DTIC ADA371923: International Cooperative Research and Development Programs

34 Pages·2.4 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

LESSONS LEARNED
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS
Neal Pollock
From a review of the literature and more than 30 interviews from those who
work on International Cooperative Research and Development Programs
comes a wealth of theoretical and practical advice on how to help these
often logistically, politically, and economically complex projects succeed.
jefore undertaking an international factors relevant to ICRADs. With the
^cooperative research and develop- addition of the author, the interviewees had
'm: ent program (ICRAD), where does more than 400 years of international
a program manager go to find guidance on experience out of a total of more than 800
what to do and what to avoid doing? There years of overall work and acquisition
is a dearth of published data in this area, experience; this is an average of more than
although some unpublished documents 12 years international and 24 years over-
created for internal use do exist. all experience per person. Most of this
The study described here set out to experience was with North Atlantic Treaty
answer that question. It consisted of Organization (NATO) programs.
research of the available literature as well While the data is anecdotal, a large
as interviews with 32 people from the enough sampling was sought to provide a
Defense Department, industry, and foreign comprehensive overview. The research
military departments who work on objective was to elicit frank comments and
ICRADs (defined as programs developed suggestions from experienced people that
cooperatively by two or more nations in can be used by others to establish and
which the design or technical effort and implement current and future ICRADs. All
the costs are shared by those nations). The interviewees were guaranteed anonymity
aim was to obtain a cross-section of (and unattributed quotes in this article are
perspectives and cover a full range of from interviewees).
217
DTTC Q04JJTTINSPECTED 3
Acquisition Review Quarterly—Summer 1999
WHY COOPERATE? allies." For instance, the Navy reports a
trend toward increased cooperation during
The Report of the Quadrennial Defense the past decade (Figure 1) (Navy Interna-
Review (Cohen, 1997) states that "we as tional Programs Office [NIPO], 1997). To
a nation must often act in concert with the trend toward coalition warfare, Abbott
others to create our preferred international (1997) adds the advantages of standard-
conditions and secure our basic national ization, interoperability, common logistics,
goals. .. .Therefore, it is imperative that and the reduced defense budget as reasons
the United States strives to build close, for a greater mandate for cooperation.
cooperative relations with the world's The decreasing budget has resulted in
most influential countries." Furthermore, a steady decline in government research
"To maintain this superiority, we must and development (R&D) expenditures
achieve a new level of proficiency in our relative to industry (NIPO, 1997). The
ability to conduct joint and combined State Department points out that "the
operations...The RBA [Revolution in perception that we are withdrawing
Business Affairs] includes...increasing physically and psychologically under-
cooperative development programs with cuts Germany's essential interest in our
Cooperative Programs/MOU Foreign Contributions (Cost Savings)
Cooperative R&D International Agreements
700
461.36
' NATO Evolved Sea Sparrow
Missile (ESSM)
600 ' Joint Advanced Strike NATO Link 11
Technology (JAST) MoU/PA Rolling Airframe Missile
(Joint Program) (RAM) Block 1
500 JSF Requirements
Validation (Joint
Multifunction Information Distribution System Program)
£ 400 MIDS Engineering and Manufacturing ... ._ HARM
Development Job.l^ Upgrade
> Intercooled Recuperated (ICR) Gas Turbine (12) • JSF PWSC
300 Engine w/U.K. > Refinement
MOU (Joint
202.60 Program)
200
(10)
99.50
100
(5)
38.00 (12)
I (8) I
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Calendar Year
| = Joint Program I I = DoN Collaborative Effort Trends ( ) = Number of Agreements
Total Foreign Contributions CY1990-1998: $1867.62 Million
Source: Navy International Programs Office (1997). As of October 13,1998
Figure 1. D of the Navy Collaborative Effort Trends
218
International Cooperative Research and Development Programs
security relationship, which allows it to as the U.S. defense industry consolidates
pursue a pan-European agenda without through mergers and acquisitions (Dalton,
appearing to threaten the rest of Europe. 1997) (Figure 2 [Abbott, 1997]). Thus,
It also undercuts our interest in moving Department of Defense Directive (DoDD)
the bilateral relationship in directions that 5000, Joint Vision 2010 (Shalikashuili,
will positively affect outcomes in and be- 1997), and the National Military Strategy
yond Europe" (Jones, 1997). Technologi- of the U.S.A. (Shalikashuili, 1997) all lend
cally, information warfare, operations considerable support to ICRADs. In the
other than war (OOTW), and the global words of one foreign interviewee,
simulation network present unique chal- "America is a European power."
lenges best met globally, in concert with
our friends and allies. Politically, ICRADs
promote allied industrial bases, help al- WHY NOT?
lies defend themselves, and strengthen
coalitions to forestall the establishment of Cooperation has had "more starts than
"Fortress Europe" and "Fortress America." finishes" (Abbott, 1997), leading to pres-
As President Bill Clinton (1997) observed, sure for pan-European versus transatlan-
"the United States squandered Allied vic- tic cooperation (D'Agostino, 1996). While
tory in World War I when it embraced iso- many reasons for failure have been cited
lationism." In today's global economy, (e.g., program selection, poor timing, lack
commercial international programs are im of training), many Americans perceive that
r
portant to America's well-being, especially the U.S. system is highly problematic
250.
200-
150.
Total
100- Industry
Government
50.
Source: Defense Budget Project (1995).
Figure 2. Growth in Industry-Led International Cooperation
219
Acquisition Review Quarterly—Summer 1999
(Kwatnoski, 1995) and that ICRADs add R&D, coproduction, and operations and
risk to program managers without com- support thus far. DoDD 5000.1 (1996), the
pensatory advantages (Deputy Under Sec- acquisition "Bible," lists cooperation sec-
retary of Defense for International and ond (after purely commercial products and
Commercial Programs, orDUSD[I&CP], above joint programs) in its ordered hier-
1997). Of course, these reasons do not archy of materiel alternatives. In addition,
address the nonrational or irrational effects DoD sponsors numerous other programs
of "not invented here," xenophobia, and (such as a data exchange annex, or DEA)
cultural differences. that could, in theory, develop into
ICRADs.
In the past, however, programs chosen
HISTORY as ICRADs tended to be noncritical, low
priority, poorly funded ones. Nunn funds
The DoD Authorization Act of 1986 would be used to cover startup costs for
initiated the NATO Cooperative R&D programs that did not make Service fund-
Program to promote more equitable shar- ing lists, and they could easily die when
ing of NATO the Nunn funds ran out. International com-
conventional re- mitments that did not (in the Service's
"Because of ICRADs' ch and de- opinion) critically support war fighting
sear
poor trade record; velopment costs requirements lost out in competitive Ser-
the Services didn't . r
want to cooperate, via ^operative vice program objectives memorandums
creating a self- projects. Con- (POMs). In other words, tactical support
fiifilling prophecy" gress believed to marginal or fringe programs was insuf-
that the Warsaw ficient to ensure their continuity when
Pact was more unsupported at the operational level. Even
cost effective than NATO due to lack of "strategic" generic support to ICRADs by
NATO cooperation (General Accounting the DUSD(I&CP) could only save a few
Office, 1990). Congress appropriated select projects (the fate of one of these,
"Nunn funds." Proposed by Senator Sam the mobile extended air defense system,
Nunn, "Nunn" funds are annually bud- or MEADS, is still in question). In addi-
geted by Congress as a special fund (in tion, entrenched bureaucracies, with their
four sub-accounts for the three services own agendas, made no concessions to
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense ICRADs versus domestic projects despite
[OSD]) to be used as seed money to begin ICRADs' inherent, added administrative
ICRADS. These funds can only be spent burdens (e.g., memorandum of under-
in the United States. Congress later added standing [MOU] development and nego-
five non-NATO nations (Australia, Egypt, tiation). To top it off, the bureaucracy
Israel, Japan, and South Korea, later "moves with the speed of a dead snail."
followed by two more, Argentina and While larger programs are required to
Jordan). Similarly, legislative relief (but submit a Cooperative Opportunities
not funds) was provided for cooperative Document, this generally has consisted
production projects. Nevertheless, no co- of "the 47 reasons why they didn't be-
operative program has proceeded through come cooperative." Because of ICRADs'
220
International Cooperative Research and Development Programs
poor track record, the Services didn't want as well as those of NATO (used here to
to cooperate, creating a self-fulfilling proph- include the additional five nations—the
ecy. Since cooperative programs are more seven Nunn nations plus Sweden—with
difficult and complex, they have a lower whom Congress has specifically autho-
probability of success. Certainly they have rized ICRADs). Of course, multiservice
more players with the resulting exponential requirements can add a broader support
increase in communications links. Accord- base. Technologies in which our allies can
ing to the Law of Requisite Variety, the make more significant contributions
problem and (solution) environments need through extant knowledge or mutual use
to have the same level of complexity. Ad- (such as mine warfare, interoperability, or
ditional resources are required to handle increased competition base) are highly
increased ambiguity. According to Jacobs advantageous prospects. Evolving techno-
and Jacques (1986), an integrative, colle- logical needs such as coalition OOTW are
gia^ nonlinear, nonrational, open systems also prime candidates.
approach is required under conditions of One needs to "service the circuit" for
increasing uncertainty. Such an approach possibilities and opportunities for coop-
is inherently nonbureaucratic. eration. Unfortunately, the Services are not
organized alike. For instance, one Service
splits up authority by type of equipment,
GETTING STARTED making it difficult to coordinate with other
Services or nations that use centralized
As with any analysis of alternatives, systems. The Services were not designed
both incentives and disincentives must be with international cooperation in mind. Of
considered. The best candidate ICRADs course, it's a waste of time to start a pro-
propose to satisfy Service operational gram with no compelling U.S. need
requirements (commander-in-chief needs) (e.g., the success of the multifunctional
TheF/A-18
Official DoD photo.
221
Acquisition Review Quarterly—Summer 1999
information distribution system [MIDS] communications and data sharing (easier
was due to the F/A-18's need for it). It to initiate under a DEA than under an
should be in the POM, or potentially so, MOU). While some say that "the best ones
in its own right. bubble up in a lab, while the weakest ones
ICRADs save scarce U.S. R&D funds, are top-down directed," others stress the
but they also take longer. In essence, the need for buy-in from both the requirements
United States trades time for allied funds. and acquisition communities.
The program in question must be able to
withstand the added time required. Thus,
the present International Cooperative RELATIONS WITH HIGHER AUTHORITIES
Opportunities Group (ICOG) effort is
aimed at very early stages of development; The difficulties of introducing major
"gleam in the eye" timing. Unfortunately, change into a large bureaucracy are legion:
in an era of declining budgets, this limits You can't turn an aircraft carrier in a 10-
opportunities for larger (ACAT [acquisi- foot circle. A change agent must address
tion category] I or II) efforts. "Adapting the psychological turn radius; people
cooperation to operate under psychological laws rather
an existing pro- than the laws of physics (Pritchett, 1993).
"The dffioJties of
gram is doing it Thus, a purely top-down approach rarely
introducing major
»an, toa large backwards,"and works—when it seems to work, it gener-
bureaucracy are lt results m ally doesn't last long (only till the driving
legjon..-" disasters. Also, force leaves). There is a long list of blue
the timing of ribbon panel reports and DoD initiatives
the project must one can review at leisure; the successful
be matched for the nations involved; re- change they have accomplished, however,
quired fielding dates must be comparable. makes for a quick read indeed.
Joint programs have similar challenges. Some evolutions have better chances for
Time can be saved and many problems success. The recent introduction of acqui-
ameliorated if a program is built upon prior sition reform may be one, particularly
efforts. A data exchange annex (DEA), an because of its emphasis on customers and
annex on a particular technical area to a stakeholders and its practical method of
master data exchange agreement between integrated product teams (IPTs). Thus,
the United States and another nation, acquisition reform can be instrumental in
which allows for the international resolving differences in requirements and
exchange of scientific and technical perspectives, such as harmonizing joint
information among scientists and requirements for the advanced concept
engineers, can serve as a springboard to technology demonstration project to
a successful ICRAD. So can Engineer and "translate" messages between the U.S.
Scientist Exchange Program experiences Army and U.S. Marine Corps variable
(Trimarran is one—a Navy ship develop- message format, and the U.S. Air Force
ment program) (Kwatnoski, 1995). and U.S. Navy Link 16 data transmission
Indeed, it may be valuable to continue a system. The four Services met and devised
DEA during an ICRAD to facilitate (with some difficulty) an initial set of
222
International Cooperative Research and Development Programs
messages to be so "translated." Similar Staff (JCS), the commanders in chief, and
efforts are under way for ICRADs (e.g., Service requirements personnel establish
ICOGs). Of course, multinational pro- the out-year needs to be cooperatively met.
grams with European partners have his- At present, JCS support seems lukewarm
torically used steering committees to reach and the commanders in chief have
mutually acceptable agreements address- evidently not been players at all.
ing problems and opportunities. The Stating a need for cooperative programs
lesson to be learned is that stakeholders and coalition warfare in the National Mili-
tend to buy in when they were part of the tary Strategy of the U.S.A. (Shalikashuiti,
decision and party to the process. 1997) and Joint Vision 2010 (Shalikashuili,
Correspondingly, total quality manage- 1997) is not comparable to active support
ment/leadership (TQM/TQL) has failed, by the Atlantic Commander or Supreme
at least in some commands, because not (NATO) Commander, Atlantic. The Atlan-
all levels of management bought into it. tic Commander and European Command
In a particular systems command, for (a U.S. commander in chief), with vested
instance, the commanding officer pushed interests in NATO coalition warfare, are
it, and many workers bought in and joined prime candidates for support. Larger pro-
numerous process action teams. While grams need early, high-level endorsement.
some improvements were implemented, MIDS, for instance, benefited substan-
TQL never entered the culture because tially from strong USD(A&T) support. In
mid-level management never accepted it. addition, as the
Leaving primary stakeholders out of the U.S. national
process inhibits its effectiveness and lon- armaments "Ensuing that the
gevity. The ultimate success of ICOGs and director, he is ««^**«" *
maintainable and
ICRADs depends on across-the-board positioned to in-
sifaportable systems
acceptance from all major players at vari- fluence high-
is the goal of LT&E."
ous levels within DoD. The Quadrennial level Europeans
Defense Review's creation of an interna- to open doors,
tional cooperative task force or the creation leading to fruitful lower level contacts
of the Armaments Cooperation Steering between nations.
Committee will not, in and of itself, But, OSD/JCS support has not guaran-
accomplish any more than the cooperative teed success. MEADS, for instance, has
opportunities documents. barely survived despite Congressional and
The fact that Jacques Gansler, who OSD support. A truly successful program
chaired the Defense Science Board study needs a solid Service requirement to be
(1996), has become Under Secretary of an unqualified success. MIDS has
Defense (Acquisition and Technology) succeeded (despite the U.S. Air Force
(USD[A&T]) appears to be a good sign pull-out early in the program) only
for both acquisition reform and coopera- because of the F/A-18's need for it. With
tion. As Pritchett (1993) emphasizes, top- the eventual phaseout of the F-14, the F/
level support is essential for culture A-18 will be a carrier's only fighter and
change. This includes top-level require- attack aircraft. Nothing beats a real need.
ments people as well. The Joint Chiefs of Thus, ICOGs emphasize primary versus
223
acquisition Review Quarterly—Summer 1999
marginal requirements for new ICRADs. benefits to the Services must be high-
Groups such as the Navy's Requirements lighted to avoid future Service funding cuts.
and Resources Review Board (advising Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) sup-
the Chief of Naval Operations on POMs) port is essential for any program, but since
should be tied into the ICRAD develop- MOUs can be political footballs (with
ment process. politics overriding business sense), Ser-
Of course, a joint, cooperative program, vice support (both requirements and ac-
while more complex, provides additional, quisition) is quintessential for ICRADs.
potential advocates for the program and In addition, MDA-granted waivers should
identifies parallel requirements. Should be achieved prior to signing an MOU.
some end, the program may still survive True success, however, may depend on
(as did MDDS). Such programs may also getting policy, requirements, and acquisi-
receive additional OSD support and fund- tion to gel, simultaneously incentivized for
ing. Since the DoD infrastructure "tends success. Then partnerships of "yes-sayers"
to ignore MOUs," it's important to "get can check the usual herds of naysayers.
the Three Stars involved in the process Figure 3 depicts a force-field analysis in
before the MOU is signed." Since Service which to prioritize efforts to enlist stake-
priorities are often the opposite of the holder support, considering their initial
DoDD 5000 priority list, cooperative position regarding ICRADs and their
Influence
High
x- ------ -
X
II
Low II
0
Valence
Figu-e 3. Stakeholder Faroe-Field Analysis
224
International Cooperative Research and Development Programs
influence level. The "X" with the arrow is Prospective participants must have a
a stakeholder with high influence and common need, not only of technical
slightly negative valence—slightly opposed specifications, but also of need dates, and
to a cooperative proposal—presenting the acceptable system maturity and risk.
best cost-benefit ratio for one's efforts to While interfaces and protocols are prior-
gain support for a cooperative approach. ity issues, platform integration should be
With trust always a major issue, per- excluded from common efforts. The goal
sonal contacts are important and effective, is a set of mutually acceptable, fully har-
since "familiarity breeds credibility." In- monized and rationalized, functional
ternational Overarching IPTs (OIPTs) performance specifications versus a target
must be extended to ICRADs and could equipment design.
include appropriate State and Commerce As much acquisition reform as possible
department members. It's better than should be incorporated (e.g., commercial
"going to war with the State Department." specifications or NATO standardization
agreements versus mil-specs or stan-
dards). While commercialization is new
DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS to some countries, most are familiar with
ISO 9000/1, a usable base-line for the
A cooperative requirements phase is introduction of commercial parts and
absolutely necessary before beginning specifications.
development or signing an MOU. In ad- Successful harmonization depends on
dition, a solid Service(s) mission need securing a proactive advocate for coop-
should be well established before negoti- eration and sensitivity to foreign partners'
ating cooperative requirements. A signed perspectives and concerns.
operational requirements document
(ORD) (with Joint Requirements and • "Don't try to force things down
Oversight Council and Joint Requirements NATO's throat." It is wise to use writ-
Board support) and threat assessment are ten definitions, consistent terminology,
highly recommended as well. A NATO and sensitivity analyses to refine
staff requirement or Military Operational requirements and avoid gold plating.
Requirement can also be quite valuable.
Optimally, the program can be linked to • "Clarity, stability, and mutual under-
commander-in-chief regional strategies, standing of project requirements were
Joint Vision 2010 (Shalikashvili, 1997), considered to be of paramount impor-
the National Military Strategy of the tance" (Kwatnoski, 1995). Explain and
U.S.A. (Shalikashuili, 1997), the DoD persuade; "I need it" doesn't work.
international strategic plan, and especially,
Systems Command and program execu- • "The perception of the threat varies
tive office business plans and budgets. from nation to nation" (Defense
More specifically, the planning horizon Science Board, 1996). While the
must be appropriate, allowing enough United States targets the entire world
time for MOU negotiations as well as environment including extreme
international program development. climates (Fair, 1985), Europeans have
225
Acquisition Review Quarterly—Summer 1999
narrower environmental requirements. that eventually the acquisition program
Furthermore, the United States tends baseline will contain these as well as cost
to undertake riskier programs, and part- as an independent variable, schedule, tech-
ners often differ greatly in technical nical, and other requirements. When
capacity. examining the issues to determine the hard
spots, look for unknown disagreements
• Don't try "too hard to look for one so- ("what we don't know that we don't
lution to satisfy all requirements" know," ä la the Johari Window [Mink,
(Business Week, 1997). "[Since] you Schultz, and Mink, 1979]) as well as
can't give orders to other countries, "conflicts of agreement" (Harvey, 1988).
avoid a dictatorial approach, get con- It's better to identify problems early ("pay
sensus." Be aware of nationalism, me now or pay me later").
sovereignty issues, and personal pride. It's easier to do one issue at a time.
Historically, many problems arise because
The fight for commonality is a long of a lack of understanding. Simplify the
process. While "there's a lot of advantages problem in a "horsy-ducky way"—when
in being the biggest and the best," a flex- you see it, you understand it. Perceptions
ible approach is likely to have the most are important; they define reality. Don't
success, espe- confuse nonrational approaches with
cially consider- irrational ones. Different nations have
" Wien walking differences different Myers-Briggs personality type
ing
tnrougn tne issues j i g ge
n an Ua 5 indicator preferences (Pollock, 1995), and
to deterrrine the
approach problems and solutions differ-
hard spots, look Perspectives,
for unknown and terminol- ently. It helps to sincerely try to understand
dsaareerrents..-'' °^- KeeP the why a nation wants a particular require-
team focused ment. "Ninety percent of problems vanished
on identifying once they were understood; get outside
similarities and differences; avoid getting experts for the other 10 percent." Mitre,
sidetracked by support functions and for instance, was quite helpful in resolv-
specialist views. Only a generalist ing problems, and some other countries
approach is appropriate for trading off also have federally funded R&D centers.
amongst specialty desires or needs. Some of the overall cost savings of
Since costs must be evaluated against cooperative programs go toward delivery
requirements, prioritization is essential. of certain requirements that particular
Operating and acquisition community nations don't need. The prime rule of
views must both be considered in order to systems engineering is: "Optimizing the
achieve a program that adequately whole de-optimizes the parts; optimizing
satisfies common needs but is also a the parts de-optimizes the whole." Work
"doable do" as far as implementation. to optimize the whole.
Understanding the cost impact of specific Enthusiastic discussions and brain-
requirements often greatly facilitates reso- storming are ideal, but avoid heated argu-
lution of differences. Goals versus thresh- ments. One may have to resort to higher
olds can be useful, especially considering level leadership to get unstuck. Project
226