DTIC ADA386175: Joint Force Quarterly: The Greater Middle East. Number 24. Spring 2000.

136 Pages·20.5 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

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AWord from the
4(cid:127) (cid:127) Marines during
q ilkexercise in Kuwait.
Chairman
n recent trips to the Middle East and But containing Iraq is not their most challenging
/ the Balkans, I have observed the su- task. They must also foster stability and coopera-
perb job that the Armed Forces do in tion with partners throughout the Middle East
"safeguarding national interests and and Southwest Asia.
maintaining the peace in a complex and danger- Efforts in this region are only some of the
ous world. Therefore it is ap- demands of global engagement. When Secretary
propriate that the JFQ Forum Cohen and I testified before Congress at hearings
s v in this issue once again spot- on military posture we outlined priorities to keep
v i lights U.S. Central Command the force strong. The Armed Forces are noted for
(CENTCOM), an organization their extraordinary people, technological edge,
r z i
which encompasses an area and warfighting skills. Overall the force is relh-
a of responsibility that is both tively healthy; but constant challenges arise in
broad and far-reaching in its CENTCOM and other combatant commands
strategic implications. The which stretch resources. Although we remain ca-
important role of U.S. engagement in this region pable of executing the national military strat-
was a recurring theme in my discussions with egy-including the most demanding scenario of
President Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jor- two nearly simultaneous major theater wars-the
dan, and King Mohammed VI of Morocco. risks have increased as we have dramatically re-
The men and women assigned to CENTCOM duced force size while taking on added commit-
operate in a region of vital national interest. ments. Moreover, frequent and persistent deploy-
Daily they patrol the sky over Iraq, enforce sanc- ments disrupt operating budgets, result in lost
tions at sea through maritime intercept opera- training opportunities, accelerate wear and tear
tions, and assure the physical security of Kuwait. (continued on page 4)
Spring 2000 / JFQ I
* CONTENTS
I A Word from the Chairman 49 Political Islam and the West
by Henry H. Shelton by John L. Esposito
6 From the Field and Fleet: 56 Europe, the Mediterranean,
Letters to the Editor and the Middle East
by Simon Serfaty
11 Rethinking Two War
Strategies
by Michael E. O'Hanlon
18 Lessons from the National
Defense Panel
by John G. McGinn
62 Nuclear Proliferation on the
* FORUM
24 The Greater Middle East Indian Subcontinent
by Kenneth R. Totty
26 Challenges in the Central
Region: An Interview
with Anthony C. Zinni 68 Planning for Preventive
War, 1945-1950
34 Crossing Boundaries: by Gian P. Gentile
Commanders in Chief and
Areas of Interest 75 NATO Exercise Programs:
by Richard A. Lechowich A Case for Improvement
by Philip Cox and James M. Hudson, Jr.
42 From Desert One to Southern
Watch: The Evolution of 81 Reserve Intelligence Support
U.S. Central Command for Operation Allied Force
by Jay E. Hines by Donald C. DeVries
87 Developing Joint Education
PHOTO CREDITS for the Total Force
The cover of this issue shows USS Curtis Wilbur in the by John B. Driscoll
[
Arabian Gulf (U.S. Navy/John Sullivan). The front inside
cover features F-16s during Roving Sands '99 (1Vt Combat 92 Interagency Cooperation:
Camera Squadron/Steven Pearsall), Marine vehicles in
live fire exercise (2d Marine Division Combat Camera PDD 56 and Complex
"Unit/Andrew
T. Thornton), U.S. ships cruising in forma-
tion, exercise RIMPAC 2000 (U.S. Navy/David C. Mercil), Contingency Operations
and Blackhawks slingloading artillery at Fort Drum by William P. Hamblet and
(FORSCOM Public Affairs/Barry Benner). The table of
contents depicts Indian border guard (AP Wide World Jerry G. Kline
Photo/Deepak Sharma) and Marine FA-18D during exer-
cise Cobra Gold 2000 (U.S. Air Force/Jeffrey Clonkey).
The back inside cover features soldier at checkpoint in Kuwait (Fleet Combat
Camera Group, Pacific/Jeff Viano). The back cover shows MV-22 landing aboard
USS Essex (U.S. Navy/Jason A. Pylarinos), crew preparing to dock USS Seawolf
(USS Seawolf/John E. Gay), high mobility artillery rocket system being tested,
Rapid Force Projection Initiative Field Experiment (55th Signal Company/Russell
J. Good), and YF-22 in flight (DOD).
2 JFQ / Spring 2000
SPRING 2000 / NUMBER 24
0 OUT OF JOINT U OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN
98 Grading Theater Engagement 119 Leonard Fielding Chapman, Jr.
Planning
by Barry M. Blechman, Kevin P. O'Prey, U THE JOINT WORLD
and Renee Lajoie 120 Organization, Doctrine,
Lessons Learned, Education,
• and History
Engagement-
104 Peacetime
A Role for Military Advisors? * OFF THE SHELF
by Paul Marks
125 Three Perspectives
on the New Terrorism:
A Review Essay
by Mark J. Roberts
127 The Navy and the Persian
Gulf War: A Review Essay
by W. Spencer Johnson
129 Why I Like "Ike":
__A Book Review
by David Jablonsky
131 Bonaparte as Military
Theorist: A Book Review
110 The Struggle for Dominance: byeort A Doughty
Korea on tKhhoeree BBinrkibnoykn , Robert A. Doughty
1979-1980
by John A. Wickham, Jr.
Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano LTC James Jay Carafano, USA
Director Director of Publications Executive Editor
Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies
Editor-in-Chief Editor
Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley William A. Rawley
Production Coordinator Copy Editor U.S. Government Printing Office
Art Director
JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 132
by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to:
tense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterlys hould be made whenever mate- Editor Joint r Quarte-l
employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. A : NDIJ-_SS-JFO
forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De-
contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the tense. Allp revious issues have been published electronically Fift Ae nue( Bd. 2
Fort LesleyJ1 McNair
unified commands, and joint force development, and are available over the lnternet at the address indicated Washingt, D.C. 31..5..6
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S,
pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office, Telephone: [phone] /DSN 325-4220
not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: [phone]/ DSN 325-4219
or any other agency of the Federal Government, Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected]
ISSN 1070-0692 June 2000 Internet ttp/fWWW.dtcIfdoct me
Spring 2000 / JFQ 3
j n F Q A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN
GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA (continued from page 1)
Publisher on systems and equipment, and jeopardize the re-
tention of our most valuable resource-people.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE
LTG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA m National Defense University Health Care
Chairman In testifying before Congress I stressed that
BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) a Office of the Chairman my top budget initiative for this coming year is
RADM Daniel R. Bowler, USN m National War College fixing TRICARE, the largest managed health care
system in the Nation. This program is complex,
Col Darrell A. Browning, USMC m Marine Corps Command and Staff College confusing, and often not customer-oriented.
Brig Gen Richard B. Bundy, USAF a The Joint Staff While most will agree that the quality of care ad-
ministered by doctors, nurses, and other health
VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN * Naval War College professionals under the program is outstanding,
A. Denis Clift n Joint Military Intelligence College accessing the system is frustrating. Its region-
LtGen Carnton W. Fulford, Jr., USMC * The Joint Staffiztnfoap based structure haitsm re sulttsebde in a fltacclmk aodf standard-
ization for appointments, benefits, claims, and
Brig Gen Edward L. LaFountaine, USAF w Armed Forces Staff College enrollment across duty stations. Servicemembers,
Maj Gen David F. MacGehee, Jr., USAF w Air War College retirees, and families deserve better.
Some near-term improvements being pur-
MajGen Harold Mashburn, Jr., USMC * Indus'ial College of the Armed Forces sued are straightforward: automatic enrollment
MG Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA a U.S. Army War College for all active duty family members into TRICARE
Col John T.S heridan, USAF w Air Command and Staff College Prime that will be honored across regions; easy-
to-understand enrollment materials; designation
Col John H. Turner, USMC mM arine Corps War College of primary care managers so that members know
BG John R. Wood, USA n U.S. Army Command and General Staff College who is responsible for their care by name; and a
claims system that ensures the government re-
ceives the bills, not the beneficiary. Other long-
term enhancements will be more challenging, but
StephenJ. Flanagan z National Defense University the service chiefs and I recognize that there is a
Chairman compelling need to provide more comprehensive
Richard K. Betts a Columbia University coverage not only for active duty members but
Col Stephen D. Chiabotti, USAF z Air Command and Staff College also for retirees. Fixing the health care system is
necessary to keep faith with those who serve
Eliot A. Cohen i The Johns Hopkins University today as well as those who consider a career in
COL David M. Cole, USA " U.S. Anny War College the Armed Forces tomorrow. We ask our soldiers,
sailors, marines, and airmen to be ready to serve
COL Robert A. Doughty, USA * U.S. Military Academy anywhere; they and their families deserve a more
Aaron L. Friedberg w Princeton University responsive health care system.
Alan L. Gropman mI ndustrialC ollege of the Armed Forces Readiness
COL G. Chesley Harris, USA mA nned Forces Staff College My testimony also covered ongoing efforts
COL Timothy S. Heinemann, USA v U.S. Arny Command and General Staff College to maintain readiness. With the support of the
CAPT Chester E. Helms, USN mN aval War College administration and Congress, last year's budget
arrested a steep decline in purchasing power and
COL Paul Herbert, USA w National War College enabled us to fund critical readiness requirements
Mark H. Jacobsen x Marine Corps Command and Staff College while increasing the recapitalization of equip-
ment and facilities. Likewise, timely approval of
Thomas L. McNaugher * The RAND Corporation the emergency non-offset supplemental appropri-
William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. n Joint MilitaryIntelligence College ation for 1999 was key to meeting the unpro-
John J. Mearsheimer a The University of Chicago grammed costs of the Kosovo operation without
having an impact on other programs.
LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) n Hudson Izstitate To sustain this momentum, the President's
James H. Toner s Air War College budget for fiscal year 2001 funds critical service
readiness requirements, supports quality of life
LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) * Harvyard University initiatives, and satisfies the procurement goal set
LtCol James I. Van Zummeren, USMC m Marine Corps War College by the Quadrennial Defense Review of $60 bil-
lion. The budget supports a range of programs
4 JFQ / Spring 2000
Shelton
Soldiers inC iernica, , Requirements Oversight Council are being refined
Kosovo, Joint ....a to accommodate warfighting needs early in the
Guardian. acquisition process. Aggressive experimentation is
underway to furnish better ideas on how to build
the joint force. The Secretary recently designated
-
(cid:127):(cid:127) the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand, as executive agent for this critical process,
' which complements experimentation being con-
ducted by the individual services. The command
will soon begin working with its first integrating
concept-rapid decisive operations-which en-
ables a joint force commander to employ the
proper balance of land, sea, amphibious, air,
space, and information-based capabilities in order
to defeat any enemy.
Keeping Peace in the Balkans
A final issue I brought up with Congress was
force commitments in the Balkans. Although
sporadic violence continues, U.S. and coalition
forces have built a secure environment to sup-
port the civil implementation program. While it
may be necessary to make some minor adjust-
ments to force size in the near term to meet secu-
rity requirements, we must remain wary of shoul-
dering new missions in Kosovo. The current
mission is clear, and any expansion of it would
Srequire approval by the North Atlantic Council.
SBut I am less concerned with mission expansion
than with mission extension. Soldiers are not the
long-term answer to the challenges that the in-
ternational community faces in Kosovo. A lasting
solution requires the accomplishment of a range
of civil, political, and economic tasks, including
aimed at protecting our national interests and establishment of the rule of law, a functioning
forces against terrorism, chemical-biological at- judiciary, and an effective police force. The
tack, and other asymmetric threats. It also funds United Nations and other governmental and
some of the lessons learned from Kosovo, such as nongovernmental agencies must fill the void cre-
forming additional EA-6B electronic attack air- ated by the lack of strong civil institutions. We
craft squadrons, increasing funds for precision must continue to press the international commu-
munitions, and providing more intelligence and nity to meet these challanges.
surveillance capabilities.
Congressional approval is important not I am extraordinarily proud of the work that
only for the annual budget but for added funding our people do on a daily basis in CENTCOM and
to keep readiness levels other regions. To make their task easier, we'll con-
high. Continued prompt tinue to improve TRICARE, maintain readiness,
U.S.action by Congress to and prepare the force for the future. The Armed
wiln s b n w provide emergency non- Forces remain sound and capable of fulfilling
-n
offset funding to replace their role in executing the national military strat-
dollars already obligated egy. With the help of Congress and the adminis-
rapid decisiveoperatiois essential to protect tration, we will guarantee their continued ability
readiness in the latter to do so in the coming years.
half of thins fiscal year
and to avoid actions that would disrupt our capa- HENRY H. SHELTON
bilities and degrade morale in the future. Chairman
I also discussed plans to prepare today's of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
forces to meet tomorrow's threats. For example, a
new joint vision is being developed to meet fu-
ture challenges, and the procedures of the Joint
Spring 2000 / JFQ S
* FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET
LLettt e trs . clearly land-centric-as one would expect, be- strategic attack as a valid and recognized mission
cause itwa s derived from Field Manual 100-5. It normally assigned to joint force air component
THE DOCTRINE DEBATE firmly posits surface commanders and forces as the commanders. The Air Force was recently
focus of joint operations, with airpower ina support designated as lead agency ind eveloping Joint
To the Editor-In his article entitled "The role. Fortunately, Joint Pub 3-0 is under revision, Pub 3-70, StrategicA ttack, the final proof of the
Plight of Joint Doctrine after Kosovo" (JFQ, Summer with unanimous joint support to cast aerospace existence of strategic attack as a doctrinal con-
99), COL Peter Herrly misleads his readers by power in a more balanced perspective, as a capa- struct. Strategic attack is indeed an accepted con-
claiming that joint doctrine is terribly flawed, when bility that can be supported as well as support. cept. The danger of Herrly's article is that ifo ne is
inf act much of it is quite good. He confuses doc- Having objected to the air campaign, Herrly unfamiliar with joint doctrine, his argument ap-
trine and strategy, misinterprets current doctrine, presents an equally off-balance discussion of pears to be factual and buttressed with credible
and impugns the integrity and courage of those strategic attack, which he sees as another less- documentation.
who participated inO peration Allied Force. than-desirable manifestation of airpower theory. He Today strategic attack is not focused on lev-
Herrly profoundly misinterprets the role of has a dated view of this concept, associating it with eling cities or inflicting terror. The Air Force defines
doctrine inf ormulating wartime strategy by assert- Douhet and pre-World War IIn otions of targeting this concept as "operations intended to directly
ing, "Operation Allied Force was inconsistent with the morale of an enemy and breaking its will. Then achieve strategic effects by striking directly at the
joint doctrine in both word and spirit." The purpose he ties the idea to collateral damage. This interpre- enemy's centers of gravity." Herrly asserts that
of doctrine is to describe the best practices drawn tation (inflicting shock and terror on enemy cities) is "advanced technology lessens the odds that
from experience; it informs strategy but is not pre- inconsistent with the current construct. Today strategic attack will work," which is only true ifo ne
scriptive. Strategy applies the tools of statecraft to strategic attack is far more nuanced than the im- presumes that strategic attack is synonymous with
political problems. Int his case, the National Com- precise bludgeoning implied int he article, its original meaning. Advanced technology offers
mand Authorities (NCA) selected a course of action Herrly attempts to ground his objections in unprecedented capabilities to strike centers of
based on an assessment of the risks and limited joint doctrine, but he fails. Like his nitpicking of gravity in urban areas with less concern over ex-
aims of the United States. Ift he details of that strat- the air campaign, he errs inc laiming that Joint cessive collateral damage. Both Desert Storm and
egy are the source of his concern, he should say Pub 3-0 doesn't mention strategic attack: "JFCs Kosovo demonstrated the ability to discretely at-
so. Then his argument could be reduced to matters seek to extend operations throughout the breadth tack key targets in urban areas with acceptable
of cause and effect, or intent and actual results, and depth of the operational area .... Strategic degrees of collateral damage to surrounding facili-
Only then can a discussion of the relevancy of cur- attack and interdiction continue throughout to deny ties and personnel. An acceptable degree is, of
rent doctrine to shaping the planning and execution the enemy sanctuary or freedom of action." The course, relative, but a B-2 releasing one weapon
of strategy take place. fact that it doesn't go into greater depth on strate- against one target is a far cry from several wings
Herrly compounds the confusion by overem- gic attack is understandable; this is a high-level of B-1i7s dropping hundreds of bombs over a wide
phasizing and misinterpreting current doctrine, publication which largely deals with overarching area to destroy one facility.
First, he nitpicks the use of the term air campaign concepts, not nuts and bolts. For that matter, Joint Finally, by belittling the contribution of air-
by the media and some members of the military, Pubs 1 and 3-0 do not explicitly mention most men, Herrly throws out a scurrilous insult to all
when doctrine only refers to a single, overarching other types of missions that may be assigned to warriors. He cites a French general who said:
joint campaign.T his is a nonissue. If air campaign joint forces. That is the role of other joint pubs, "What good are members of an armed force who
is invoked as shorthand to refer to the aerospace several of which discuss strategic attack, foremost are permitted to kill but not to die?" The answer is
portion of an overall joint campaign, rest assured among them Joint Pub 3-56.1, Command and found in a line ascribed to George Patton: "No
that no one int he Air Force is losing sleep over this Control for JointAir Operations.T hey identify dumb bastard ever won a war by dying for his
sloppy use of terminology. More importantly, the country. He won the war by making some other
joint force air component commander understands
that the only mission of joint air is to support the
joint campaign.
That said, Herrly seems to have a different
definition of joint campaign. If lam correct, his in-
terpretation means that every service must be rep-
resented for a force to be called joint. This is the
antithesis of true joint thinking. Joint warfare is not
little league baseball in which each player gets a
turn at bat. Force structure is tailored to handle the
task at hand, not to ensure equity among all possi-
ble participants. If NCA orders an air-only joint cam-
paign, that's the force that one builds. Allied Force
was joint-including Navy and Marine air compo-
nents (in fact, itw as multinational). It was not an Air
Force-only campaign, as Herrly implies. He also
makes a sweeping assertion: "Joint Pub 3-0...
acknowledged that air power was equal to land and
naval power ... "T his claim calls for closer i P s yu r t t E
scrutiny. The current version of Joint Pub 3-0 is n l t mated
- -
6 JFQ / Spring 2000
FROM THE FIELD AND FLEETU
dumb bastard die for his country." Herrly further on the forefront of technological change: they were similar knowledge and skills. Accordingly PME insti-
declares "An obsessive fear of casualties not only not. Rather it was the graduates with their skills to tutions must be changed structurally despite their
robs warfare ot useful tools ... but on a deeper adapt to the unforeseen. The faculty and alumni of unique charters and constituencies.
level strips away its redeeming qualities." IsH errly the Naval War College who developed War Plan Currently war colleges tend to expose stu-
suggesting that American sons and daughters be Orange over decades were able to adjust to the dent bodies to accumulated knowledge and texts.
sacrificed to prove U.S. commitments, or that joint shift from coal to oil propulsion, and from big guns Instead they should resemble modern universities,
commanders always put troops on the front lines to dive bombers. There were many reasons for this where a range of strategic issues are studied in
to keep aerospace power in its place? This point flexibility-but a critical one was that the services depth under tutors who have mastered their sub-
smacks of a suspicion of the morality of using int he interwar years assigned their best and bright- jects. Less time should be spent on core curricula,
aerospace power that recalls turn -of -the-century est to faculty billets. I would rather find senior lead- which can be taught at a distance or more appro-
objections by the Navy to the submarine and the ers advocating top-quality faculty than learning priately at the staff college level, and more on indi-
longstanding antipathy by the Army to the sniper. technologies. vidual research and writing. The adult learning
Both innovations were undeniably effective, yet My second point ist hat senior leaders need model which dominates some colleges should not
they fell outside the norms of symmetrical attrition to set a certain tone if the revolution inP ME ist o take precedence over deeper learning, serious
warfare that ist he hallmark of Western combat. In take root, Its tarts with a consistent, positive waes- analysis, and critical student work.
both cases, traditional -minded officers objected to sage. Some senior visiting lecturers delight in re- War colleges should be an incubator for fu-
what they believed was a less than manly instru- marking "That's the seat I slept in when I was ture leaders by providing the means to transition
ment of war-as if one-on-one combat was the here," "In ever opened a book," "Iw as here on an from the operational to strategic level. Students
only edifying form of military engagement. athletic scholarship," or otherwise minimizing the must throw off the yoke of training and embrace
"The Plight of Joint Doctrine after Kosovo" value of PME. These witticisms get a laugh, but I'm exercises to solve difficult problems. Although cre-
does little to advance the debate on the future of concerned about the sentiment behind them. It ative thinking can be discussed in a classroom,
joint warfare. Instead it perpetuates myths and seems to range from benign neglect to open dis- they must be given serious projects in which cre-
masks the state of existing joint doctrine, which dain. I don't believe the Air Force ist he only service ativity can be supported, guided, and subjected to
does fairly well in describing how the services can suffering from this malady. critical debate. Two initiatives would be most help-
form ac oherent joint team. The real problem isg et- I was most dismayed that the ten conclusions ful: written products that recommend innovative
ting all members of the Armed Forces int he field of the JPME study cited int he article did not make strategies and participation ing aming and simula-
and fleet to use it.T he call by Herrly to revise joint mention of the critical center of gravity: the faculty. tions. The latter must be laboratories for innovation.
doctrine isb ased on basic misinterpretations that Without the actions of service chiefs to put latter- Students should design games that posit various
would have adverse results on jointness. day Ray Spruances on PME faculties and to support scenarios. They should control the play and have
-Col Ronald Dietz, USAF them, all the wonderful advances in cyberspace, access to both regional and functional expertise. In-
Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center net-centric education technology, and distance ternational students can play an effective role in
Maxwell Air Force Base learning will mean very little, unclassified games. Students must be able to wres-
-Richard R.M uller tie and live with their strategic decisions.
WAORD FROM THE Air Command and Staff College JPME should be taken to the next level-in-
SCHOOLHOUSE teragency education. This could fill the gap that
To the Editor-As a faculty member at a pro- To the Editor-The ideas on joint professional prevents real integration of agency perspectives at
fessional military education (PME) institution, I was military education reflected by Richard Chilcoat a critical formative stage, one that occurs before of-
extremely interested to read "The Revolution in (JFQ, Summer 99) are forward-looking and inw ays ficers are actually thrown together int he intera-
Military Education" by Richard Chilcoat int he revolutionary in themselves. Transmitting informa- gency process.
Summer 99 issue of the journal. Although it was fion farther, faster, and on demand will bring JPME Curricular changes would release faculty
gratifying to read such forceful advocacy of JPME, I within reach of everyone and could be career-long, members to pursue their academic interests, which
believe the article missed two critical points, much like professional development ino ther sec- would prevent the problem of dumbing down the
Many discussions of the changing nature of tors. Linkages to foreign institutions should also core curricula so that lust anyone can teach it.
PME are focused immediately on technological de- have payoffs int he long run. More is needed. Crafting defense policies to meet
velopments, Indeed, impressive advancements Capitalizing on technological advances, JPME the threats confronting the United States often en-
such as laptop computers, Internet access, and vir- must also be closely examined int erms of the sub- tails country, language, and ethnic/religious knowl-
tual classrooms have made a great difference in stance of what ist aught, who teaches it and how, edge that only true regional experts possess. Ina d-
educating the Armed Forces, especially given in- and what skills are developed at the war colleges. dition, historical perspective should imbue all levels
creased operational tempo. Yet I am afraid that em- Int his regard, analogies to industry might be help- of teaching and research.
phasis on technological solutions obscures the fact ful, but only to a degree. Ifi t ist rue that int he cor- War colleges must be integrated into the ca-
that education, in particular military education, is porate world rapid access to information can mean reer paths of the services and joint community. In
basically a human undertaking. Without aw ell-de- survival, the movers and shakers in the private sec- addition, standards for military education must be
signed curriculum and dedicated professionals to for are able to anticipate, recognize, and analyze devised that are realistic but that also reflect more
present it,t echnology isa n empty vessel, basic changes int he environment. They also know than simple ticket-punching. Congress performed a
It isc ommendable that Chilcoat begins his how to adapt and when adaptation must give way great service by setting JPME requirements, but it
argument with a journey into history, noting the de- to revolutionary change. Senior officers must have should look more closely at the content of the edu-
cisive contribution that the war colleges and othercainbngofrdtwrclees
institutions made to victory inW orld War 11B.u t this These transformations must take place as
success did not occur because the colleges were part of a serious approach to education. Int urn, this
Spring 2000 / JFQ, 7
0 FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET
requires a renewed emphasis on critical thought Douhetian devotees who believe inv ictory through on old structures and cultural practices. Command
and methods of analysis. Military education must strategic airpower alone can possibly disagree. relationships were numerous, redundant, and verti-
lose its strong emphasis on training. The civilian Ground forces were decisive inP anama and the cal; voice communications drove nodal connectivity;
and military students who attend JPME institutions Persian Gulf, and the tact that Army flag officers the structure for information exchange require-
should be granted their desire for intellectual chal- were inc ommand positions was incidental to their ments was single service in character; systems ar-
lenge and transformation, courses of action. chitecture was overly complex and dependent upon
-John F.G arafano The author's argument isf urther weakened by legacy system technology; the flow and exploitation
Strategic Studies Institute examining more recent cases. The air war inK osovo of information were restricted; and information as-
U.S. Army War College was directed by an Army regional CING and with an- sets were centralized at the highest level. Today's
other Army officer serving as Chairman. Nonethe- culture limits the potential of smart soldiers and
PROVINCIAL, WAHO MIE? less, the torces deployed and manner inw hich they new technology.
Toth Eitr-n Ledeshp ndwere employed were almost exclusively beneficial to The inability to adapt ise specially evident in
PaoctheiEditor-I "Leear9d)SrousmaBn ds hi the Air Force and Navy. More interestingly, both the the military's sustaining of its industrial-age per-
gues that service parochialism continues to influ- Army Chief of Staff and Chairman opposed the re- sonnel system. This institution must be changed
ence senior military decisionmaking despite the quest by the Army CINC for increased involvement first if reforms of other areas such as doctrine,
pasageoftheGolwaer-ichlsAct Alhogh is of Army forces in the conflict. Their reasoned evalu- force structure, and education are to succeed. Cur-
passaentof the Gnoldwate-i chaos b lc .t Alhrtog u hd hi i ation of the situation and the national interest led rent plans for the future Army look too much like
closer look reveals that the author isg uilty of the them to an opposite decision from the one service the Army of today where forces still resemble
same parochialism he ostensibly deplores. Inf act, parochialism dictated. World War 11d ivisions-slow and centralized and
som ofothlt piorpso eodu l icreseThis isn ot to argue that service parochialism not organized for rapid deployability within a joint
someofheaim prpoe souin wudicesdoes not exist. So long as we have separate ser- task force.
pa roh isalism, a e"xmne h raia vices, senior officers will continue to be more Unfortunately, changes in personnel laws and
aBsiho statemthaetohnesi"e xaminesartheesorgnizas comfortable with the forces they grew up with. policies, doctrine, and force structure have taken
tiona ciimpedWimentstoroptmlyre militaryuresptonse However, suggesting that they intentionally choose second place, falling in line behind the adaptation
ioman rcWrihsiilse.t icty truserche sulccumnbist on less than optimal courses of action, at risk to the of new technology. Emerging concepts, which fall
chomosng caerrinopro icy rese rarch:lesc tionsbiasein national interest and the lives of servicemembers, under Force XXI and the Army Affer Next programs,
chooksin case froawmhaicto e derscin Gonlaluwsio s.H isa n allegation requiring more support than the ar- pledge revolutionary changes int he way wars will
trate his thesis that "organizational and individual tidle presents. Similarly, suggesting that stricter ad- be fought, The focus on Europe and defense was
bias still adversely affect force employment." In herence to a service rotation policy int he appoint- eliminated, and the emphasis shitted to jointniess,
biomt clisse sta ht theAry bckrouds ment of Chairmen and unified commanders is a especially Army-Air Force cooperation, and coalition
bofthaes himepagl ies tatdth eairmyn backgrm ounse flawed solution to a problem that does not exist, It warfare, as exemplified by Desert Storm and NATO
ofcth corsegionafI acind Chairmanoled themsi et -vcea would be better to increase joint education for offi- against Serbia. The problem with these brilliant and
the expense of "the best possible defense." cers throughout their careers (as Bash correctly expensive efforts ist hat they will take the Army
The author ignores the possibility that the suggests) and then continue selecting the most down the road to centralization (literally overcontrol)
cboyuPseofealv rmea hve ee th bst qualified officer for the job, regardless of service, if the cultural foundation is not addressed. The ser-
coure favaiabloycrePo wellmsina y iohaovbe jeenthevestA ny other interpretation-like the notion that miii- vice needs a revolution in human affairs, which
one favttatiato accoplirshingnationheAlm dobjcies.no tary leaders are basing their decisions on anything should occur in parallel to advances int echnology.
prove it was not the best available option; to make except what isb est for the Nation-is itself a re- Advanced communications, precision -guided
thtcseoemstdmnsrt ha oel u- flection of service parochialism, munitions, and the greater range and accuracy of
posefully ignored hard evidence that the Army plan -MAJ John A.N agI, USA weapons present a paradox for the Army, While of -
was flawed. The fact that the chiefs of the Navy and U.S. Military Academy fering opportunities for rapid movement and swift
Air Force were unhappy with the final plan ish ardly concentration of superior force, the Army isb ecom-
unbiased evidence. INTO THE LOOKING ing obsessed with technology to the point that
The Desert Storm case similarly uses se- GLASS breakthroughs in weapon systems are unmanage-
lected evidence to support the assertion that Army To the Editor-In "Which Way to the Future?" able and dysfunctional. During the Advanced
officers chose less than optimal force packages (JFQ, Summer 99) by Ian Roxborough and Dana Warfighting Exercise at Fort Irwin in 1997 over 7D
and employment options out of loyalt to service Eyre, it ist he discussion of the failure to embrace Arysteeks teeehnlogyed Iatov id diprect cofothatione
rather than national interest. Bash isp articularly cultural change and not organization (as trike force, Andyt ocntro teheoogte mo atohfd da teirecldo wthfrn aires
perturbed by Schwarzkopf's insistence on the use cylbercorps, constabulary force, and unconven- frdom sensrors and tepreison guiebtlfemdu ithions.
of airpower to support allied ground forces and to tional/special operations force) that lures the sNnorto n ly hasthdec iArmy gonded mntovebordfo
prepare the battlefield for the ground offensive. He reader. The military today has become a complex technonloyi,t hpans foeramd opignew sysemsooare
cites the commander of the 1s Marine Air Wing: adaptive system, seeming to change while main- terriblofylw, dits thecnurr entopaceitg nwillstexperi-
"[Schwarzkopfl was not willing to let any of us go tamning the status quo. An example was the air op- mentbl foruglywd sixthecryeenatr sbeoe ftilleldeing-
off and shoot down airplanes or conduct deep erations war during Allied Force int he Balkans mn o ogl ite er eoefedn
strikes at the cost of preparing that battlefield in when the Army attempted to deploy an ad-ho~c task prmoerntaized crorps. A?wn hda t y loafokf rincsde w uiltx
front of the Army, Marines, and coalition forces." As force to Albania and new technology was imposed perimentationa produe?-barmys imulations arobmuiltte
one member of that force (commander of a tankWa.Wlthssiutontrsaeovrora-
platoon in the First Cavalry Division), I believe that war.Wll thenaisTseim ultin transplateodv ertto rn heal
Schwarzkopf made the right choice and that only wrdseais h ryhspae iiso h
8 JFQ / Spring 2000