, Defense Against NBC of the strategic personality of one’s ad- both with regard to how far technol- versary, to include a cognizance of the When one considers deterring ogy can offer solutions as well as insti- region, the culture, the military forces, Iran’s mullahs or a Qadhafi or Hussein, tutional problems such as service prior- and the regime itself. it is clear that deterrence could fail. Be- ities, budgetary constraints, and a For these reasons, the United cause of the inherent complexities of realistic grasp of the implications of States must reexamine the require- deterrence and the problematic nature NBC use on military operations. ments for, and assumptions of, deter- of its success, it is necessary to plan for The Armed Forces have an essen- rence in a regional context. In the its failure. As previously indicated, tial role to play across the entire range CENTCOM area of interest this means should this occur and NBC weapons be of issues affecting the deterrence of, strengthening the U.S. capability to re- used against U.S. and coalition forces, and the defense against, proliferation. taliate conventionally so that the con- the political implications would be pro- CENTCOM and other regional com- sequences of contemplated aggression found and the military effects could be mands are well placed to understand are clear to leaders such as Saddam substantial at both the strategic and op- the politico-military-cultural dynam- Hussein. Moreover, it requires finding erational levels. ics which are critical to effective de- more effective ways to communicate Given the potential impact of terrence. Inputs from the commands resolve and capabilities through de- such use on individual units and larger are also key to determining how best claratory policy and private channels. formations as well as on civilian infra- to convey intentions and resolve, in The credibility of U.S. deterrent forces structure, the United States must have declaratory policy and private chan- can also be enhanced through such sufficient capability both to render the nels. Most important, regional com- measures as deployments and exercises. use of NBC less effective and to prevail manders in chief have the overall re- In this regard, it may be necessary on the battlefield. Moreover, the responsibility for contingency planning to review the formulations of the vari- quirement for mitigating the effects of and execution of military options to ous U.S. negative security assurances in NBC use can extend, particularly deter, defend against, and destroy the context of regional deterrence, within a coalition, to the protection of NBC threats in their respective areas keeping in mind that American superi- civilians—both those essential to the of responsibility. JFQ ority in conventional force cannot be war effort and the population at large. expected in every case to deter war or In short, the United States must use of NBC weapons after war has be able—in terms of doctrine, training, begun. For example, declaring that the and equipment—to protect its forces United States will not use nuclear and ensure they can operate and pre- weapons against non-nuclear parties to vail in an NBC environment. This re- the NPT may be perceived by states quires maintaining effective conven- such as Iran to exempt them from pos- tional and nuclear forces as well as sible nuclear retaliation if chemical or detailed contingency planning for de- biological weapons are employed terrence and defense in a regional con- against American forces. This would text. Moreover, it demands that de- clearly undercut the value of the U.S. fense—both active (for example, nuclear deterrent which, if Iraqi leaders ballistic and cruise missile defenses) are to be believed, was decisive in Bagh- and passive (effective chemical/biologi- dad’s decision not to employ chemical cal weapons suits and detectors)—be and biological weapons. Iraq’s concern given high priority and that counter- was based on a direct American warn- force capabilities suited to the unique ing that it would suffer catastrophic characteristics of NBC targets be consequences if it used chemical or bio- strengthened (for example, the ability logical weapons against the coalition. to kill deep underground targets). Iraq interpreted this to mean nuclear re- With such an arsenal of capabili- taliation. Thus, even though the post- ties, U.S. deterrent posture would be Cold War role of nuclear weapons in strengthened. In fact, deterrence by de- U.S. defense policy is not precisely de- nial—denying the enemy the benefits fined, nuclear weapons remain the ulti- of NBC use—is the best guarantor of mate sanction and a vital element of deterrence success. It is also the best hedge in the event deterrence fails. NBC proliferation represents a joint problem for which there can only Autumn 1995 / JFQ 69