DTIC ADA338840: Nuclear Safeguards and the International Atomic Energy Agency

161 Pages·12.8 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

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Accession Number: 5333
Publication Date: Apr 06, 1995
Title: Nuclear Safeguards And The International Atomic Energy Agency
Corporate Author Or Publisher: OTA, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office Report
Number: OTA-ISS-615
Comments on Document: Final Report received and entered into database on 08/02/95.
Descriptors, Keywords: IAEA Nuclear NPT Proliferation Inspection Origins Safeguard Regime Material
Handling Nuclear
Pages: 00147
Cataloged Date: Apr 11, 1995
Document Type: HC
Number of Copies In Library: 000002
Record ID: 29910
Source of Document: OTA
JULY REO T re
1995
Nuclear Safeguards and the
International Atomic Energy Agency
T
helnternationalAtomicEnergyAgency tant threat. They also showed that the IAEA's
(IAEA) plays a central role in prevent- traditional mission of detecting the misuse of
ing the spread of nuclear weapons. safeguarded nuclear materials addressed only
Through its system of nuclear safe- part-and probably not the most important
guards, the IAEA is responsible for ensuring that part-of the proliferation problem. To avoid
signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation similar problems in the future, the IAEA has to
Treaty (NPT) do not use their nuclear materials,
Detecting misuse of
equipment, or facilities for weapon purposes.
known facilities is only
IAEA safeguards, however, have significant
limitations, as described in the Office of Technol-
part of the problem
ogy Assessment report Nuclear Safeguards and
the InternationalA tomic Energy Agency. Some
of these limitations were highlighted in the after- ensure that states do not have covert nuclear
math of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when it was facilities, a mission that in the past the agency
revealed that Iraq had mounted an extensive, did not have the political support, the resources,
covert nuclear weapon program in addition to, nor the information to conduct.
and partly in proximity to, open nuclear research
activities that were under IAEA safeguards. The FINDINGS
followingyear, IAEA investigations revealed that m IAEA safeguards make it very difficult for
the North Korean government was hiding infor- states to use civil nuclear facilities for weapon
mation on the extent of its nuclear material purposes without detection. However, they
production. cannot prevent states from acquiring the
The Iraqi and North Korean cases showed that technology needed to produce nuclear mate-
states could and did violate their Non-Prolifera- rials, or from stockpiling this material within
tion Treaty commitments, actions that many civil programs, and then withdrawing from
had previously considered an abstract and dis- or violating safeguards to produce weapons.
"* The steadily growing demands placed upon * The IAEA is exploring a number of means to
the IAEA cannot be accommodated without determine whether states are pursuing unde-
sacrificing effectiveness under the "no-real- dared nuclear weapon programs. However,
growth" funding policy that has been im- it is not an intelligence organization. Its
posed upon the agency since 1985. If effec- ability to discover sites that states wish to
tiveness is not to diminish, new responsibili- keep hidden will depend significantly on the
ties-such as applying safeguards to new willingness of other member states to share
NPT parties, some of which have joined the their own intelligence information with the
Treaty with substantial nuclear infrastruc- IAEA, as well as on the ability of the IAEA to
tures-need to be accompanied by new re- evaluate and analyze that information.
sources. . The conventional "material accountancy"
"* Under existing agreements, the IAEA may safeguards methods now in use by the IAEA
not have the power to impose some measures appear unable to assure that the diversion of
to strengthen safeguards, such as the analy- a bomb's worth of plutonium per year from a
sis of environmental samples for evidence of large plutonium reprocessing plant would be
secret nuclear facilities. Many states may detected with high confidence. New tech-
voluntarily accept such measures, but others niques such as "near-real-time accoun-
may not agree to measures that they believe tancy"-unproven at this scale by the IAEA-
go beyond their original commitments, must be adopted for plants of this size, and
"- As a multilateral institution, the IAEA can even these techniques may not meet this
conduct inspections that individual states standard. To date, the IAEA has not consid-
could not. It has the authority-in consulta- ered the possibility that it may be unable to
tion with the inspected state-to conduct so- safeguard effectively large facilities such as
called special inspections at any site where the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant now
The Office of the IAEA has reason to believe nuclear-re- under construction in Japan, but neither has
Technology lated activities are being conducted. Special it been able to demonstrate that it can.
Assessment is the
analytical arm of inspections may be on short notice, but they * Evaluations of safeguards effectiveness that
Congress that do not provide "anytime-anywhere" access. consideronlythe precisionwithwhich nuclear
examines the m The IAEA, by itself, lacks an effective means material inventories and flows can be mea-
impacts of of enforcement. However, it can refer dis- sured underestimate the effectiveness of the
technological putes to the United Nations Security Council, overall safeguards system. The IAEA is im-
change. which has the legal authority to take enforce- proving its use of other techniques that can
ment action. lessen the likelihood of successful diversion.
However, the contribution of these other tech-
niques is very difficult to quantify.
OPTIONS TO IMPROVE provide the IAEA with information and ac-
SAFEGUARDS cess above and beyond what they are obli-
Some options to improve IAEA safeguards gated to supply.
can be taken without making major changes to m 71ghtening "significantquantity"and" time-
existing institutions or international agreements. liness"goals. The IAEA could lower the size
Others, however, would involve substantial modi- of diversion that safeguards are intended to
fications or additions to the existing regime. In detect, or shorten the time interval permitted
the first category are: for detection of such a diversion. However,
"* Increasingr esourcesa vailableforsafeguards. doing so would require additional resources,
In addition, the United States could pay its which might be put to better uses.
dues on time. However, controversy remains * Improving the ability to detect secret nuclear
over who should pay more and how the addi- facilities. Techniques to find covert sites
tional funds should be allocated. For ex- include accepting and evaluating informa-
ample, the safeguards budget may be difficult tion supplied by member states. They may
to increase without also increasing the IAEA's also include the analysis of environmental
programs to promote the use of nuclear tech- samples. Acting on such information will
nology in the developing world. require increased use of the agency's special
"* Reallocating inspection effort toward prob- inspection authority.
lem states. Much of the IAEA's inspection * Declaring that sufficiently large "bulk-han-
effort is devoted to those states with the dlingfacilities"c annot be adequately safe-
largest nuclear programs under safeguards guarded. An alternate option, considering
(for example, Germany, Japan, and Canada), the limitations of material accountancy in
as opposed to the states thought to pose the proving that a single bomb's worth of
greatest proliferation risks. However, by its plutonium has not been diverted from a large
obligation to be nondiscriminatory, the IAEA reprocessing facility, would be to rely explic-
cannot make politically based judgments of itly on other safeguards techniques such as
trustworthiness and would have great diffi- surveillance, evaluation of plant design, and
culty in justifying more stringent safeguards monitoring of plant operations to provide
in one country than in another. assurance of nondiversion.
"* Supporting "enhanced transparency"e fforts.
Safeguards will be enhanced and interna- Some of the options to address the limita-
tional tensions relieved if states take actions tions of IAEA safeguards that involve changes or
to enhance the visibility and openness of additions to the treaties and agreements gov-
their own nuclear activities. States could erning nuclear nonproliferation include:
a
Constraining the ability of states to with- States that have made massive investments
drawfrom theNPT. The NPT allows states to in plutonium reprocessing plants (e.g., Rus-
withdraw upon 90 days' notice. Although sia, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom)
amending the NPT is considered a practical would likely oppose such an option.
impossibility, the United Nations Security m Exploring internationalizationo f the nuclear
Council could resolve that withdrawing from fuel cycle. Immediately following World War
the NPT without surrendering or destroying II, the international community rejected a
weapon-capable nuclear materials, and fa- legal regime that would have prohibited indi-
cilities for their production, would threaten vidual states from pursuing activities such as
international peace and security, enriching uranium and reprocessing pluto-
a Expanding the abiliOy of the United Nations nium, reserving these for a new international
Security Council to expose and renderh arm- organization. Such an idea could be revived
less the proliferationo fnuclear weapons. The if it were deemed unwise for individual states
Security Council is the only international to have these capabilities.
institution with the legal authority to take
coercive action against nuclear proliferation.
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Congress of the Thniteh States
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8025
ROGER C. HERDMAN, DIRECTOR
July 20, 1995
Dear Colleague:
I am pleased to call the OTA report Nuclear Safeguards and the InternationalA tomic
Energy Agency to your attention. This report examines what International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards can and cannot be expected to accomplish, identifies areas where they might be
strengthened and improved, and presents options for doing so.
The IAEA's system of nuclear safeguards is intended to deter states from acquiring
nuclear weapons by threatening to detect and expose activities such as the diversion of nuclear
material from civil nuclear progr.ams. Safeguards cannot prevent states from developing nuclear
weapons, but they make it much more difficult for states to use safeguarded facilities to do so
without being caught. However, the IAEA's traditional mission of ensuring that states do not
divert nuclear materials from the facilities they are known to possess is probably not as important
as making sure that states are not pursuing weapon activities at secret locations - a new mission
that the IAEA is beginning to take on. Unless the agency is provided with additional resources,
however, it cannot accommodate the steadily growing demands placed upon it without sacrificing
effectiveness.
This report is the sixth publication of OTA's assessment on the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, which was requested by the Senate Foreign Relations and Governmental
Affairs Committees. Earlier publications are Proliferationo f Weapons ofMass Destruction:
Assessing the Risks (August 1993), The Chemical Weapons Convention: Effects on the US.
Chemical Industry (August 1993), Technologies Underlying Weapons ofMass Destruction
(December 1993), Export Controls and NonproliferationP olicy (May 1994), and Proliferation
and the Former Soviet Union (September 1994). If you would like any further information on any
of this study's publications, please call me at [phone]. I can also be reached by fax at
[phone], or on the Internet at [email protected].
Sincerely,
Gerald L. Epstein
Project Director
Enclosures:
Publication Brief
Report
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Cover Photo Credits: Top left: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Bottom left: Los Alamos
National Laboratory. Center: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear
Safeguards and the InternationalA tomic Energy Agency, OTA-ISS-615 (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1995).
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
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