DTIC ADA350172: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1951-1953, Volume III, The Korean War: Part Two,

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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy
1951-1953
The Korean War
Part Two
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History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
and National Policy
Volume III
1951-1953
The Korean War
Part Two
James F. Schnabel
Robert J. Watson
Office of Joint History
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC, 1998
The Library of Congress has catalogued volume 5 as follows:
Watson, Robert J., 1920—
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954
(History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff/Robert J. Watson; v. 5)
Includes index.
1. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff—History 2. United
States—Military policy. I. Title. II. Series: Watson, Robert J.,
1920— . History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 5.
UA23.W366 1986 355.3'3042'0973 86-4621
Foreword
Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strate-
gic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners,
have played a significant role in the development of national policy Knowledge
of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secre-
tary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of
their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of
crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history
of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an
official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for
the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source
of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.
The series, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, treats the activities of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War II. Because of the nature of the
activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the
volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification
designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classi-
fied volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, cov-
ering the years 1945 to 1952 and the Korean war, were distributed in unclassified
form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the Na-
tional Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made
available as official publications.
Volume III describes the participation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Korean
War; their other activities during the period are covered in Volume IV, except for
activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. This vol-
ume was originally planned by Mr. Wilber W Hoare, who developed an outline
and drafted six of the first seven chapters. Following a lapse of some years, these
drafts were revised and expanded by Dr. Walter S. Poole, under the direction of
Mr. Kenneth W. Condit. Meanwhile, other chapters, or portions thereof, had been
prepared by Miss Martha Derthick, Mr. Morris MacGregor, and Miss Barbara
Sorrill. In 1968, Dr. Robert J. Watson was assigned as the responsible author. He
reviewed existing drafts, carried out additional research, and wrote Chapters 1
through 9 in essentially their present form. When he was transferred to other du-
ties, Mr. James F. Schnabel assumed responsibility for the volume and planned,
Foreword
researched, and wrote the remaining eight chapters. Subsequently, all of the
chapters were reviewed and revised by both Mr. Schnabel and Dr. Watson. Final
revision and historical editing proceeded under the supervision of Dr. Watson in
his capacity as Chief, Histories Branch, and of his successor in that position, Mr.
Kenneth W. Condit. Resource constraints have prevented further revision to re-
flect more recent scholarship.
This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Govern-
ment departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official
publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been con-
sidered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and
does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject.
Washington, DC DAVID A. ARMSTRONG
March 1998 Director for Joint History
VI
Preface
At the time it was fought, the war in Korea was unique in recent American
military experience. Unlike World Wars I and II, which were vigorously prose-
cuted on the battlefield until the enemy surrendered unconditionally, the Korean
conflict ended without clear-cut military victory for either side. It was fought
with limited means for limited objectives. In fact, political efforts to resolve the
conflict at the negotiating table predominated during the last two years of the
conflict. During this period, neither side sought a decision by military means.
The conflict in Korea also was an important milestone in the "cold war" rela-
tions between the Communist and non-Communist nations. By launching an
unprovoked attack on a militarily insignificant country located in an area where
none of their vital interests were involved, the Communists appeared to leaders
of the non-Communist states to be giving proof of their aggressive designs for
world domination. As a result, the United States reversed the policy of reducing
its military establishment and launched an impressive expansion of its armed
forces. At the same time, the United States joined with its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) partners to create a military command for the alliance and
to incorporate German forces in it. In the Far East, the United States also acted to
shore up the defenses of the non-Communist world by entering into treaties
with Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and Na-
tionalist China.
The Korean War provided the first wartime test for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
acting as part of the machinery set up by the National Security Act of 1947 and its
1949 amendment. In this capacity, they provided strategic direction to the United
Nations (UN) forces in the field and were the agency by which President Truman
exercised overall control of war strategy. When the focus shifted from combat to
armistice negotiations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to play an active role.
They participated in all the key decisions taken during negotiations, and they
provided the channel of communications between the Government in Washing-
ton and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and his
armistice negotiating team in Korea.
The focus of this volume is, naturally, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as they
were not acting in a vacuum, it has been necessary to describe the context in
which they functioned. To this end, the actions of the President and the Secre-
taries of State and Defense concerning overall military strategy and armistice ne-
gotiations have been described in some detail. In addition, the consequences of
Vll
Preface
these actions, on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, have been sketched
in broad outline.
The authors received help from many sources during the preparation of this
volume and gladly acknowledge their indebtedness. A special debt is owed to
Mr. Ernest H. Giusti and Mr. Vernon E. Davis, respectively Chief of the Histori-
cal Division and Chief of the Special Projects Branch during most of the time
this volume was being written, for their support and encouragement. Without
the research assistance of Mr. Sigmund W. Musinski and his staff in the JCS
Records Information and Retrieval Branch, and of the Modern Military Records
Division, National Archives and Records Service, the authors' task would have
been far more difficult. Special thanks are due to CWO William A. Barbee and
Janet M. Lekang of the JCS Declassification Branch for the many hours they de-
voted to reviewing and declassifying JCS documents cited in the volume. The
maps were prepared by the JCS Graphics Branch. Mrs. Janet W. Ball, Editorial
Assistant, made an invaluable contribution through her cheerful and efficient
direction of all phases of preparing the original manuscript. We thank Ms. Susan
Carroll for preparing the Index, and Ms. Penny Norman for performing the
manifold tasks necessary to put the manuscript into publishable form.
JAMES F. SCHNABEL
ROBERT J.WATSON
vin
Contents
1. Seeking a Political Solution 1
Interlude \
Basic US Negotiating Policies 3
The Battlefield Scene, June 1951 7
CINCUNC's Directives 9
The Opening of Negotiations 10
Control of Negotiations 14
Agenda Item 2: The Demarcation Line 16
The Negotiations Are Interrupted 18
Military Developments 23
Item 2 Is Resolved 27
The Situation in November 1951 31
2. The Developing Diplomtic Deadlock 35
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Make New Recommendations 35
The State Department Position 36
"Hot Pursuit" Resolved 37
Toward a New Policy 38
Consultation with the British 41
NSC 118/2 42
Negotiations on Concrete Arrangements: Item 3 46
Development of the Airfield Issue 52
The "Greater Sanction" Statement 55
Item 4: Prisoners of War 58
The Issue of Voluntary Repatriation 59
UNC Policy on Prisoners 63
Negotiation Begins on Item 4 68
The UN Proposal of 2 January 71
3. Narrowing the Issues 77
The Situation in January 1952 77
Item 5: Recommendations to Governments 78
Negotiation of Item 3 (Concrete Arrangements) 81
IX
Contents
A New Issue: The USSR and the NNSC 82
Item 4: Negotiations Continue 85
An Injurious Incident: 18 February 88
The Package Proposal 90
The Prisoner Issue Again 94
Screening and Segregation of Prisoners 99
Presentation of the UNC Package 103
The Kidnapping of General Dodd 105
4. The UN Command in the Middle 109
President Rhee Opposes an Armistice 109
Political Crisis in South Korea 114
Strengthening ROK Forces 120
Biological Warfare Charges against the UNC 127
Confrontation on Repatriation and the Package Proposal 131
Plans for Communist Prisoners 133
CINCUNC and Washington Ponder Strategies 135
Release of Civilian Internees 140
Control and Screening of Communist Prisoners 141
5. The Search for Feasible Options 143
The Military Standoff, 1952 143
Bombing the Power Complexes 145
Increasing Reliance on ROK Manpower 148
Possible Use of Chinese Nationalist Forces 152
The POW Issue: The Chinese Initiative 156
The Soviet Initiative 157
Deadlock on Prisoners 159
The Proposed Presidential Initiative 165
Variations on a Theme 168
Release of South Korean POWs 173
The Department of Defense Is Upheld 175
The Recess at Panmunjom 178
6. Problems and Progress 181
Korea as an Issue in 1952 181
The UN General Assembly Enters the Picture 182
India Complicates Matters 184
Difficulties with Communist Prisoners 186
Military Operations and Plans 189
President-Elect Eisenhower Visits Korea 193
Growing Danger to the UNC Military Position 194
A New Look at ROK Forces 196
The New Administration Appraises Old Policies 200
Beginning of a Thaw: Operation LITTLE SWITCH 207