DTIC ADA325070: Strategic Appraisal 1997: Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century,

363 Pages·16.1 MB·English

by  Defense Technical Information Center

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Strategie Appraisal 1997
Strategy
and
Defense
Planning
for the 21st Century
Edited by
Zalmay M. Khalilzad ♦ David A. Ochmanek
MR-826-AF
Project AIR FORCE
Prepared for the United States Air Force
R A N D 0» QUALITY INSPECTED
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
^.7 0576 /?£>
PREFACE
The difficulty in life is the choice.
— George Moore
1852-1933
In the preface to his classic work On Thermonuclear War, RAND's
Herman Kahn mused on what he called the painful problem of
choice. Writing in 1960, Kahn was concerned with the weightiest
issues of his day. He pointed to choices "open to the free world" that
included peaceful coexistence, rearmament, Soviet domination, and
thermonuclear war. Like Bernard Brodie, Albert Wohlstetter, and
other defense strategists of his day, Kahn was preoccupied with
problems associated with trying to contain Soviet power and
expansionism while minimizing the risk of war. Thanks in part to the
efforts of Kahn and others like him, those engaged in defense
strategy and planning today are confronted with problems for which
the stakes involved are considerably less grave. With the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the tentative embrace of less confrontational
objectives by the most important of its successor states, our security
environment is no longer dominated by the reality of vast military
power in the hands of an implacable foe. In this sense, the risks of
failure for defense planners are certainly less starkly immediate than
they were in Kahn's day.
Yet the posture and capabilities of the U.S. armed forces remain
central factors in global stability. Put simply, the United States is the
world's preeminent military power and the chief "exporter" of
security. For the foreseeable future, if the industrial democracies of
North America, Europe, and East Asia are confronted with serious
iv Strategic Appraisal 1997
military challenges to their interests, it will be up to the United States
to take the lead in defeating these challenges. More broadly, whether
the world evolves toward a more stable, peaceful, and prosperous
future or toward a future characterized by instability, deepening
rivalry, and conflict depends very much on future U.S. policies and
America's capacity to effectuate its policies. Hence, even in the
absence of a superpower adversary, much depends on the United
States getting its defense strategy, planning, and resource allocation
right.
This book is intended to contribute to that effort. It is the product of
many hands and is more a collection of the ideas of individuals than
a tightly cohesive treatment of the problems of defense strategy and
planning. While the chapters, in toto, address what we see as the
most significant issues facing defense planners, the book is not
comprehensive. For example, this volume says almost nothing about
the future U.S. nuclear posture (something that would have
astonished Herman Kahn), although it considers from several
aspects the challenge of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
in the hands of future adversaries. There is also little discussion of
individual defense programs or weapon systems. Likewise, the
reader who is looking for "RAND's force structure"—specific
numbers and types of units that the authors believe should be
fielded—will be disappointed.
The intent here is rather to cast light on the issues that will bear most
heavily on policymakers and analysts as they grapple with the need
to reshape U.S. military forces and capabilities for the 21st century.
Too often work done on and for the U.S. defense community offers
specific "answers" while going light on whatever analysis might
underpin those answers. We reverse that emphasis on the
assumption that what decisionmakers most need is help in
understanding the primary factors at play in an issue, the ways in
which they interact, and the kinds of outcomes that might result
from particular choices. Armed with this sort of analysis, they can
then make informed choices.
This book is dedicated to the goal of a U.S. defense program that is
structured on the basis of a careful and honest assessment of future
needs, an appreciation of the possibilities offered by emerging
technologies and operational concepts, and a willingness to adopt
Preface
new approaches when these have been shown to be relevant and
feasible. The United States has rightly adopted an expansive and
ambitious strategy to guide its actions in the post-Cold War world.
Superior military capabilities will be needed to support this strategy.
Yet the resources available to sustain U.S. forces will be tight.
All of which brings us back to the necessity for choice. Within the
U.S. defense establishment, it is less and less possible to hedge
against uncertainty by fielding redundant capabilities. Likewise, the
cost—in terms of forgone military capabilities—of avoiding
politically painful initiatives to make our defense establishment
more efficient is mounting inexorably. Hence, U.S. defense planners
will be confronted with stark choices between high-priority
modernization needs and force structure, between operational
capabilities ("tooth") and support structure ("tail"), and between
traditional approaches to warfare and innovations that offer
appealing efficiencies but also some risks. There is not, in short, a
risk-free option. The choice is between different types and levels of
risk.
If there is a single theme that runs through these chapters it is this:
The challenge of fielding the world's most capable military force
within strict resource constraints can be met, but only if the nation's
leaders are willing to make extensive changes in the U.S. defense
establishment. These changes encompass the roles assigned to
different types of forces, both in peacetime and war, and the ways in
which the Department of Defense does business. The Department of
Defense has started down these roads, but even with committed
leadership and sustained efforts, change of this magnitude will take
considerable time to implement. There is little time to lose.
Strategic Appraisal 1997 is RAND's second book in an annual series
that reviews for a broad audience issues bearing on national security
and defense planning. Strategic Appraisal 1996 assessed challenges
to U.S. interests around the world, focusing on key nations and
regions.
It is hoped that this series will contribute to "the public welfare and
security of the United States of America"—the purposes for which
RAND was chartered.
CONTENTS
Preface »i
Figures xi
Tables xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Abbreviations xvii
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Zalmay Khalilzad and David Ochmanek 1
Chapter Two
STRATEGY AND DEFENSE PLANNING FOR THE
COMING CENTURY
Zalmay Khalilzad 7
An Era of U.S. Preeminence 8
The Need for a Grand Design 10
A Proposed National Security Strategy 12
Challenges to Global Leadership 15
A Strategy for Global Leadership 20
Conclusions 31
Bibliography 32
Chapter Three
THE CONTEXT FOR DEFENSE PLANNING: THE
ENVIRONMENT, STRATEGY, AND MISSIONS
David Ochmanek and Stephen T. Hosmer 35
vlii Strategic Appraisal 1997
Filling in the Framework: National Objectives,
Environment, and Strategy 39
The National Security Strategy 49
Forces for What? Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces .... 55
Summary 67
References 67
Chapter Four
ADAPTIVENESS IN DEFENSE PLANNING: THE BASIS
OF A NEW FRAMEWORK
Paul K. Davis, David Gompert, and Richard L. Kugler . . 69
Introduction 69
Threat-Based Planning and Its Shortcomings 71
Conceiving Alternative Force Postures 86
Assessing the Options 88
The Need for Unusually Strong Leadership 92
References 94
Chapter Five
NEW PRINCIPLES FOR FORCE SIZING
PaulK. Davis and Richard L. Kugler 95
Introduction 95
The Two-MRC Issue on Its Own Terms 97
Going Beyond the Two-MRC Criterion 102
Force Needs Under the Environment-Shaping
Criterion 105
Force Needs Under a One-MRC Standard 115
Force Needs Under a Two-MRC Standard 118
Summary Estimates of Force Needs 119
Can Allies Contribute? 123
Advantages of a Three-Criteria Approach to
Force Sizing 125
Longer-Term Force Sizing: Potential Implications
of New Forces and Doctrine and of Changes
in Threat 129
Conclusions 135
Bibliography 136
Chapter Six
CAPABILITIES FOR MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS
PaulK. Davis, RichardHillestad, and
Natalie Crawford 141
Contents ix
Introduction 141
A Campaign Structure for Analysis 142
Exploratory Analysis for MRCs 145
Representative Results for the Halt Phase 152
Conclusions from Initial Exploratory Analysis 164
Bibliography 175
Chapter Seven
FROM SIDESHOW TO CENTER STAGE: THE ROLE
OF THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
Jennifer M. Taw and Alan Vick 179
Introduction 179
Why "MOOTW?" 180
U.S. Army MOOTW Operations 185
The U.S. Air Force in MOOTW 196
Preparing for Future MOOTW 204
References 211
Chapter Eight
MANAGING REGIONAL SECURITY: TOWARD A NEW
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE OVERSEAS
Richard L. Kugler 213
Where We Have Been 216
A New Framework for Planning 218
The Baseline—Today's Posture 221
A Conceptual Basis for Planning 227
Requirements and Priorities for Future Forces and
Investment Programs 232
Outlines of a Future Posture 240
Conclusion 253
References 253
Chapter Nine
WHAT CAN LIKELY DEFENSE BUDGETS SUSTAIN?
DavidS. C.Chu 255
Introduction 255
Budget or Strategy—Which Comes First? 255
The Limits of History 257
DoD's Recent Budgetary History 258
What Might Future Defense Budgets Look Like, and
What Might They Sustain? 261
x Strategic Appraisal 1997
Why Will It Be So Difficult to Make Everything Fit? 265
What Are the Tradeoffs? 269
Conclusion 269
References 270
Chapter Ten
TRADING BUTTER FOR GUNS: MANAGING
INFRASTRUCTURE REDUCTIONS
Carl]. Dahlman and C. Robert Roll 273
Introduction 273
What Is Infrastructure? 279
Recent Proposals for Infrastructure Reductions 284
What Savings from Outsourcing and Reengineering? .... 291
Recent DoD Attempts to Improve Internal Operations . . . 299
An Alternative Analytical Approach 316
The Challenge: Reengineering the Policy Process 330
Some Implications for the QDR 340
Conclusion 342
Bibliography 345
CONCLUSION
ZalmayKhalilzad and David Ochmanek 349
FIGURES
3.1. Planning Framework, Planning and Uncertainty .... 37
3.2. Petroleum Imports Versus Total U.S. Consumption . . 43
3.3. Value of U.S. Imports and Exports, 1970-1993 43
3.4. The Importance of International Trade 44
3.5. The World's Largest Economies, 1993 50
3.6. A Framework for Classifying Threats 53
3.7. Threats and Potential Threats 54
4.1. Schematic of a Threat-Based Planning Scenario 72
4.2. Testing Force Postures 76
4.3. Moving from Point Assumptions to Scenario-
Space Testing 77
4.4. An Illustrative Contingency Analysis for the Persian
Gulf 78
4.5. Notional Cost Effectiveness Conclusions About
Contributions to Environment Shaping 81
4.6. A Logic for Strategic Planning Under
Uncertainty 83
4.7. Notional Scorecard Assessment of Force-Posture
Alternatives 89
4.8. Capabilities Versus Budget Levels (Notional) 90
5.1. MRC Capabilities as a Function of Circumstances ... 100
5.2. Notional Plot of Diminishing Returns 102
5.3. Three Simultaneous Sizing Criteria 104
5.4. Consequences of Rotation Base for Total CVBG
Requirements as a Function of Numbers Kept
on Station 112
5.5. Environment Shaping Becomes a Relatively
Stressful Criterion 122
xli Strategic Appraisal 1997
5.6. Comparison of Force Levels 123
5.7. Requirements Over Time and the Role of Allies 125
5.8. A Potential "Requirements" Curve for the
Participation of Major Allies 126
6.1. Schematic Time Line for Two MRCs 143
6.2. Illustrative Invasion Case for Southwest Asia 152
6.3. Illustrative Results for Defense of Saudi Arabia 154
6.4. Prospects for Defense of Kuwait with
Baseline Forces 156
6.5. Defense of Saudi Arabia, Considering Effects of
Sortie Suppression 157
6.6. Defense of Saudi Arabia, with Entry and Access
Problems 159
6.7. Penetration Versus Weight of Airpower 161
6.8. First-Cut Estimates of Countermeasure Effects 170
10.1. Performance Metrics of Order and Ship
Processes 309
10.2. Performance of Order and Ship Processes 310
10.3. Illustrative Payoff Matrices from Policy Game 326