Table Of Content

Gulf War Air Power Survey 7 9 743 AD-A2 and Suppor DTIC S ELECTE MAY 27 1994DI SG Washington, D.C. 1993 DUO'11 #Uu.j...z r"fA~A'iJ I Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume MI Logistics and Acceslon For Support NTIS CRA&I DTIC TAB Unannounced 0 Justification Dlstri bution I Availability Codcs Avail and/or Dist Special Washington, D.C. 1993 94-16022 94 5 26 189 Library of Congreua Cataloging-in.Publicatlon Data Gulf War Air Power Survey p. cm. Gulf War Air Power Survey directed by Eliot A. Cohen. Includes an unnumbered summary report by Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen. Includes bibliographical references and indexes. Contents: v. I. Planning and Command and Control -- v. 2. Operations and Effects and Effectiveness -- v. 3. Logistics and Support -- v.4. Weapons, Tactics, and Training and Space Operations -- v. 5. A Statistical Compendium and Chronology. I. Persian Gulf War, 1991-Aerial operations. American. 2. United States. Air Force--History--Persian Gulf War, 1991. I. Cohen, Eliot A. IH.G ulf War Air Power Survey (Organization : U.S.). III. United States. Dept. of the Air Force. IV. Title: Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report. DS79.724.U6C85 1993 956.7044'248--dc2O 93-30601 CIP ji.,l ' t],%" O)il1V: :... Uol'vnllineml~ 11rhimitg 0t~li.ce S. t "ll itlidLInt (it 1Ma:.'t il S(cid:127)opL: M 011( . ',.(cid:127),hhlgtoI. I)(D2 04() 2 H ISBN 0-16-042911-0 Gulf War Air Power Survey Staff Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director Col. Emery M. Kiraly Executive Director Lt. Gen. Robert E. Kelley Senior Military Advisor (Retired, USAF) Dr. Wayne W. Thompson Senior HistoricalA dvisor Mr. Ernest D. Cruea ANSER Program Manager Maj. Joseph W. Patterson Executive Officer Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek Publishing Manager Lt. Col. Daniel T. Kuehl Chief, Statistics Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen Chief, Chronology Dr. John F. Guilmartin Chief, Weapons, Tactics and Training Mr. Richard A. Gunkel Chief, Logistics, Space, and Support Dr. Thomas C. Hone Chief, Command, Control, and Organization Dr. Alexander S. Cochran Chief, Strategy and Plans Mr. Barry D. Watts Chief, Operations and Effects Dr. Thomas A. Keancy Chief, Summary Report iii Gulf War Air Power Survey Review Committee Hon. Paul H. Nltze, Chairma Diplomat in Residence Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Cen. Michael J. Dugan (USAF. Retired) Multiple Sclerosis Society Adm. Huntington Hardisty (USN, Retired) Center for Naval Analyses Dr. Richard H. Kohn The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Dr. Bernard Lewis Princeton University Mr. Andrew W. Marshall Office of the Seretary of Defense Mr. Phillip Merrill Former Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support, NATO Dr. Henry Rowen Stanford University lion. Ike Skellon U.S. House of Representatives Gen. Maxwell Thurman (USA, Retired) Association of the U.S. Army Maj. GCn. Jasper A. Welch, Jr. (USAF, Retired) Former Assistant Chief (if Staff (Studies and Analysis) Dr. James Q. Wilson University of California at Los Angeles iv Foreword From 16 January through 28 February 1991, the United States and its allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history, a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role. The Gulf War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991 to -eview all aspects of air warfare in the Persian Gulf for use by the United States Air Force, but it was not to confine itself to discussion of that institution. The Survey has produced reports on planning, the conduct of operations, the effects of the air campaign, command and control, logistics, air base support, space, weapons and tactics, as well as a chronology and a compendium of statistics on the war. It has prepared as well a summary report and some shorter papers and assembled an archive composed of paper, microfilm, and electronic records, all of which have been deposited at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The Survey was just that, an attempt to provide a comprehen- sive and documented account of the war. It is not a definitive history: that will await the passage of time and the opening of sources (Iraqi records, for example) that were not available to Survey researchers. Nor is it a summary of lessons learned: other organizations, including many within the Air Force, have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides an analytical and evidentiary point of departure for future studies of the air campaign. It concentrates on an an'alysis of the operational level of war in the belief that this level of warfare is at once one of the most difficult to characterize and one of the n,Qst important to unders'and. The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by a mixture of civilian and military analysts, including retired officers from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was divided into task forces, most of which were run by civilians working temporarily for the Air Force. The work produced by the Survey was examined by a distinguished review committee that included scholars, retired general officers from the Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and curient senior gov- ernment officials. Throughout, the Survey strived to conduct its research in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members had as their standard the observ',don of Mr. Franklin D'Olier, chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey during and after the second World War: v "We wanted to bum into everybody's souls that fact that the survey's responsibility was to ascertain facts and to seek truth, eliminating completely any preconceived theories or dogmas." The Survey attempted to create a body of data common to all of the reports. Because one group of researchers compiled this core material while other task forces were researching and drafting other, more narrow- ly focused studies, it Is possible that discrepancies exist among the reports with regard to points of detail. More Importantly, authors were given discretion, within the bounds of evidence and plausibility, to interpret events as they saw them. In some cases, task forces came to differing conclusions about particular aspects of this war. Such divergences of view were expected and even desired: the Survey was intended to serve as a point of departure for those who read its reports, and not their analytical terminus. This volume concentrates on direct as well as indirect support re- quired to conduct air operations. The first report, Logistics, is primarily concerned with overall logistics planning, supply and maintenance of the force, and its transportation necessary for war. The second report, Sup. port, concerns itself with the air base and airbase operations (e.g., civil engineering, services, and personnel). This is the dual theme of !he volume. vi Acknowledgments The Survey's members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the project, provided it with resources, and set for it the highest standards of independence and objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave generously of their resources and time to support this effort. Various branches and com- mands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in providing material for and, in some cases, personnel to conduct the study. The United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study in different ways, including the sharing of data pertaining to the air war. A number of the United States' Coalition partners also made available individuals and records that were vital to the Survey's work. Many participants in the war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Servic- es were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Private students of the Gulf War also made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the text. The Survey's independence was its reason for being. Each report is the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily represent the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force or the Department of Defense. vii Security Review The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were submitted to the Department of Defense for policy and security review. In accordance with this review, certain information has been removed from the original text. These areas have been annotated as [DELETED]. Viii Gulf War Air Power Survey Reports Summary Report Volume J: Part 1: Planning Report Part II: Command and Control Report Volume II: Part I: Operations Report Part II: Effectiveness Report Volume III: Part i: Logistics Report Part II: Support Report Volume IV: Part I: Weapons, Tactics, and Training Report Part II: Space Report Volume V: Part 1: A Statistical Compendium Part I1: Chronology ix