RUSSIA'S AIR. POWER AT THE CROSSROADS 19970116 BJSTRJBÜTJON STATEMENT A Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-96-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, HqUSAF. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Lambeth, Benjamin S. Russia's air power at the crossroads / Benjamin S. Lambeth, p. cm. "Project AIR FORCE." "Prepared for the United States Air Force." "MR-623-AF." Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-2426-4 (alk. paper) 1. Aeronautics, Military—Russia (Federation) 2. Air power—Russia (Federation) 3. Chechnya (Russia)—History— Civil War, 1994- I. United States. Air Force. II. Project AIR FORCE (U.S.) III. Title. UG635.R9L18 1996 358.4 '00947—dc20 96-27099 CIP © Copyright 1996 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve public policy through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Published 1996 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310)451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] 50-\t U Project AIR FORCE 19 4 6-1996 RUSSIA'S AIR POWER AT THE CROSSROADS BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH «C^AW-»^0™8- Prepared for the United States Air Force RAND Approved for public release; distribution unlimited PREFACE This report is an assessment of trends and prospects in Russian mili- tary aviation. It is based in large measure on the extensive reportage on air power and other military matters that has pervaded the Russian defense literature since the onset of glasnost in 1986. It also benefits from limited first-hand contacts between the author and senior Russian Air Force and aviation industry leaders. The roots of this undertaking go back to a Project AIR FORCE study initiated at RAND in 1987 for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, aimed at providing a comprehensive look at how tactical aviation fit- ted into broader Soviet concepts for theater warfare in Europe. That project, entitled "Soviet Tactical Air Power in Strategic Perspective," sought to examine the USSR's fighter force in terms of its historical origins, organizational development, training and tactics, opera- tional style, mission tasking, and role in overall theater campaign strategy. Soon after work began, most of the original questions posed, along with the geostrategic setting of Soviet force planning, underwent a fundamental change as a result of then-President Mikhail Gorbachev's doctrinal innovations and the ensuing end of the cold war. At the same time, Gorbachev's domestic reforms created new issues of interest with regard to Soviet military aviation. They also opened up some unprecedented sources of insight into the inner workings of the Soviet defense establishment. As a result, the spon- soring office, Project CHECKMATE, agreed to put the study on hold so that these developments might be taken into proper account. iv Russia's Air Power at the Crossroads In the ensuing period, the author established contact with the chief test pilot of the Mikoyan Design Bureau at the 1988 Farnborough Air Show. As a result of that contact, in December 1989 at Kubinka Air Base near Moscow, the author became the first American citizen to fly the Soviet MiG-29 fighter and the first Westerner invited to fly a combat aircraft of any type inside Soviet airspace since the end of World War II.1 That experience opened further doors into the Soviet Air Force and aviation industry. During the time of the abortive August 1991 Soviet coup attempt, the author was in Moscow for the annual Aviation Day events on invitation from the head of the Central Aerohydro- dynamics Institute. The following December, he had an opportunity to meet at length with the commander in chief of the Soviet Air Force, then-Colonel General Petr Deinekin, at his Moscow head- quarters on the day before the heads of the Soviet republics an- nounced the dissolution of the USSR. The warmth and candor of that session with General Deinekin en- couraged the author to seek Project AIR FORCE support for a de novo study of developments in Russian military aviation in the post-Soviet period that might draw on Russian Air Force cooperation. The de- clared intent was to provide Western air power specialists with a first-hand assessment that transcended dry facts to impart a sense of the Russian Air Force as an evolving institution. Ultimately, the hoped-for support from the Russian Air Force proved too ambitious a goal in the still turbulent and unsteady process of post-Soviet Russian reform. Nevertheless, as an experiment in post- cold war professional outreach, the effort was not a complete failure. The author met three times more with General Deinekin during sub- sequent trips to Moscow to describe his research plan in detail. He also had several conversations with the head of the Russian Air Force's Central Research Institute, Major General Vasily Aleksandrov, in an attempt to build a bridge between RAND and its closest ana- logue in the Russian Air Force. Finally, he was able to gain additional lA full account ofthat relationship and a technical overview of the MiG-29, including a detailed flight report, are presented in Benjamin S. Lambeth, From Farnborough to Kubinka: An American MiG-29 Experience, Santa Monica, California, RAND R-4000- RC, 1991. Preface insights into the operational side of Russian fighter aviation through an invitational Su-27 flight with the Gromov Flight Research Institute and two front-seat advanced handling flights in a MiG-21 and MiG-23 with the Mikoyan Design Bureau, all at the Ramenskoye Flight Test Center.2 The present report was prepared in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Project AIR FORCE. It seeks to impart to the USAF leadership a richer portrait of the setting in which their Russian counterparts operate, for the purpose of better informing U.S. participation in the continuing, if now increasingly halting, ex- change relationship between the two services. It should be of inter- est to USAF officers and other members of the defense community concerned with air operations and training, force development, comparative military capability and policy assessment, and Russian- American security relations. The bulk of the study embodies work done in support of a Project AIR FORCE research effort entitled "The World's Air Forces."3 Chapters Four through Eight were sponsored by a subsequent project entitled "Sources of Conflict and Their Implications for Air Force Operations." The latter has been tasked to consider alternative scenarios of the global conflict arena to the year 2020, including Russia's role in it, aimed at identifying and bounding those external factors most likely to challenge the USAF through the first decade of the next century. Both projects were sponsored by the Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force. PROJECT AIR FORCE Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analyses. It provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is being performed in three programs: Strategy and 2For a report on the latter, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Flying the Flogger," Flight International February 23-March 1,1994, pp. 38-41. 3An overview of research conducted in that larger study is presented in Christopher J. Bowie et al., Trends in the Global Balance of Air Power, RAND MR-478/1-AF, 1995. vi Russia's Air Power at the Crossroads Doctrine; Force Modernization and Employment; and Resource Management and System Acquisition. In 1996, Project AIR FORCE is celebrating 50 years of service to the United States Air Force. Project AIR FORCE began in March 1946 as Project RAND at Douglas Aircraft Company, under contract to the Army Air Forces. Two years later, the project became the foundation of a new, private nonprofit institution to improve public policy through research and analysis for the public welfare and security of the United States—what is known today as RAND. CONTENTS Preface m Figures X1 Summary X1U Acknowledgments xxvu Acronyms XXX1 Chapter One INTRODUCTION l Chapter Two THE SOVIET LEGACY n Initial Responses to the Failed Coup 14 Immediate Consequences of the Breakup of the USSR ... 16 Problems with Air Defense I7 Impact on the Defense Industry 23 From the CIS to Russian Unilateralism 25 Troubled Relations with Ukraine 26 New Priorities and Concerns 32 The Collapse of State Financing for Defense 32 A Growing Pilot Surplus 36 The Crisis in Flying Hours 38 Maintenance Shortcomings 42 Safety and the Accident Situation 47 Problems with Air Traffic Control 51 The Declining Quality of WS Life 53 Faltering Service Prestige and Pilot Recruitment 56 viii Russia's Air Power at the Crossroads Chapter Three EVOLVING ORGANIZATION, DOCTRINE, AND FORCES 59 Post-Soviet Retrenchment and Reform Plans 61 The Formation of a Russian Military 62 Toward a Mobile Force Concept 65 New Looks for the Russian Air Force 67 Force Reductions and Consolidation 68 Employment Concepts and Air Doctrine 70 New Commands and Organizational Arrangements ... 75 New Basing Approaches 78 Force Structure and Force Development Plans 80 Frontal Aviation 83 Long-Range Aviation 86 Military Transport Aviation 89 Reserve and Training Command 91 Air Defense 93 Naval Aviation 94 Chapter Four UNDERGRADUATE PILOT TRAINING 101 Screening and Selection 102 The UPT Syllabus 105 Operational Conversion 108 Recent Changes in the UPT System 110 Instructor Pilot Selection and Training 116 Issues in Training Philosophy 120 Chapter Five CONTINUATION TRAINING IN LINE FIGHTER UNITS . . 123 Contrasting Western Views Before the Fall of Communism 124 Standardization Evaluation 129 Operational Style 134 Scheduling and Sortie Apportionment 137 A Typical Flying Day 140 Flight Simulator Utilization 149 Weapons Training and Range Use 150 Tactics Development 156 Chapter Six THE OPERATING MILIEU 163 Contents ix ATyranny of Bureaucratism 164 Self-Deception as a Way of Life 168 The Beginnings of Soviet Awakening 171 Toward New Horizons 176 Chapter Seven HOW MIGHT THEY HAVE DONE IF...? 181 A Level-of-Analysis Problem 182 Ambiguities in the Changing Threat Picture 183 The Fallacy of Mirror-Imaging 185 The Limits of Informed Hindsight 188 Chapter Eight RUSSIA'S AIR WAR IN CHECHNYA 191 Highlights of the Air Campaign I93 The Operational Setting I96 Preparatory Moves I97 The Gaining of Air Control 200 Air Support to Ground Operations 201 Results and Costs 208 Key Accomplishments 213 A Validation of Airlift 2U The Beginnings of Candor in Self-Assessment 215 Problems and Lessons Indicated 221 The Burdens of Bad Planning 222 The Price of Financial Starvation 225 Disjunctions in Joint Force Integration 227 The Limits of Air Power in Irregular War 229 Implications 230 Chapter Nine PROSPECTS FOR A FIFTH-GENERATION AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTER 235 Russia's Interest in a Fifth-Generation Fighter 237 Appreciation of the Tactical Advantages of Stealth 240 A Russian Advanced Fighter Prototype in Hand? 241 Constraints on the Near-Term Emergence of a New Russian Fighter 244 Competing Air Force Investment Priorities 246 Competing WS Development Options 248