DTIC ADA279744: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Volume 4. Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations PDF
Preview DTIC ADA279744: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Volume 4. Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations
744 S .AD-A279 Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume IV Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations DTIC ELECTE IJ MAY 2 7 1994 Washington, D. C. 1993 aimL., ' Accesion For NTIS CRA&I DTIC TAB (cid:127)Wy Unannounced Guff Wayr Justification "Y o=-. *. (cid:127) .o- o . o .... Air Power Survey Distribution / Availability Codes' Avaiiland/or Volume IV Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations 0o"94-16021 I~ii1i1L1U11 I I 1~L1l11U1 I1 1W 15 26 188 Washington, D. C. 1993 Library f Conges Catalogimg4a.Publkadon Data Gulf War Air Power Survey p. cm. Gulf War Air Power Survey directed by Eliot A. C, %en. Includes an unnumbered summary report by Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Contents: v. 1. Planning and Command and Control .. v. 2. Operations and Effects and Effectiveness -- v. 3. Logistics and Support -- v.4, Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations -- v. 5. A Statistical Compendium and Chronology. I. Persian Gulf War, 1991--Aerial operations. American. 2. United States. Air Force-History-Perslan Gulf War, 1991, I. Cohen, Eliot A. Ii. Gulf War Air Power Survey (Organization : U.S.). III. United States. Dept. of the Air Force. IV. Title: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report. DS79.724.U6G85 1993 956.7044'248--dc2O 93-30601 CIP Por sale by the U.S. Government Prilntin Office Superintendent of Document., Mail Stop: SSOP, Wv.ilhington. XC 20402-9.,2H ISBN 0-16-042927-? Gulf War Air Power Survey Staff Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director Col. Emery M. Kiraly Executive Director Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley Senior Military Advisor (Retired, USAF) Dr. Wayne W. Thompson Senior HistoricalA dvisor Mr. Ernest D. Cruca ANSER Program Manager Mej. Joseph W. Patterson Executive Officer Mr. Lawrence 3. Paszek Publishing Manager Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl Chief, Statistics Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen Chief, Chronology Dr. John F. Guilmartin Chief, Weapons, Tactics and Training Mr. Richard A. Gunkel Chief, Logistics, Space, and Support Dr. Thomas C. Hone Chief, Command, Control, and Organization Dr. Alexander S. Cochran Chief, Strategy and Plans Mr. Barry D. Watts Chief, Operationsa nd Effects Dr. Thomas A. Keaney Chief, Summary Report iii Gulf War Air Power Survey Review Committee Han. Paul H. Nitze, Chairman Diplomat in Residence Paul H. Nits* School of Advanced International Studies Gen. Michael I. Dugan (USAF, Retired) Multiple Sclerosis Society Adm. Huntington Hardisty (USN, Retired) Center for Naval Analyses Dr, Richard H. Kohn The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Dr. Bernard Lewis Princeton University Mr. Andrew W. Marshall Office of the Secretary of Defense Mr. Phillip Merrill Former Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, NATO Dr. Henry Rowan Stanford University Hon, Ike Skelton U.S. House of Representatives Gen. Maxwell Thurman (USA, Retired) Association of the U.S, Army Maj. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr. (USAF, Retired) Former Assistant Chief of Staff (Studies and Analysis) Dr. James Q. Wilson University of California at Los Angeles iv Foreword From 16 January through 28 Febnrary 1991, the United States and its allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history, a conflict In which air operations played a preeminent role. The Gulf War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991 to review all aspects of air warfare In the Persian Gulf for use by the United States Air Force, but It was not to confine Itself to discussion of that institution. The Survey has produced reports on planning, the conduct of operations, the effects of the air campaign, command and control, logistics, air base support, space, weapons and tactics, as well as a chronology and a compendium of statistics on the war. It has prepared as well a summary report and some shorter papers and as- sembled an archive composed of paper, microfilm, and electronic re- cords, all of which have been deposited at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, The Survey was Just that, an attempt to provide a comprehensive and documented account of the war. It is not a definitive history: that will await the passage of time and the opening of sources (Iraqi records, for example) that were not available to Survey researchers. Nor Is it a summary of lessons learned: other organizations, Including many within the Air Force have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides an analytical and evidentlary point of departure for future studies of the air campaign. It concentrates on an analysis of the operational level of war in the belief that this level of warfare is at once one of the most difficult to character- ize and one of the most important to understand. The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by a mixture of civilian andJ military analysts, including retired officers from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was divided into task forces, most of which were run by civilians working temporarily for the Air Force. The work produced by the Survey was examined by a distin- gulshed review committee, that Included scholars, retired general officeri from the Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and current senior government officials, Throughout, the Survey strived to conduct Its research in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members had as their standard the observation of Mr. Franklin D'Olier, chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the second World War: "We wanted to burn into everybody's souls that fact that the survey's responsibility . . . was to ascertain facts and to seek truth, eliminating completely any preconceived theories or dogmas." V The Survey attempted to create a body of data common to all of the reports. Because one group of researchers compiled this core material while other task forces were researching and drafting other, more nar- rowly focused studies, it is possible that discrepancies exist among the reports with regard to points of detail. More Importantly, authors were given discretion, within the bounds of evidence and plausibility, to inter- pret events as they saw them. In some cases, task forces came to differ- ing conclusions about particular aspects of this war. Such divergences of view were expected and even desired: the Survey was intended to serve as a point of departure for those who read its reports, and not their analytical terminus. In the classified version, this volume consists of two reports: Weapons, Tactics, and Training, which focuses on Coalition as well as Iraqi air forces and Iraqi surface-based air defenses in the Gulf War, and Space Operations,w hich examines the use of space systems, mobilization of equipment for space operations, and the role of commercial space systems within a military context. However, because the Space report contains such an excessive amount of classified detail that tho balance would be Incomprehensible, the report Is not published in the unclassified volume. vi Acknowledgments The Survey's members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the project, provided it with resources, and set for it the highest standards of independence and * objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave generously of their resources and time to support this effort. Various branches and com- mands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in providing material for and, in some caes, personnel to conduct the study. The United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study In different ways, including the Pharing of data pertaining to the air war. A number of the United States' Coalition partners also made available individuals and records that were vital to the Survey's work. Many participants in the war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Servic- es were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Private students of the Gulf War also made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the text. The Survey's independence was its reason for being. Each report is the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily represent the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force or the Department of Defense. vii Security Review The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were submitted to the Department of Defense for policy and security review. In accordance with this re- view, certain information has been removed from the original text. These areas have been annotated as (DELETED]. viii Gulf War Air Power Survey Reports SummMe Report Volume 1: Part I: Planning Report Part 11: Command and Control Report Volume ii: Part I: Operations Report Part 11: Effectiveness Report Volume III: Part 1: Logistics Repokt Part Ili Support Report Volume IV: Part I: Weapons, Tactics, and Training Report Part 1i: Space Report Volume V: Part Is A Statistical Compendium Part Ili Chronology ix
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