DTIC ADA375583: AFA Special Report Shortchanging the Future

33 Pages·1.9 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

AFA SPECIAL REPORT
SHORTCHANGING
THE FUTURE
Air Force Research and Development
Demands Investment
January 2000
Air Force Association
Science and Technology Committee
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
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A Special Report by
The Air Force Association Science and Technology Committee
Chairman Air Force Association National Officers
Gen. Lawrence A. Skantze, USAF (Ret.) Thomas J. McKee, National President
Doyle E. Larson, Chairman of the Board
Committee Members
The Honorable Edward C. Aldridge, Jr. William D. Croom, National Secretary
Dr. Krzysztof Burhardt Charles H. Church, Jr., National Treasurer
Col. James W. Evan, USAP (Ret.)
Air Force Association Staff Support
The Honorable Marty Faga
Writer/Researcher: Michael S. Moore, Chief of Policy
Gen. John Michael Loh, USAF (Ret.) and Research
Gen. Robert T. Marsh, USAF (Ret.) Stephen P. Aubin, Director of Policy and
Communications
Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, USAF (Ret.)
John T. Correll, Editor in Chief, AIR FORCE Magazine
Lt. Gen. George K. Muellner, USAF (Ret.)
John A Shaud, Executive Director
Dr. George A Paulikas
Mr. James M. Sinnen
Maj. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
The Honorable John J. Welch, Jr.
The Air Force Association is an independent, non-profit, civilian aerospace organization
whose objective is to promote greater understanding of the role aerospace power plays in
national defense. AFA is a grass-roots organization with a membership of 150,000. The Air
Force Association was incorporated in the District of Columbia on February 4, 1946.
Air Force Association
1501 Lee Highway
Arlington, VA 22209
Web: www.afa.org
e-mail: [email protected]
Why the Nation Needs Air Force Research fh^ cha^gin9
h e ut u r
Victory in Desert Storm in early 1991 effect by A-10s, F-4G Wdd Weasels
Air Force Research
was not just the result of a punishing 38- and F-l6s. Based on early-1960s re-
and Development
day air campaign, followed by a 100-hour search and development, the Vietnam Demands Investment
ground action. The seeds were sown years vintage Maverick had added infrared
before in investments made in research and guidance in the mid-1980s and was a
development. Desert Storm's dramatic major factor in the A-10s' destruction
military success owed much to systems like of over 4,000 tanks, vehicles and ar-
the E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and tillery.
Control System, E-8A Joint Surveillance
• The AIM-120 Advanced Medium-
Target Attack Radar System, Low-Altitude
Range Air-to-Air Missile had been
Navigation and Targeting Infrared for
"touch and go" through several years
Night, AGM-65 Maverick TV-guided air-
of turbulent development and testing
to-ground missile, AIM-120 Advanced
in the early 1980s. But here in its first
Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile and the
combat, it claimed aerial kills that
F-117 stealth fighter. All of these systems
helped render the Iraqi Air Force in-
were products of research and development
efFectivc.
in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s:
• And most important of all perhaps
• E-3, the Airborne Warning and Con- was the F-l 17 stealth fighter-bomber,
trol System, based on a 1963 require- used to strike targets in Baghdad with
ment, used radar and communications deadly precision through dense Iraqi
concepts tested in the mid-1960s. air defenses. And without a scratch.
Over Iraq, AWACS was essential in es- Its low-observable stealth technologies
tablishing initial air superiority and emerged from research first funded in
coordinating precision air attacks. 1974.
• E-8A, the Joint Surveillance Target
After their victorious use in Desert
Attack Radar System, a prototype then
Storm, and their repeat performance in
being fielded provisionally, provided
Operation Allied Force against Yugosla-
timely coordination of ground and air
via, these systems continue to provide re-
attacks on tactical surface targets.
liable, effective service and will be around
JSTARS originated from the PAVE
for the foreseeable future, but their tech-
MOVER studies of the 1970s.
nology is aging, and the threat to U.S.
• LANTIRN, the Low-Altitude Navi- interests is becoming ever more compli-
gation and Targeting Infrared for cated, leapfrogging into state-of-the-art
Night system, carried as pods on technologies.
F-15E Strike Eagle aircraft, had been
fielded only in the late 1980s after a The Question. Desert Storm proved,
tough, technology-stretching develop- and subsequent conflicts like Kosovo have
ment program beginning in the late confirmed, that technology provides a de-
1970s. At times the program seemed pendable way to counter high-risk threats.
destined to flop, but here at last it pro- The question is whether, when they are
vided the ability to pound surprised needed, those technologies will be available
Iraqi ground forces in bad weather and in the future. Does the U.S. Air Force have
at night. the resources and resolve to create today
the technological solutions that may be
• The AGM-65 Maverick TV-guided
needed in another 20 or 30 years?
air-to-ground missile was used to great
Shortchanging Troubling Trends
the Future
Air Force Research Since the end of the Cold War, fund- men will have to depend on to face threats
and Development
ing for Science and Technology (S&T) has not yet imagined.
Demands Investment
steadily declined. For instance, in constant Unfortunately, in todays budget en-
Fiscal Year 2000 dollars, Air Force S&T vironment, it is clear that the institutional
funding has dropped from $1.77 billion advocacy and planning required to produce
in Fiscal Year 1990 to a projected level of a balanced R&D program are sorely lack-
$1,183 billion by FY 2000. ing. The R&D community is no longer
As a percentage of Air Force Total well positioned to prevail at the highest
Obligational Authority (TOA), the S&T decision levels. Unfortunately, the planning
budget has been as high as 2.3% in FY and program development process does
1993, but it will only be 1.81% for FY not support basic research and develop-
2000, decreasing further to 1.65% by FY ment at the critical funding junctures
2005 (the last year of the FY 2000 Future within the Air Force. And the logic of fu-
Years Defense Program [FYDP]). ture payoff has not prevailed against near-
The Air Force is not alone. The De- term readiness and modernization priori-
partment of Defense as a whole has also ties.
consciously reduced S&T funding in the A critical capability and a real strength
mistaken belief that industry would fill in of the Air Force R&D community used to
the gap. To make things even worse, both be development planning. This was a
the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- strong analytical function that looked at
ministration (NASA) and the Federal Avia- embryonic technologies and created com-
tion Administration (FAA) are also step- pelling technology roadmaps tied to na-
ping away from applied research. tional security projections. These roadmaps
Of all the services, the Air Force has a provided a weapons systems acquisition
unique legacy of high technology vision rationale and brought technologies like
and exploration. Army Air Forces General AWACS and JSTARS to reality. The Air
Henry H. "Hap" Arnold and Dr.Theodore Force must recreate that development plan-
Von Karman set the course at the end of ning function as soon as possible.
World War II. Their challenge created Of equally critical importance is the
structural changes in the Air Force Re- need to educate and nurture a skilled cadre
search and Development (R&D) commu- of Air Force officers in the R&D and the
nity that gave impetus to exploring the S&T community.1 The evolution of Air
technologies that led to ballistic missiles, Force leaders, from their entry into the ser-
launch vehicles, satellites, supersonic flight, vice through graduation from the Air Force
night vision, stealth, precision weapons, Institute of Technology, and then on to
the Airborne Warning and Control Sys- increasing S&T and R&D experience, in-
tem (AWACS), the Joint Surveillance Tar- cluding program management, is the cru-
d1 iNsotitnec ttihoant btheetw aermene dS A(rTa, cwehsi cmha iknev oal vceles ar get Attack Radar System (JSTARS), and cial factor in rebuilding and maintaining
basic research through to technology the Airborne Laser. Air Force R&D. The slowly diminishing
demonstration, and R&D. which goes all the
way to preparation (or operational service Success in technology development number of highly qualified acquisition of-
can take up to 20 years. Without a robust ficers is of great concern.
Air Force R&D program today, there will To begin to reverse these trends, the
be no way to catch up 20 years from now. Air Force should consider creating a high-
What's in the pipeline now is what our air- level annual review of Air Force R&D pro-
Shortchanging
sile [AMRAAM], and the F-117 stealth
grams so that critical issues can be identi-
the Future
fighter) produced from 1960s' R&D
fied and debated at the highest levels dur-
projects were guided through annual con-
ing the decision-making process.
Air Force Research
gressional budget reviews with strong Air
Among the findings of the Air Force and Development
Association Science and Technology Com- Force commitment and advocacy. Pro- Demands Investment
grams like the Global Positioning System
mittee are the following:
(GPS) and improved space satellites had
to be vigorously defended in the congres-
1. Air Force funding of the R&D
budget has declined too far over the past sional arena.
decade and is projected to decrease even
4. Given a decade of declining S&T
more in real terms over the FY 2000 Fu-
budgets, the most promising technologies,
ture Years Defense Program. As Air Force
such as directed energy, miniaturized mu-
investment shrinks, it will be more and
nitions, new electronics countermeasures
more difficult to attract industry invest-
(ECM) techniques, unmanned combat
ment dollars.
aerial vehicles (UCAV), and improved
2. S&T spending by agencies such materials for space power, may not be
ready to be incorporated into Air Force
as the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) and the Ballistic Mis- systems to be fielded through 2020.
sile Defense Organization (BMDO) is no
5. In examining the technology
substitute for a robust Air Force S&T bud-
base, particularly in times of scarce fund-
get. To the extent the Air Force accepts
ing, the argument for "relevance" of the
outside funding, this should be done to
complement its own spending on the Air S&T budget has tended to couple S&T
projects to emerging weapons system pro-
Force's highest priority programs.
grams. This philosophy may weed out
There has been a severe reduction in promising technologies not directly
Air Force-initiated and research-oriented coupled to existing or emerging systems.
Advanced Technology Demonstration Senior Ar Force leaders need to reverse
the S&T funding decline and invest in a
(ATD) projects. The FY 1999 budget has
stable, robust, balanced R&D base that is
$ 130 million to cover 80 ATDs. With the
creation of the more user-focused Ad- not necessarily tied to emerging weapon
vanced Concept Technology Demonstra- system programs but that does include
tion (ACTD) process in DARPA, it is easy long-term S&T investment.
to argue that major ATDs should be pro-
Important technologies, such as
posed and funded by that agency. Al-
hypersonics, have already been eliminated
though Ar Force participation in S&T
for lack of direct weapon system applica-
programs with the other services, as well
tion. Hypersonics briefly flourished un-
as with DARPA and NASA, is vital to the
der the "National Aerospace Plane
overall health of the national aerospace
(NASP)" program, but was immediately
technology base, the Ar Force should also
dropped upon NASP cancellation. When
undertake some major ATDs on its own.
the Air Force or DoD eliminates crucial
technology like hypersonics, industry im-
3. The Desert Storm Air Force sys-
mediately does likewise. Such technology
tems (AWACS, JSTARS, Low-Altitude
base funding focused on the future must
Navigation and Targeting Infrared for
be protected from arbitrary budget cuts.
Night [LANTIRN], Infrared Maverick,
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Mis-
8. The Air Force needs to strengthen
Shortchanging 6. In the last decade, the paucity of
institutionally the role of technology ad-
S&T funding has helped erode traditional
the Future
vocacy within the service. There are too
Air Force technology strengths such as elec-
many bureaucratic processes between the
Air Force Research tronic warfare. Where once the Air Force
and Development was the leader in this area, the Air Force Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), the
Demands Investment major commands (MAJCOMs), Air Force
now depends on the other services.
headquarters, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and Congress that continually
7. Senior Air Force leadership must
dissect and ruminate on the Air Force S&T
tolerate and even embrace failure as an
program submission.
integral part of the technology develop-
ment process. Alongside the successes, like
9. The AFRL strategic plan must re-
AWACS, JSTARS, LANTIRN,
flea a balance of MAJCOM interests, as
AMRAAM, IRMaverick, and F-l 17, that
well as promising exploratory technology
emerged from 1960s' R&D were many
and significant Advanced Technology
technology projects that failed. This is akin
Demonstrators (ATDs) not direcdy tied to
to the bid and proposal process, where
current weapon systems. The strategic plan
50% is a pretty good win rate.
should also take into account foreign tech-
nology activities, particularly those of our
allies.
Shortchanging
The Future Threat
the Future
Repeated studies have confirmed that Force Research Laboratory basic re-
Air Force Research
for America to mobilize all its military ser- search project in 1976, but was not
and Development
vices swiftly in coordinated action against successful until 1979, when it was Demands Investment
future threats — and to succeed in future moved into development. Jitter algo-
high-priority missions with minimal casu- rithms that went into the ABL project
alties — depends on steady investment in grew from a basic Air Force Office of
science and technology.2 So what is the fu- Scientific Research (AFOSR) project. Committee for National Security of the
National Science and Technology Council.
ture threat, and do we have technologies Development work continues, but National Security Science and Technology
Strategy. Washington DC. 1995. p.ii.
in development now to counter it? Perhaps funding is now relatively stable, and
3 naniPi ftmiri» tern Air and Snace Power in
this can best be determined by looking at this program is on schedule. Prelimi- the New Millennium. CSIS. Washington
DC.1997.
three periods covering the next 25 years. nary design review was completed in
Committee for National Security, op. cit.,
February 1999.
p.26.
Near Term (2000-2010). The DoD's
Quadrennial Defense Review (OJDR) en- • The Space-Based Infrared System
visaged a threat from "robust regional ad- (SBIRS) comprises constellations of
versaries" early in the 21st Century and satellites in high and low orbits to pro-
from "heavily-armed theater-level 'peer' vide theater forces with improved de-
competitors or major powers" by about tection and warning of missile
2014. These potential adversaries are now launches. Initial operational capabil-
acquiring threatening high technology in ity (IOC) for the high orbit system is
the areas of targeting, weapons of mass 2003, and for the low orbit counter-
destruction (WMD), long-range delivery pan, 2006. SBIRS uses staring infra-
systems (theater ballistic missiles [TBMs] red (IR) detection technologies in de-
and cruise missiles), and airborne OISR velopment since the 1970s. Funding
(meaning "command, control, communi- for this effort has been assured over
cations, computers, intelligence, surveil- the coming Future Years Defense Pro-
lance and reconnaissance").3 It has been gram, but other R&D has been de-
noted that "some 20 nations have or are creased as a result.
seeking weapons of mass destruction, and
many are also seeking the missiles to de- • The F-22, to be deployed initially in
liver them," while "a wide range of nations 2005, depends on 1980s research into
have significant conventional arsenals that supercruise, supermaneuver, Ad-
could pose threats to regional security."4 vanced Fighter Technology Integra-
To counter these threats through 2010, tion (including digital flight control)
the Air Force will put into the field sys- and "supercockpit" research. This
tems which are products of R&D from the next-generation fighter is now in the
1970s through the 1990s: engineering-manufacturing develop-
ment stage, with a funding cap im-
• The Airborne Laser (ABL), to be op- posed by Congress.
erational in 2007, grew out of projects
beginning in the 1970s, like Project • The Joint Strike Fighter, with a pro-
DELTA, the Field Test Telescope, the jected initial operational capability in
Airborne Laser Laboratory, adaptive 2008, uses 1980s research in short
optics, the chemical oxygen-iodine la- takeoff and landing, materials and
ser (COIL), and jitter algorithms. stealth. It is now in the concept defi-
COIL was funded as an internal Air nition phase.
Shortchanging • For joint suppression of enemy air Technical Objectives (DTOs)10 had no
the Future defense (JSEAD) in 2010, unattended space goals in 1998, but the Air Force in-
sisted on space being included in the 1999
ground sensors are under develop-
Air Force Research ment, to be tied to a "robust" OISR objectives. Space will be allocated some
and Development 20% more of Air Force total obligational
system, including a dynamic control-
Demands Investment authority over the next 20 years at the ex-
ler to manage lethal and nonlethal at-
pense of other programs. Space activities
tacks in real time. The ground sen-
will center on:
sors, equipped with Global Position-
1 William S. Cohen, Annual Peonrttothe ing System (GPS) links, will operate
P-psident and the Congress. Washington • Global information management: cre-
from precisely-known locations and
CC. 1999. p. 136.
ating a pervasive network of nodes fa-
provide "highly reliable" data on tar-
" Philip A. Odeen. chairman. Transforming
P-e'ense- National Security in me 21 gets in their vicinity. The dynamic cilitating intelligent information gath-
Century. Report ol me Naoonal Defense
ering, processing, analyzing and advis-
Panel. Arlington VA. December 1997. p.iii. controller will deconflict lethal and
ing. Information "superiority" requires
' William S. Cohen. Annual aenorttothe nonlethal attacks, maintain an inte-
President and me Coneress. DoD. "a robust muldsensor information grid
Washington DC. 1998. 0.117. grated electronic order of battle
(EOB), and retask assets as needed.5 providing dominant awareness of the
' ibid. p. 142; Joint Vision 2010. published in
1997, is a pivotal document describing the battle space to U.S. commanders and
future concepts and capabilities required
forces" and "a sensor-to-shooter grid
for U.S. military forces. Mid-term (2010-2020). As one re-
to enable dynamic targeting and cue-
* Odeen, op. cit., p.iii. viewing panel noted, "legacy systems pro-
" DTOs identify specific technological cured today will be at risk in 2010-2020."6 ing of precision-guided weapons, co-
areas to be developed or demonstrated operative engagement, integrated air
They are listed and defined in the Defense Defense Secretary William S. Cohen de-
Technology Area Plan. defense, and rapid battle damage as-
clared in his report to Congress on the FY
" Cohen. 199« Annual Report, op cit. p. 1999 budget that the United States needs sessment and re-strike."
116. p. 140; DaAStar was subsequently
canceled. to "respond to the full range of military
• Sensors. "Future sensor grids will fea-
challenges throughout the next 20 years"
ture a variety of new imaging and sig-
in a "highly dynamic" security environ-
nals intelligence sensors, currendy in
ment. This requires "extensive experimen- advanced stages of development, de-
tation both to understand the potential
ployed abroad in Global Hawk,
contributions of emerging technologies DarkStar, and Predator unmanned
and to develop innovative operational con- aerial vehicles (UAVs), as well as new
cepts to harness these new technologies."7 space-based sensor grids, like the high
This research is needed because "U.S. tech- and low-orbit elements of the Space-
nological superiority is essential to achieve
Based Infrared System (SBIRS).""
the full spectrum dominance envisioned
by Toint Vision 2010."8 • CISR will be integrated across systems
to maximize warfighters' view of the
Air Force systems fielded by 2020 to
battle space, but in this mid-term pe-
operate in this environment will be prod-
riod there still will be disconnects be-
ucts of S&T projects initiated in the 1990s
tween incompatible systems. It could
and the first part of the next century. As
cost $ 1-2 billion per year to make sys-
one analyst noted in 1997, "Joint Vision
tems talk to each other. Requirements
2010 and the visions of the services con-
for this integration are now being writ-
tain many of the capabilities we need in
ten. Investment is projected to be $ 100
the future. However, the procurement
billion over the next 20 years.
budgets of the services are focused prima-
rily on current systems and do not ad-
► Information Warfare/Information
equately support the central thrust of their
visions."9 Trying to reach the Air Force vi- Operations (IW/IO). Potential adver-
saries will have access to sophisticated
sion has already caused some budgetary
commercial communications systems,
discomfort. For example, the Defense
will be aware of U.S. dependence on • Global area strike system: this may in- Shortchanging
information dominance, and will act volve a transatmospheric vehicle in- the Future
accordingly through asymmetrical re- tegrated with high-energy laser and
sponses like jamming and hacking. In- kinetic energy weapons or an ex- Air Force Research
and Development
formation operations to counter them tended range strike aircraft using hy-
Demands Investment
must integrate deception, software, personic standoff weapons. Standoff
doctrine and tactics. warfare is now receiving a lot of work
because of opponents' probable use
Long-term (2020 and beyond). As- ofWMD to create exclusionary zones. 2025 Support Office. 2025:Executive
Summary. Air University Press, Maxwell Af 3.
sessing the potential enemy over 20 years August 1996. p. 34. Also see Appendix A of
this report (Of a list of AFOSR technology
in the future is a difficult, risky endeavor. • Uninhabited combat air vehicle: an
objectives.
As an Air Force planner noted recendy, the unmanned long-endurance vehicle
" Or. Hans Mark. Director of Defense
future is "not linear: it is chaotic." Even integrated with multispectral sensors Research and Engineering, recently
questioned whether there is in fact a military
lacking a clear definition of the opposition, and precision-guided standoff muni- requirement for SBL
the following technologies have been iden- tions.
tified as needed for the year 2025 and be-
yond12: • Space-based Laser (SBL) system: a
space-based multimegawatt, multi-
• Sanctuary base: for field deployment, mode high-energy chemical laser con-
a secure, low-observable, all-weather stellation. SBL R&D studies began
forward operating base with highly under the Strategic Defense Initiative
automated base security and support. in the late 1970s.13
Because of worldwide terrorism, there
will be no other sanctuary, and all • Solar-powered high-energy laser sys-
sites—even in the United States— tem: same as above, but solar-pow-
must be protected. ered.
• Global surveillance, reconnaissance • Attack microbots: a class of highly
and targeting system: a space-based, miniaturized robotic systems capable
multisensorial collection, processing of mass deployment and having wide
and dissemination real-time database. potential for innovative uses.
UAVs are part of this C4ISR effort.
This marks a further integration of the The DoD's S&T vision for this pe-
field global information management riod is spelled out in documents such as
architecture. the Basic Research Plan, giving investment
strategy for "six particularly promising
• Piloted single-stage-to-orbit transat- technologies: biomimetics [materials that
mospheric vehicle: a vertical takeoff mimic living cells and tissues],
rocket and hypersonic air-breathing nanoscience [the study of processes and
vehicle that could provide space sup- devices at the atomic level], smart struc-
port and global reach from the earth's tures, mobile wireless communications,
surface to low earth orbit using a com- intelligent systems, and compact power
bination of rocket and hypersonic air- sources."
breathing technology and then be able
to land on conventional runways.
Shortchanging Ten basic research areas are high- • Rapid global mobility
the Future lighted for further concentration:
• Precision engagement
1) atmospheric and space sciences
• Information superiority
Air Forc8 Research
and Development 2) biological sciences • Agile combat support
Demands Investment 3) chemistry
• Global battlespace awareness
4) cognitive and neural sciences
5) electronics To sum up, the future threat presents
both uncertainty and opportunity; it
6) materials science
requires an Air Force with the tech-
7) mathematics and computer sci-
nologies to respond flexibly and deci-
ences
sively to a wide range of threats. The
8) mechanics question then becomes whether the
9) terrestrial and ocean sciences Air Force today has the S&T and
R&D capabilities in place, together
10) physics
with the appropriate commitment rep-
resented through budgetary funding
This technology emphasis is based on
plans, to make available to the
the Air Forces core competencies:
warfighter after 2020 those technolo-
• Air and space superiority
gies that will be needed.